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This dissertation investigates the acquisition of language-specific constraints on scope 
interpretation by Japanese preschool children. Several constructions in Japanese do 
not allow scope interpretations that the corresponding English sentences do allow. 
First, in Japanese transitive sentences with multiple quantificational arguments, an 
inverse scope interpretation is disallowed, due to the Rigid Scope Constraint. Second, 
Japanese logical connectives cannot be interpreted under the scope of local negation, 
due to their Positive Polarity. Thirdly, in Japanese infinitival complement 
constructions with implicative matrix verbs like wasureru (“forget”) the inverse scope 
interpretation is required, due to the Anti-Reconstruction Constraint. The main goal 
of this research is to determine how Japanese children learn these constraints on 
scope interpretations. To that end, three properties of the acquisition task that have an 
influence on the learnability of linguistic knowledge are examined: productivity, no 
negative evidence, and arbitrariness. 
  
 
The results of experimental investigations show that Japanese children productively 
generate scope interpretations that are never exemplified in the input. For example, 
with sentences that contain two quantificational arguments, Japanese children 
accessed inverse scope interpretations that Japanese adults do not allow. Also, 
Japanese children interpret the disjunction ka under the scope of local negation, 
which is not a possible interpretive option in the adult language. These findings 
clearly show that children do not acquire these scope constraints through conservative 
learning, and raise the question of how they learn to purge their non-adult 
interpretations. It is argued that input data do not provide learners with negative 
evidence (direct or indirect) against particular scope interpretations. Two inherent 
properties of input data about possible scope interpretations, data sparseness and 
indirectness, make negative evidence too unreliable as a basis for discovering what 
scope interpretation is impossible. In order to solve the learnability problems that 
children’s scope productivity raise, I suggest that the impossibility of their non-adult 
interpretations are acquired by learning some independently observable properties of 
the language. In other words, the scope constraints are not arbitrary in the sense that 
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Chapter 1: Introduction  
 
 
 A central problem for a theory of language acquisition is determining how 
children learn both what is possible and what is not possible. This problem is 
especially acute for phenomena residing at the boundary between syntax and 
semantics, where (a) the mapping from surface form to meaning is often complex and 
(b) languages vary in how form and meaning align. In this thesis, I aim to use the 
acquisition of quantifier scope phenomena as a probe into the character of the syntax-
semantics mapping and the learning of this mapping. This domain embodies both 
aspects of the problem, because (a) semantic scope relations do not always match 
surface syntactic relations, and (b) languages and constructions vary in how 
transparent the mapping is.  
 This thesis investigates the acquisition of language-specific constraints on scope 
interpretation in Japanese. In the language, certain scope interpretations that are 
possible with the corresponding sentences in languages like English are blocked. The 
main purpose of the investigation is to determine how knowledge of such language-
specific constraints on scope interpretations can be acquired by first language learners. 
This introduction aims to specify the empirical issues that must be addressed by a 
study of the acquisition of language-specific scope constraints. I begin by briefly 
reviewing cross-linguistic variation in possible scope interpretations, and then turn to 
the logic of language learning. Together, these two problems lead to important 
empirical questions for a theory of how language-specific constraints on scope 





1.1 Scope flexibility and language-specific constraints 
 
 In natural languages, scope relations between logical words do not always 
correspond to surface linear/hierarchical relations. For example, the English sentences 
in (1) allow “inverse” scope interpretations where a hierarchically lower 
quantificational element takes wider scope than a higher one: 
(1) a. John didn’t find someone 
  can mean: “there is someone that John didn’t find” 
 
 b. Everyone didn’t read this book 
  can mean: “not everyone read this book” 
 
 
The existence of inverse scope interpretations demonstrates that the mapping between 
surface syntax and semantics is not always simple, and suggests that the mapping 
system of natural language encompasses some mechanism that relates mismatching 
surface syntactic representations and semantic representations. The mechanism could 
be covert syntactic operations (often referred to as Quantifier Raising or QR) that 
alter hierarchical relations between quantificational elements without audible 
consequences for surface forms (e.g., Huang 1982; May 1977; McCawley 1970) 
Another possibility is that the mechanism consists of semantic rules that determine 
the scope relations of quantificational elements independent of their syntactic 
positions (e.g., Cooper 1983; Steedman 1987).  Although these approaches have 
various different empirical and theoretical consequences, they all share the 
characteristic that something beyond a simple uniform composition mechanism 





 Scope flexibility in natural languages is not an unrestricted phenomenon. Rather, 
many sentences/constructions in natural languages are scopally unambiguous, 
allowing only one of the logically possible scope interpretations. Particularly relevant 
to our concern here is the existence of various language-specific constraints on scope 
interpretation. For example, the following construction in Japanese does not show the 
scope ambiguity that its English counterpart shows: 
(2) Dareka-ga dono-sensei-mo hihan-sita 
 someone-NOM every teacher criticize-did 
 Literally: “Someone criticized every teacher” 
 ∃ >> ∀ / *∀ >> ∃ 
 
 
In Japanese transitive sentences with multiple QP arguments like (2), the inverse 
scope interpretation is disallowed: the object QP cannot take scope wider than the 
subject QP (e.g., Hoji 1985; Kuno 1973; Kuroda 1970). Thus, the sentence can only 
mean that “there is a specific individual who criticized every teacher”, but not that 
“for every teacher, there is an individual who criticized him”. Following Huang 
(1982), this is called the rigid scope constraint. 
 Another example of a language-specific constraint on scope interpretations is 
illustrated by the interpretive contrasts in the following pairs of simple negative 
sentences that involve a logical connective: 
(3) a. John doesn’t speak French or Spanish 
   John does not speak French AND does not speak Spanish 
 
 b. John-wa furansugo ka supeingo-o hanasa-nai 
  John-TOP French or Spanish-ACC speak-NEG 
   John does not speak French OR does not speak Spanish 
(4) a. John doesn’t speak both French and Spanish 






 b. John-wa furansugo mo supeingo mo hanasa-nai 
  John-TOP both French and Spanish speak-NEG 
   John does not speak French AND does not speak Spanish 
 
 
In English sentences the disjunction or and the conjunction both...and... are 
interpreted within the scope of local negation, allowing inferences that closely 
resemble De Morgan’s laws in propositional logic. In contrast, the Japanese 
disjunction ka and the conjunction ...mo...mo resist taking scope under local negation, 
yielding distinct interpretations from their English counterparts. In earlier studies 
(Goro 2004, 2006), I argued that Japanese logical connectives are Positive Polarity 
Items, which must take scope over local negation (e.g., Progovac 1994; Szabolcsi 
2004). A Positive Polarity Item forces the inverse scope interpretation when it 
appears within the surface c-command domain of local negation.   
 Another constraint concerns the scope interaction between a certain class of verbs 
and a quantificational argument within the complement clause of the verb: 
(5) Taroo-wa mado-wo zenbu shime-wasure-ta 
 Taroo-TOP window-ACC all close-forget-PAST 
 Literally: “Taroo forgot to close all the windows” 
 *forget >> ∀ / ∀ >> forget 
 
 
In Japanese infinitival complement constructions with implicative matrix verbs like 
(5) a QP in the complement clause must take wider scope than the matrix predicate 
(Bobaljik & Wurmbrand 2005, 2007; Koizumi 1995; Sano 1985). In other words, the 
inverse scope interpretation is obligatory in this type of construction: the object QP is 





matrix predicate. Following Bobaljik and Wurmbrand I will refer to this phenomenon 
as the anti-reconstruction constraint. 
 Given these variations in possible scope interpretations among different languages, 
a first language learner must somehow learn both what is possible and what is 
impossible about scope interpretation in his target language. In other words, one 
cannot place the burden completely on innate linguistic knowledge: the scope 
interpretations that are blocked in the Japanese examples above are possible in their 
English counterparts, therefore it is impossible to assume that those interpretations are 
ruled out by innate linguistic knowledge. The learning process can be regarded as 
discovering the correct hypothesis about the possible mappings between surface 
syntax and semantics. A theory of language acquisition must therefore specify how it 
is possible for first language learners to discover the correct hypothesis about the 
mappings by using the input data that is available to them. In what follows, I will 
define the task for a theory of the acquisition of language-specific constraints on 
scope interpretation in terms of the learnability approach (e.g., Pinker 1979, 1989; 
Wexler and Culicover 1980; Baker and McCarthy 1981), and specify what must be 
uncovered by empirical investigation. 
1.2 Learnability 
 
 In order to construct a theory of the acquisition of a given piece/domain of 
linguistic knowledge, the following components in the acquisition process must be 
specified: (i) the learner’s contribution, (ii) the learner’s experience, and (iii) what is 





characteristic, the acquisition problem becomes a paradox, which cannot be explained 
in any logically reasonable way. I will briefly review each of Pinker’s points. 
 Productivity of the learner. Since any natural language allows unboundedly many 
different expressions, and since the acquisition of language is carried out on the basis 
of finite numbers of input sentences that children hear from their parents, language 
acquisition cannot be a strictly conservative process. Learners cannot simply stick to 
expressions that they have heard, and must make generalizations that go beyond their 
finite linguistic experience, so that they can productively generate new expressions 
that were not included in the input data. However, the task of language acquisition 
becomes complicated when a learner’s generalization generates, for example, an 
expression X that is not possible in the target language. In such a case, the learner 
must learn to modify his hypothesized generalization so that it correctly blocks the 
expression X. The question, then, is how such learning is triggered, and how 
experience contributes to the process. 
 Obtaining negative evidence from experience. One possibility is that input 
experience provides some kind of negative evidence to the learner, leading him to 
recognize that expression X is impossible in the target language. One type of negative 
evidence that has been extensively discussed in the literature is direct negative 
evidence, i.e., some sort of parental feedback (e.g., correction, disapproval, etc,) to 
children’s utterances. However, the available evidence suggests that direct negative 
evidence is not systematically provided to children. For example, since Brown and 
Hanlon (1970), research on child-parent interactions has repeatedly found that the 





contingent on the well-formedness of children’s utterances. Given this, Pinker 
concludes that learners cannot count on direct negative evidence to find out what is 
not possible in the language. 
 Arbitrariness of the constraint. It is possible that the impossibility of the 
expression X is a consequence of some general property of the language. In such a 
case, the learner does not have to be directly told that X is impossible: learning the 
general property should lead him to expunge X from his language. However, it is also 
possible that the constraint that blocks generation of X is arbitrary in the sense that 
the impossibility of X is not related to any other property of the grammar. In such a 
case, the learner can only learn that X is impossible based on input experience that 
provides (negative) evidence against X. Thus, how children can learn a given piece of 
knowledge (especially one that involves a negative constraint) depends highly on the 
properties of what is learned: when the target knowledge involves an arbitrary 
constraint, the burden on experience becomes larger. 
 A learnability paradox arises when an acquisition task has the following three 
characteristics: (i) productivity: the learner productively generates new expressions in 
such a way that some ungrammatical expressions are also generated, (ii) no negative 
evidence: experience does not provide the learner with any form of negative evidence 
against the ungrammatical expressions, and (iii) arbitrariness: the ungrammaticality 
of those expressions is not predictable from other generalizations that can be made on 
the basis of observable properties of the language, and therefore the learner needs 
direct evidence that shows the expressions are not possible in the language. With all 





learnability account: the learner makes a mistake that must be corrected by the time 
he becomes an adult, but there is no reasonable way to explain how the correction 
occurs. Accordingly, a theory of language acquisition must deny at least one of the 
three components.  
 The same kind of learnability paradox can arise in the acquisition of language-
specific constraints on scope interpretation in Japanese, when (i) children generate 
scope interpretations that are not possible in the adult language (e.g., the inverse 
scope interpretation for sentences like (2)), (ii) input data do not provide any kind of 
negative evidence against children’s non-adult scope interpretations, and (iii) the 
relevant constraint is arbitrary in the sense that the impossibility of those scope 
interpretations is not related to any other properties of the language. Given this 
background, the empirical questions that must be addressed in a study of the 
acquisition of the language-specific constraints on scope can be summarized as 
follows: 
(6) a. Productivity: How productive are Japanese children in the acquisition of   
 possible scope interpretations? Do they generate scope interpretations that   
 have not been  exemplified in the input? Do they allow scope interpretations  
 that Japanese adults do not allow? 
  
 b. No negative evidence: Do input data provide children with any form of   
  negative evidence against particular scope interpretations? If direct negative  
  evidence is not available, is there any other way for children to discover useful 
  information that shows that those scope interpretations are impossible? 
  
 c. Arbitrariness: How arbitrary are the language-specific constraints on scope  
  interpretation? Can the impossibility of specific scope interpretations be   
  predicted based upon some other properties of the language? If so, are the   
  crucial properties learnable from experience? 
 
 





 1.2.1 Productivity and conservatism 
 
 A learnability paradox arises when the learner makes an overly permissive 
generalization which cannot be falsified by input evidence. One way to avoid being 
stuck with overly permissive generalizations is to avoid making such generalizations: 
if you do not make a mistake in the first place, you do not have to correct your 
mistake. In the literature, this idea has usually been implemented in some form of 
conservative learning algorithm. Such a conservative algorithm forces the learner to 
choose the most restrictive generalization and to hold that generalization until 
positive evidence shows that it is too restrictive. In other words, a conservative 
learning mechanism assumes that something is impossible unless it is shown to be 
possible. This default assumption contributes to the formation of knowledge about 
what is impossible. That is, the absence of falsifying evidence against the narrowest 
generalization is translated by the learning mechanism into evidence about what is 
impossible. Under this type of learning strategy, the crucial input data that triggers a 
modification of the current hypothesis does not have to be all that abundant: logically, 
a single encounter with the crucial data suffices, as long as the data unambiguously 
reveals the over-restrictedness of the current hypothesis. 1  
 This kind of learning mechanism has widely been assumed in various approaches 
to language acquisition. Within the Principles and Parameters approach the idea is 
often implemented in the subset principle for parameter setting. The Subset Principle 
                                                 
 
1 An independent issue is to what extent such unambiguous triggering data is available to children. The 
availability of unambiguous triggers depends highly on the relation between a learner's hypotheses: if the 
hypotheses largely overlap with respect to their predictions, then the set of unambiguous triggers should 
correspondingly be small. See Gibson and Wexler (1994) and Fodor (1998) for discussion of this issue. In any 





forces the learner to choose the parameter value that yields the most restrictive 
grammar, i.e., the grammar that generates the smallest subset of sentences, until 
positive evidence proves that the parameter setting cannot generate possible sentences 
in the language (e.g., Berwick 1985; Clark 1992; Fodor 1992, 1994; Manzini and 
Wexler, 1987; Roeper and de Villiers 1987; Wexler 1993). In addition to the subset 
principle for syntactic acquisition, some studies on the acquisition of semantics have 
proposed the Semantic Subset principle, which states that children assume as a 
default the scope interpretation that yields the narrowest truth conditions (i.e., the 
interpretation that makes the sentence true in the fewest possible situations: Crain et 
al., 1994; Goro and Akiba 2004; Goro 2004; Jing et al. 2005). 2  Additionally, a 
somewhat different implementation of the idea of conservative learning can be found 
in Snyder (2007; in press), in which the author claims the following: 
(7) Children do not begin making productive use of a new grammatical construction 
in their spontaneous speech until they have both determined that the construction 
is permitted in the adult language, and identified the adults’ grammatical basis for 
it. 
                   (Snyder 2007) 
 
 
The claim is referred to as Grammatical Conservatism (GC). GC is different from the 
subset principle in that it predicts that the learner may avoid using a grammatical 
construction even if the construction is generated by the most restrictive parameter 
setting. In this respect GC is more experience-driven than the subset principle is: 
innate linguistic knowledge alone is not sufficient for the learner to assume that a 
                                                 
 
2 Recent studies on computational models of language learning have revealed that implementing the idea of the 
Subset Principle in a realistic model of syntactic acquisition is less straightforward than was imagined (e.g., Fodor 





certain construction is available in the language. Furthermore, more strongly 
experience-based learning models also incorporate the idea of conservative learning 
(e.g., Baker, 1979; Tomasello, 2000, 2003). Although these approaches have various 
different empirical and theoretical consequences, they share the prediction that in no 
case can children’s grammar be more permissive than adults’ grammar: there should 
be no overgeneralization, since conservative learning is precisely the mechanism that 
blocks overgeneralizations. 
 It is true that some form of conservative learning model can often provide a 
conceptually appealing resolution to a learnability paradox because it circumvents the 
difficult problem of “unlearning”. However, whether or not children are actually 
conservative learners is an independent empirical issue. It has been observed that in 
some linguistic domains children do make overgeneration errors in the course of 
language acquisition, For example, there are well-documented observations that 
children spontaneously use verbs in non-adult argument structure frames, e.g., he get 
died, etc. (e.g., Bowerman 1983; Gropen et al. 1989; Pinker 1989). In the present case, 
therefore, it is important to empirically assess the question of how conservative (or 
conversely, how productive) Japanese children are in the acquisition of possible scope 
interpretations. If empirical evidence shows that children do make overgeneration 
errors with scope interpretation, then a theory of language acquisition must solve the 
problem of unlearning, however difficult it might be. 
 In this thesis, I employ an experimental paradigm that is called the Truth Value 
Judgment Task (e.g., Crain and McKee 1985; Crain and Thornton 1998) to 





interpretation. The basic logic of the experimental paradigm is as follows: a test 
sentence with two quantificational elements is provided as a description of a certain 
kind of situation. In the situation, the scope interpretation that is possible in the adult 
language makes the sentence false, and the scope interpretation that is blocked by a 
language-specific constraint makes the sentence true. For example, sentence (2) is 
presented in a situation where each teacher was criticized by a different individual. 
The surface scope (∃ >> ∀) interpretation is false, because there is no unique 
individual who criticized every teacher; in contrast, the inverse scope (∀ >> ∃) 
interpretation is true, because every teacher was criticized by someone. If the child 
accepts the sentence as a truthful description of the situation, then the response is 
interpreted as evidence that the participant accessed the inverse scope interpretation. 
Conversely, if the participant judges the sentence to be false under the situation, then 
the response is interpreted as evidence that the participant obeys the rigid scope 
constraint. The results of the experimental investigations will be reported in Chapter 2, 
4, and 6. 
1.2.2 Experience and negative evidence 
 
 With respect to scope interpretation, it seems straightforward to assume that 
children do not receive direct negative evidence. Direct negative evidence against a 
particular scope interpretation could only arise when (i) the child uses a doubly-
quantified sentence intending that scope interpretation, (ii) the caretaker notices that 
the sentence does not match the situation under the other possible scope interpretation, 
and (iii) the caretaker corrects the child in a way that the child can understand that the 





lexical items). Given that parental feedback is highly inconsistent even in the cases 
where children’s errors are much more obvious (i.e., errors in forms, rather than in 
interpretations), it is extremely unlikely that children actually encounter such a 
situation.  
 One possible way to recover from overly permissive generalizations without 
relying on direct negative evidence is to resort to indirect negative evidence (INE). 
The idea was first discussed in early 1980s (e.g., Chomsky 1981) and has recently 
been attracting growing attention within research on probabilistic learning models 
(e.g., Elman 1993; Lewis and Elman 2001; Seidenberg 1997; Tenenbaum and 
Griffiths 2001; Rhode and Plaut 1999; Regier and Gahl 2004). Roughly speaking, 
INE is the absence of input evidence that a certain hypothesis predicts to be possible 
in the language, and the learning mechanism uses the absence of expected data as 
evidence against the hypothesis. An important characteristic of recent probabilistic 
learning models that shapes learning around INE is that they have an ability to 
discriminate subset-superset hypotheses on the basis of positive evidence alone (e.g., 
Regier and Gahl 2004; but see Pearl and Lidz 2006). For the acquisition of possible 
scope interpretations, a probabilistic learner who can reliably detect the absence of a 
certain scope interpretation in the input data would be able to use the absence as 
evidence against the hypothesis that generates the scope interpretation. 
 Since children do make overgeneration errors in some domains (e.g., argument 
structure alternation), a mechanism that ensures recovery from this kind of 
overgeneration error is necessary in any theory of language acquisition, and a 





be a good candidate for this role. However, it must be pointed out that compared to 
learners of argument structure alternations, learners of scope interpretations must rely 
on sparse and indirect data. Among the possible combinations of quantificational 
elements, only a subset of them are informative for learners: for example, someone 
read a book is not informative for learners of the rigid scope constraint, because the 
inverse scope interpretation is truth-conditionally indistinguishable from the 
isomorphic interpretation. Moreover, a potentially informative combination of 
quantificational elements may be used in a context where the two scope 
interpretations happen to yield the same truth value: both interpretations of everyone 
didn’t come are true when nobody came. These factors lead to inherent sparseness of 
the relevant data. Furthermore, the intended scope interpretation is not apparent in the 
linguistic signals. For example, even if the sentence “Someone ate everything” is 
presented to the learner with an intended inverse scope interpretation, nothing about 
the form tells the learner whether surface scope or inverse scope is intended.3 This 
contrasts with the discovery of regularities in forms, where objective observations can 
directly reveal crucial evidence. For example, an English input sentence like “John 
gave Mary the book” directly tells the learner that the verb give can be used in the 
double object frame. Likewise, a Japanese input sentence in the form “NP-ACC NP-NOM 
                                                 
 
3 I am aware of the fact that some marked intonation pattern can force a specific scope interpretation. However, 
such prosodic markings of scope do not seem to be a robust phenomenon. Leddon, Lidz and Pierrehumbert (2004) 
carried out an experiment in which they recorded English-speaking parents reading stories to their pre-school 
children. The stories contained potentially scope-ambiguous sentences such as every bunny didn’t jump over the 
fence, and those sentences were read under two kinds of situations: ones that correspond to the surface scope 
interpretations and others that correspond to the inverse scope interpretations. The results of the analysis of the 
recorded utterances found no systematic prosodic distinction between the intended surface scope interpretation 





Verb” directly shows that the word order (i.e., scrambling) is permitted in the 
language.  
 Furthermore, scope ambiguities of the kind we are concerned with here do not 
straightforwardly follow from the properties of directly observable regularities of 
surface syntax.4 This contrasts with the discovery of usual structural ambiguities, 
where independently observable patterns should allow the learner to draw a 
conclusion about possible interpretive options. To illustrate, let us observe the case of 
thematic ambiguity in Japanese relative clauses. In Japanese, a relative clause with a 
stative predicate such as suki “like” allows two different thematic interpretations, as 
illustrated in (8).  
(8) Taroo-ga sukina onna-no ko 
       Taroo-NOM like  female-GEN child 
 “The girl who likes Taroo” or “The girl who Taroo likes” 
 
 
This ambiguity arises because the predicate in the relative clause suki “like” takes a 
nominative object. Combined with the head-final order of Japanese, this property 
makes it possible for the relative clause in (8) to have two possible surface structural 
analyses. 
(9) a. Taroo-ga onna-no ko-ga sukida → [Taroo-ga ti sukina] onna-no koi 
  Taroo-NOM female-GEN child-NOM likes 
  “Taroo likes girls/the girl”    →  The girl who Taroo likes 
 
 b. Onna-no ko-ga Taroo-ga sukida → [ti Taroo-ga sukina] onna-no koi 
                                                 
 
4 There are also scope ambiguities that directly follow from surface syntactic ambiguity. For example, the 
English sentence "John didn’t marry Mary because she was rich" is ambiguous with respect to the relative scope 
relation between negation and the because-clause: it can either mean "John didn’t marry Mary, and it was because 
she was rich" or "John married Mary but it was not because she was rich". It is generally assumed (e.g., Johnston 
1993) that the ambiguity reflects the attachment ambiguity of the because-clause: if the because-clause is attached 
to the position that is higher than negation, the former interpretation results, and the lower attachment yields the 





  female-GEN child-NOM Taroo-NOM likes 
  “Girls/the girl likes Taroo”         → “The girl who likes Taroo” 
 
 
The ambiguity in (8) is an automatic consequence of the fact that (i) the predicate 
takes multiple nominative arguments, and (ii) both the subject and object precede the 
verb in Japanese. Those two properties should be easily observable in input signals. 
Consequently, the learner does not need direct evidence about the possible 
interpretive options of forms like (8). That is, in order to learn that the form is 
ambiguous, it is not necessary for the learner to hear the form in situations that match 
each of the two interpretive options. In contrast, the scope ambiguity of “Someone ate 
everything” does not follow straightforwardly from any directly observable properties 
of the language. The sentence is simply not structurally ambiguous in its surface 
syntactic representation. 
 The inherent indirectness of evidence for possible scope interpretations leads to 
an increased role for the learner in discovering crucial evidence.  In other words, 
information about possible scope interpretations can only come from the learner’s 
internally generated hypotheses about what the sentence s/he just heard is likely to 
mean. This dependence on the learner’s internal state can lead to a significant 
discrepancy between inputs and intakes (i.e., signals from external world and 
information that the learner gains from the signals). For example, suppose that a child 
heard the sentence “Someone ate everything” uttered with the intended inverse scope. 
It is possible that the child assigns the surface scope interpretation to the sentence, 
and does not correct his incorrect scope assignment for the following reasons: (i) the 





sentence was uttered, (ii) the child did not have enough information to explicitly 
judge whether or not the surface scope interpretation is true, and simply assumed that 
it must be true, or (iii) the child noticed that the surface scope interpretation did not 
match the situation, but he assumed that the speaker said something wrong. In such a 
case, the input data would be interpreted by the learner as evidence for the surface 
scope interpretation, rather than the evidence for the inverse scope interpretation. 
Therefore, in general, the probability of positive evidence for a certain scope 
interpretation in the learner’s intake may not appropriately reflect the actual 
probability of positive evidence for that scope interpretation in the input to the learner. 
This can be problematic for a probabilistic learner who relies on probabilistic 
comparisons of positive evidence for possible scope interpretations. The learner can 
miss nontrivial amounts of positive evidence for a certain scope interpretation; 
conversely, the learner may also “fabricate” nontrivial amounts of positive evidence 
by interpreting input sentences with a certain type of scope interpretation that is not 
possible in the language. These points make it unclear whether or not first language 
learners can reliably extract indirect negative evidence (i.e., absences of certain scope 
interpretations) from input data. 
 In sum, constraints on scope interpretation make the problem of unlearning a 
more complex task than, for example, constraints on argument structure alternation 
do. There are two inherent complexities associated with input data about possible 
scope interpretations: data sparseness and indirectness. I will bring up those points 
again when I discuss the specific cases of the acquisition of language-specific 





1.2.3 Arbitrariness of the constraints 
 
 A constraint is arbitrary when its effect (i.e., the impossibility of a certain set of 
expressions) cannot be derived from any other property of the grammar. Thus, 
learners of an arbitrary constraint must independently discover the impossibility of 
the relevant expressions from input experience, and hence can be seriously impaired 
by data sparseness and indirectness. In contrast, if the impossibility of a certain set of 
expressions is a consequence of some other property of the language, learners do not 
need to rely crucially on input evidence to find out what is impossible. In this 
connection, an important insight can be drawn from the concept of parameter in the 
Principles and Parameters approach (Chomsky 1981, 1986; Chomsky and Lasnik 
1995). 
 When it was first introduced to the theory of grammar and language acquisition, 
the concept of parameter aimed to derive multiple consequences by setting the value 
of one parameter, thereby reducing the burden on an inductive learning mechanism. 
This original idea of parameter is clearly stated in the following quote from Chomsky 
(1981: 4): 
(10) If these parameters are embedded in a theory of UG that is sufficiently rich in  
 structure, then the languages that are determined by fixing their values one  
 way or another will appear to be quite diverse, since the consequences of one  
 set of choices may be very different from the consequences of another set; yet  
 at the same time, limited evidence, just sufficient to fix the parameters of UG,  
 will determine a grammar that may be very intricate and will in general lack  
 grounding in experience in the sense of an inductive basis. 
 
 
Over the years, the meaning of the term parameter has been stretched to the extent 





Nevertheless, in some recent parametric approaches to language acquisition (e.g., 
Baker 2001; Snyder 1995, 2001, in press; Sugisaki 2003), the original spirit of the 
concept of parameter remains the same: the system of parameters allows the learner 
to derive a wide variety of grammatical consequences by setting parameter values on 
the basis of limited evidence. 
 Quite independent of whether or not one actually employs some specific 
mechanism of parameters, the parametric approach to language acquisition provides 
an important insight about how learners might acquire knowledge about what is 
impossible. The insight can be stated in the following terms. For a learner who is 
equipped with a grammatical system that has a rich internal structure, learning 
something new (i.e., introducing a new component to the grammar) can affect other 
parts of the existing grammar. Such a consequence can be negative in the sense that it 
has the effect of blocking the generation of representations which had previously been 
possible until the introduction of the new component. Under this scenario, the learner 
acquires knowledge about what is impossible as a consequence of learning something 
else. This opens up the possibility of getting around the data-sparseness problem that 
arises within some areas of grammatical acquisition. Suppose that a certain property 
X of a language/construction is a consequence of another grammatical property Y of 
the language/construction. Then, as long as the learner knows the causal relation 
between X and Y, and Y can be learned from observable properties of the input, then 
the learner does not need evidence about X in the input. The acquisition of X 





 In order to determine whether or not this type of explanation can be applied to the 
acquisition of language-specific constraints on scope interpretation in Japanese, it is 
necessary to examine the nature of the constraints in detail. Chapters 3 and 5 of this 
thesis are thus devoted to theoretical analyses of scope constraints in Japanese, in 
which I present previously unnoticed empirical data, and propose theories of the 
scope constraints in Japanese that account for this data. Based on the theoretical 
models, their implications for a theory of language acquisition will be discussed. 
1.3 Organization 
 
 The chapters of this thesis are organized as follows. Chapter 2 examines 
acquisition of the rigid scope constraint in Japanese. Experimental investigations on 
Japanese children’s scope interpretations reveal that children allow inverse scope 
interpretations that adults do not allow. These findings call for a non-conservative 
learning mechanism that allows children to purge their non-adult interpretations. 
Based on considerations of what input data is available, I argue that unlearning cannot 
be carried out on the basis of probabilistic indirect negative evidence. The acquisition 
of scope rigidity in Japanese thus presents a learnability problem as to how children 
learn to restrict their overly permissive grammar of scope. Chapter 3 presents a 
theoretical analysis of the rigid scope constraint in Japanese. Based on novel 
empirical data, I argue that the rigid scope constraint is not a property of the language 
as a whole: the lack of inverse scope interpretations is restricted to specific cases, and 
Japanese has a mechanism for shifting the scope of an element, whose properties are 
shown to be the same as the mechanism of covert scope-shifting in English. I then 





pragmatic implicature imposed on nominative subjects in Japanese. Chapter 3 also 
examines scope-reconstruction with scrambling, and provides a theory of scrambling 
reconstruction. Based on the theoretical account that I develop in Chapter 3, I argue 
that the acquisition of the syntactic/semantic/pragmatic properties of case particles 
feeds the acquisition of scope rigidity. Chapter 4 discusses findings on the acquisition 
of Japanese logical connectives and positive polarity, presenting experimental data 
that show that Japanese children assign non-adult scope interpretations to the 
disjunction ka. Consideration of the input evidence available to children again leads 
to the conclusion that the non-adult scope interpretation cannot be unlearned on the 
basis of evidence about possible scope interpretations. Chapter 5 analyzes the scope 
properties of Japanese logical connectives. I propose that the connectives are positive 
polarity items that are subject to obligatory covert movement targeting a functional 
projection above negation. The syntactic movement analysis accounts for the 
interesting properties of positive polarity: locality and insensitivity to non-overt 
negation. Based on this analysis, I argue that the possible hypotheses about the scope 
of disjunctions in natural languages must be constrained by some innate knowledge. 
Chapter 6 focuses on the anti-reconstruction constraint. With this case, experimental 
investigations reveal that a certain proportion of adult Japanese speakers accept the 
scope interpretation that is claimed to be impossible in the literature. Based on these 
results, I argue that two populations with a different grammar of anti-reconstruction 
coexist among adult speakers of Japanese. I propose that this variation among adult 
speakers is due to the unreliability the relevant input evidence. In chapter 7, I discuss 









2.1 Covert scope-shifting 
 
In natural languages, semantic relations between logical words are not always 
uniquely determined by surface linear/hierarchical relations. For example, the English 
sentence in (11) has two truth-conditionally distinct interpretations, which correspond 
to two different scope interpretations of the logical words: 
(11) Some student admires every professor. (∃ >> ∀ / ∀ >> ∃) 
 
 
The scope ambiguity observed in cases like (11) is distinct from standard cases of 
structural ambiguity in, for example, sentences like John hit the man with a stick. For 
such structurally ambiguous sentences, one can easily motivate two distinct surface 
syntactic representations that correspond to each of the possible interpretations, using 
standard syntactic tests (movement, substitution, etc.). For scopally ambiguous 
sentences like (11), however, the interpretive ambiguity cannot be straightforwardly 
reduced to syntactic ambiguity in most cases. For example, there seems to be no 
independent syntactic evidence that indicates the existence of two possible surface 
structural relations between the subject and the object of a transitive predicate. Given 
this, we assume that sentences like (11) have a single surface syntactic representation, 
and that natural language encompasses some mechanism that maps a single surface 
syntactic representation to multiple semantic representations. The mechanism could 





alters hierarchical relations between quantificational elements without audible 
consequences for surface forms (e.g., Huang 1982; May 1977; McCawley 1970) 
Another possibility is that the mechanism consists of semantic rules that determine 
the scope relations of quantificational elements independent of their syntactic 
positions (e.g., Cooper 1983; Steedman 1987). Although these approaches have 
various different empirical and theoretical consequences, they all share the 
characteristic that something beyond a simple composition mechanism applied to the 
surface syntactic representation is required. 
 Among possible interpretations, we are particularly interested in those in which a 
hierarchically lower quantificational element takes scope over a higher one (e.g., the 
∀ >> ∃ reading in (11)). Such interpretations are called inverse scope interpretations, 
as opposed to surface scope interpretations in which a hierarchically higher element 
takes wider scope than lower ones. Inverse scope has often been considered to be a 
“marked” interpretive option (e.g., Gil 1982), mainly because the interpretation 
pattern often shows a lesser degree of accessibility as compared to surface scope 
interpretations. First, speakers often show considerable difficulty in accessing inverse 
scope interpretations, even with “standard” examples of scope ambiguity such as (11). 
Some earlier theoretical works even claimed that there is no such thing as an inverse 
scope interpretation in sentences like (11) (e.g., Reinhart 1976). In psycholinguistic 
experimental research, inverse scope readings have repeatedly been shown to yield 
lower acceptance rates and/or higher processing loads relative to surface scope 
interpretations (e.g., Ioup 1975; Gil 1982; Kurtzman and MacDonald 1993; Frazier 





linguistic variation. Languages like Japanese (e.g., Kuroda 1970; Kuno 1973; Hoji 
1985), Chinese (e.g., Huang 1982; Aoun and Li 1993), Korean (e.g., Kim 1989; Ahn 
1990; Sohn 1995), and German (e.g., Krifka 1998; Pafel 2005) are reported to be 
“scopally rigid” in the sense that the counterparts of (11) in those languages allow 
only the surface scope interpretation. Given these asymmetries, I assume that while 
surface scope interpretations are directly “read off” from hierarchical orders in 
surface syntactic representations, some additional mechanism is responsible for the 
derivation and/or processing of inverse scope interpretation. In other words, I assume 
that surface scope interpretations are “default” scope interpretations, and some extra 
steps are involved in deriving corresponding inverse scope interpretations. This extra 
mechanism that derives inverse scope interpretations will be referred to as covert 
scope-shifting (CSS).  
 This chapter has two main parts. First, it reports the results of experimental 
studies that investigated Japanese children’s interpretations of sentences that contain 
two quantificational arguments. The results reveal that Japanese children access 
inverse scope interpretations that Japanese adults do not allow. In other words, 
Japanese children’s grammar of CSS appears to be overly permissive in that it 
generates scope interpretations that are prohibited in the adult language. Second, it 
discusses the problem for a theory of language acquisition that the experimental data 
raise. Japanese children’s non-adult interpretations suggest that they do not learn 
possible scope interpretations through conservative learning, and therefore 
necessitates a learning mechanism that allows them to purge their non-adult 





children to solve the learning problem, due to the sparseness of relevant evidence. 
Thus, the acquisition of the restrictions on CSS in Japanese represents a case of the 
learnability paradox that I discussed in Chapter 1. 
 This chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 provides a few preliminaries 
before I start the discussion on the main issue. Section 2.3 briefly introduces “scope 
rigidity” effect in Japanese. In section 2.4, I discuss experimental studies that 
investigated scope interpretations in canonical order sentences by Japanese and 
English speakers. It turns out that Japanese children allow inverse scope 
interpretations that Japanese adults do not allow. Section 2.5 provides experimental 
data and discussion on Japanese children’s scope interpretations in scrambled order 
sentences. The results again reveal that Japanese children access non-adult inverse 
scope interpretations. In section 2.6, I consider the nature of Japanese children’s non-
adult behaviors, and argue that the “freedom of scope” shown by Japanese children 
cannot be regarded as a version of previously observed non-adult behavior by young 
children. Section 2.7 examines the learnability problem that the acquisition of scope 
rigidity poses to a theory of language acquisition. 
2.2 A few preliminaries 
 
2.2.1 Phrase structure in Japanese 
 
 Japanese is a strictly head-final language: a head always follows its complement. 
In this thesis, I assume that the phrase structure of Japanese sentences is basically the 





a head and its complement. Thus, an S-O-V order transitive sentence in Japanese 
receives the following structural analysis: 
(12)     CP 
     
   TP     C 
  Subj   TP 
 
    vP     T 
      
  tSubj   vP 
 
    VP     v+V 
 
  Obj     v 
 
 
 I am not going to fully justify the structure in (12), and will remain neutral on the 
issues about the positions that lexical elements in Japanese occupy in surface 
syntactic representations. There are ongoing debates in the Japanese syntax literature 
as to whether lexical elements overtly raise to functional projections in Japanese (e.g., 
Koizumi 2000 Fukui 1986; Fukui and Sakai 2003, etc.). For my purposes, however, it 
suffices to determine the relative hierarchical relations between relevant elements, 
without specifying the exact positions that the elements occupy. To this end, a 
relevant empirical observation is that pronominal subjects in transitive sentences 
show the familiar Condition C effect in Japanese: 
(13) a. Johni-ga [Mary-ga karei-ni okutta tegami]-o  mada yonde inai         (koto) 
  John-NOM Mary-NOM he-DAT sent letter-ACC       yet     read  have-not   (fact) 
   “John has not read the letter Mary sent to him” 
 
  b. *Karei-ga [Mary-ga Johni-ni okutta tegami]-o  mada yonde inai      (koto) 
   John-NOM Mary-NOM he-DAT sent letter-ACC       yet     read  have-not   (fact) 






                  (Saito, 1985: 37) 
 
 
This observation suggests that the subject position of a transitive sentence in Japanese 
c-commands the object position. I thus conclude that the subject position of a 
Japanese transitive sentence is hierarchically higher than the object position. 
Therefore, if an object QP takes scope over its subject QP in an S-O-V transitive 
sentence, it is to be understood as an inverse scope reading in the sense that a 
hierarchically lower QP takes wider scope than a higher one. 
2.2.2 Scope of indefinites 
 
 One of the most prominent approaches to CSS assumes that there is a covert 
syntactic movement operation, which is often referred to as Quantifier Raising (QR), 
that alters hierarchical relations between quantificational elements without making 
any audible consequences. One of the strongest arguments for this syntactic 
movement approach is a correlation between the possible range of overt movements 
and the range of CSS interpretations. For example, when a QP appears within a 
syntactic island that blocks overt extraction from it, the QP cannot take scope out of 
the island5: 
(14) a. A doctor will examine the possibility that we give every new patient a   
  tranquilizer.    (∃ >> ∀ / *∀ >> ∃) 
 
 b. A doctor should worry if we sedate every new patient. 
         (∃ >> ∀ / *∀ >> ∃) 
                                                 
 
5  The scope of (universal) QPs is actually more restricted. For example, every in someone believes that John 
criticized every professor cannot take scope over someone, suggesting that a QP cannot take wide scope out of a 
tensed clause, even though overt extraction from this position is fine, as in which professor does someone believe 
that John criticized?. Given this fact, approaches that treat CSS as covert syntactic movement must make it clear 
what kind of movement CSS is, so that the additional constraint on CSS follows from the property of the particular 





(15) a. *Which patients will a doctor examine the possibility that we give e a   
   tranquilizer? 
 
 b. *Which patients should a doctor worry if we sedate e? 
           
           (examples taken from Reinhart 1997: 336) 
 
 
 It has been widely observed, however, that the scope of indefinites does not show 
the correlation with overt movement, i.e., it does not obey island constraints. For 
example, indefinite QPs in (16) are embedded within syntactic islands, yet they are 
able to scope out of the islands: 
(16) a. John gave an A to every student who recited a difficult poem by Pindar. 
  (∀ >> ∃ / ∃ >> ∀) 
 
 b. If some relative of mine dies, I will inherit a house. 
   (IF >> ∃ / ∃ >> IF) 
 
                  (Reinhart 1997: 342) 
 
 
(16)a can mean that there is a specific poem by Pindar such that John gave an A to 
every student who recited it6. (16)b can mean that there is some specific relative of 
mine such that if he dies, I will inherit a house. Thus, in contrast with the definite 
universal quantifier every, the scope of the indefinite some does not show sensitivity 
to island constraints. Furthermore, the same type of asymmetry was found with 
another type of CSS. Lasnik (1997), attributing the original observation to 
Zubizarreta (1982) and Chomsky (1995), noted that while indefinites that have 
undergone A-movement can take scope at the base position, other types of QPs 
                                                 
 
6  The example is originally due to Farkas (1981). Note that the inverse scope interpretation (∃ >> ∀) does not 
entail the narrow scope interpretation: the inverse scope interpretation does not mean that every student got an A 





cannot. First, observe the following example by May (1997). The sentence has two 
scope interpretations, one of which does not correspond to the surface hierarchical 
relations: 
(17) Some politician is likely to address John’s constituency. 
 
 
(17) can either mean that there is some specific politician who is likely to address 
John’s constituency, or that it is likely that some politician will address John’s 
constituency. This kind of ambiguity fails to manifest itself when the raised QP is not 
an indefinite: 
(18) a. No one is certain to solve the problem 
 
 b. Every coin is 3% likely to land heads 
 
 
According to Lasnik, (18)a does not mean that it is certain that no one will solve the 
problem, i.e., the problem is way too difficult for anyone. Likewise, (18)b cannot 
mean that it is 3% likely that every coin will land heads, leaving only the far less 
plausible interpretation available (every coin is weighted in such a way that it is 33 
times more likely to land heads than tails). Thus, in these so-called “reconstruction” 
cases, indefinites show a wider range of possible scope interpretations as well as in 
the “QR” cases discussed above. 
 In the literature that has tackled this exceptional scope behavior of indefinites, it is 
often claimed that the exceptional scope interpretations of indefinites are derived by 
an independent interpretive mechanism that is available only to indefinites. In this 
thesis, I will not address the issues concerning the nature of the mechanism that 





research7. The purpose for bringing up this issue here is to raise a methodological 
concern for using indefinites when testing scope possibilities. Specifically, it is 
dangerous to make any sweeping generalization solely on the basis of observations 
regarding the scope of indefinites, because other types of quantifiers may show 
different behaviors, as we have seen above. In what follows, I will avoid using 
indefinite QPs in the hierarchically lower position when we test the availability of 
inverse scope in general. 
 A related issue concerns indefinite pronouns in Japanese. Japanese indefinite 
pronouns consist of a wh-phrase and ka, a morpheme used as a disjunction connective 
and also as a question particle. Thus, nani “what” with ka makes nanika “something”, 
dare “who” with ka makes dareka “someone”, and so on. At first glance, those 
indefinite pronouns appear to resist taking scope out of a syntactic island.8 Observe 
the following cases that involve conditional and relative clause islands: 
(19) Mosi paati-ni dareka-o yobuto, Tanaka sensei-wa okoru. 
 If   party-to  someone-ACC invite  Prof. Tanaka-TOP get-mad 
 “If we invite someone to the party, Prof. Tanaka will get mad” 
(20) Nanika-o       motteiru jyoukyaku-wa minna hikouki-ni nore-nai. 
  something-ACC have-ing passenger-TOP all     plane-DAT  board-NEG 
  “Every passenger who is carrying something is not allowed to board a plane” 
 
 
In (19), the interpretation in which the indefinite takes scope over the conditional is 
very hard to obtain. Thus the sentence is most likely to be interpreted as meaning that 
Prof. Tanaka will get mad if we invite any person to the party. Similarly, (20) can 
                                                 
 
7  Interested readers should refer to Reinhart (1997; 2006), Winter (1997), Kratzer (1995), and references 
therein. 






only describe an unusual situation where a passenger cannot carry anything on board 
a plane. One may be tempted to interpret these observations as showing that Japanese 
indefinite pronouns do obey island constraints, suggesting that the interpretive 
mechanism that is necessary to derive the widest scope interpretation is not available 
to them. However, such a conclusion turns out to be too hasty. When the sentences in 
(19) and (20) are embedded within a “sluicing” context, the widest scope of Japanese 
indefinite pronouns can easily be obtained9: 
(21) Mosi paati-ni dareka-o yobuto, Tanaka sensei-wa okoru rasii ga,      
 If   party-to  someone-ACC invite  Prof. Tanaka-TOP get-mad MOOD but  
 sore-ga    dare ka   wakaranai.  
 that-NOM who Q know-NEG 
 “(I heard that) Prof. Tanaka will get mad if we invite someone to the party, 
 but I don’t know who” 
(22) Nanika-o      motteiru   jyoukyaku-wa minna hikouki-ni nore-nai rasii ga, 
 something-ACC have-ing passenger-TOP all    plane-DAT  board-NEG MOOD but 
 sore-ga nani ka wakaranai 
 that-NOM what Q know-NEG  
 “(I heard that) every passenger who is carrying something is not allowed to 
 board a plane, but I don’t know what” 
 
 
In order to see what is responsible for the change in the judgments, it is necessary to 
observe that there are two different kinds of “specific” interpretation of indefinites, as 
pointed out by Haspelmath (1997). One type of specificity presupposes the existence 
of a uniquely identifiable referent and conveys the speaker’s uncertainty about its 
identity. The other type of specificity is not associated with the speaker’s uncertainty, 
                                                 
 
9 As the English translations of those examples suggest, sluicing in English does not seem to obey island 
constraints (Ross 1969; Chung et al 1995; Merchant 2001). We leave the issue on the derivation of Japanese 





and appears in contexts where the speaker actually knows the referent of the 
indefinite he used.10 Someone in English can be used in both of those two contexts: 
(23) I heard that Norbert wanted to introduce someone to you, but I don’t know  
 who. 
 (specific, unknown-to-speaker) 
(24) I wanted to introduce someone to you. Here, this is Norbert. 
 (specific, known-to-speaker) 
 
 
According to Haspelmath, his typological study revealed that there is an implicational 
universal relation between those two specific interpretations. That is, if an indefinite 
pronoun in a given language allows the specific, speaker-known interpretation, it also 
allows the specific, speaker-unknown interpretation. English indefinite pronouns 
obviously allow both interpretations. Japanese indefinite pronouns, in contrast, seem 
to be excluded from the “speaker-known” contexts: 
(25) #Kimi-ni dareka-o shoukaishi-you. Goro Takuya-san desu. 
  you-DAT someone-ACC introduce-MOOD. Goro Takuya-Mr. COP 
  “I am going to introduce someone to you. This is Goro Takuya.” 
(26) A: Gogo-wa isogashii-desu-ka? 
   afternoon-TOP busy-COP-Q 
                                                 
 
10 Jeff Lidz (Personal Communication) pointed out to me that the speaker known-unknown distinction may 
correspond to epistemic specificity in Farkas (1994). Epistemic specificity is illustrated in the following example 
by Fodor and Sag (1982): 
 
a. A student in Syntax 1 cheated on the exam. 
b. His name is John. 
c. We are all trying to figure out who he is. 
 
When the sentence (a) is continued by (b), the speaker has a unique referent of the indefinite a student in Syntax 1. 
In contrast, when the sentence (a) us continued by (b), the indefinite subject only expresses an existential 
commitment. The former specificity is referred to as epistemic specificity by Farkas. It appears that Japanese 
indefinite pronouns do not allow epistemically specific interpretations, as illustrated by the awkwardness of the 
following example: 
 
d. #Dareka-ga siken-de husei-o sita.             Kare-no namae-wa Taroo da. 
 Someone-NOM exam-on cheat-ACC did       he-GEN name-TOP Taroo COP 






   “Are you busy this afternoon?” 
 
  B: #Hai. Dareka-to yakusoku-ga arimasu.11 
   Yes  someone-with appointment-NOM exist 
   “Yes, I have an appointment with someone” 
 
 
The use of indefinite pronouns in those contexts invokes strong awkwardness.12 Given 
this, I assume that Japanese indefinite pronouns can only be used when the speaker is 
not sure about the identity of the “referent” of indefinites13. This characteristic of 
Japanese indefinite pronouns suggests a possible account for the difficulty for them to 
have the widest scope in sentences like (21)/(22). In a declarative form, those 
sentences are felicitously used when the speaker commits to presenting the 
information regarding the conditions under which Prof. Tanaka will get mad or one 
will be denied permission to board a plane, etc. Under the speaker-unknown construal 
of indefinites, however, the wide-scope interpretation of indefinites implies that the 
speaker only has incomplete information about the conditions, since he does not 
know the identity of the specific referent of the indefinite. I assume that this 
implication renders the wide-scope interpretation pragmatically awkward, given the 
                                                 
 
11 The sentence sounds natural in a context where the speaker actually does not know the identity of the person 
who he has an appointment with, e.g., the person is waiting for a secretary to confirm who it is. (Colin Phillips, 
Personal Communication) 
12  Null arguments, instead of overt arguments, would most naturally be used in those contexts. 
13  Haspelmath (1997) describes those Japanese indefinite pronouns as having the ability to occur in the “specific-
known” contexts. I believe this characterization is inaccurate, given the consistency of the native-speaker 
judgments I have obtained with examples like (25)/(26). One possible factor that could have interfered with 
Haspelmath’s observation is the fact that Japanese indefinite pronouns are not excluded from, for example, “guess 
who?” type contexts: 
 
(i)  Dareka-ga kimi-ni denwa-o yokosimasita. Dare da to omou? 
 someone-NOM you-DAT call-ACC did-polite      who COP COMP think 
 “Someone called you. Guess who?” 
 
This sentence can be felicitously used in a situation where the speaker knows the identity of the person who made 
the call, but is trying to avoid giving the information to the listener right away. I, however, believe this should not 
be classified as a “speaker-known” context, as this type of context is generally associated with a particular type of 





felicity condition associated with the sentences. In other words, it is pragmatically 
infelicitous for one to commit to presenting the information regarding a condition 
without knowing how the condition is met. Since Japanese indefinite pronouns cannot 
have the “speaker-known” interpretation, the widest-scope (thus necessarily 
“specific”) interpretation of indefinites always creates pragmatic awkwardness in 
declarative sentences like (21)/(22), overshadowing the interpretation from the 
listener’s consideration. In sluicing contexts, however, the felicity condition is 
explicitly cancelled, and the widest-scope interpretation becomes natural and easy to 
access.  
 Given this account, we conclude that the difference between Japanese and English 
indefinite pronouns is not the availability of wide-scope out of syntactic islands, but 
the ability to occur in “specific-known” contexts. In other words, Japanese indefinite 
pronouns can be interpreted using the special mechanism that allows them to take 
wider range of scope than other quantifiers do (e.g., universal quantifiers). 
Consequently, Japanese indefinite pronouns are not exceptions to the methodological 
concern discussed in the earlier part of this section. Therefore, the same caution needs 
to be raised against making sweeping generalizations on the basis of tests relying 
solely on the scope of Japanese indefinite pronouns. 
2.3 Scope rigidity 
 
 In the Japanese syntactic literature, there is a long-standing observation that 
surface word order and quantifier scope in Japanese are tightly related (Kuroda, 1970; 
Kuno, 1973). Hoji (1985) renewed interest in this topic by bringing up the issue of 





interpretations in Japanese appear to be more restricted than in English in that 
inverse-scope interpretations are disallowed in sentences like (27): 
(27) Dareka-ga      daremo-o     semeta 
 someone-NOM everyone-ACC criticized 
  “Someone criticized everyone” 
  ∃ >> ∀ / *∀ >> ∃            (Hoji 1985: 336) 
 
 
Since May (1977), the scope ambiguity obtained in the English counterpart of (27) 
has often been taken as an argument for covert syntactic movement that may shift 
scope of an element without affecting phonological representations. As Hoji pointed 
out, such an approach to inverse scope in English cannot be directly transferred to the 
analysis of Japanese scope interpretations, as it would predict more scope ambiguity 
than Japanese sentences actually exhibit. This property of Japanese is often referred 
to as scope rigidity, and a number of studies report that the same observation holds in 
other languages, such as Chinese (Huang, 1982; Aoun and Li, 1993), Korean (Hoji, 
1985; Kim, 1989; Sohn 1995), and German (Krifka, 1998; Pafel, 2005).  
 Earlier approaches to this cross-linguistic contrast regarded scope rigidity as a 
property of languages, and accordingly tried to formulate the cross-linguistic contrast 
in terms of the contrast between “scope-rigid languages” and “free scope languages” 
(e.g., Hoji, 1985; Aoun and Li, 1993). This characterization of the cross-linguistic 
contrast invites a very simple model of the acquisition of possible scope 
interpretations in Japanese. For example, if Japanese children learn possible scope 
interpretations conservatively, then as long as children can correctly identify intended 
scope interpretations, a conservative learning mechanism leads them to block inverse 





parameter that distinguishes scope-rigid languages and free scope languages, where 
one setting only generates surface scope interpretations, and the other setting 
generates both surface and inverse scope interpretations. Thus, with respect to 
possible scope interpretations, the former setting generates a subset of the 
interpretations that the latter setting generates. If children start with the subset setting, 
then Japanese children would not encounter positive evidence that forces them to re-
set the default setting, and accordingly their grammar only generates surface scope 
interpretations. 
 These models assume that some conservative learning mechanism restricts 
Japanese children’s hypothesis about possible scope interpretations. Consequently, it 
is predicted that Japanese children never allow inverse scope interpretations that 
Japanese adults do not allow. If this is actually the case, then the acquisition of scope 
rigidity does not create a learnability paradox: Japanese children do not overgenerate 
scope interpretations. Given this, it becomes important to test the prediction 
empirically. The next section presents a series of experiments that aimed to address 
the issue: do Japanese children overgenerate inverse scope interpretations? 
2.4 Experiments: Inverse scope in canonical order sentences 
 
The experiments seek to determine whether Japanese and English speaking children 
access the inverse scope interpretations of sentences like (28): 
(28) a. Japanese 
   Dareka-ga dono tabemono mo tabeta 
   someone-NOM every food         ate 
   “Someone ate every food” 
 





   Someone ate every food 
 
 
The Japanese sentence (28)a is scopally unambiguous for adult speakers, allowing 
only the interpretation in which the subject quantifier takes scope over the object 
quantifier (that is, the ∃ >> ∀ interpretation). In contrast, the English counterpart 
(28)b allows the inverse scope interpretation (the ∀ >> ∃ interpretation) as well. The 
surface scope interpretation of the sentence is false, for example, in the situation 
where each food was eaten by a different individual. The inverse scope interpretation 
of the sentence is in contrast true under the same situation. This discrepancy between 
the two scope interpretations in their truth values allows us to test the availability of 
the inverse scope interpretation using the Truth Value Judgment Task (Crain and 
McKee 1985; Crain and Thornton 1998). Suppose the experimental participant 
accepts the sentence in (28) presented in the situation where each of the foods was 
eaten by a different individual. The response suggests that the participant accessed the 
interpretation that makes the sentence true: the inverse scope interpretation. 
Conversely, if the participant does not allow the inverse scope interpretation, then 
s/he should reject the sentence in the same situation, because the only interpretation 
that is possible – the surface scope interpretation – is false. Our goal is to compare the 
acceptance rate and patterns of Japanese and English speaking children, in order to 
determine whether or not the difference in adult grammars (which leads to the 
difference in input) affects children's behavior. If children learn possible scope 
interpretations conservatively, then it is predicted that Japanese children adhere to the 
surface scope interpretation, disallowing the inverse scope interpretation. English 





often they encounter positive evidence for inverse scope interpretations in input data. 
As a point of departure, I review some previous studies on the acquisition of scope 
interpretations. Among the experimental studies in this area of research, Marsden 
(2004) and Sano (2003) are particularly relevant for our concerns. I will discuss those 
studies in turn. 
2.4.1 Marsden (2004) 
 
 Marsden (2004) investigated scope interpretations of adult L2 learners of 
Japanese. Roughly speaking, Marsden found that the properties of the learner’s L1 
scope assignments affect possible scope interpretations of intermediate L2 Japanese, 
and English / Chinese / Korean learners of Japanese show divergent developmental 
patterns with respect to scope interpretations in Japanese. What I would like to 
discuss here, however, is not those results from Marsden’s main experiments, but 
rather the results of her control experiments with adult native speakers. I am 
particularly interested in how native speakers of Japanese / English treat inverse 
scope in sentences like (28). 
 With both L2 and L1 subjects, Marsden used a picture-matching acceptability 
judgment task. In the task, pairs of a picture and a sentence were presented to the 
participant, and for each picture the participant was asked to judge how well the 
sentence matched the picture. The participant was given a scale with four points 
(from completely acceptable to completely unacceptable, +2, +1, -1, -2; the 
participant could also choose “Can’t decide”), and used the scale to evaluate the 
relative acceptability of a sentence as a description of the corresponding picture. In 





and dono N mo/every N as the object was presented with a picture that describes a 
distributive event that only matches the inverse scope interpretation of the sentence. 
For example, the following Japanese/English sentence was presented with a picture in 
which there are three children, and a different adult is scolding each of the three 
children: 
(29) a. Dareka-ga dono kodomo mo sikatta 
   someone-NOM every child    scolded  
 
  b. Someone scolded every child 
 
 
If the participant judged the sentence to be an acceptable description of the situation 
in the picture, then that response was interpreted as reflecting the availability of the 
inverse scope interpretation.  
 The table below summarizes the results of Marsden (2004), focusing on 
Japanese/English native data of inverse scope readings of sentences like (29). In the 
table, the “Accept” row has the percentages and numbers of the participants who 
selected ratings of +1 or +2 on at least four of the five test tokens. Similarly, “Reject” 
is the participants who selected ratings of -1 or -2 on at least four of the five test 
tokens. “Inconsistent” is those who do not fall in either category. 
(30)  
   Japanese (n=20) English (n=24) 
Accept (% (n)) 5% (1) 54.2% (13) 
Reject (% (n)) 80% (16) 12.5% (3) 
Inconsistent (% (n)) 15% (3) 33.3% (8) 
 
 
The results are for the most part consistent with the claims in the theoretical literature. 





and the acceptance rate shows a contrast with that of English native speakers. 
However, the native English data involve a degree of inconsistency. Theoretically, the 
crucial test sentences are scopally ambiguous and therefore English speakers should 
consistently accept the inverse scope interpretations. The actual acceptance rate for 
inverse scope was, however, not quite as high. This lack of consistent acceptance of 
inverse scope resembles the results in other psycholinguistic studies on scope 
interpretations (e.g., Kurtzman and MacDonald 1993; also see Frazier 2000; 
Anderson 2005 for reading time experiments), and those studies conclude that inverse 
scope interpretations are generally dispreferred and require more processing resources. 
Marsden also argues that the lack of consistent acceptance of inverse scope in her 
experiment reflects the processing costs associated with the computation of inverse 
scope interpretations. 
 Now, suppose that Japanese children share whatever property of the processing 
system gives rise to the general dispreference for inverse scope interpretations with 
English adults, and therefore do not prefer inverse scope interpretations. Given the 
results of other studies, it is expected that such children would not consistently accept 
the inverse scope interpretation of sentences like (28) in judgment experiments, even 
if their grammar generates representations for inverse scope. In other words, even if 
Japanese children lack the knowledge of scope rigidity in Japanese, children’s actual 
performance may not straightforwardly reflect their grammar, and we may obtain 
inconsistent acceptances of inverse scope from Japanese children. In such a case, a 
control experiment with English-speaking adults and comparison of the data would be 





are significantly similar, then we would be able to argue that they share the same 
grammatical basis for inverse scope, and consequently, conclude that Japanese 
children allow CSS in the context where Japanese adults do not allow inverse scope 
interpretations.  
2.4.2 Sano (2004) 
 
 Sano (2004) investigated Japanese children’s scope interpretations in canonical 
and scrambled word order sentences. Test sentences like those in (31) were used in 
his TVJT experiment. 
(31) a. Dareka-ga dono neko mo tukamaeta 
   someone-NOM every cat   caught 
   “Someone caught every cat” 
 
  b. [Dono neko mo]i  dareka-ga ti tukamaeta 
   every cat                someone-NOM caught 
   “Every cat, someone caught” 
 
 
The sentences were presented to 20 Japanese-speaking children (aged 4;1-6;5) with 
two types of scenarios: one scenario made the test sentence true under the surface ∃ 
>> ∀ interpretation (i.e., a specific individual caught all the cats), and the other 
scenario made the test sentence true under the inverse ∀ >> ∃ interpretation (each of 
the cats was caught by a different individual). Under adults’ readings, the canonical 
order sentence lacks the inverse scope interpretation, and therefore is false in the ∀ 
>> ∃ scenario; in contrast, the scrambled version has the ∀ >> ∃ interpretation, and is 
true under the same scenario. With the surface ∃ >> ∀ scenario, children consistently 





scenario, however, children’s performance was rather more complex. First, 14 of 20 
children incorrectly accepted the canonical order test sentence in the inverse ∀ >> ∃ 
scenario, i.e., they showed no sensitivity to the adult restriction on inverse scope (an 
adult control group rejected the test sentence in the scenario 80% of the time). 
Furthermore, even among the 6 children who correctly rejected the test sentence in 
the inverse ∀ >> ∃ scenario, 5 did not accept the scrambled version of the test 
sentence with that scenario. Only one child behaved like adults in Sano’s experiment. 
 Although Sano’s study provides an interesting initial set of data, there are several 
reasons why follow-up research is called for. First, little attention was paid to the 
felicity conditions for using indefinite existential QPs in Sano’s experimental context. 
Sano’s story involves four characters: three children whose names are known to the 
child, and one “nameless” boy who turns his back to the child. In the ∃ >> ∀ scenario, 
this nameless boy ends up catching all the cats. Under the wide scope interpretation 
of dareka, the indefinite pronoun in the test sentences should thus be interpreted as 
referring to this “nameless” boy. However, this use of the indefinite creates 
awkwardness, and it would be more natural to say something like “this boy” pointing 
to the nameless boy, or simply say “the nameless boy”. This is because in the 
experimental scenario the speaker (i.e., the puppet) can be more specific rather than 
using an indefinite, because the specific identity of the person that caught every cat is 
known to the speaker. This pragmatically infelicitous use of the indefinite pronoun 
might have confused children, forcing them to resort to random guessing without 
actually judging the truth of the test sentences. Given that several experimental 





children’s performance in TVJT (e.g., Crain et al. 1996; Gualmini 2003), it would be 
useful to test children in an experiment with improved pragmatics. Second, Sano’s 
dataset was relatively small, with only one trial per condition: that is, each child was 
given only one chance to reject the inverse scope interpretation of (31)a. Thus, it is 
important to expand the study, in order to see how robust and how consistent 
Japanese children’s (in)sensitivity to the scope restriction in Japanese is. Third, the 
scrambled sentences like (31)b involve several confounding factors. The inverse 
scope interpretation (∃ >> ∀) entails the surface scope interpretation (∀ >> ∃), and 
therefore, it is not clear whether one can logically determine if the inverse scope 
interpretation is possible with the sentence. Furthermore, even if we decide to ignore 
the entailment problem, the fact that the hierarchically lower subject is an indefinite 
(i.e., dareka) makes the nature of the “inverse scope interpretation” obscure. If one 
assigns a “referential” interpretation in the sense of Fodor and Sag (1982) to the 
indefinite, the same truth values obtain, but the interpretation is no longer “inverse 
scope” in the proper sense of the term. In fact, the referential interpretation seems to 
be the intended interpretation in Sano’s scenarios: the indefinite pronoun refers to the 
nameless boy. Thus, sentences like (31)b do not provide an ideal test case for 
children’s scope interpretations, and some different combination of quantifiers is 
needed to investigate children’s scope interpretations in scrambled sentences. 
 Since the issue on children’s scope interpretations with scrambled sentences will 
be independently addressed in our second set of experiments that is reviewed in 
section 2.5, I decided to exclude sentences with the scrambled word order from the 





straightforwardly addressed by simply increasing the number of crucial test trials. 
However, the first issue about the felicity condition associated with uses of indefinites 
requires some serious elaboration of the experimental design. In the next section I 
discuss experimental contexts that can remove the possible interfering factor in Sano's 
experiment. 
2.4.3 Felicitous uses of indefinites 
 
 Our challenge here is to create a context in which test sentences with the 
indefinite pronoun dareka/someone are used felicitously. In this connection it is 
important to observe that the use of Japanese indefinite pronouns is a little more 
restricted than their English counterparts. The point was discussed in 2.2.2, and I 
repeat the crucial part of the relevant empirical data. English indefinite pronouns like 
someone can be used even in a context where the speaker knows the specific identity 
of the “referent” of the indefinite. The example in (32) illustrates the point: 
(32) I wanted to introduce someone to you. Here, this is Takuya Goro. 
  
 
In this example, someone was used felicitously even though the speaker obviously 
knows who s/he is. In contrast to this, the Japanese counterpart of someone, dareka, is 
excluded in this context: 
(33) #Kimi-ni dareka-wo shoukaishi-you. Goro Takuya-san desu. 
  you-dat someone-ACC introduce-mood. Goro Takuya-Mr. cop 
(34) A: Gogo-wa isogashii-desu-ka? 
   afternoon-TOP busy-cop-Q 
   “Are you busy this afternoon?” 
 
  B: #Hai. Dareka-to yakusoku-ga arimasu. 





   “Yes, I have an appointment with someone” 
 
 
Thus, Japanese indefinite pronouns strongly imply the speaker’s uncertainty, and can 
only be used felicitously in contexts where the speaker is unsure of the identity of the 
individual that the indefinite refers to. Accordingly, to meet the felicity condition, the 
test sentences with dareka must be presented in a context where the speaker (in a 
TVJT, a puppet) is unsure of the identity of the referent. 
 In collaborative work with Sachie Akiba, we constructed an experimental context 
to satisfy the felicity conditions for Japanese indefinite pronouns (Goro and Akiba 
2004a/b). Those studies primarily concern Japanese children’s interpretation of 
disjunction in negative sentences, and will be extensively discussed in Chapter 4. In 
one of these experiments, we investigated the scope interaction between object 
indefinite QPs and sentential negation. We sought to determine whether Japanese 
children allow the wide scope interpretation of the indefinite pronoun nanika with 
sentences like (35): 
(35) Butasan-wa nanika tabe-nakatta 
  pig-TOP something eat-NEG 
  “The pig didn’t eat something” 
 
 
It has been observed that English-speaking children often fail to assign the wide 
scope interpretation to the object indefinite in English counterparts for (35) if the 
sentence is presented in a pragmatically infelicitous way (e.g., Gualmini, 2003). To 
create a context in which indefinite pronouns are used felicitously, we divided the 
experimental context into two phases. The first phase was a partial “story”. One 





phase was the Truth Value Judgment part. Here, a puppet, Kermit the Frog, was 
manipulated by a second experimenter. The puppet uttered the target sentences. 
 The central theme of the stories was an eating-contest. There were twelve 
different animals, who were each invited to eat the following foods: an eggplant, a 
carrot, and a green pepper. The child was first told that not all of the animals like 
vegetables (just like many children). Then the rules of the contest were introduced. 
First, if an animal eats all of the vegetables, then it receives a shining gold medal. 
Second, if an animal eats some of the vegetables but not all of them, then it receives a 
blue medal. Finally, if an animal does not eat any vegetables, then it gets a black 
cross. After explaining the rules, the story begins. One of the experimenters acts out 
the eating trials for each animal. Among the twelve animals, four got a gold medal; 
four got a blue medal; and four got a black cross. The story phase continued until all 
twelve animals finished their trials and were presented with their rewards. 
 After the story phase was finished, attention returned to the first animal, and the 
puppet started to guess how well each animal did in the game. First, the puppet said 
that he didn’t remember exactly what each animal had eaten, then he started to make 
guesses, based on the color of the prizes the animals had received as awards. In the 
crucial condition, the puppet uttered a sentence like (35) as a guess about an animal 
with a blue medal. Recall that the puppet started to make its guesses after the 
“contest” phase had been completed. It is crucial here that a blue medal was awarded 
only to those animals who had only eaten some of the vegetables - it did not indicate 
which vegetable the animals had actually eaten. Given this incomplete information, 





the animal ate all of the vegetables, there is some vegetable that he didn’t eat”, which 
corresponds to the wide scope interpretation of the indefinite nanika. At the same 
time, a blue medal indicates that the animal ate at least some vegetables, and therefore 
if children assign the narrow scope interpretation to the indefinite pronoun, they 
should reject the puppet’s guess. In this experiment, 30 Japanese children (3;7 - 6;3, 
Mean: 5;4) accepted the crucial test sentences 88% of the time (adult control: 100% 
acceptance), allowing an adult-like wide scope interpretation of indefinites relative to 
negation. 
 The crucial property of the design is that test sentences are not presented as 
descriptions of the event that just happened. Rather, they are the puppet's guesses 
based on incomplete information that leaves room for uncertainty.14 This creates an 
appropriate context to use indefinite pronouns in Japanese, and also indefinite 
pronouns in English. Given the successful results of Goro and Akiba’s experiment, I 
decided to adopt the same two-phase design in our experiment that uses indefinite 
pronouns. 
2.4.4 Experiments: design and participants 
 
The experimental design employs Goro and Akiba’s two-phase structure. The first 
phase was a partial “story”, and the second phase was the Truth Value Judgment part. 
The crucial test sentences in Japanese and English are repeated here as (36): 
(36) a. Japanese 
   Dareka-ga dono tabemono mo tabeta 
   someone-NOM every food      ate 
                                                 
 





   “Someone ate every food” 
 
  b. English 
   Someone ate every food 
 
 
 The central theme of the stories was an “eating-game". There were twelve groups 
of animals; each consists of 3 animals of the same kind (e.g., 3 pigs, 3 raccoons, 3 
elephants…). Each of those groups was invited to eat three pieces of food (e.g., a 
cream puff, banana, and a pepper). First, the child was told that there were two 
important rules in the game. The first rule is that all foods must be eaten. The second 
rule is that each one of the members of a team must get to eat something. Thus, if 
each animal in a group is generous and shares the snacks with his friends, making 
sure that every one of them gets to eat something, then the group "wins" the game and 
receives a shining gold medal as a prize. However, if one of the animals in a group is 
greedy and eats all of the foods all by himself, then the group receives a black cross (a 
symbol of failure that Japanese children are familiar with). Also, if a group refuses to 
eat one of the foods (e.g., a pepper) because they don’t like it, the group receives a 
black cross. In the experiment with English-speaking children, the rewards for 
success and failure were replaced by a happy face mark and a sad face mark, 
respectively.  
 Among the twelve groups, four appropriately observed the rules and got a gold 
medal. This pattern matches the inverse scope interpretation of the sentences in (36): 
each food got eaten by a different individual.  The other four groups had a greedy 
member who ate everything and got a cross. This pattern models the surface scope 





Finally, each of the remaining four groups ate two of the foods but did not finish the 
last one, and get a cross. This pattern was included in the paradigm to illuminate the 
importance of eating up all the foods. The three patterns of outcome are schematically 
represented in (37): 
(37) a. Success: a gold medal 
   Animal1 Animal2 Animal3 
 
   Food1  Food2  Food3 
   (matches the ∀>>∃ interpretation) 
 
  b. Failure type I: a black cross 
   Animal1 Animal2 Animal3 
 
   Food1  Food2  Food3 
   (matches the ∃>>∀ interpretation) 
 
  c. Failure type II: a black cross 
   Animal1 Animal2 Animal3 
 
   Food1  Food2  Food3 
 
 
To make sure that the participant understood the rules, we asked him/her to present a 
reward to each animal group, and corrected if s/he made a mistake. The story phase 
continued until all of the groups finished. 
 After the story phase we returned to the first group, and the puppet manipulated 
by one of the experimenters started to guess how well each group did in the game. 
The puppet said that he didn't remember exactly what each group did, and then started 
making guesses based on the reward that each group had. The crucial test sentence in 
(36) was presented as the puppet's guess about a group with a gold medal. Thus, the 
sentence is true under the inverse scope interpretation, but is false under the surface 





 The failure patterns were used for filler trials, and also have the function of 
properly conditioning the alternative interpretations of the crucial test sentence. First, 
the existence of failure pattern I makes the surface scope interpretation of the test 
sentence salient and plausible in the experimental context: there are indeed groups of 
animals who failed to win the game because one of the members ate all the foods. 
Making the alternative interpretations equally salient and plausible is crucial in 
eliciting reliable performance from children (Crain and Thornton 1998; Conroy et al. 
2007; see also Elbourne 2005). Second, the existence of failure pattern II serves the 
function of reducing a bias for the surface scope interpretation. In failure pattern II, 
the event initially proceeds in accordance with the inverse ∀>>∃ interpretation, but in 
the end it unfolds in a way that makes the interpretation false (i.e., the first two 
animals each ate a different food, but the last one didn’t eat the remaining food). 
Without the failure pattern II, the story revolves around the question about who ate 
the foods (i.e., each of the animals vs. a single animal): in both the success pattern and 
failure pattern I every food got eaten, and therefore the question about what foods 
were eaten is irrelevant to the difference in outcome (i.e., the different rewards). In 
such a case, since the crucial information for the question about who ate the foods is 
provided by the subject of the test sentence, the subject is likely to receive a 
"focused" interpretation, which may bias the participant towards the surface scope 
interpretation (e.g., "It was some, not all the animals, who ate every food!"). To 
circumvent this potential interfering factor, we made the question about what were 
eaten (i.e., all of the foods vs. only some of them) relevant in the experimental 





pattern and failure pattern II, both the subject and the object of the test sentence now 
provide the crucial information for the underlying questions in the experimental 
context. With this manipulation, the chance of the subject being interpreted as a focus 
is expected to be reduced, and consequently, the bias towards the surface scope 
interpretation is expected to be reduced.  
 The two-phase structure of this experimental design motivates the use of the 
indefinite pronoun dareka in the test sentence. By observing that a group of animals 
has a black cross with no foods left, for example, the puppet (and the child) can 
successfully conclude that there was a greedy individual in the group, but due to the 
two-phase structure of the experiment, he cannot remember who the greedy one was. 
Thus, he has no choice but to use an indefinite pronoun (rather than, for example, a 
demonstrative "this animal" with pointing) to refer to the greedy animal who ate 
everything.  
 There are four crucial trials (i.e., (36) is presented with the success pattern) 
interspersed with eight fillers. Four different groups participated in the main 
experiment: (i) Japanese-speaking children, (ii) Japanese-speaking adults, (iii) 
English-speaking children, and (iv) English-speaking adults. The first group consisted 
of 16 Japanese children (Age 4;10-5;9, Mean: 5;4) who were recruited at Miyagi 
Gakuin Kindergarden, Sendai, and were tested individually. The second group 
consisted of 16 adult native speakers of Japanese who were either graduate or 
undergraduate students of Tohoku University, Sendai. The group watched a video-
taped version of the TVJT experiment, and was tested in small groups (1 to 4 





(Age 5;0-5;10, Mean: 5;4) who were recruited at the Center for Young Children at 
University of Maryland at College Park. Those children were tested individually. 
Finally, the fourth group was a group of 29 English-speaking adults who were 
undergraduate students at the University of Maryland at College Park. Those adult 
subjects were also tested individually by a native English speaker. I thank Annie 
Gagliardi for running those experiments in English, and for her various suggestions 
and efforts to make the English experiments better.15 In addition to those main groups, 
another group of 16 Japanese-speaking children (Age: 4;9-5;9, Mean: 5;3) 
participated in a control experiment. In the control experiment, the test sentence in 
(36) was presented as a puppet’s guess about failure pattern I: that is, the sentence 
was true under the surface scope interpretation. The purpose of conducting this 
control was to make sure that children have no problem with the surface scope 
interpretation. In all the experiments, participants who made more than two errors in 
filler trials were excluded from final analysis. 
2.4.5 Results 
 
 Let us first briefly report the results from the control group. In the control 
experiment, children consistently accepted the crucial test sentences (acceptance 
rate=90.6%, 58/64): that is, they accepted the surface scope interpretation of the test 
                                                 
 
15 As a part of our effort to elicit inverse scope interpretations from English-speaking adults, we tried several 
slightly different ways of presenting the experimental story. Thus, the English adult participants actually consist of 
three groups. For the first group (N=10), the puppet watched the eating-game trials; for the second group (N=9, 
one participant was excluded because the participant answered “you (the puppet) are partially right” in all of the 
four crucial trials), the puppet fell asleep while the animal groups was on their trials; for the third group (N=10), 
the puppet went over the rules before he started making guesses using passive “if every food was eaten by a 
different person...”. The three groups showed no difference in their acceptance rates of the inverse scope 
interpretation of the test sentences (group 1= 37.5%, group 2 = 31.3%, group 3 = 32.5%). I thus choose to 
combine the data from all the groups. For Japanese participants and English-speaking children, we uniformly used 





sentence. Combined with Sano’s (2003) results, the result leads us to conclude that 
Japanese children do not have a problem with the surface scope interpretation of 
sentences like (36)a. This conclusion is reminiscent of that of other previous studies 
on young children’s scope interpretations (e.g., Musolino et al 2000; Lidz and 
Musolino 2002). Generally speaking, young children do not show difficulties with 
surface scope interpretations (but see Krämer 2000 for a possible exception to this 
generalization). 
 The results from the main experiments are analyzed in terms of the acceptance 
rate of the inverse scope reading of the crucial test sentences (i.e., the rate of "yes" 
response to the test sentence presented as a puppet's guess about the success pattern in 
(37)). These percentages are presented in the table and the figure below. 
(38)  
   Acceptance %/n of the 
inverse scope 
G1 (Japanese children, N=16) 42.2% (27/64) 
G2 (Japanese adults, N=16) 0% (0/64) 
G3 (English children, N=16) 35.9% (23/64) 










































A 2 x 2 ANOVA (language x age) revealed a significant main effect of age (±adult) 
(F (1, 73) = 7.2, P < 0.01) and a significant interaction of language and age (F (1, 73) 
= 5.8, P = 0.018). There was a marginal main effect of language (F (1, 73) = 2.7, p = 
0.102). Simple main effect tests showed that a simple main effect of language was 
significant for the adult groups (F (1, 73) = 8.2, p < 0.01), and a simple main effect of 
age was significant for the Japanese groups (F (1, 73) = 13.0, p < 0.01). 
2.4.6 Discussion 
 
 The purpose of the main experiment was to determine whether Japanese and 
English-speaking children access inverse scope interpretations. To begin, let us 
consider the adults' behaviors. First, Japanese adults consistently rejected the inverse 
scope interpretation of the crucial test sentences. This replicates Marsden's (2004) and 





theoretical literature. English adults, in contrast, accepted the inverse scope 
interpretation significantly more often than Japanese adults, but the acceptance 
pattern is subject to inconsistency, and the overall acceptance rate (33.6%) resembles 
the data observed in Kurtzman and MacDonald (1993). I assume, following Marsden 
(2004) and others, that this inconsistency reflects a general dispreference for inverse 
scope interpretations. Also, a design feature of the TVJT may have further enhanced 
the dispreference. Generally, inverse scope interpretations become easier to access 
when the corresponding surface scope readings result in contextually implausible 
interpretations.16 However, this kind of facilitation of inverse scope interpretations 
cannot be implemented in a TVJT. As we discussed in the previous subsection, the 
alternative interpretations of the test sentence (in our case, the surface and inverse 
scope interpretation) must be equally plausible and salient in experimental stories for 
TVJT. This design feature is necessary to reduce the possibility that the participant 
rejects one of the interpretations simply because that interpretation is less 
plausible/salient, rather than because the interpretation is blocked by the participant's 
grammar. In our experimental story, the fact that some animal groups lost the game 
because one greedy member ate all the foods (i.e., failure pattern I) made the surface 
scope interpretation plausible and salient in the context. Given that the surface scope 
was easily accessible in the experiment, the participants may have got stuck with that 
interpretation without considering the other possible interpretation.  
 I now turn to the results from children. Here, children in both languages showed 
similar behaviors, and their acceptance rates resemble that of English adults. The 
                                                 
 





parallelism between children and English adults can be made clear by comparing the 
distribution of individual acceptance rates. There were four crucial test trials in the 
main experiments, thus the possible probabilities of accepting the inverse scope 
interpretation for a participant were 0%, 25%, 50%, 75% or 100%. The following 
table plots the distribution of the individual participants in each group across the 
possible probabilities of accepting the inverse scope interpretation.  
(40)  
% acceptance of inverse 
scope   
0% 25% 50% 75% 100% Total 
N 
Japanese children (n) 5 3 3 2 3 16 
English children (n) 7 4 0 1 4 16 
English adults (n) 14 3 3 6 3 29 
 
 
A Chi-square analysis comparing each of the children's distributions with English 
adults' distribution found no significant differences (Japanese children vs. English 
adults: χ2 = 2.74, p = 0.603; English children vs. English adults: χ2 = 5.93, p = 0.204). 
Thus, it is unlikely that different mechanisms (e.g., random guessing for children, 
CSS for adults) underlie the children's behavior and the adults' behavior. Given these 
results, I conclude that both Japanese and English children have access to CSS, and 
also have adultlike bias towards the surface scope interpretation. 
 The main finding of the experiments is that Japanese children did not show 
sensitivity to the restriction on CSS in the language, and allowed the inverse scope 
interpretation as often as English children/adults did. The fact Japanese adults never 
accepted the inverse scope interpretation of the relevant test sentences suggests that 
there is indeed a difference between adult grammars of Japanese and English, which 





Japanese children's behavior was more similar to English adults behavior than to 
Japanese adults is unexpected if children learn possible scope interpretations through 
some conservative learning process. Children overgenerate scope interpretations in 
the course of development, which in turn demonstrates the need for a non-
conservative learning mechanism that allows children to purge the non-adult scope 
interpretation solely based on positive evidence. Given this, it becomes important to 
find out if the scope flexibility exhibited by Japanese children is restricted to the 
particular construction and/or combination of quantifiers, or is more robust. If 
children show the same kind of overgeneration errors with a different construction 
and/or combination of quantifiers, then it becomes more likely that the non-adult 
scope flexibility of children reflects their general assumption about possible scope 
interpretations. In order to examine the robustness of children’s scope flexibility, I 
turn to sentences that involve scrambling. 
2.5 Experiments: Inverse scope in scrambled order sentences 
 
2.5.1 Scrambling and scope interpretations 
 
 It has often been pointed out that scrambled sentences in Japanese show scope 
ambiguity that their canonical order counterparts lack. For example, Hoji (1985) 
provides the following pair of canonical and scrambled order sentences, pointing out 
that only the scrambled version shows ambiguity: 
(41) a. Dareka-ga daremo-o sementa 
   someone-NOM everyone-ACC criticized 
   “someone criticized everyone” (unambiguous) 
 





   everyone-ACC someone-NOM criticized 
   Lit. “Everyone, someone criticized” (ambiguous) 
 
 
However, since the “surface scope” ∀ >> ∃ interpretation of (41)b is entailed by the 
inverse scope the inverse scope ∃ >> ∀ interpretation, the contrast in (41) does not 
provide conclusive evidence for the availability of the inverse scope interpretation in 
the scrambled version. The sentence in (41)a should thus be compared with (42), 
which in fact shows scope ambiguity: 
(42) Dareka-oi daremo-ga ti semeta 
  someone-ACC everyone-NOM criticized 
  Lit. “Someone, everyone criticized” 
  ∃>>∀ / ∀>>∃ 
 
 
The sentence can be truthfully uttered in a situation where everyone criticized a 
different individual. Since the surface scope ∃>>∀ interpretation should make the 
sentence false in the situation, this fact shows that the inverse scope interpretation is 
indeed available with the scrambled sentence. 
 However, not all scrambled sentences show scope ambiguity. For example, in 
(43), both the canonical order sentence and the scrambled order sentence only allow 
the scope interpretation that matches surface word order: 
(43) a. Taroo-dake-ga furansugo mo supeingo mo hanasu 
   Taroo-only-NOM both French and Spanish speak 
   “Only Taroo speaks both French and Spanish” 
   ONLY >> BOTH / *BOTH >> ONLY 
 
  b. [Furansugo mo supeingo mo]i Taroo-dake-ga ti hanasu 
   Lit. “Both French and Spanish, only Taroo speaks” 







The interpretation of the canonical order sentence (43)a can be paraphrased as “Taroo 
is the only one who speaks both French and Spanish”. Thus, the sentence is true in the 
situation illustrated in (44), where Hanako speaks French but not Spanish, and Jiro 
speaks Spanish but not French: 
(44)    Taroo  Hanako Jiro 
  French     √      √     * 
  Spanish    √      *     √ 
 
 
In contrast, the scrambled version (43)b can only mean that “Only Taroo speaks 
French and only Taroo speaks Spanish”, and hence, is false under the situation in (44). 
This shows that the scrambled conjunction cannot be interpreted under the scope of 
the subject dake “only”. The nature of this scope constraint will be discussed closely 
in section 3.6. 
 Our second set of experiments targets this construction. Specifically, we are 
interested in whether or not Japanese children permit the inverse scope interpretation 
of the sentence-initial QNP in sentences like (43)b. In adult Japanese, the sentence 
only allows the surface scope interpretation: the object QNP in the sentence-initial 
position must be interpreted with its scope in the surface position. Since only the 
inverse scope interpretation of (43)b makes the sentence true in the situation in (44), 
the availability of the inverse scope interpretation should determine the participant’s 
truth value judgment of the sentence presented in the situation: the participant may 
accept the sentence only if s/he accesses the inverse scope interpretation. Since adult 
Japanese do not allow inverse scope interpretations with sentences like (43)b, a 
conservative learning approach would predict that children also avoid assigning 





order sentences, Japanese children allow inverse scope interpretations that Japanese 
adults do not allow, contrary to the prediction that a conservative learning approach 
would make. Based on the results, the current experiment seeks to determine whether 
this overgeneration error is an isolated case that occurs in a specific construction or is 
a part of more general phenomenon. 
 Such an experiment would require the following premises: (i) the target children 
have acquired the grammar of scrambling, and (ii) the target children are able to 
compute the scope interaction between dake "only" and A mo B mo "both A and B". 
We begin with reviewing some previous studies that provide empirical support for 
those premises.  
2.5.2 Children's grammar of scrambling 
 
 Scrambling has often been analyzed as a movement phenomenon: scrambled 
word orders are derived from canonical order sentences by applying optional 
movement to a phrase/phrases. Under movement approaches, scope ambiguity with 
cases like (42) is taken to be evidence for the availability of “reconstruction” of the 
scrambled phrase to the lower base position (e.g., Saito 1985). The crucial part of the 
analysis is the assumption that there is an abstract and inaudible link between the 
scrambled phrase and the lower "base" position of the phrase, and the inverse scope 
interpretation is obtained via the abstract link. It is thus important for our purpose to 
make sure that children's representations of scrambled sentences involve the same 
kind of abstract link. Otsu (1994) showed that young Japanese children (age 3-4) 
were able to assign adultlike thematic interpretations for scrambled arguments. Under 





Otsu's results can be interpreted as providing support for the argument that scrambled 
phrases in children's representations are linked to their base positions (e.g., a 
scrambled object is linked to the sister position of V, etc.). Sano's (2003) study on 
children's interpretation of floating quantifiers added further support to this argument. 
 It is well known that Japanese quantifiers can be "floated" from their host NP (e.g., 
Miyagawa 1989). In simple transitive sentences, both the nominative-marked subject 
and the accusative-marked object can launch a floating quantifier (FQ): 
(45) FQ from the subject 
  a. [Futari-no gakusei-ga] kyoujyu-o hihansita 
   two-cl-GEN student-NOM professor-ACC criticized 
 
  b. [Gakusei-ga] hutari kyoujyu-o hihansita 
   student-NOM two  professor-ACC criticized 
   "Two students criticized a professor" 
(46) FQ from the object 
  a. Gakusei-ga [hutari-no kyoujyu-o] hihansita 
   student-NOM two-GEN professor-ACC criticized 
 
  b. Gakusei-ga [kyoujyu-o] hutari hihansita 
   "A student criticized two professors" 
 
 
In (45)a and (46)a, the quantifier hutari is marked by genitive case and appears inside 
a NP.17 In contrast, hutari follows its host NP in (45)b and (46)b, without being 
                                                 
 
17 A prenominal quantifier may lack a genitive case marker, as in the following sentence: 
 
(i) Gakusei-ga hutari kyoujyu-o hihansita 
 student-NOM two professor-ACC criticized 
 “A student criticized two professors” 
 
Such a quantifier without a genitive marker is a floated quantifier and is outside of its host NP. Within a NP, the 
genitive case marker cannot be dropped. These points are illustrated by the following pair of sentences that shows 
a genitive-less quantifier may not appear in between its host NP and another prenominal modifier: 
 
(ii) a. *Gakusei-ga [kono gakkou-no hutari kyoujyu]-o hihansita 
  student-NOM this school-GEN   two professor-ACC criticized 
 





followed by a case marker. The relation between a FQ and its host NP is subject to 
some kind of locality constraint. For example, in canonical word order sentences, a 
FQ that follows the object cannot be linked to the subject. Thus (47) is unacceptable, 
because the FQ hutari cannot be linked to the subject, and the object is a proper 
name:  
(47) *Gakusei-ga Taroo-o hutari hihansita 
   student-NOM Taroo-ACC two criticized 
  "A student criticized two Taroo" 
 
 
Interestingly, the locality effect disappears in scrambled order sentences. That is, a 
FQ can be linked to the sentence-initial scrambled object, even if the subject NP 
intervenes between them: 
(48) Gakusei-o Taroo-ga hutari hihansita 
  student-ACC Taroo-NOM two criticized 
  "Two students, Taroo criticized" 
 
 
This contrast between canonical and scrambled word order has been taken to be an 
argument for the claim that the OSV word order is derived from underlying SOV 
order via movement (e.g., Kuroda 1980; Saito 1985; Miyagawa 1989). Under the 
overt movement theory of scrambling, the object and the FQ in (48) are adjacent to 
each other in the underlying SOV structure. The movement of the object leaves a 
trace/copy, and the adjacency is preserved between the trace/copy and the FQ. Recent 
base-generation theories of scrambling (e.g., Bošković & Takahashi 2001) can easily 
be reconciled with the contrast: the sentence-initial object is lowered to a position in 
                                                                                                                                           
 
  student-NOM this school-GEN   two-GEN professor-ACC criticized 






which the object is adjacent to the FQ.  In any case, some kind of abstract link 
between the scrambled object and its "base" position is necessary. Otherwise, cases 
like (48) cannot be distinguished from SOV order sentences like (47). 
 Sano (2007) sought to determine whether children are sensitive to the contrast 
between SOV and OSV sentences with respect to the interpretation of FQ. In Sano's 
TVJT experiment, the OSV-order sentence in (49) was presented in a situation where 
a pig is brushing two bears: 
(49) Sono kuma-o buta-ga nihiki18 kosutteiru yo 
  that bear-ACC pig-NOM two  brush-ing 
  can mean: "Two of the bears, a pig is brushing" 
 
 
The FQ nihiki can be linked to the sentence-initial object, and therefore the sentence 
can have the interpretation given in the translation. As a control condition, Sano used 
the SOV-order sentence in (50). 
(50) Sono kuma-ga buta-o nihiki kosutteiru yo 
  that bear-NOM pig-ACC two  brush-ing 
  cannot mean: "Two of the bears are brushing a pig" 
 
 
In this sentence the FQ cannot be linked to the non-adjacent subject, and 
consequently it must be interpreted as being linked to the adjacent object – that is, 
there have to be two pigs being brushed in order for the sentence to be true. Sano 
presented the sentence in a situation where two of the bears are brushing only one pig. 
If children have adultlike abstract representations for scrambled sentences, then they 
should accept sentence (49) in a situation that involves two bears and one pig. At the 
                                                 
 
18 The numeral looks different from the one in previous examples, because a different classifier is required for 





same time, children should reject sentence (50) when two bears and only one pig are 
involved in the event described by the sentence. That is precisely what Sano found: 
25 Japanese children (age 4-5) consistently accepted the scrambled sentence in the 
crucial test condition (86% of the time, 43/50), and they consistently rejected the 
canonical order sentence in the control condition (98% of the time, 49/50).  
 The results of Sano's experiment provide a strong argument for the claim that 
Japanese children at the age of 4-5 have adultlike abstract representation of scrambled 
sentences. Specifically, children's representation of scrambled sentences must involve 
some kind of abstract link between the scrambled phrase and its base position, as 
schematically shown in (51): 
(51) NP-o  NP-ga [e] FQ V 
 
 
Presumably, this kind of abstract representational resource is what underlies the 
inverse scope, “reconstructed” interpretations of scrambled QNPs. Given this 
presumption, we expect that Japanese children have access to the representational 
resources that are required to derive inverse scope readings in scrambled sentences. 
The question about whether or not children overgenerate scope interpretations in 
scrambled sentences becomes legitimate with this background. The availability of the 
grammatical resources that generate inverse scope interpretations in scrambled 
sentences would make children prone to overgeneration of inverse scope 
interpretations.  






 In collaboration with Stephen Crain and Utako Minai, we investigated English 
and Japanese-speaking children's interpretation of sentences that involve dake/only 
and a conjunction. The experiments concerned an independent issue that I will fully 
discuss in Chapter 4 and 5. Here I will briefly review some relevant data from 
Japanese children to set up the necessary background for our present experiment. The 
issue and experimental results will be fully discussed in the later chapters.  
 The purpose of the experiments was to determine whether or not young children 
can correctly compute truth conditions associated with sentences containing 
dake/only and a conjunction. (52) is a sample of test sentences that were used in the 
experiments: 
(52) Pikachu-dake-ga aoi hako mo kuroi hako mo ake-ta 
 Pikachu-only-NOM both blue box and black box open-PAST 
 “Only Pikachu opened the blue box and the black box” 
 
 
The truth condition of the sentence consists of two parts. First, it must be the case that 
Pikachu opened both the blue box and the black box; second, it must be the case that 
everyone other than Pikachu did not open both of the boxes. Crucially, someone 
else’s opening only one of the boxes does not make the sentence false. We sought to 
determine whether or not Japanese children can associate the correct truth condition 
for the test sentence. In our TVJT experiment, children witnessed a (computer 
generated) ‘PSI power’ demonstration by three Pokemon (Pikachu, Zenigame, and 
Hitokage), who used their PSI powers to attempt to perform several feats, e.g., open 
boxes, flip over cars, etc. Each test trials involved two objects that the characters 





(53) Condition I 
       Blue box  Black box 
 Pikachu     √    √ 
 Zenigame     *    * 
 Hitokage     √    * 
(54) Condition II 
       Blue box  Black box 
 Pikachu     *    √ 
 Zenigame     *    * 
 Hitokage     √    * 
(55) Condition III 
       Blue box  Black box 
 Pikachu     √    √ 
 Zenigame     *    * 
 Hitokage     √    √ 
 
 
The sentence is true in Condition I because nobody other than Pikachu succeeded in 
opening both boxes. In contrast the sentence is false in Condition III, because in this 
case Hitokage also opened both of the boxes. Condition II also makes the sentence 
false, because in this case Pikachu also failed to open both boxes 19 . Children's 
behavior in the experiment was fully adultlike: 20 children (Age: 4;1 - 6;2, Mean: 
5;4) consistently accepted the test sentence in Condition I (95% of the time, 38/40), 
while they rejected the test sentence in Conditions II and III just as often. The results 
were interpreted as evidence that Japanese children can correctly compute the truth 
conditions that result from scope interaction between dake and A mo B mo.  
 Given the successful results of this experiment, I decided to adopt the 
experimental stories in our current experiment, and combine the stories with the 
scrambled versions of the test sentences. The choice of the test items should reduce 
                                                 
 
19 Depending on one’s theory of the nature of the semantics of sentences with dake, the test sentence under the 
condition II may not technically be false, but rather a case of presupposition failure. See Horn (1969), Atlas 





the possibility that children show poor performance due to some independent 
difficulty with computing a particular scope relation.  
2.5.4 Experiments: design and participants 
  
 The experiment employs a standard TVJT. The theme of the experimental story-
line was a PSI-power demonstration, in which three cartoon characters (Pikachu, 
Doraemon, and Anpan-man) attempted to perform feats using their PSI power. Toy 
figures of the three characters were manipulated by one experimenter, and he also 
coordinated a computer-generated animation presentation of feats of PSI-power, 
which was implemented as the toy figures pronounced their "signature phrases" (e.g., 
"Pika-pika-pi!" by Pikachu). The subject witnessed the figures uttering their signature 
phrases as they gestured towards objects displayed on a computer screen. 
Subsequently, objects were animated by the experimenter (e.g., boxes shook and 
opened, cars flipped over, a frog turned into a princess, etc.). Each of the characters 
was awarded with prizes each time he succeeded in performing one of the feats. For 
example, a small red car was awarded if a character successfully flipped over the red 
car. These prizes served as reminders for children whose task was to judge the truth 
or falsity of test sentences. The test sentences were produced by a puppet, Kermit the 
Frog (manipulated by a second experimenter) who watched the magic competition 
along with the child subject. There were ten trials, presented to children in a fixed 
order. Four were test trials and six were filler trials. In one of the test trials, the three 
characters attempt to open two boxes, the blue box and the black box. In the story, 
Pikachu was the first one to attempt to perform the feat of opening those boxes. He 





Doraemon began his attempt, but he failed to open the blue box. He moved on to the 
black box, but he failed again. Anpan-man was the last one, and he failed to open the 
blue box. Nevertheless he did not give up, and managed to open the black box. The 
final outcome of the story is illustrated in (56): 
(56)     blue box  black box 
  Pikachu   √    √ 
  Doraemon   *    * 
  Anpan-man    *    √ 
 
 
At the end of the story, the experimenter manipulating toys and computer asked 
Kermit the Frog what happened in the story in the following way: 
(57) Ima-no ohanasi-wa, hako-o chounouryoku-de akeru ohanasi datta yo ne. 
  now-GEN story-TOP   box-ACC PSI power-inst    open  story      was  mood 
  "That was a story about opening boxes using PSI power, right?" 
  Nani-ga okotta ka na? 
  what-NOM happened Q 
  "What happened?" 
 
Responding to the experimenter's question, Kermit stated what he thought happened 
on the trial, using the test sentences in (58): 
(58) Aoi hako mo Kuroi hako mo Pikachu-dake-ga aketa 
  both blue box and black box Pikachu-only-NOM opened 
  "Both the blue box and the black box, only Pikachu opened" 
 
 
Note that the lead-in by the experimenter only mentions the boxes, and does not say 
anything about the agents of opening the boxes. This is because we wanted to control 
the discourse structure so that the test sentence with scrambling can be used 
felicitously. Generally speaking, scrambled phrases express old information in the 





and accordingly the subject of the test sentence expresses new information, while the 
object corresponds to old information. This feature of the discourse structure 
motivates the use of scrambled word order in the test sentence. 
 Under the surface scope interpretation of the test sentence (58), the conjunction 
operator takes wider scope than dake, and the test sentence means that "for both the 
blue box and black box, only Pikachu opened it". Under this interpretation the 
sentence is false in the situation in (56), because Anpan-man also opened the black 
box. In contrast, the inverse "reconstructed" interpretation makes the sentence true in 
the same situation. The inverse scope interpretation asserts that everyone other than 
Pikachu didn’t open both of the boxes, which is indeed the case in (56). The surface 
scope interpretation is the only interpretation that is available for adults, and therefore 
adult speakers should reject the test sentence in the situation. Children should do the 
same if they obey the same restriction on scope-reconstruction as adults. However if 
children lack the restriction, then they should accept the test sentence, just as they did 
in our previous experiment using canonical-order test sentences.  
 The experimental stories initially proceed in the way that is consistent with the 
surface scope interpretation of the corresponding test sentence until the last moment 
(e.g., until Anpan-man opened the black box). Thus, the surface scope interpretation 
of the test sentence was almost true in the stories. This structure of the experimental 
stories has the function of making the surface scope interpretation plausible, 
satisfying the Condition of Plausible Denial (e.g., Crain and Thornton 1998).   
 16 Japanese children (Age 4;11-5;10, Mean 5;6) and 16 Japanese adults 





Kindergarten and Takamori Meisen Kindergarten in Sendai, and were tested 
individually. The adult participants are undergraduate and graduate students of 
Tohoku University. The adult group watched a video-taped version of the TVJT 
experiment, and was tested in small groups (1 to 4 participants at a time). All 




 The results from the experiment are analyzed in terms of the acceptance rate of 
the crucial test sentences. These percentages are presented in the table and the figure 
below. 




































As shown in the figure, the acceptance rates from children and adults showed a sharp 





(Wilcoxon Signed Ranks, Z = 3.945. p < 0.01). The fact that adults rarely accepted 
the test sentence (5/64 trials) suggests that the inverse scope/reconstructed 
interpretations of the test sentences are indeed impossible for adult Japanese speakers. 
In contrast, children are a lot more lenient about accepting the test sentences in the 
experiment (accepting them in 49/64 trials), and the distribution of individual 
response patterns is bimodal. Three children were adultlike in that they consistently 
rejected the test sentence, and the remaining 13 children consistently accepted the test 
sentence (94.2% acceptance, 49/52). In order to determine if this high acceptance rate 
truly reflected children's ability to access the inverse scope interpretation, we decided 
to run two additional control experiments. 
2.5.6 Control experiments 
 
 First, let us consider the possibility that the children in the experiment had a 
problem with interpreting the focus operator dake. Previous research on the 
acquisition of the focus operator only in English have often reported that young 
children frequently assigned non-adult interpretations to sentences that involve only. 
For example, Crain et al. (1994) observed that children often associate pre-subject 
only with VP, and interpret, for example, only John speaks Spanish as meaning that 
John only speaks Spanish. On the other hand, Paterson et al. (2003) argued that 
children sometimes ignored only in a given test sentence. Under the "VP-oriented 
interpretation", our test sentences would mean something like "Pikachu only opened 
both the blue box and the black box". If children were ignoring dake, then the test 
sentence in (58) should have been interpreted as meaning "Pikachu opened both the 





sentence true in the test condition illustrated in (56). In order to determine whether 
the high acceptance of the test sentences in the original experiment was due to those 
non-adult interpretations of the focus operator, we conducted a control experiment 
using a slightly different experimental condition, which is illustrated in (60): 
(60)     blue box  black box 
  Pikachu   √    √ 
  Doraemon   *    * 
  Anpan-man    √    √ 
 
 
In this situation, Pikachu and Anpan-man opened both the blue box and the black box. 
Therefore, the test sentence in (58) is false under the inverse scope/reconstructed 
interpretation: the interpretation asserts that Pikachu was the only individual who 
opened both of the boxes, but in reality Anpan-man also opened both of the boxes. In 
contrast, the possible non-adult interpretations of the focus particle dake continue to 
make the sentence true. Under those interpretations, what Anpan-man did does not 
affect the truth value of the test sentence. Thus, if the high acceptance rate of the test 
sentence in the original experiment was due to non-adult interpretations of dake, then 
children should continue to accept the test sentence in the control experiment as often 
as they did in the original experiment. 
 The control experiment used exactly the same materials as the original experiment, 
except for the changes in the crucial conditions as illustrated in (60). 12 Japanese 
children (Age 5;1-5;10, Mean 5;4) participated in the control experiment. Those 
children were recruited in Miyagi Gakuin Kindergarten and Takamori Meisen 





 The results were quite straightforward: children never accepted the test sentences 
in the control experiment (0/48). The results clearly show that the non-adult behavior 
in the original experiment was not caused by children's problems with dake. 
 Another possible source of the non-adult behavior in the original experiment is 
adherence to a non-adult strategy in interpreting the test sentences. Recall that in the 
crucial conditions of the original experiment, there were always two objects on which 
the main characters attempted to perform some feat. Given this structure of the 
experimental stories, children might have considered the goal of the "PSI-
demonstration" to be to successfully perform a feat with both of the objects. In the 
situation in (56), Pikachu was the only one who achieved such a goal. If children 
were using a strategy of making judgments on the basis of who achieved the goal, the 
strategy should have made them accept the test sentence in the original experiment, 
but reject the same sentence in the first control experiment. For those children who 
were resorting to the strategy, the test sentence should have meant something like 
"only Pikachu succeeded / won" (where success/winning means opening both of the 
boxes, etc.), and the conjunction phrase was effectively ignored.  
 In order to test this possibility, the second control experiment modified the lead-
ins and the test sentences, replacing the object conjunction phrase with a null 
argument: 
(61) Ima-no ohanasi-wa, hako-o chounouryoku-de akeru ohanasi datta yo ne. 
  now-GEN story-TOP   box-ACC PSI power-inst    open  story      was  mood 
  "That was a story about opening boxes using PSI power, right?" 
  Dare-ga sono hako-o aketa ka na? 
  who-NOM that box-ACC opened Q 
  "Who opened those boxes?" 





  Pikachu-only-NOM opened 
  Lit. "Only Pikachu opened" 
 
 
If children are using the strategy of making judgment on the basis of who successfully 
did a feat with both of the objects, the modification on the test sentence should not 
affect their behavior. The modification simply took out the object phrase which had 
already been ignored20 if children were resorting to the strategy.  
 The second control experiment used exactly the same materials as the original 
experiment, except for the changes in the crucial test sentences as illustrated in (61) 
and (62). 16 Japanese children (Age 5;0-5;11, Mean 5;5)  participated in the control 
experiment. Those children were recruited in Miyagi Gakuin Kindergarten and 
Takamori Meisen Kindergarten, Sendai. They were tested individually.  
 The results showed a clear contrast with the results from the original experiment: 
Children's acceptance rate of the crucial test sentences like (62) were only 14% (9/64). 
The difference between the original group and the second control group was 
statistically significant (Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Z = 3.541, p < 0.01). The contrasting 
performances of children in the two groups strongly suggest that they were not 
ignoring the object of the crucial test sentences. The following figure summarizes 
                                                 
 
20 The exact interpretation of (62) is hard to specify. The antecedent of the null argument in the test sentence is 
the NP sono hako "that box" in the lead-in (61), which is ambiguous between singular and plural interpretations. 
The lack of a grammatical number system in Japanese makes it hard to control the interpretation of the antecedent 
NP, and consequently, the interpretation of the null argument in the test sentence. In theory, the sentence should be 
able to mean "only Pikachu opened the box" or "only Pikachu opened those boxes" but the former interpretation is 
pragmatically odd, because it is not clear which of the two boxes the box refers to. Adult Japanese speakers have a 
strong intuition that the sentence (62) is false under the situation in (56), suggesting that only those interpretations 
that make the test sentence false under the situation are available to adult speakers. In any case, this possible 
ambiguity of the null object should not matter for our current purpose. The control experiment aims to determine 
whether children were ignoring the object of the test sentences, and if they were indeed doing so, the null object 





children’s acceptance rate of crucial test sentences in the main and control 
experiments: 
(63) Figure 3: percentages of children’s acceptances of crucial test sentences in the  



































 In sum, the results of the two control experiments did not support the alternative 
explanations for children's non-adult behavior in the original experiment. Given this, I 
conclude that the non-adult behavior was in fact due to the availability of the inverse 
scope/reconstructed interpretation to (a vast majority of) children. Thus, we once 
again obtained evidence that Japanese children accessed inverse scope interpretations 
that Japanese adults do not allow. This in turn provides additional evidence that 
children do not rely on a conservative learning strategy in discovering what scope 
interpretation is impossible. At the same time, these findings call for a non-
conservative learning mechanism that allows children to recover from 





 2.6 Freedom of Scope 
 
 Our experimental results have revealed that Japanese children access inverse 
scope interpretations that Japanese adults do not allow. Let us call the scope 
flexibility that Japanese children showed in our experiments Freedom of Scope. In 
this section, I will consider the nature of Freedom of Scope by comparing it with 
children’s non-adult behaviors observed in other studies on the acquisition of scope 
interpretations. The main question is whether or not Freedom of Scope can be 
reduced to an instance of a previously observed non-adult scope behavior by young 
children. 
 Studies on children’s interpretations of quantificational sentences have revolved 
around non-adult responses that children produce under certain experimental 
conditions. In the 1990s, children’s non-adultlike behavior with universally quantified 
sentences attracted much attention (e.g., Crain et al. 1996; Drozd and Philip 1993; 
Drozd and van Loosbroek 1998; Philip 1995; Phillip and Aurelio 1991, among 
others). Various studies showed that when presented with a sentence like “is every 
boy riding a pony?” with a picture showing three boys on a pony with an extra rider-
less pony, 3-5 year-olds often respond “no”, pointing to the extra pony (e.g., Philip 
1995; cf. Inhelder and Piaget 1964). This non-adult behavior is often referred to as 
symmetrical response, and the source of this non-adult behavior is still under active 
debate (e.g., Drozd 2000; Gualmini et al. 2003; Philip and Lynch, 2000). 
 The debate bears a relevance to the question as to whether children’s CSS is the 
same as adults’ CSS. One possibility is that children derive inverse scope 





quantificational argument. Under this view, it is possible to maintain that the syntactic 
(i.e., LF) representations that underlie children’s inverse scope interpretations are 
identical to corresponding representations in adults’ grammar. Another possibility is 
that children’s grammar allows more freedom in syntax-semantics mapping than 
adults’ grammar does in the sense that it allows a quantificational element to take 
scope independently of its syntactic position. The latter view has often been proposed 
as an account for children’s symmetrical responses. For example, Philip (1995) 
argues that children’s grammar may allow the determiner every in sentences like 
every boy is riding an elephant to quantify over events, rather than over individuals. 
If such event quantification by a determiner is possible, then our test sentence 
someone ate every food would yield truth conditions that are not distinguishable from 
the inverse scope interpretation by adults.21  
 The latter view, however, has faced some serious empirical challenges. First, it 
has often been observed that the symmetrical response by children can be reduced 
significantly by simply manipulating experimental design (Crain et al. 1996; Sugisaki 
and Isobe 2001; Gouro et al. 2002). The results have been taken as showing that the 
non-adultlike behavior of children is not due to their grammar, but is an experimental 
artifact. Moreover, Gualmini et al. (2003) observed that children assigned different 
interpretations to or within the first argument (i.e., the restriction) and the second 
argument (i.e., the nuclear scope) of every. This is unexpected if children interpret 
every as taking sentential scope, as predicted by the Event Quantification Account by 
                                                 
 
21 Under Philip’s (1995) theory, the truth condition with event quantification by every is analyzed as follows: 
For every event e in which either an animal or a food participates, or which is a possible sub-event of an animal-
eating-a-food, an animal ate a food e. This truth condition makes the test sentence true in the crucial test condition, 





Philip. In addition, in computing scope relations between negation and a 
quantificational element, children are found to be sensitive to abstract syntactic 
notions such as c-command (Lidz and Musolino 2002; Gualmini and Crain 2005). In 
short, there is evidence that children’s scope interpretations are constrained by 
syntactic configurations. Given these empirical problems with the latter view, I am 
led to assume that children’s grammar do not allow a quantificational element to take 
scope independently of its syntactic position, and consequently, that children use the 
same mechanism as adults in deriving inverse scope interpretations. 
 In the 2000s, more direct interest in the acquisition of scope relations was brought 
about by a study by Musolino et al. (2000) that claimed that young children's scope 
interpretations are restricted to those that match surface word orders. In their TVJT 
experiments, Musolino et al. found that young children often failed to assign inverse 
scope readings to test sentences like those in (64): resulting in a failure to accept a 
sentence like (64), for example, in a situation where the detective found two of his 
friends but missed one.  
(64) a. The detective didn’t find someone/some guy 
 
  b. Every horse didn’t jump over the fence 
 
 
In their experiments, young children often failed to accept a sentence like (64)a in a 
situation where the detective found two of his friends but missed one. Similarly, (64)b 
was rejected by children in a situation where two of the horses jumped over the fence 
but the other one didn’t. Children’s justifications of their negative judgments 
suggested that they were adhering to “isomorphic” scope interpretations, the 





of Isomorphism. Lidz and Musolino (2002) extended these findings to Kannada, a 
language with SOV word order. They found that Kannada-speaking children have the 
same problem as English-speaking children in accessing wide-scope interpretations of 
object quantifiers, despite the difference in word order – negation follows the object 
in Kannada. Given this, Lidz and Musolino argued that children's scope 
interpretations are constrained by surface c-command relations between negation and 
quantifiers, not by linear word order. 
 In more recent experimental work, however, it has been found that children's 
performance with negation-quantifier scope interpretations is greatly improved by 
implementing certain changes in the context in which these sentences are presented. 
For example, Gualmini (2003) found that children showed significantly less difficulty 
in accepting the inverse scope interpretation of sentences like (64)a when these 
negative sentences are used to point out the discrepancy between a contextual 
expectation and what actually happened. Musolino and Lidz (2002) also showed that 
children’s performance on inverse scope is greatly improved when negative test 
sentences are preceded by a positive lead-in (e.g., Every horse jumped over the fence 
but every horse didn’t jump over the barn), possibly illustrating the same 
phenomenon. In light of these new findings, there is an emerging consensus that the 
original observation of isomorphism is not due to a problem in children’s 
representations. In other words, children do not lack the grammatical device that 
inverts scope of quantificational elements (i.e., CSS in our terms), and therefore they 
are able to construct inverse scope representations, provided that the experimental 





 Given the conclusion that children have the ability to compute non-isomorphic 
scope interpretations, the remaining question about the Observation of Isomorphism 
is why they do not systematically use this ability. One background assumption of the 
TVJT is that when a given test sentence is ambiguous to the participant, s/he respects 
the Principle of Charity (the bias to give the speaker credit for speaking truthfully 
whenever that is possible) and chooses the interpretation that makes the sentence true 
(e.g., Crain and Thornton 1998). However, for children who show the adherence to 
isomorphic interpretations, the Principle of Charity appears to be overridden by some 
independent factor, given the assumption that their grammar generates inverse scope 
interpretations. Several proposals have been made about the overriding factor. 
Musolino and Lidz (2003; 2005) suggest that the computation of non-
isomorphic/inverse scope interpretations involves revision of the initial syntactic 
parse of a sentence, and the processing cost involved in the reanalysis process is so 
high for children that it sometimes outweighs the Principle of Charity. Following 
Hulsey et al. (2004), we call this view Isomorphism-by-Default. Hulsey et al. (2004), 
in contrast, argue that children do not consider the scope interpretation that does not 
addresses the question under discussion in a given experimental context. The crucial 
factor under this view is the pragmatic felicity of the possible scope interpretations, 
and the "isomorphism bias" results only when the non-isomorphic interpretation 
happens to be pragmatically infelicitous. The pragmatic principle that determines the 






 It is clear that the Observation of Isomorphism and the Freedom of Scope effect 
encompass quite different problems. The problem of isomorphism is that children 
sometimes fail to access the scope interpretations that their grammar can generate. In 
contrast, the problem of the Freedom of Scope is that children fail to avoid accessing 
scope interpretations that are prohibited in their target language (i.e., Japanese). 
Nonetheless, it is worthwhile to consider if we can develop a uniform explanation for 
those non-adult behaviors. If we can argue that the same factor that biases children 
towards isomorphic interpretations also forced Japanese children to accept the non-
adult interpretations, then the two observations can be regarded as different 
manifestations of the same problem that children have.  
 The crucial test sentences in our experiments are repeated here as (65) and (66). 
(65) a. Japanese 
   Dareka-ga dono tabemono mo tabeta 
   someone-NOM every food      ate 
   “Someone ate every food” 
 
  b. English 
   Someone ate every food 
(66) Aoi hako mo Kuroi hako mo Pikachu-dake-ga aketa 
  both blue box and black box Pikachu-only-NOM opened 
  "Both the blue box and the black box, only Pikachu opened" 
 
 
Both in canonical and scrambled word order, Japanese children accessed the inverse 
scope interpretations, i.e., the interpretations that do not match surface word 
order/hierarchical structure. Given this, it is clear that the Isomorphism-by-Default 
view cannot explain the Freedom of Scope effect: the non-adult interpretations that 
Japanese children accessed are non-isomorphic interpretations that should lead to 





children (and also English children/adults) did sometimes show a preference towards 
the isomorphic interpretation. In the experiment with canonical order sentences, 
Japanese children's acceptance rate of the inverse scope interpretation was around 
40%. The number resembles the typical acceptance rates of inverse scope 
interpretations that were taken as showing children's bias towards isomorphic 
interpretations (e.g., Musolino et al. 2000; Lidz and Musolino 2002). Thus, the 
processing cost that is involved in the computation of inverse scope interpretations 
may have affected Japanese children's performance, 22 but it cannot be the reason why 
Japanese children accessed the non-adult interpretations. 
 The QAR view requires a closer inspection. Let us consider each of our 
experiments in turn. First, in the "eating game" story, the goal is to win the prize by 
satisfying the two rules of the game. The question is then whether each animal group 
can satisfy the two rules. The Question under Discussion in Hulsey et al.'s (2004) 
sense would consist of the following two questions: 
(67) a. Were all the foods eaten? 
 
  b. Did everyone get to eat something? 
 
 
Given these questions, we now consider whether each of the interpretations of the test 
sentence addresses the questions. The two interpretations of the test sentence are 
paraphrased as (68)a and (68)b: 
                                                 
 
22 This line of reasoning would require careful elaboration of the notion of "processing cost". In normal cases of 
Isomorphism that involve negation and a quantifier, adults generally do not have problems in accessing inverse 
scope interpretations (but see Musolino and Lidz 2003), but in the current case, English adults showed the same 
degree of reluctance in accepting the inverse scope interpretation of the test sentences. Clearly, surface syntactic 
configuration is not the unique determining factor of the scope preference, and in order to account for the full 





(68) a. Surface scope 
   A specific individual ate all the foods 
 
  b. Inverse scope 
   Every food was eaten by someone 
 
 
The two interpretations equally addresses the question in (67)a: under either 
interpretation, the answer to (67)a is "no". The question in (67)b is a little more tricky. 
The surface scope interpretation straightforwardly addresses the question, but the 
inverse scope interpretation may not, if we allow the truth condition to be satisfied 
with a non-distributive model (i.e., each of the foods was eaten by someone, and that 
"someone" happens to be the same individual in each of the eating events). But in any 
case, the inverse scope interpretation either fails to address the question or addresses 
the question to the same extent that the surface scope interpretation does. In no 
circumstances does only the inverse scope interpretation satisfy the QAR. Thus 
according to the QAR, children should either show no scope bias at all or show a bias 
towards the surface scope interpretation.  As we have discussed, Japanese children 
did show a bias towards the surface scope interpretation, but the QAR does not 
explain why Japanese children nonetheless accessed the inverse scope interpretation 
as well. 
 Second, let us take the "opening-the-boxes" story as an example story from the 
second experiment. In the story, the intended Question under Discussion was 
something like (69)a, but as I pointed out in 3.3.3.3, children might have considered 
(69)b to be the underlying question. Let us consider both of those two possibilities. 
(69) a. Who opened each of the boxes? 
 







The surface and inverse scope interpretations of the test sentence are paraphrased in 
(70): 
(70) a. Surface scope 
   Only Pikachu opened the blue box, and only Pikachu opened the black  
   box 
 
  b. Inverse scope 
   Only Pikachu opened both of the boxes  
 
 
The surface scope interpretation addresses both of the questions in (69): the 
interpretation specifies who opened each of the boxes, and also who opened both of 
the boxes – it was Pikachu. In contrast, while the inverse scope interpretation 
addresses question (70)b, it does not address question (70)a: the interpretation does 
not specify the individuals who opened each of the boxes. Thus again, in no 
circumstances did only the inverse scope interpretation satisfy the QAR. Therefore, 
the QAR does not explain why Japanese children accessed the inverse scope 
interpretation of the test sentence. 
 In sum, neither Isomorphism-by-Default nor the QAR motivate Japanese 
children's bias towards non-adult scope interpretations. Given this, we conclude that 
Japanese children accessed the non-adult scope interpretations not because some 
independent factor biased them towards those interpretations, but because those 
interpretations were simply available to them (given the effect of the Principle of the 
Charity). This entails that Japanese children lack the language-specific restrictions 





Freedom of Scope cannot be subsumed under the non-adultlike scope bias of children 
that has been observed in previous research, and requires an independent treatment.  
2.7 A learnability problem 
 
 In this section, I consider the learnability problem that the freedom of scope poses 
to a theory of language acquisition. In Chapter 1, I reviewed the three components 
that create a learnability paradox, discussed in Pinker (1989). The three components 
are: (i) productivity, (ii) no negative evidence, and (iii) arbitrariness. With all the 
three components, an acquisition task presents a learnability paradox, making it 
impossible to explain. I argue that the first two components are undeniably present in 
the acquisition of scope rigidity in Japanese, and therefore, the third component must 
be denied in order to solve the learning problem.  
 First, given the freedom of scope observed in our experiments, it is now clear that 
Japanese children’s scope assignments are productive. The fact that children allowed 
inverse scope interpretations that adults do not allow suggests that they do not simply 
stick with scope interpretations that were exemplified in adult speech, that is, children 
are not conservative learners of possible scope interpretations. Rather, children’s 
grammar involves a mechanism that productively generates inverse scope 
interpretations (i.e., CSS): children's scope flexibility was observed both in canonical 
word order sentences and in scrambled word order sentences, with different 
combinations of quantifiers. Given this, it is necessary for Japanese children to learn 
how to expunge their non-adult scope interpretations.  
 The second component is no negative evidence. The relevant question here is 





interpretations that are impossible in the language. Within the current case, it is rather 
straightforward to assume that direct negative evidence is not available for the 
learners of scope rigidity in Japanese. Direct negative evidence against inverse scope 
could only arise when (i) the child uses a doubly-quantified sentence with intended 
inverse scope, (ii) the caretaker notices that the sentence does not match the situation 
under the surface scope interpretation, and (iii) the caretaker corrects the child in a 
way that the child can understand and remember. Such a situation is not likely to be 
common at all, and it is extremely unrealistic to assume that all Japanese children 
must encounter such a situation in order to acquire the adult grammar of scope. Given 
this, I conclude that direct negative evidence does not play a crucial role in making 
children abandon their non-adult inverse scope interpretations.  
 I now turn to the possibility of taking advantage of indirect negative evidence. 
Given the constraints on scope, it is presumably the case that Japanese adults do not 
use the relevant sentences with intended inverse scope interpretation. If a probabilistic 
learner can detect the lack of intended inverse scope in adult speech, then he may be 
able to use the absence of supporting evidence as evidence against his overly 
permissive grammar. In order to test this possibility empirically, it is necessarily to 
test a probabilistic learning model with realistic input data, as it has been pointed out 
that the success of a probabilistic learning model depends highly on the structure of 
the input data (e.g., Pearl 2007; Pearl and Lidz 2006). In this thesis, I am not going to 
seriously investigate the issue, as it is beyond the scope of this research. Nonetheless, 
I would like to give my current thoughts about the potential of probabilistic learning 





 A first potential problem for a probabilistic learning scenario is that it requires an 
assumption that children can reliably identify the intended scope interpretations of 
input sentences. As I pointed out in Chapter 1, input linguistic signals do not uniquely 
specify scope interpretations. Thus, given that children’s grammar overgenerates 
inverse scope interpretations, it seems possible that their grammar wrongly assigns 
inverse scope interpretations to random input sentences that are uttered with intended 
surface scope. In such a case, the learner must reject the inverse scope assignments, 
because it would lead to a “fabrication” of supporting evidence for inverse scope 
interpretations that would interfere with a probabilistic learning mechanism. However, 
it is not clear how the learner can reliably correct unintended inverse scope 
assignments. In order to do so, the situation in which the relevant sentence is uttered 
must explicitly contradict the learner’s generated inverse scope interpretation. This 
requires that the relevant sentence contains a specific combination of quantifiers with 
which only the surface scope interpretation makes the sentence true in the situation, 
but presumably input sentences are not restricted to those that contain such 
combinations of quantifiers. Moreover, the relevant sentence can be a description of 
events that the learner did not directly witness (e.g., the speaker describes a past event 
that occurred in the learner’s absence). In such a situation, the learner may lack any 
grounds to judge if the inverse scope interpretation truthfully describes the event. 
Furthermore, it is possible that the learner simply concludes that the speaker said 
something that is false, sticking to his wrong inverse scope interpretation. Given all 
these considerations, it is not straightforward to assume that the learner can reliably 





 A second problem for a probabilistic learning scenario is that potentially 
informative input data can be very sparse. First, only sentences that involve two overt 
quantificational arguments can be relevant to the learners of scope rigidity. Second, 
among the possible combinations of quantificational elements, only a small subset of 
them is informative for learners: for example, someone read a book is not informative, 
because the surface and inverse scope interpretations are truth-conditionally 
indistinguishable. The data sparseness problem is even more acute with scrambled 
sentences. Miyamoto and Nakamura’s (2005) corpus study revealed that in actual 
language use scrambled word order is much less frequent than canonical word order. 
This observation naturally leads to an expectation that scrambled sentences that are 
informative for learners of scope are accordingly rare.  Furthermore, some properties 
of Japanese make the problems even worse. Japanese does not have a grammatical 
distinction of number or definiteness. Thus, for example, a bare noun inu “dog” is 
four ways ambiguous: singular definite/indefinite, plural definite/indefinite. This 
ambiguity sometimes makes it impossible to uniquely determine scope relations. In 
English, the sentence “A dog ate every food” uttered in a situation where each food 
was eaten by a different dog can provide evidence for the inverse scope interpretation. 
The Japanese counterpart of the sentence, in contrast, does not unambiguously signal 
the necessity of inverse scope: assigning a (collective) plural interpretation to the 
subject inu makes the sentence potentially compatible with the situation under the 
surface scope interpretation. Therefore, it is possible that an adult uses the sentence 
with intended surface scope with a plural interpretation of the subject, and 





interpretation because he assigned a singular interpretation to the subject. Making the 
learner ignore such potentially ambiguous cases comes at the cost of significantly 
reducing the size of potentially informative input data, leading to an even worse data 
sparseness problem. 
 A third problem is that the grammar of Japanese does not completely exclude 
inverse scope interpretations. As I pointed out above, some scrambled sentences 
allow scope ambiguity. The relevant example is repeated here as (71): 
(71) Dareka-oi daremo-ga ti semeta 
  someone-ACC everyone-NOM criticized 
  Lit. “Someone, everyone criticized” 
  ∃>>∀ / ∀>>∃ 
 
 
Given this, children must learn to distinguish cases like (71) from cases that do not 
allow an inverse scope interpretation, such as (72): 
(72) [Furansugo mo supeingo mo]i Taroo-dake-ga ti hanasu 
  Lit. “Both French and Spanish, only Taroo speaks” 
  *ONLY >> BOTH / BOTH >> ONLY 
 
 
In order for a probabilistic learning mechanism to learn the contrast between (71) and 
(72), an absence of inverse scope interpretations with cases like (72) is not enough: it 
must be accompanied by substantial evidence for inverse scope interpretations in 
cases like (71). Otherwise, a probabilistic learning mechanism would simply conclude 
that there is no difference between (71) and (72) with respect to possible scope 
interpretations. However, there are several reasons to suspect that such positive 
evidence for inverse scope interpretations in cases like (71) is vanishingly rare. First, 





canonical order sentences. Second, given that the inverse scope interpretation of a 
scrambled sentence can be expressed by its canonical order counterpart, speakers are 
likely to choose to express the scope interpretation with the canonical order 
counterpart. Moreover, discourse factors that motivate scrambled word order can be 
incompatible with inverse scope interpretations. For example, scrambled word order 
can be felicitously be used when the scrambled phrase refers to an entity that has been 
introduced in the preceding discourse (i.e., old information). Thus, the sentence in 
(71) can be naturally used in the following context (e.g., Otsu 1994): 
(73) Dareka-ga okurete haitte-kita. 
 someone-NOM late  came-in 
 “Someone came in late” 
  Sono dareka-o daremo-ga semeta. 
  that someone-ACC everyone-NOM criticized 
  Lit. “That someone, everyone criticized” 
 
 
However, within the second sentence of (73), the scrambled indefinite refers to a 
specific individual (as the demonstrative shows) introduced in the preceding 
discourse, and therefore is not compatible with the distributive inverse scope 
interpretation. Thus, in discourse contexts where the speaker would choose to 
scramble an indefinite object, the scrambled indefinite would be likely to favor the 
surface scope interpretation. Thirdly, even if a child is fortunate enough to encounter 
such an exceptional example, evidence for inverse scope may only be obtained if the 
learner actually chooses to compute the interpretation, which may not always occur. 
Given all these considerations, I suspect that the actual probability of positive 





 If my conjecture about the low probability of positive evidence for inverse scope 
in scrambled sentences is correct, then probabilistic learning models would face a 
serious challenge in discriminating cases like (71) from cases like (72). The input data 
simply do not provide enough relevant cases that a probabilistic learning algorithm 
can work on, and the two hypotheses are not different with respect to the amount of 
supporting evidence they receive from the input. In short, the inherent sparseness of 
positive evidence for inverse scope may trivialize the significance of the absence of 
certain evidence. With sparse data, positive evidence for grammatically possible 
scope interpretations can be equally absent as positive evidence for grammatically 
impossible scope interpretations, making it impossible to distinguish the two classes 
of scope interpretations on the basis of absence of positive evidence. In other words, 
probabilistic comparisons of different data sets would not yield a reliable conclusion 
when the overall data size is so small.  
 Summarizing, given the specific properties of the relevant input and evidence 
taken by the learner, probabilistic learning of scope rigidity taking advantage of 
indirect negative evidence appears to be quite unreliable. This discussion is not to 
deny the general potential of probabilistic learning in some domains. Rather, for this 
particular domain of grammar, I do not yet see how a probabilistic learning account 
that relies on indirect negative evidence for inverse scope could provide a realistic 
model of the acquisition of the restrictions on CSS in Japanese, i.e., how Japanese 
children purge their non-adult inverse scope interpretations. 
 So far, I have pointed out that (i) Japanese children make overgeneration errors 





their non-adult interpretations, and (ii) input data do not provide reliable negative 
evidence (direct or indirect) against children’s non-adult interpretations, and therefore 
children cannot rely on negative evidence against a certain scope interpretation to fix 
their grammar. If the constraints on scope interpretation in Japanese are arbitrary in 
the sense that they are totally independent components of grammar and do not 
interact with any observable properties of the language, then the learnability problem 
becomes a learnability paradox: there seems to be no logical way to explain how 
Japanese children learn the scope grammar of Japanese. Accordingly, at least one of 
the three components must be denied to provide any account for the learning problem. 
Since the first two components are fairly well established, I choose to challenge the 
third component: arbitrariness. In the next chapter, I will examine CSS in Japanese 
and constraints imposed on the process, and propose an analysis that derives the 









 In the previous chapter, I reviewed the results of experimental investigations on 
Japanese children’s interpretations of sentences that contain two quantified arguments. 
The result show that Japanese children allow inverse scope interpretations that 
Japanese adults do not allow, raising a learnability problem. Children’s non-adult 
behaviors are unexpected under a conservative learning scenario, and demonstrate the 
need of some learning mechanism that allows children to figure out how to expunge 
their non-adult scope interpretations. In this connection, it is important to determine 
what exactly Japanese children need to learn. In section 2.7, I argued that negative 
evidence (direct or indirect) against certain scope interpretations is too unreliable and 
would not provide a basis for children to purge their non-adult scope interpretations. 
It must therefore be the case that the scope constraints in Japanese are related to some 
observable properties of the language. In other words, the interaction of grammatical 
properties of Japanese must make it be the case that the effects of the scope 
constraints are derived by learning some independently observable properties. 
 The main purpose of this chapter is to examine the nature of CSS in Japanese and 
the locus of the cross-linguistic contrast in possible scope interpretations. In section 
2.2 and 2.3,  I point out, on the basis of recently uncovered data, that i) scope 
interpretation in Japanese is not always rigid, and ii) scope interpretations in English 
are not always free. These observations will lead us to conclude that the mechanisms 





reviews several proposed analyses of constraints on CSS, and combining those 
analyses together, I propose a theory of CSS in English and Japanese in section 2.5. 
Section 2.6 and 2.7 explore the possibility of attributing Japanese-specific restrictions 
on scope interpretations to some independent property of the language. In section 2.8, 
I come back to the learnability problem, and attempt to provide an account of the 
problem using the theoretical analysis of the language-specific constraints on scope 
interpretation. 
3.2 Not-so-rigid scope in Japanese 
 
In this subsection, we review cases in which Japanese sentences allow inverse scope 
interpretations. We restrict our attention to cases that are minimally different from 
typical examples that show the scope rigidity effect, and show that inverse scope 
readings become available either by replacing one quantifier by some other one, or by 
manipulating contexts without changing the quantifier combination. 
3.2.1 Specificity of the subject 
 
 Sentences like (74) are the paradigm case of scope rigidity in Japanese. Such an 
example typically uses the indefinite pronoun dareka as the subject, and the 
distributive universal dono X mo as the object. Native speakers’ judgment of this type 
of sentences is quite robust23: the inverse scope interpretation is disallowed. 
(74) Dareka-ga dono kyoujyu-mo hihan-sita 
 someone-NOM every professor criticize-did 
 “Someone criticized every professor” 
                                                 
 
23 Experimental investigations in Marsden (2004) and in the current project confirmed this. We will return to 





  *∀ >> ∃ 
 
 
Under the surface scope interpretation, the subject indefinite dareka receives a 
specific interpretation. That is, it presupposes that there exists a uniquely identifiable 
individual who admires every professor (although the speaker is not sure about the 
person’s identity: see 2.2.2)24 . However, replacing the subject quantifier with an 
indefinite that inherently lacks this kind of specific interpretation results in scope 
ambiguity25, as shown in (75): 
(75) a.  Hutari ijyou-no          gakusei-ga dono kyoujyu-mo hihan-sita 
     two greater-than-GEN student-NOM every professor  criticize-did 
    “More than two students criticized every professor”      
   ∀ >> more than two 
 
  b. Sannin ika-no              gakusei-ga dono kyoujyu-mo hihan-sita 
   three smaller-than-GEN student-NOM every professor criticize-did 
   “Less than three students criticized every professor”   
   ∀ >> less than three 
 
  c. Sukunakutomo hutari-no gakusei-ga dono kyoujyu-mo hihan-sita 
   at-least             two-GEN   student-NOM every professor  criticize-did 
   “At least two students criticized every professor”    
   ∀ >> at least two 
 
 
Modified numerical quantifiers such as hutari ijyou “more than two”, sannin ika “less 
than three”, and sukunakutomo hutari “at least two” do not specify the exact 
cardinality, thus do not ensure the unique identifiably of the referents26. In examples 
                                                 
 
24 This definition of specificity follows Haspelmath (1997). The concept of unique identifiability is akin to 
“numerical identity” by Croft (1983). 
25 Although my informants agreed that inverse scope interpretations are possible with the sentences in (75), they 
noted that the interpretations are still less preferred as compared to the corresponding surface scope interpretations.  
26 Note that the lack of unique identifiability, which by definition is the lack of specificity, does not preclude a 
non-distributive (that is, surface scope) interpretation of the sentences. See also fn. 29. In contrast, distributive 
interpretations do require a non-specific interpretation of indefinites. The value of distributively interpreted 
indefinites varies over the domain of quantification, and therefore does not pick up a unique referent 





with those quantifiers as the subject, inverse scope interpretations are much easier to 
obtain than in (74)27. The availability of inverse scope in sentences like (75) is a prima 
facie counterexample to theories that posit a constraint that blocks CSS in general in 
Japanese. But why does subject specificity matter for the availability of inverse 
scope? In fact, an apparently similar observation can be made in English. 
(76) a. Some student criticized every professor 
 
 b. At least two students criticized every professor 
 
 
Although the theoretical literature generally holds the view that inverse scope is 
possible with sentences like (76)a, actual judgments by native speakers are subject to 
variation, and there are individuals who find it relatively hard to assign an inverse 
scope interpretation to sentences like (76)a (e.g., Reinhart 1976). In contrast, 
sentences like (76)b elicit inverse scope interpretations quite easily and robustly.28 
Thus, we observe that subject specificity affects the relative ease of accessing inverse 
scope interpretations in English. In Japanese, on the other hand, subject specificity 
affects the basic availability of inverse scope.  
 Theories of the semantics of indefinites often argue that the specificity of 
indefinites is encoded in syntactic representations (e.g., Diesing 1993). Abstracting 
away from details for now, it is proposed that specific indefinites occupy a higher 
syntactic position than non-specific indefinites do. Under this theory of syntactic 
encoding of specificity, combined with the assumption that scope is determined by 
                                                 
 
27 Hayashishita (2004) discusses similar examples from a somewhat different perspective. Hayashishita focuses 
on the semantic property of the object QP, and argues that only quantificational expressions that can refer to a 
specific group can yield inverse scope interpretations (cf. Liu 1990). We will come back to this point. 





syntactic hierarchical orders that result from covert syntactic movement, it is possible 
to argue that the syntactic position that specific indefinites occupy is higher than the 
target landing site of a covert movement operation that raises the object QP. Non-
specific indefinites, in contrast, stay in a lower position than the target landing site. 
This approach may provide a successful description of syntactic representations that 
correspond to each of the possible interpretations, but it does not explain the cross-
linguistic contrast as is originally defined. Both English some and Japanese dareka 
allow non-specific interpretations as well as specific interpretations, drawing forth the 
conclusion that both of them can appear in the lower “non-specific position”. If so, 
the fact that dareka never allows another quantifier to take scope above it in sentences 
like (74) remains mysterious. The locus of the cross-linguistic contrast should thus 
reside somewhere else.  
3.2.2 Irrealis contexts 
 
 The last subsection presented a case where inverse scope becomes possible by 
replacing the subject with another QP. In the following subsections, we show that 
even with the original dareka + dono X mo combination, inverse scope becomes 
possible by some context manipulations. Observe in (77) that the subjunctive 
complement allows the inverse scope interpretation, as opposed to the factive 
complement clause in (78): 
(77) Taroo-wa [dareka-ga dono heya mo souji-suru youni] sita/meijita/negatta 
 Taroo-TOP someone-NOM every room clean-do  COMP  made sure/order/hope 
 “Taroo made sure/ordered/hoped that someone would clean every room” 
 OK∀ >> ∃ 





 Taroo-TOP someone-NOM every room clean-do COMP acc saw 
 “Taroo saw someone cleaning every room” 
 *∀ >> ∃ 
 
 
(77) can be truthfully uttered in a situation where Taroo assigned a different person to 
every room so that each room would be cleaned by someone29. In contrast, (78) 
cannot be used to describe a situation where Taroo observed that each room was 
getting cleaned by a different person. In general, inverse scope becomes a lot easier to 
access in modal contexts that can be roughly categorized as “irrealis”: 
(79) a. Imperative/subjunctive 
  Dareka-ga dono heya mo souji-si nakereba naranai 
  someone-NOM every room clean-do unless      MOOD 
  “It is imperative that someone cleans every room” 
  OK∀ >> ∃ 
 
 b. Counterfactual/subjunctive 
  Dareka-ga dono heya mo souji-suru hazu datta 
  Someone-NOM every room clean-do MOOD COP-PAST 
  “Someone should have cleaned every room” 
  OK∀ >> ∃ 
 
 c. Assumptive 
  (Sonouchi)            dareka-ga dono heya mo souji-suru darou 
  (In the meantime)  someone-NOM every room clean-do MOOD 
  “I assume someone will clean every room in the meantime” 
  OK∀ >> ∃ 
 
 d. Speculative 
  (Sonouchi)   dareka-ga dono heya mo souji-suru ka-mo shirenai 
  (in the meantime)  someone-NOM every room clean-do COMP-also MOOD 
  “It is possible that someone will clean every room in the meantine” 
  OK∀ >> ∃ 
 
                                                 
 
29 The sentence is in fact three ways ambiguous. In one reading, dareka takes the widest scope and is 
interpreted as specific, meaning that there is a uniquely identifiable individual x such that Taroo made sure x 
would clean every room. Another reading does not presuppose the existence of unique referent of dareka, while 
dareka takes wider scope than the universal quantifier: Taroo made sure that one person would clean every room, 
without specifying who the person is. This reading shows that non-specific indefinites can take scope over 






In contrast, contexts of the “realis” variety generally resist inverse scope assignment: 
(80) a. Factive 
  Taroo-wa [dareka-ga dono heya mo souji-sita koto]-ni kizuita 
  Taroo-TOP someone-NOM every room clean-did COMP DAT realized 
  “Taroo realized that someone cleaned every room” 
  *∀ >> ∃ 
 
 b. Non-factive/indicative 
  Taroo-wa [dareka-ga dono heya mo souji-sita to] shuchou-sita 
  Taroo-TOP someone-NOM every room clean-past COMP claim-did 
  “Taroo claimed that someone cleaned every room” 
  *∀ >> ∃ 
 
 c. Implicative 
  Dareka-ga dono heya mo souji-site noketa 
  someone-NOM every room clean-do managed 
  “Someone managed to clean every room” 
  *∀ >> ∃ 
 
 
These contrasts are reminiscent of the effect of subject specificity seen above. In 
prototypical realis contexts, indefinites have a strong tendency to have a specific 
interpretation, and in languages that make morphological distinctions between 
specific and non-specific indefinites, the non-specific series are generally excluded 
from those contexts. Irrealis contexts, in contrast, easily allow a non-specific 
interpretation of indefinites and morphologically non-specific indefinites to appear 
(Croft 1983; Haspelmath 1997). Note, however, that these observations do not entail 
that realis contexts completely exclude non-specific indefinites. As long as a non-
specific interpretation of an indefinite yields an informative set of truth conditions for 
the sentence, realis contexts tolerate that interpretation. Such is the case, in particular, 





affirmative declarative (i.e., a prototypical realis) sentence in (81), the indefinite 
dareka can easily have a non-specific, distributive interpretation.  
(81) Dono gakusei mo dareka-o hihan-sita 
 every student       someone-ACC criticize-did 
  “Every student criticized someone” 
 
 
 The contrast between (77)/(79) and (78)/(80) makes it tempting to relate subject 
specificity with the availability of inverse scope interpretation. However, we cannot 
attribute the unavailability of inverse scope in (78)/(80) to, for example, the 
unavailability of a non-specific interpretation of the subject, due to some pragmatic 
felicity conditions. If the inverse scope interpretation were indeed possible, the 
subject dareka with a non-specific interpretation could provide pragmatically 
felicitous truth-conditions. Thus, there has to be an independent mechanism that 
imposes a specific interpretation on irrealis subjects in Japanese. The remaining 
question, then, is why the contexts in (77)/(79) obviate the effect of such a 
mechanism. 
3.2.3 Implausible surface interpretation 
 
 As I alluded to above, inverse scope interpretations in English are subject to 
varying judgments. One contextual factor that has been known to affect scope 
interpretations is the plausibility of the available interpretations. The example (82) is 
originally due to Hirschbühler (1982), and was discussed by Reinhart (1995; 2006) 
with regard to its scope possibilities: 







The surface scope interpretation of the sentence describes an implausible situation 
where a single specific flag is hanging over in front of different buildings. Reinhart 
points out that inverse scope is much easier to access in such contexts where surface 
scope results in a contextually and/or pragmatically implausible interpretation.  
 A parallel contextual manipulation in Japanese affects the basic availability of 
inverse scope. While keeping the same quantifier combination (dareka + dono X mo), 
the sentence in (83) allows the inverse scope interpretation: 
(83) Dareka-ga        dono biru no mae-ni mo tat-teiru 
 someone-NOM every building front-DAT also stand-ing 
 “Someone is standing in front of every building” 
  OK∀>>∃ 
 
 
A possible confounding factor with (83) is that the universally quantified NP may be 
an adjunct, rather than an argument. The next example controls this point, using a 
verb that takes an accusative-marked argument: 
(84) (Choudo ima) dareka-ga  dono oudan hodou mo watat-teiru 
 right now       someone-NOM every crosswalk      cross-ing 
 “Right now, someone is crossing every crosswalk” 
 OK∀>>∃ 
 
  cf. dareka-ga kono oundan hodou-o watat-teiru 
   someone this crosswalk-ACC           cross-ing 
   “Someone is crossing this crosswalk” 
 
 
Compare (84) with (85), in which the past/perfect tense makes the surface scope 
interpretation implausible. I assume that this is because with the past/perfect tense, 





person to have crossed every crosswalk, with each crossing event occurring 
separately. 
(85) Dareka-ga  dono oudan hodou mo watatta 
 someone-NOM every crosswalk      crossed 




While the inverse scope interpretation of (84) is possible, (85) only allows the surface 
scope interpretation. Thus, an implausible surface scope interpretation makes 
corresponding inverse scope interpretation possible for Japanese speakers. In short, 
the plausibility of the surface scope interpretation affects the relative ease of 
accessing inverse scope in English, and the basic availability of inverse scope in 
Japanese. 
3.3 Not-so-free scope interpretations in English and Japanese 
 
 So far we have observed that inverse scope in Japanese is not totally impossible. 
Even with a minimal manipulation on the subject quantifier or on the context, inverse 
scope interpretations surface in the language. These observations necessarily lead to 
the conclusion that some kind of CSS is operative in Japanese. This conclusion, 
however, does not entail that CSS in Japanese is the same as CSS in English: the two 
languages might make use of two distinct mechanisms that derive inverse scope in a 
different way. In the following subsections, I consider how Japanese and English CSS 
are different. I will first review cases in English where inverse scope is disallowed. 
Each case will be followed by an examination of the corresponding Japanese 









 One well-known constraint on inverse scope (of non-indefinite quantifiers) in 
English is that it does not expand the scope of a quantifier out of certain syntactic 
domains. For example, a universal quantifier embedded in a complex NP, in an 
indirect question, and in an adverbial clause cannot take scope over the matrix subject. 
(86) a. Someone met the child that talked to everyone 
 
  b. Someone wondered whether I talked to everyone 
 
  c. Someone left the meeting before I talked to everyone 
   *∀ >> ∃             (Johnson 2000) 
 
 
The domains that trap the scope of everyone inside the lower clause in (86) are the 
domains that block overt movement: syntactic islands. Such a correlation between 
inverse scope and overt movement is often taken as an argument for the approach that 
claims that CSS is essentially invisible syntactic movement (e.g., May, 1977). I now 
seek to find out whether Japanese CSS respects the same kind of constraints. 
 The first point we need to confirm is that Japanese covert scope-shifting can in 
principle cross a clause boundary, because otherwise it would be pointless to ask 
whether it can cross syntactic islands, which typically involve a clause boundary. I 
use syntactic causative construction in Japanese as a test. The causative construction 
in Japanese is productively formed by putting the causative morpheme –(s)ase onto a 





(87) Simple transitive 
 Hanako-ga heya-o souji-sita 
 Hanako-NOM room-ACC clean-did 
 “Hanako cleaned a/her room” 
(88) Causative 
 Taroo-ga [Hanako-ni heya-o souji-s]-ase-ta 
 Taroo-NOM Hanako-DAT room-ACC clean-do-cause-past 
 “Taroo made Hanako clean a/her room” 
 
 
The embedded subject of the causative construction is marked by dative ni. Thus, the 
surface array of case-marked NPs in causative constructions is superficially identical 
with that of ditransitive constructions, as in (89): 
(89) Ditransitive 
 Taroo-ga Hanako-ni shashin-o ageta 
 Taroo-NOM Hanako-DAT picture-ACC gave 
 “Taroo gave Hanako a picture” 
 
 
However, the two constructions are structurally distinct. One well-known test is 
zibun-binding. Japanese zibun “self” is an anaphor that must be bound by a subject 
(e.g., Kuroda 1965). For example, in (90) zibun can be bound by the subject Taroo, 
but not by the object Hanako30: 
(90) Tarooi-wa Hanakoj-o zibuni/*j-no gakusei-ni shoukaisita 
 Taroo-TOP Hanako-ACC self-GEN student-DAT introduced 
 “Taro introduced Hanako to his/*her student 
 
The fact that the ni marked argument in the causative can bind zibun suggests that it 
has a property of subjects: 
(91) Causative 
 Tarooi-ga [Hanakoj-ni zibuni/j-no heya-o souji-s]-ase-ta 
                                                 
 





 Taroo-NOM Hanako-DAT self-GEN room-ACC clean-do-cause-past 
 “Taroo made Hanako clean his/her room” 
(92) Ditransitive 
 Tarooi-ga Hanakoi-ni zibuni/*j-no shashin-o ageta 
 Taroo-NOM Hanako-DAT self-GEN picture-ACC gave 
 “Taroo gave Hanako his/*her picture” 
 
 
Given this contrast, it would be reasonable to assume that the causative construction 
has a bi-clausal structure, with the ni marked argument serving as the embedded 
subject.  
 Now we turn to inverse scope in causatives. As in (93), in a simple declarative 
context the embedded object QP does not scope out of the embedded clause, resulting 
in the impossibility of the inverse scope interpretation: 
(93) Dareka-ga [Taroo-ni dono heya mo souji-s]-ase-ta 
 someone-NOM Taroo-DAT every room clean-do-cause-past 
  “Someone made Taroo clean every room” 
  *∀ >> ∃ 
 
 
This just replicates the so-called scope rigidity effect in Japanese. What is interesting 
here is that the inverse scope interpretation can be made possible by embedding the 
sentence in an irrealis context: 
(94) Hanako-wa   dareka-ga    [Taroo-ni dono heya mo souji-s]-aseru     youni sita 
 Hanako-TOP someone-NOM Taroo-DAT every room clean-do-cause    COMP made 
  “Hanako made sure that someone would make Taroo clean every room” 
  OK∀ >> ∃ 
 
 
This observation establishes that Japanese CSS can cross a clause boundary, with an 





scope, even within a simple clause). Given this, whether or not Japanese CSS obeys 
island constraints now becomes a meaningful question.  
 Relative clauses, indirect questions, and adverbial clauses in Japanese all show 
the properties of islands, blocking covert extraction of naze “why” (e.g., Huang 1982, 
Lasnik and Saito 1992): 
(95) Relative clause 
 *Taroo-wa [kono heya-o naze souji-sita] gakusei-o mituketa-no? 
  Taroo-TOP  this room-ACC   why clean-did  student-ACC found-Q 
  “Whyi did Taroo find the/a student [who cleaned this room ti]” 
(96) Indirect question 
 *Taroo-wa [Hanako-ga naze kono heya-o souji-sita kadouka] sitteiru-no? 
  Taroo-TOP  Hanako-NOM why this room-ACC clean-did whether know-Q 
  “Whyi did Taroo know [whether Hanako cleaned this room ti]” 
(97) Adverbial clause 
 *Taroo-wa [kono heya-o naze souji-suru mae]-ni gakkou-ni itta-no? 
  Taroo-TOP  this room-ACC why clean-do before-DAT school-DAT went-Q 
  “Whyi did Taroo go to school [before he cleaned this room ti]” 
 
 
The crucial test involves the following steps: (i) replace the matrix subject with 
dareka, (ii) replace the embedded object with dono X mo, and (iii) embed the whole 
sentence into an irrealis context: 
(98) Relative clause 
 Taroo-wa dareka-ga [dono heya mo souji-sita] gakusei-o mitukeru youni sita 
  Taroo-TOP someone-NOM every room clean-did student-ACC  find     COMP made 
  “Taroo made sure that someone would find a student who cleaned every   
  room” 
  *∀ >> ∃ 
(99) Indirect question 
 Taroo-wa dareka-ga [Hanako-ga dono heya mo souji-sita kadouka] sitteiru  
 Taroo-TOP someone-NOM Hanako-NOM every room clean-did whether know 
 youni sita 
  COMP did 
  “Taro made sure that someone knew whether Hanako cleaned every room” 





(100) Adverbial clause 
 Taroo-wa dareka-ga [dono heya mo souji-suru mae]-ni gakkou-ni iku youni  
  Taroo-TOP  someone-NOM every room clean-do before-DAT school-DAT go COMP  
  sita 
  made 
  “Taroo made sure that someone went to school before he cleaned every room” 
  *∀ >> ∃ 
 
 
In contrast with (94), inverse scope in (98)-(100) is strictly disallowed. A significant 
observation here is that dareka in (98)-(100) can easily be interpreted as non-specific: 
for example, (98) can mean that Taroo made sure that one person would find a 
student who cleaned every room, without specifying who the person is. Still, even 
when dareka receives a non-specific interpretation, it must take wider scope than 
dono X mo in (98)-(100). I thus conclude that the contrast between (94) and (98)-
(100) provides evidence that Japanese CSS obeys island constraints. In this respect, 
Japanese CSS is similar to English CSS.31 
3.3.2 Quantifiers that do not invert 
 
 Liu (1990, 1997), Beghelli (1995), and Beghelli and Stowell (1997) (also see 
Hayashishita 2004) discussed the scope behavior of modified numerals (e.g., more 
than five, fewer than five, at least two, etc.) and pointed out that those quantificational 
expressions may never scope over a certain type32 of QP in a hierarchically higher 
                                                 
 
31 Jeff Lidz (Personal Communication) correctly points out that there is a potential problem for the argument. 
English overt wh-movement and Japanese covert wh-movement are not identical: covert wh-movement of a wh-
argument in Japanese generally fails to show island sensitivity (e.g., Nishigauchi 1990; Lasnik and Saito 1995). 
Therefore, if I assume that inverse scope interpretations are derived by covert movement of the lower QP, then it 
amounts to the claim that covert movement of argument QPs shares some property only with covert movement of 
adjunct wh-phrases. However, I will not take this approach: In 3.5.1, I will propose a theory of CSS that assumes 
that reconstruction of A-moved subjects is crucially responsible for deriving inverse scope interpretations. Given 
that A-movement never crosses an island boundary, reconstruction of A-movement into an island never happens, 
both in Japanese and English.  
32 Beghelli and Stowell call this type of QPs Group-Denoting QPs (GQP). Under their definition, the class 





position. For example, in the following examples, modified numerals in the object 
position cannot take inverse scope: 
(101) Some/one of the students visited more than two girls. 
 *more than two >> ∃       (Beghelli and Stowell 1997: 83) 
  
 
In section 2.3.1.1, we observed that modified numerals in the subject position affect 
the basic availability of inverse scope in Japanese. In this section, we examine the 
scope behavior of Japanese modified numerals in the object position. 
 As a point of departure, let us examine the scope behavior of non-modified 
numerals in Japanese, such as itutu-no heya “five rooms”. Not surprisingly, in an 
affirmative declarative sentence, a bare numeral in the object position cannot scope 
over the subject. 
(102) Dareka-ga itutu-no heya-o souji-sita 
  someone-NOM five-GEN room-ACC clean-did 
  “Someone cleaned five rooms” 
  *FIVE>>∃ 
 
 
Thus the sentence is false when there are five persons who each cleaned a room. The 
inverse scope becomes possible, however, when the sentence is embedded within an 
irrealis context: 
(103) Taroo-wa   dareka-ga     itutu-no  heya-o souji-suru youni meijita 
  Taroo-TOP someone-NOM five-GEN room-ACC clean-did COMP ordered 
  “Taroo ordered that someone clean five rooms” 
  OKFIVE>>∃ 
 
 
The sentence in (103) can be interpreted as meaning that “Taroo ordered that it be the 





interpretation shows that Japanese CSS can shift the scope of itutu-no heya over the 
subject dareka in the sentence. Now, we replace the bare numeral with a modified 
numeral. The result is in (104): 
(104) Taroo-wa  dareka-ga   sukunakutomo itutu-no / itutu ijyou-no /  itutu ika-no  
  Taroo-TOP someone-NOM  at least five-GEN  more than five-GEN  less than five-GEN 
  heya-o souji-suru youni meijita 
  room-ACC clean-do COMP ordered 
  “Taroo ordered that someone clean at least five / more than five / less than  
  five rooms” 
  *at least five/more than five/less than five >> ∃ 
 
 
Inverse scope becomes unavailable: the sentence can only mean that it is Taroo’s 
intention that a single person clean at least five/more than five/less than five rooms. 
Thus, a parallelism between English and Japanese manifests itself again. CSS in both 
languages does not shift the scope of modified numerals. 
3.3.3 Scope freezing effect 
 
Double object constructions in English are curious in that they enforce “scope 
rigidity” over the two objects. In double object constructions the second object cannot 
take scope over the first object, even when the second object is a “wide-scope 
oriented” quantifier such as each (e.g., Bruening 2001). This phenomenon is dubbed 
“scope freezing”: 
(105) I gave a child each doll 
 *EACH >> A            (Bruening 2001: 234) 
(106) The teacher assigned one student every problem 







In the Japanese syntactic literature, the same phenomenon in Japanese has been 
widely acknowledged for quite a long time (e.g., Kuno 1973; Hoji 1985). However, 
this particular case has been considered as an instantiation of the general scope 
rigidity of the language, and therefore has not received an independent treatment (at 
least until Nakanishi, 2001a; 2001b). In the present context, however, this 
phenomenon deserves special attention. We have established the ways to override the 
general scope rigidity effect holding between the subject and the object of simple 
transitive constructions. I now move on to ask whether these manipulations can also 
circumvent the scope freezing scope effect in double object constructions.  
 As a baseline, let us first observe that in affirmative declarative ditransitive 
constructions in Japanese, the direct object cannot take scope over the indirect object 
when the surface word order is IO-DO: 
(107) Taroo-wa dareka-ni dono heya mo miseta 
  Taroo-TOP someone-DAT every room showed 
  “Taroo showed someone every room” 
  *∀>>∃ 
(108) Taroo-wa dareka-ni dono gakusei mo shoukai-sita 
  Taroo-TOP someone-DAT every student introduce-did 
  “Taro introduced every student to someone” 
  *∀>>∃ 
 
 
Now I apply the manipulations to the sentences. It turns out that neither using a non-
specific quantifier nor embedding into an irrealis context, or even a combination of 
both, make the inverse scope possible: 
(109) a. Nonspecific quantifier 
   Taroo-wa sukunakutomo hutari-no gakusei-ni dono heya mo miseta 
   Taroo-TOP at least              two-GEN  student-DAT every room  showed 





   *∀>>at least two 
 
  b. Irrealis context 
   Hanako-wa Taroo-ga dareka-ni dono heya mo miseru youni sita 
   Hanako-TOP Taroo-NOM someone-DAT every room show COMP made 
   “Hanako made sure that Taroo would show every room to someone” 
   *∀>>∃ 
 
  c. Nonspecific quantifier + irrealis context 
   Hanako-wa Taroo-ga sukunakutomo hutari-no gakusei-ni dono heya mo  
   Hanako-TOP Taroo-NOM at least           two-GEN  student-DAT every room 
   miseru youni sita 
   show  COMP made 
   “Hanako made sure that Taroo would show every room to at least two   
   students” 
   *∀>>at least two 
(110) a. Nonspecific quantifier 
   Taroo-wa sukunakutomo hutari-no sensei-ni dono gakusei mo shoukai-sita 
   Taroo-TOP  at least          two-GEN professor-DAT every student  introduce-did 
   “Taroo introduce every student to at least two professors” 
   *∀>>at least two 
 
  b. Irrealis context 
   Hanako-wa Taroo-ga dareka-ni dono gakusei mo shoukai-suru youni sita 
   Hanako-TOP Taroo-NOM someone-DAT every student introduce-do COMP made 
   “Hanako made sure that Taroo would introduce every student to someone” 
   *∀>>∃ 
 
  c. Nonspecific quantifier + irrealis context 
   Hanako-wa Taroo-ga sukunakutomo hutari-no sensei-ni dono gakusei mo  
   Hanako-TOP Taroo-NOM at least          two-GEN professor dat every student 
   shoukai-suru youni sita 
   introduce-do COMP made 
   “Hanako made sure that Taroo would introduce every student to at least  
   two professors” 
   *∀>>at least two 
 
 
Furthermore, these examples contrast with syntactic causative constructions, which 
have a superficially identical array of case-marked NPs with ditransitive constructions. 
When a causative sentence is embedded within an irrealis context, the object QP can 





(111) Hanako-wa Taroo-ga     dareka-ni       dono heya mo souji-s-aseru youni sita 
  Hanako-TOP Taroo-NOM someone-DAT every room clean-do-cause COMP made 
  “Hanako made sure that Taroo makes someone clean every room” 
  OK∀>>∃ 
 
 
Thus, the ditransitive constructions are indeed exceptional in that they never allow 
their objects to part in inverse scope interpretations. These observations would give 
us a ground for supposing that the scope freezing is operative in Japanese, 
independently of the general scope rigidity effect. 
3.3.4 Summary 
 
So far, our examination of Japanese scope interpretations has revealed two significant 
facts. First, inverse scope in Japanese can systematically be made available with a 
simple manipulation of a quantifier or contexts. This has led us to conclude that the 
grammar of Japanese is not completely immune to CSS. Second, constraints on 
English CSS systematically apply to Japanese CSS: we found no instance where 
Japanese CSS derives inverse scope in a context in which English CSS cannot shift 
the surface scope. Based on these observations, I argue that Japanese CSS and 
English CSS are governed by the same constraints, thereby inviting the conclusion 
that they are essentially the same kind of operation. A remaining puzzle which has 
been mentioned in passing is the original contrast that we began the discussion with: 
the unavailability of inverse scope in sentences like (74), which we repeat here as 
(112): 
(112) Dareka-ga dono kyoujyu-mo hihan-sita 
 someone-NOM every professor criticize-did 
 “Someone criticized every professor” 







In fact, our conclusion that the same mechanism governs inverse scope in both 
Japanese and English now highlights the significance of the original contrast. Why is 
it that Japanese CSS cannot shift the surface scope in sentences like (112)? This 
question now needs to be answered in a way that does not propose a fundamental 
distinction between Japanese CSS and English CSS. Our task for the next part is, then, 
to explain the original Japanese-English contrast by providing an independent 
mechanism that blocks inverse scope in certain restricted cases.  
3.4 Ways of restricting scope 
 
The goal of this section is to provide an account for the Japanese-English contrast 
shown in examples like (112). Before attempting to provide an explanation of the 
contrast, I first review some proposed theories of the constraints on English CSS. My 
purpose here is not to critically review those theories, and I will adopt many of them 
for an expository purpose, without committing to it. I then add my own theory for the 
Japanese-English contrast on top of those existing theories. 
3.4.1 Locality: CSS as syntactic movement 
 
 Since May (1977), many researchers have argued that CSS is a consequence of 
syntactic movement. An important background assumption for this variety of theories 
is that syntactic representations uniquely determine the relative scope of 
quantificational elements. That is, there are no “scope ambiguities” in the proper 
sense of the term, just structural ambiguities within a level of syntactic representation 





usually referred to as LF/Logical Form. The idea that inverse scope is derived via 
applications of syntactic movement naturally explains the fact that CSS cannot shift 
the scope of an element within a syntactic island: syntactic movements cannot move 
something across an island boundary. Although it is now well known that the possible 
ranges of overt movements and CSS do not completely overlap (e.g., Reinhart 1997, 
Johnson 2000), I regard the thesis that (at least some part of) CSS is a consequence of 
syntactic movement as still tenable. In what follows, I will simply adopt the thesis so 
that later discussion can be based on a specific theory that yields specific predictions. 
As was alluded to above, establishing a comprehensive theory of CSS is beyond the 
scope of this thesis. 
 There are, roughly, two variations of the actual implementation of the idea that 
CSS is a consequence of syntactic movements. Earlier approaches (e.g., May 1977, 
1985; Huang 1982) assumed that inverse scope is derived by raising operations that 
covertly move a QP across another one. A derivation that involves such a raising 
operation can be schematized as in (113). The raising operation is of course sensitive 
to island constraints, therefore the covert movement cannot shift the scope of an 
element that is embedded within an island. 
(113) [...QP1...[...QP2...]] 
       
  covert movement 
 
   [QP2[...QP1...[...t]]] 
 
 
The other version, first proposed by Hornstein (1995), argues that CSS is derived by 
reconstruction operations which in a sense “undo” applications of overt movements. 





movements) theories in the 1990s (e.g., Chomsky 1995). The crucial assumption is 
that DP arguments have their case checked in the specifier positions of functional 
projections that are distinct from their thematic positions. Thus in simple transitive 
constructions, for example, both the subject and the object overtly raise to functional 
projections above VP, leaving traces in their base positions. Inverse scope results 
from the reconstruction of the subject to its base position, without the reconstruction 
of the object. (114) schematizes such a derivation33: 
(114) [VP QP1[...QP2]] 
 
  overt A-movements 
 
  [QP1i...[QP2j...[VP ti[...tj]]]] 
 
  covert reconstruction 
  
  [...[QP2j...[VP QP1[...tj]]]] 
 
 
Under the reconstruction approach, the locality effect of CSS is reduced to the island 
sensitivity of overt movement: since no overt movement can move an element across 
an island boundary, there is no way to construct a chain across an island boundary, 
and therefore there is no possible reconstruction.  
 A catch of the reconstruction approach is that it eliminates the necessity of a 
covert movement operation that is specific to a certain semantically closed class of 
lexical items: quantificational elements (Hornstein 1995). Case-driven overt 
movement and covert reconstruction are, in contrast, independently motivated by the 
behavior of argument DPs in general. Although this reductionism is quite attractive, 
                                                 
 
33  The exact mechanism of reconstruction (i.e., whether it involves a lowering-type operation or LF deletion of 





especially from the standpoint of the Minimalist Program (e.g., Chomsky 1995; 
Hornstein 1995), some empirical facts pose a serious problem for the complete 
elimination of covert raising operations. Kennedy (1997), for example, pointed out 
that in so-called “inverse linking” (e.g., May 1985) cases, inverse scope cannot be 
reduced to case-checking A-movement: 
(115) I met a representative from every committee 
 
 
(115) can mean that for every committee, I met a representative from that committee. 
However, there seems to be no way to reduce the inverse scope interpretation to case-
checking movement and subsequent reconstruction: it is generally assumed that an 
NP in the complement of a preposition gets its case feature checked in situ, and hence 
no case-driven movement of every committee can be motivated.  Given these facts, I 
conclude that the strong reductionist position is not possible to maintain, and some 
kind of covert raising operation is necessary. This conclusion, however, does not 
completely exclude the possibility that some inverse scope patterns are derived via 
reconstruction. In fact, several studies maintain that reconstruction, rather than covert 
raising, is responsible for inverse scope between the subject and the object of 
transitive constructions, without denying the existence of covert raising. Such theories 
will be reviewed in the following subsections. 
3.4.2 Quantifiers that do not invert: decomposition and shortest movement 
 
 Recall that in 2.3.2.2, we observed that modified numeral objects do not take 





(116) Some student read more than five books 
 *more than five >> ∃          (Beghelli 1995: 48) 
 
 
A simple account for this fact would assume that those modified numerals do not 
undergo the syntactic movement that derives shifted scope readings. This account is 
incompatible with a Hornstein-type theory of A-movement-based CSS. In the A-
movement-based CSS theory, both the subject and the object move out of their VP 
internal positions to check their cases. Inverse scope results, as we saw, from 
applying reconstruction only to the subject. Thus, in order to block inverse scope with 
a modified numeral object, it is necessary to assume that DPs with modified numeral 
do not A-move to check their case – an assumption that does not seem to receive an 
independent motivation. In addition, even within an approach that assumes objects 
check their case-feature in situ (e.g., Chomsky 1981; 2000) and inverse scope is 
derived by covert raising, an important empirical problem arises. The problem 
concerns so-called Antecedent-Contained Deletion (ACD). 
 ACD is a specific version of VP-ellipsis in which an elided VP is structurally 
contained within its antecedent VP.  
(117) John [VP speaks every language that Mary does [VP e]] 
 
 
With this structure, an attempt to resolve the ellipsis in situ gives rise to an infinite 
regress. Because the antecedent VP includes the elided VP, ellipsis resolution 
targeting the antecedent VP ends up creating another elided VP once again, as in 
(118): 
(118) John [VP speaks every language that Mary does [VP speaks every language that  







A widely appreciated account of this puzzle (e.g., Kennedy, 1997; May, 1985; Larson 
and May 1990) argues that the ellipsis resolution involves a covert raising of the 
object QP that contains the elided VP. Once the object QP moves outside the 
antecedent VP leaving a variable bound by the moved object,34 the elided VP is no 
longer contained within its antecedent, and the ellipsis can successfully be resolved. 
(119) Covert raising 
  John [every language that Mary does [VP e]]i [VP speaks ti] 
 
  Ellipsis resolution 
  John [every language that Mary does [VP speaks ti]]i [VP speaks ti] 
 
 
Given this account, the ability to host ACD has often been used as a diagnosis for the 
availability of covert raising of the QP object. Takahashi (2006) points out that 
modified numerals can host ACD,35 and argues that this shows that modified numerals 
can be covertly raised outside of VP: 
(120) John speaks more than three of the languages that Mary does [speak t] 
                 (Takahashi 2006: 61) 
 
 
Let us adopt this argument and assume that modified numerals can be covertly raised. 
Under this assumption, in order to block the inverse scope interpretation in sentences 
like (116), we need an independent way to distinguish modified numerals from 
quantifiers that do invert, e.g., every. The ACD data suggest that as long as the 
                                                 
 
34 See Fox (2002) on the issue of how to reconcile this account with the copy theory of movement. 
35 Takahashi (2006: fn4) notes that (120) is degraded if the object QP is not partitive. This is a potential 
problem for the argument that modified numerals per se can license ACD, and hence, a problem for concluding 





availability of covert raising to outside of VP is concerned, the two classes are 
indistinguishable. 
 Beghelli (1995) and Beghelli and Stowell (1997) put forth an approach that posits 
different landing sites for different types of quantifiers. First, they classify 
quantifying expressions into five types: 
(121) QP types: Beghelli and Stowell (1997) 
  i. WhQPs: wh-phrases such as what, which men, etc. 
  ii. Negative QPs (NQPs): nobody, no man, etc. 
  iii. Distributive-Universal QPs (DQPs): every and each. 
  iv. Counting QPs (CQPs): decreasing QPs like few, at most six, and modified  
   numerals such as more than five, etc. 
  v. Group-Denoting QPs (GQPs): a, some, several and bare numerals 
 
 
Second, they posit an array of functional projections whose spec-position serves as a 
landing site for a specific type of QP: 
(122)   RefP 
   
  Spec   CP 
   
  GQP Spec   AgrS-P 
   
    WhQP Spec   DistP 
   
      CQP Spec   ShareP 
   
        DQP Spec   NegP 
   
          GQP Spec   AgrO-P 
   
            NQP     Spec   VP 
   
                  CQP    ... 
 







Beghelli and Stowell exploit this structure to capture various different scope facts, but 
let us restrict our attention to cases like (116). Here, the subject is a GQP, and the 
object is a CQP. The subject GQP must overtly raise to Spec-AgrSP to check its case, 
and from there it may further raise to Spec-RefP or reconstruct to Spec-ShareP. The 
object CQP, in contrast, can only raise to as high as Spec-AgrOP. Thus, there is no 
possible derivation in which the object CQP ends up in a higher position than the 
subject GQP. In contrast, an object DQP raises to Spec-DistP, and if the subject GQP 
reconstructs to Spec-ShareP, a configuration for inverse scope is obtained. In short, 
this account distinguishes between modified numerals (which do not invert) and 
distributive universals (which do invert) by postulating different final landing sites for 
the two types. One is higher than the lowest possible position of the subject (i.e., 
Spec-DistP), and the other is lower than that position (i.e., Spec-AgrOP). 
  A possible problem for this landing site theory is cases that concern scope 
interpretation between objects, not between a subject and an object. Takahashi (2006) 
pointed out that in (123), the to-dative objects, even though they are modified 
numerals, can take scope over the direct object: 
(123) a. John submitted some paper to more than five journals this month 
   OKmore than five>>∃ 
 
  b. John donated two books to more than five churches this month 
   OKmore than five>>two        (Takahashi 2006: 73) 
 
 
Under Beghelli and Stowell’s theory, the direct object presumably moves overtly to 
Spec-AgrOP, possibly followed by further raising to Spec-ShareP and/or Spec-RefP. 
Thus, the lowest possible scope position for the direct object is Spec-AgrOP (Beghelli 





position). Now, it seems hard to posit a higher position that the dative CQP can move 
to: since it is a CQP it cannot use Spec-ShareP or Spec-RefP; positing a case-position 
above AgrOP for dative case checking does not seem to be motivated, given the 
surface word order.  
 Takahashi (2006) proposed an alternative approach to the lack of inverse scope in 
sentences like (116). His proposal consists of three components. First, he argues that 
modified numerals (specifically, “comparative QPs” such as more than five X) consist 
of two (syntactic) subparts: a comparative operator and a DP many X. Under this 
approach, the QP more than three books has the following syntactic representation: 
(124) [DP [DegP er than three] many books] 
 
 
Takahashi assumes that a QP in the object position must undergo raising targeting vP 
(a node with type <t>) to resolve a type mismatch (cf. Heim and Kratzer 1998). Since 
there are two QPs within (124), they must independently be raised to vP. 
Consequently, the LF configuration of (125)a is represented as (125)b: 
(125) a. John read more than three books 
  b.   TP 
   
   John1  
       vP 
 
   [DegP er than three]2  
         vP 
 
     [DP t2 many books]3 
           vP 
 
           t1 







The second component is a locality condition on covert scope-shifting movement. 
Takahashi assumes that in order to obtain inverse scope, the subject QP must be 
lowered to the lowest vP (i.e., to the trace position of the subject). He then argues that 
the lowering of QPs must target the closest node of type <t> (the constraint is a 
version of Shortest Move). Given this constraint, it follows that the first step of the 
lowering must place the subject QP between the comparative operator and the object 
DP, as illustrated in (126): 
(126) Covert lowering of the subject 
 
  
  QPsubj    vP      [er than 3]1  vP 
     
   [er than 3]1     vP     QPsubj     vP 
 
     [t1 many books]   ...     [t1 many books]     ... 
 
 
The third component is a constraint against this intermediate step. Takahashi proposes 
what he refers to as the Heim-Kennedy Constraint (obviously because the original 
idea comes from Heim, 2001 Kennedy, 1999): 
(127) The Heim-Kennedy Constraint 
  A quantificational DP cannot intervene between a DegP and its trace. 
                 (Takahashi 2006: 70) 
 
 
The intermediate structure of the quantifier lowering which is necessary for inverse 
scope (i.e., the right-hand structure of (126)) violates the Heim-Kennedy Constraint. 
However, this intermediate step is necessary, given Takahashi’s version of Shortest 
Move applying to the lowering. These constraints thus leave no possible derivation 





 Under Takahashi’s theory, cases like (123) are not problematic. Since Takahashi 
assumes that the direct object has its case checked in situ, lowering is not necessary to 
obtain inverse scope configuration. The decomposition of the dative object CQP can 
occur at a position higher than the direct object (i.e., the edge of vP), and the 
decomposed QPs are interpreted at that position, taking higher scope than the direct 
object. 
 For the sake of explicitness in the discussion, I will adopt Takahashi’s theory as 
an account for why modified numerals do not invert. One motivation for this choice is 
that Takahashi’s theory is relatively simpler than Beghelli and Stowell’s in the sense 
that it does not require classifying quantifiers into different types and postulating 
specific functional projections for each of the types. Nothing in the following 
discussion hinges on this choice, however. 
3.4.3 Scope freezing: covert raising and Shortest 
 
The last constraint we are concerned with here is the scope freezing with double 
object constructions. The relevant examples are repeated here as (128) and (129):  
(128) I gave a child each doll 
 *EACH >> A            (Bruening 2001: 234) 
(129) The teacher assigned one student every problem 
  *∀ >> ONE           (Nakanishi 2001a: 456) 
 
 
An interesting aspect of the effect is the fact that other diagnostics suggest that the 
second object can be raised covertly. Bruening (2001) points out, first, the second 





(130) a. Ozzy gave someone everything            
  *∀>>∃ 
 
 b. Ozzy gave someone everything that Belinda did [VP e]      
  *∀>>∃ 
                 (Bruening 2001: 240) 
 
Under the assumption that the resolution of ACD involves covert raising of the QP 
that contains the elided VP, the fact that (130)b is perfectly acceptable leads to the 
conclusion that the second object must have been raised out of the antecedent VP. A 
puzzle arises here: if the second object can covertly raise to outside of the VP, then 
why is it that it cannot take scope over the first object? The VP-external landing site 
should be higher than the position of the first object. 
 Another relevant fact is that the second object can take scope over the subject. 
That is, as shown in the examples in (131), the second object can take part in inverse 
scope relations with the subject, even though inverse scope with the first object is 
impossible: 
(131) a. A (different) teacher gave me every book         
  OK∀>>∃ 
 
  b. At least two judges awarded me every medal     
   OK∀>>at least two 
 
  c. The judges awarded a (#different) athlete every medal      
   *∀>>a 
                 (Bruening 2001: 243) 
 
 
This, again, presents a puzzle. The fact that the second object can take scope over the 
subject presumably suggests that the second object is able to undergo covert raising: 





than the subject should put the second object in the higher position than the first 
object. 
 Bruening (2001) provided an account for this puzzle using an independently 
motivated constraint on syntactic movements. The relevant constraint, called Shortest, 
is stated as follows: 
(132) Shortest 
  A pair P of elements [α,β] obeys Shortest iff there is no well-formed pair P’  
  which can be created by substituting γ for either α or β, and the set of nodes c- 
  commanded by one element of P’ and dominating the other is smaller than the 
  set of nodes c-commanded by one element of P and dominating the other. 
                 (Bruening 2001: 247) 
 
 
Thus the effect of Shortest, roughly, is to exclude a creation of a link between α and β 
when a shorter link can be created between either α or β and something else. When 
there are two elements targeting a same position as a landing site, Shortest constrains 
both which one must move first and how far the second movement can go. Let us 
assume, following Bruening (cf. Chomsky 2000; Richards 1997) that syntactic 
movement is triggered by a formal feature of a functional head that attracts elements 
in its c-command domain. Suppose, then, that the head K in (133) has a formal 
feature that can attract both α and β: 
(133) [ K [ ...α [ ...β ]]] 
 
 
Since α is closer to K than β is, K must first attract α. α moves to K and the 
following configuration is constructed: 







Since α has moved in (134), β is now the closest attractee to K. Given Shortest, the 
movement of β must be as short as possible, meaning that the landing site must be as 
close as possible to the head K. Thus, the derivation (135)b is ruled out, because a 
shorter movement is possible as in (135). 
(135) a. [KP αi [KP βj [ K [ ...ti [ ...tj]]]] 
  b. *[KP βj [KP αi [ K [ ...ti [ ...tj]]]] 
 
 
A major consequence of Shortest is that multiple movements targeting the same head 
cannot change the hierarchical order of the moved elements. This conclusion receives 
independent support from several overt movement phenomena: Multiple wh-fronting 
in languages like Bulgarian (e.g., Richards 1997), and multiple overt object shifts in 
several Germanic languages (e.g., Collins and Thrainsson 1996). See Bruening (2001) 
and references therein.  
 Given the assumption that Shortest constrains syntactic movements, the puzzle of 
scope freezing can be resolved. Bruening assumes that a double-object vP has the 
following configuration, and the v head can be assigned a P-feature that attracts QPs 
within the vP (cf. Chomsky 2000): 
(136)   vP 
 
  Subj   v 
      
    v[P]    VP1 
 
      QP1   V1 
   
        V1    VP2 
 







Movements of the QPs that are driven by the P-feature of the v obey Shortest, hence 
giving rise to a configuration in which the relative hierarchical order of the QPs has 
been preserved: 
(137)   vP 
 
  QP1   vP 
    
    QP2   vP 
 
      Subj   v 
      
        v[P]    VP1 
 
          tQP1   V1 
   
            V1    VP2 
 




Given this configuration, ACD on QP2 can successfully be resolved: the elided VP 
contained in QP2 is now outside of the antecedent VP. Likewise, the narrow scope 
interpretation of the subject can be now obtained by reconstructing the subject from 
the Spec-TP to its base position: the base position is lower than the raised QP2. But in 
both cases, scope freezing effect persists: QP1 and QP2 sustain the original 
hierarchical order throughout the derivation.  
 Note that this conclusion presupposes that those object QPs cannot reconstruct to 
their base positions. Bruening (2001), following Heim and Kratzer (1998), assumes 
that object quantifiers are uninterpretable in situ due to type mismatching. The same 
problem does not occur with a QP subject: the sister of the subject (vP) is a node with 





subjects and objects: while reconstructing objects into their base position results in 
uninterpretable representations, reconstruction of subjects does not create the same 
problem. I will follow the assumption that object quantifiers must move to vP for a 
semantic reason. This assumption will also become relevant in Chapter 6.  
3.5 A theory of Japanese scope interpretations 
 
3.5.1 Basic assumptions 
 
In this section, I combine the insights of the accounts that we have reviewed so far, 
and present a theory that is intended to capture both Japanese and English CSS. First, 
I take the position that syntactic representations determine the relative scope of 
quantificational elements. I assume, following the standard enterprise taken in the 
Principles and Parameters approach, that the mapping from surface syntactic 
representations to semantic representations is mediated by another level of syntactic 
representation, which is called LF. Operations that apply to LF do not have any 
audible consequences, given the so-called “Y-model” architecture of the 
Computational System of human language. 
(138) The Y-model architecture 
  
   
 
 
   PF     LF 
 (phonological form) 
 
 
With respect to the mapping from LF to semantics, I assume that (139) holds. (139) 





quantificational elements. (139) may not be an independent principle of grammar: it 
could be a consequence of the compositional computation of semantic interpretation 
procedure (cf. Heim and Kratzer 1998). 
(139) If a generalized quantifier (GQ) α asymmetrically c-commands another GQ β  
 at LF, α takes scope over β. 
 
 
Note that we restrict (139) to generalized quantifiers. For the indefinites that can take 
unboundedly wide scope (see 2.2.2), we follow Reinhart (1997, 2006) and assume 
that they are ambiguous between GQ and choice-function denotations. The procedure 
of existential closure that binds choice-function variables applies freely, hence giving 
rise to the island insensitivity of indefinite wide scope. For details on the choice-
function analysis of indefinites, see Reinhart (1997, 2006), and Winter (1997).  
 Second, let us assume that Japanese and English simple transitive sentences have 
the following surface representation (abstracting away the difference in head-
complement orders): 
(140)   CP 
   
  C    TP 
 
    Subj   TP 
 
      T    vP 
 
        tSubj   vP 
 
          v+V   VP 
 







The subject overtly raises to the spec of TP to check the EPP feature of T; the object 
and the v+V amalgamate head do not raise overtly. While this assumption is well-
motivated for English because of the surface word order of the relevant elements, it is 
rather unclear whether the same conclusion holds for Japanese surface representation. 
This is because Japanese surface word order provides little clue with regard to the 
positions that each element occupies, due to the head-final structure of the language. 
Here I assume, for simplicity alone, that Japanese and English surface structures are 
basically identical. This theoretical choice is not crucially relevant to the data I am 
concerned with in this chapter. In the subsequent chapters, I will discuss cases where 
the theoretical choice (especially the V-raising part) actually affects empirical 
predictions. 
 The third component of our model is the assumptions on covert operations. 
Following Heim and Kratzer (1998), I assume that a GQ object must be covertly 
raised to vP in order to resolve type mismatching. Furthermore, as noted above, I 
assume that the object must be interpreted in the raised position (after all, the object is 
raised in order to be interpretable), and hence it cannot be reconstructed to the base 
position. Thus in this model, inverse scope between the subject and the object is 
obtained by reconstructing the subject into its vP-internal trace position. The 





(141)   CP 
   
  C    TP 
 
        TP 
 
      T    vP 
 
        Obj   vP 
 
           Subj   vP 
 
            v+V   VP 
 




Bruening’s and Takahashi’s accounts can be straightforwardly incorporated into this 
model. I assume that the covert operations (raising and reconstruction) obey Shortest36 
in (132): as illustrated above, the relevant facts follow from the assumption.  
 Overall, this theory is essentially a mosaic of existing theories of restrictions on 
CSS that attribute the restrictions to general constraints on syntactic movement. The 
theory correctly captures the relevant facts. First, the island sensitivity of CSS follows 
from the assumption that CSS is driven by covert syntactic movements: 
reconstruction of A-movement and/or semantically driven covert raising. Second, the 
restricted scope possibilities of modified numerals are accounted for along the lines of 
Takahashi’s theory: given the decomposed structure of raised modified numerals, 
reconstruction of the subject that is required for inverse scope is bound to violate 
some independent constraint of grammar. Lastly, the scope freezing effect follows 
                                                 
 
36 The reconstruction of the subject actually involves two steps if it obeys shortest: it first reconstructs to the 





from the assumption that the covert raising of objects to vP obeys a constraint on 
syntactic movement: Shortest. Thus, basic assumptions account for the restrictions on 
CSS that hold for both Japanese and English. Our next task is to provide an account 
for the Japanese-specific restriction on CSS. 
3.5.2 “Scope rigidity” in Japanese 
 
The discussion in the preceding sections can be summed up as follows: (i) Japanese 
has CSS, and (ii) Japanese CSS obeys the same constraints as English CSS does. 
These conclusions preclude the possibility of attributing the scope rigidity effect in 
Japanese directly to the lack of English-type CSS in the language. That is, the 
mechanism that is responsible for the lack of inverse scope in sentences like (142) 
should not block CSS in general in Japanese.  
(142) Dareka-ga dono kyoujyu-mo hihan-sita 
 someone-NOM every professor criticize-did 
 “Someone criticized every professor” 
  *∀ >> ∃ 
 
 
Based on the conclusions that I have made so far, I maintain that the grammatical 
mechanism that generates LF representations is identical in Japanese and English. 
This means that the grammar of Japanese generates an LF representation for inverse 
scope of sentences like (142). Given this, there must be an extra mechanism in 
Japanese that “filters out” inverse scope interpretations of sentences like (142). In 
what follows, I consider several pragmatic factors that possibly contribute to such a 
filtering. The basic idea is as follows: even though the grammar of Japanese provides 





a pragmatic implicature that blocks inverse scope interpretations in some contexts. 
Scope rigidity in Japanese is therefore a matter of pragmatics. Inverse scope becomes 
possible in contexts where the implicature does not arise, or where the implicature is 
canceled. I will first consider a blocking account that attributes scope rigidity to the 
existence of scrambling, and then next turn to the semantic/pragmatic properties of 
nominative subjects. 
3.5.3 Blocking effects 
 
It has often been claimed that pragmatics is responsible for blocking certain 
interpretive options that grammar provides. A simple illustration of such a pragmatic 
account can be made by using the interpretations of the disjunction operator or in 
English as an example. When the English disjunction or is used in sentences like 
(143), the hearer would normally infer that the speaker intended to mean “A or B, but 
not both A and B”: 
(143) a.  You may take an apple or an orange 
 
  b. I’ll bring pizza or pasta to the party 
 
 
This interpretation of or appears to suggest that the lexical item corresponds to 
exclusive disjunction in standard logic. However, in other contexts, or behaves as if it 
has the interpretation of inclusive disjunction: 
(144) a. I’m looking for a person who speaks French or Spanish 
 







We normally interpret (144)a as meaning that a person who can speak both Spanish 
and French would meet the speaker’s requirements, exceeding the minimum 
requirements. Similarly, the statement in (144)b is certainly not excluding the 
possibility of finding the book both at amazon.com and half.com. This apparent 
polysemy of or can be explained by appealing to pragmatic implicature (e.g., Grice 
1975). In contexts where the speaker is committed to providing the maximally 
specific information to the hearer, the speaker is expected to use the form that yields 
the most restricted truth conditions. Avoiding using a form that would yield a more 
restrictive interpretation would then make the hearer infer that the speaker is not in a 
position to provide a more restrictive, and thus informationally stronger statement. In 
the current case, using the conjunction and instead of the inclusive-disjunction or 
yields a more restrictive interpretation. Therefore, if the speaker avoids using and, the 
truth conditions that are associated with and are inferred to be inappropriate for 
expressing the speaker’s intent, giving rise to the implicature of exclusivity with or. 
For example, hearing the sentence (143)a the hearer infers that the speaker does not 
want the hearer to take an apple AND an orange, given that the speaker could have 
used the conjunction and if s/he had the intention of permitting the hearer to take both. 
Given this analysis, it is possible to maintain that or is not lexically ambiguous, and it 
denotes inclusive disjunction. In a certain contexts, the form continues to supply its 
basic meaning as inclusive disjunction, but a derived exclusive implicature is 
computed and added onto the basic meaning. 
 Note that the model for deriving the implicature of exclusivity for or is built upon 





P∧Q entails P∨Q, disjunction is identified as a weaker term on the entailment scale 
which gives rise to a less restrictive truth condition. The reason why the truth 
conditions associated with and matter when interpreting or is that they are terms on 
the same scale. This type of pragmatic implicature is specifically referred to as scalar 
implicature (e.g., Horn 1972, 1989). But in principle, we should be able to extend the 
line of reasoning to other cases. As long as the hearer has a basis for inferring that the 
speaker intentionally avoided using an alternative form that would provide more 
specific interpretation, the same kind of pragmatic implicature is expected to offer 
itself. The question, then, is what counts as the “alternative form”. 
 In Japanese, scrambling can change the surface order of arguments quite freely. 
An application of scrambling to a quantified argument has a consequence of shifting 
its scope (e.g., Kuroda 1973; Kuno 1973; Hoji 1985 among many others). Thus in 
(145), the ∀ >> ∃ interpretation which is impossible with canonical word order is 
expressed by a scrambled counterpart. 
(145) a. Dareka-ga dono kyoujyu mo hihan-sita 
  someone-NOM every professor criticize-did 
  *∀ >> ∃ 
 
  b. [Dono kyoujyu mo]i dareka-ga ti hihan-sita 
   every professor         someone-NOM criticize-did 
   OK∀ >> ∃ 
 
 
Thus, scrambling in the sentence functions as “overt scope shift”: it changes the 
relative hierarchical order of QPs, creating a new configuration from which a 





 It is tempting to assume that the robust availability of “overt scope shift” in 
Japanese triggers a pragmatic implicature of the kind I sketched above. In our current 
theory, the grammar of Japanese generates both surface and inverse scope 
interpretations for canonical word order sentences. The inverse scope, however, can 
also be explicitly expressed by the corresponding scrambled word order. Moreover, 
an application of scrambling is not associated with addition/alternation of lexical 
items or grammatical morphemes (cf. passivization, clefting, etc.). Suppose, then, that 
when a sentence with multiple QP arguments is presented in the canonical word order, 
the hearer recognizes the existence of an alternative word order with the same lexical 
items. The hearer then wonders why the speaker avoided the alternative (i.e., 
scrambled) order, and this leads to a pragmatic inference that scope construal is the 
reason that the speaker avoided scrambled word order: the scope interpretation that is 
expressed by the alternative word order is not appropriate for expressing the speaker’s 
intent. It is possible that such a pragmatic implicature yields a general preference for 
surface scope interpretations over the corresponding inverse scope interpretations. A 
stronger claim would be that inverse scope interpretations in Japanese are blocked by 
such a pragmatic implicature that is triggered by the availability of scrambled word 
order. If this position can be maintained, then the lack of inverse scope in a certain set 
of sentences in Japanese is explained in terms of a pragmatic blocking effect.  
 The blocking account attributes the lack of inverse scope with Japanese sentences 
like (145)a to a blocking effect due to the existence of an alternative form (145)b. 
English, in contrast, does not have scrambling, hence inverse scope interpretations are 





order crosslinguistically correlates with scope rigidity, which seems to receive a 
certain amount of  empirical support37 (e.g., German, Korean: “free-order” languages 
that show scope rigidity). Nonetheless, the blocking account faces some serious 
challenges. First, the account would predict strict scope rigidity: both in canonical and 
scrambled order sentences, scope interpretations must match surface word orders. 
However, this prediction is not borne out. As I pointed out in section 2.5.1, scrambled 
indefinites gives rise to scope ambiguity: 
(146) Dareka-oi daremo-ga ti semeta 
  someone-ACC everyone-NOM criticized 
  Lit. “Someone, everyone criticized” 
  ∃>>∀ / ∀>>∃ 
 
 
Furthermore, it offers no explanation for why in some contexts inverse scope 
becomes possible in Japanese even with canonical order. For example, scrambling is 
equally available to both (147) and (148) (=(79)c), but inverse scope with canonical 
order is not blocked in (148): 
(147) a. Dareka-ga dono heya mo souji-sita  
   someone-NOM every room clean-did 
   *∀ >> ∃ 
 
  b. [Dono heya mo]i dareka-ga ti souji-sita 
   every room          someone-NOM clean-did 
   OK∀ >> ∃ 
(148) a. (Sonouchi)            dareka-ga dono heya mo souji-suru darou 
   (In the meantime)  someone-NOM every room clean-do MOOD 
   OK∀ >> ∃ 
 
  b. (Sonouchi)            [dono heya mo]i dareka-ga  ti souji-suru darou 
                                                 
 
37 Note that under this approach, word order freedom is only a sufficient condition for scope rigidity. It does not 
exclude the possibility of a language that has rigid word order, and some independent property that gives rise to 





   (In the meantime)  every room       someone-NOM clean-do MOOD 
   OK∀ >> ∃ 
 
 
The same point can be made with all the cases that I discussed in 3.2: in those cases 
inverse scope is possible with the canonical order, even though overt scope shifting 
with scrambling is always an available option. These observations suggest that the 
availability of scrambling and blocking of inverse scope are not in a causal relation in 
Japanese. I therefore reject the blocking account for scope rigidity in Japanese. 
Accordingly the alleged cross-linguistic correlation between free word order and 
scope rigidity must be explained by some other means. The issue clearly awaits 
further empirical investigations. 
3.5.4 Nominative subjects 
 
Since Kuroda (1965), there has been a long-standing discussion on a peculiar 
semantic characteristic that nominative(ga)-marked subjects in Japanese exhibit (e.g., 
Kuroda, 1965, 1972, 1992, 2005; Kuno, 1973; Shibatani, 1990, among many others). 
The property is often referred to as the exhaustive listing interpretation: a ga-marked 
subject is interpreted as if it represents an exhaustive list of entities that satisfy the 
predicate of the sentence in the relevant domain/context. To illustrate, consider the 
following example. 
(149) Ano hito-wa       yuumeina MLB-no senshu desu 
  That person-TOP famous   MLB-GEN player  COP 
  “That person is a famous MLB player” 
 
  Kare-wa/*ga    nihonjin desu 
  He-TOP/NOM     Japanese COP 







The first sentence directs the hearer’s attention to a person who is presumably being 
seen by both the speaker and the hearer. The second sentence then gives a description 
of the person. In the second sentence, a ga-marked subject leads to an awkwardness: 
it sounds as if the speaker is trying to claim that “he” is the only one who is Japanese 
(in the universe), which is obviously false. In contrast, when the context delimits the 
domain to which the exhaustive listing interpretation applies, a ga-marked subject 
does not cause any awkwardness: 
(150) Ano hito-wa       yuumeina MLB-no senshu desu 
  That person-TOP famous   MLB-GEN player  COP 
  “That person is a famous MLB player” 
 
  Kare-wa/ga  kono chiimu-de tada hitori-no nihonjin desu 
  He-TOP/NOM   this team-in      only one-GEN  Japanese COP 
  “He is the only Japanese player on this team” 
 
 
Similarly, if the predicate of the second sentence uniquely determines the person to 
which the predicate applies to, an exhaustive listing ga-subject is perfectly 
acceptable: 
(151) Ano hito-wa       yuumeina MLB-no senshu desu 
  That person-TOP famous   MLB-GEN player  COP 
  “That person is a famous MLB player” 
 
  Kare-wa/ga  kyonen-no hoomuran ou desu 
  He-TOP/NOM  last year-GEN homerun king COP 
  “He is last year’s homerun king” 
(152) Ano hito-wa       yuumeina MLB-no senshu desu 
  That person-TOP famous   MLB-GEN player  COP 
  “That person is a famous MLB player” 
 
  Kare-wa/ga Ichiro desu 
  He-TOP/NOM Ichiro COP 







 In his work, Kuroda (e.g., 1965, 1972, 1992, 2005) has put forth theories of 
judgments. Below I review the latest version of his theory based on Kuroda (2005), 
but interested readers should also refer to his original works. Kuroda argues that 
sentences/clauses may express judgments in addition to representing propositions. 
Propositions are abstract objects which may be conceptualized as functions from 
worlds to truth values. In contrast, according to Kuroda, judgments are cognitive or 
mental acts that take place in the mind/brain, which are in the sense real objects. The 
following quote summarizes Kuroda’s view on propositions and judgments: 
(153) A judgment is a mental act by means of which the mind makes itself aware  
 that a proposition is true. We assume that when a sentence expresses a    
 judgment, it also represents the proposition the expressed judgment judges as  
 true. A sentence uttered as a statement [...] expresses a judgment and    
 represents a proposition. 
                 (Kuroda, 2005: 16) 
 
 
Thus, judgments are the speaker’s commitment to the truth of the sentence, which 
therefore is not expressed by every clause. This point will become relevant in the 
following discussion.  
 On the basis of the proposition-judgment distinction, Kuroda further distinguishes 
two types of judgments. One type of judgment is called a categorical/predicational 
judgment, which corresponds to the cognitive act of asserting; another type is a 
thetic/descriptive judgment, which corresponds to the cognitive act of affirming. 






(154) Asserting is a cognitive act of committing oneself to the truth of a conceived  
 proposition and in its essence independent of other cognitive act or cognitive  
 state; one could simply assert even without grounds for doing so. In contrast,  
 affirming is dependent on another cognitive act or state, the perceptual or   
 conceptual apprehension of a situation. 
                (Kuroda 2005: 26) 
 
 
To illustrate the idea, Kuroda presents a very interesting contrast between wa and ga 
marked subjects. The following two syllogisms minimally differ with respect to the 
particle on the subject of the conclusion: 
(155) Syllogism I 
  a. Socrates  wa    kuruma  no  naka ni  iru 
       car        gen  inside at be 
   “Socrates is in a car” 
 
  b. Kuruma wa ugoite iru 
   car               move be 
   “The car is moving” 
   Dakara 
   ‘therefore’ 
 
  c. Socrates wa ugoite iru 
                         move be 
   “Socrates is moving” 
(156) Syllogism II 
  a. Socrates  wa    kuruma  no  naka ni  iru 
       car        gen  inside at be 
   “Socrates is in a car” 
 
  b. Kuruma wa ugoite iru 
   car               move be 
   “The car is moving” 
   Dakara 
   ‘therefore’ 
 
  c. Socrates ga ugoite iru 
                         move be 
   “Socrates is moving” 







Kuroda points out that Syllogism I can be felicitously presented in the following 
scenario: 
(157) Scenario A. 
  The speaker perceives a car and perceives Socrates seated in it. Socrates is not 
  visibly moving. The car is indeed moving, but it is moving so slowly that the  
  speaker can barely recognize that it is moving. The speaker does realize,   
  though, that it is moving, because s/he sees that the wheels are slowly rotating. 
  At this point, the speaker presents Syllogism I as an argument. 
                    (ibid.:28) 
 
 
Notice that under Scenario A, the speaker does not perceive Socrates’s movement. 
The speaker only perceives that Socrates is in the car and the car is moving, which 
leads the speaker to believe that the proposition that Socrates is moving is true. The 
conclusion expresses that the speaker believes that the proposition, which is by 
definition an abstract object that is not based upon other cognitive acts, is true. The 
speaker simply associates an attribute with an entity through the syllogism, and 
asserts the truth of the proposition represented by the conclusion sentence.  
 In contrast, Syllogism II fits better to the following scenario: 
(158) Scenario B. 
  We are watching a scene on a TV screen. A convertible is in the foreground;  
  the image of the car on the screen is immobile; no background scenery is   
  visible that could indicate that the car is moving. There is Socrates, with the  
  lower half of his body hidden behind the visible side of the car. It is not   
  obvious if he is in the car or behind the car. But his hair is horizontally drawn  
  in the direction of the back of the car, as though blown by wind. 
                     (ibid.) 
 
 
In this case, Kuroda argues, that the speaker tries to claim that the car is moving and 
Socrates is in the car on the basis of his/her “perception” that Socrates is moving. The 





of the situation, and it affirms the perceptual apprehension. Therefore, under Scenario 
B, the last sentence of (156) is not really the conclusion of the syllogism: it is rather 
the premise based on which the speaker infers that the car is moving and Socrates is 
in the car. 
 To make the point clearer, let us imagine a slightly modified situation. First, 
imagine that the scene on the TV starts with a close-up shot of Socrates’ face. His 
other body parts and background scenery are not visible. But his hair is horizontally 
drawn, and his head is occasionally bobbing up and down as if he is in some kind of 
moving vehicle. The observer’s perception of the scene is that Socrates is moving, 
and that makes him wonder why Socrates is moving, because his facial expressions 
does not look like he is using his body muscles. Then the camera gradually zooms out, 
and a convertible appears on the screen, with the lower half of Socrates’ body hidden 
behind the visible side of the car. At this point, the observer may utter (156). The last 
sentence in (156) describes the observer’s perceptual apprehension of the scene, from 
which the observer made an inference about why Socrates is moving. Thus, in 
English, (156), would naturally be expressed as: “Socrates is in a car and the car is 
moving. That’s why Socrates is moving.” 
 Kuroda claims that Japanese grammaticalizes the distinction between 
categorical/predicational judgment (asserting) and thetic/descriptive judgment 
(affirming) by means of the wa-ga contrast: a wa sentence expresses a 
categorical/predicational judgment; a ga sentence expresses a descriptive judgment. 
In other words, a statement with a wa-marked subject is understood as expressing a 





understood as expressing a thetic/descriptive judgment. Accordingly, a wa-sentence 
presents a proposition and expresses that the speaker believes that the proposition is 
true for whatever reason. The speaker may not have direct perceptual ground for 
believing the truth of the proposition, as in the scenario A in (157). In contrast, a ga-
sentence presents a proposition and expresses that the proposition describes a 
perceptual/conceptual apprehension of some event in the external world by the 
speaker.  
 Kuroda maintains that “a kind of maximality constraint” is imposed on the 
cognitive process of making thetic/descriptive judgments which functions as a 
description of a situation. When making a thetic/descriptive judgment, a speaker 
chooses a situation that is embedded in cognitive environments, conceptual frames, or 
perceptual scenes, along with other situations. The maximality constraint forces the 
speaker to choose a description that makes the grasped situation a maximal fit. 
Conversely, when a thetic/descriptive judgment is expressed by a ga-marked subject, 
it is expected that the speaker has picked up a maximal situation in the cognitive 
environment that fits the form. Intuitively, the idea can be stated as follows: if the 
speaker is cooperative, then he is expected to give a full, maximally specific 
description of a given situation, rather than providing partial information about the 
situation. This expectation yields the exhaustive listing implicature, and thus the 
implicature can be regarded as a version of familiar conversational implicature. For 
example, the use of the form in (159) evokes an expectation that the speaker has 
picked up a maximal situation that fits the form. From this expectation the exhaustive 





unless it is clear that kare is in fact a maximal fit in the context (i.e., kare is indeed 
the only Japanese person in the context). 
(159) Kare-ga nihonjin desu 
  he-NOM   Japanese COP 
  “He is Japanese” 
 
 
Therefore, the exhaustive listing implicature is associated with the particular speech 
act that thetic/descriptive judgments express. When someone is simply expressing his 
belief that the proposition “Taroo is Japanese” is true (i.e., making a 
categorical/predicational judgment), the speaker is not expected to present other 
numerous propositions that he also believes to be true. For example, the speaker may 
also believes that the proposition “Hanako is Japanese” is true in this world, but that 
is simply not relevant to the purpose of his present speech act. In contrast, when 
someone is describing a situation that involves Taroo and Hanako, then assuming that 
the speaker is cooperative, it is expected that his description provides a maximal 
grasp of the situation. In this case, presenting the proposition that “Taroo is Japanese” 
as a description of the situation invites an inference that that this proposition fully 
describes the situation, and therefore yields an implicature that Taroo and only Taroo 
is Japanese. 
 Kuroda further maintains that the effect of the maximality constraint should be 
recognized with stage-level predicates, which are often claimed to assign a “neutral-
description” (i.e., no exhaustive listing implicature) interpretation to a ga-marked 
subject (e.g., Kuno 1973). In such cases, Kuroda argues, the perceived situation on 
which the speaker’s judgment is based makes the relevant context narrower. So for 





speaker’s visual perception is so narrowed as to make this situation a maximal fit” 
(Kuroda 2005: 39) 
(160) Asokode Mori-san ga  hasitte iru 
  There                            run      be 
  “Mori-san is running there” 
 
 
 So far I have reviewed Kuroda’s theory of judgment and its interaction with the 
ga/wa distinction in Japanese. Based on Kuroda’s theory, I will try to provide a more 
detailed description of the meanings of Japanese sentences, focusing on those that 
involve a ga-marked subject. First, consider the following situation. A person who 
does not speak Japanese fluently traveled to Japan, and got lost in Narita Airport. The 
person wanted to ask someone the way to the train station in the airport, and since he 
was not confident in his ability to comprehend Japanese, he looked for someone who 
speaks English. He found an airport staff member, and asked the guy if he speaks 
English. In this situation, the use of a ga-subject creates a strong awkwardness, while 
the corresponding wa-version is fine: 
(161) a. #Anata-ga eigo-o hanasi masu ka? 
    you-NOM English-ACC speak polite Q 
   Lit. “Do you speak English?” 
 
  b. Anata-wa eigo-o hanasi masu ka? 
   you-NOM English-ACC speak polite Q 
   Lit. “Do you speak English?” 
 
 
Let us analyze the meaning of (161)a using Kuroda’s ideas. First, the use of the ga-
marked subject indicates that the form is (the yes-no question of) a description of a 
situation that is picked up from the speaker’s cognitive environment. The content of 





property of being able to speak English, because the situation is described by using 
the predicate “λx. x speaks English”. This gives rise to an existential presupposition: 
the description is possible only if the discourse context provides the speaker enough 
cognitive basis (e.g., perceptual scenes, conceptual frames, etc.) for believing that 
there exists someone who speaks English in this particular place/moment of time. In 
other words, one cannot describe something as involving a property without knowing 
if there is anything with the property. Thus, the use of the form that has a function as 
a description invokes the presupposition “∃x (x speaks English)”. This presupposition, 
however, contradicts the actual situation where the sentence (161)a is uttered: the 
speaker only perceived that there was a person, without having any clue about 
whether or not the person spoke English. In other words, the speaker did not have a 
basis within his cognitive environment for presupposing that there was someone 
(other than himself) who spoke English. This contradiction contributes to the 
awkwardness associated with (161)a. By contrast, (161)b is free from an existential 
presupposition, and therefore can felicitously be used in the situation.  
 Second, as Kuroda argues, (161)a is subject to a maximality constraint. Given the 
maximality constraint, the description is expected to be a maximal fit to the situation. 
The description involves a singular term anata 38  “you” as the argument of the 
predicate “λx. x speaks English” If the speaker obeys the maximality constraint, then 
it is expected that the set of individuals that satisfy the predicate is maximally 
specified by the descriptive content of the subject. In other words, the singleton 
referent of the subject should constitute the maximal set satisfying the predicate. 
                                                 
 
38 Japanese personal pronouns have the singular-plural distinction. Anata-gata and anata-tachi are the plural 





Consequently, an implicature of uniqueness arises: there is only one individual that 
satisfies the predicate. Thus, the meaning of (161)a is translated into English using a 
definite description as the predicate of the sentence: “Are you the person who speaks 
English?” To illustrate this point further, let us imagine the following situation. A 
person visited the University of Maryland to attend a conference held at the university. 
After the conference, the person went to a party at one of the faculty members’ house. 
There were a lot of students at the party, and one of them talked to the person. The 
person wanted to know if the student is a student of UMD, so he asked the following 
question: 
(162) a. #Anata-ga UMD-no gakusei desu ka? 
    You-NOM UMD-GEN student COP Q 
   “Are you the student of UMD?” 
 
  b. Anata-wa UMD-no gakuse desu ka? 
   You-NOM UMD-GEN student COP Q 
   “Are you a student of UMD?” 
 
 
As the English translation suggests, the ga version implies that the speaker assumes 
that there is only one student of UMD, which creates awkwardness: in the situation 
there is no obvious reason to assume that there is only one student of UMD attending 
the party. Note that the awkwardness in this case cannot be due to a failure to satisfy 
the existential presupposition: since the party was held at the University of Maryland, 
and the speaker saw that there were many students at the party, it is quite natural for 
him to believe that there was someone who was a student of UMD at the party. This 
effect of the maximality constraint is what is usually referred to as the exhaustive 
listing implicature. I will instead call the semantic effect the implicature of 





English. (162)a can be felicitously uttered if the implicature of uniquness/maximality 
does not contradict the context. For example, if the speaker is an organizer of a 
conference for which only one student of UMD has registered, the speaker can 
felicitously ask someone at the conference registration desk if he is the student of 
UMD, using the form in (162)a.  
 This analysis has revealed that the meaning that is conveyed by a ga-sentence is 
strikingly similar to the meaning of definiteness in English (and presumably in other 
languages as well): the crucial components are existence and maximality, which are 
often regarded as the defining characteristics of definiteness39  (e.g., Lyons 1999; 
Abbott 2004). Note, however, that in Japanese ga-sentences, the existential 
presupposition and the uniqueness/maximality implicature are defined in terms of the 
property denoted by the predicate of the sentence, rather than by the ga-marked 
subject. To illustrate this point, compare the following examples. I do not include an 
English translation for (163)b in order to avoid making any presumption about the 
meaning of the sentence: 
(163) a. The student of UMD came in 
 
  b. UMD-no gakusei-ga haittekita 
   UMD-GEN student-NOM came-in 
 
 
I assume, following Roberts (2003), that the English sentence (163)a presupposes that 
there is someone who is a student of UMD, and that individual is unique among the 
individuals in the discourse context in bearing the property of being a student of 
                                                 
 
39 As reviewed in Abbott (2004), there are various different approaches to the meaning components of 
definiteness, and different proposals has been made with respect to the nature of the meaning components (i.e., 





UMD: there is one and only one student of UMD in the context. In contrast, I argue 
that what the Japanese sentence (163)b presupposes is that there is someone who 
came in, and the sentence implies that the referent or the referents of the subject (the 
form is ambiguous between singular and plural interpretation) is unique among the 
individuals in the situation that the speaker picked up as the basis of the description in 
bearing the property of having come in. Thus, the Japanese sentence can be used 
without presupposing the existence of a student of UMD in the discourse context: the 
existence of the student can be completely new information. Also, there can be 
possibly many students of UMD in the situation, as long as all of the students bear the 
property of having come in.  
 Summarizing so far, I have argued that a ga-sentence that expresses a judgment is 
associated with an existential presupposition and implicature of 
uniqueness/maximality. Those pragmatic meaning components are added on top of 
the propositional meaning/assertion of the sentence that is compositionally computed 
from the LF representation. Based on the assumption, I now provide a full description 
of the meaning components of a ga-sentence. (165) gives a full description of the 
meaning components of (164): 
(164) Taroo-ga nihonjin desu 
  Taroo-NOM Japanese COP 
  “Taroo is Japanese”  
(165) a. Assertion: Taroo is Japanese 
 
  b. Existential presupposition: within the situation that has been picked up by  
   the  speaker, there is some individual x and x is Japanese. 
 
  c. Uniqueness/maximality implicature: Taroo is unique among the    
   individuals in the situation in bearing the property of being Japanese.   







(165) is simply a description, as I currently do not have an explicit theory of the 
computation and rules that derive (b) and (c). It remains an interesting puzzle to spell 
out how those meaning components are compositionally computed from the linguistic 
form in (164). 
 I will now extend this analysis to cases that involve a quantificational subject, 
especially dareka “someone”. In (166), the subject is replaced by dareka, and it is 
marked by ga. The meaning of the sentence is analyzed as in (167). 
(166) Dareka-ga nihonjin desu 
  Someone-NOM Japanese COP 
  “Someone is Japanese”  
(167) a. Assertion: There is some individual x and x is Japanese 
 
  b. Existential presupposition: Within the situation that has been picked up by 
   the  speaker, there is some individual y and y is Japanese. 
 
  c. Uniqueness/maximality implicature: There is only one x and x is unique  
   among  the  individuals in the situation in bearing the property of being   
   Japanese. Therefore, x=y. 
 
 
What is particularly important here is the uniqueness implicature that is imposed on 
the individual that satisfies the predicate “λx. x is Japanese.” By using the ga-
sentence in (166), the speaker of the sentence expresses a thetic/descriptive judgment, 
by which the speaker gives a description of a situation that is picked up from his 
cognitive environment (rather than merely presenting a proposition that the speaker 
believes to be true). Given the maximality constraint imposed on such descriptions, it 
is expected that the set of individuals that satisfy the predicate is maximally specified 





determine the set of individuals on which the maximality constraint is imposed. With 
a proper noun or a definite subject, the set simply corresponds to the set of the 
referent(s) of the subject. However, with an indefinite subject, the determination 
process is not straightforward, especially so if we assume that indefinites denote a GQ. 
Here, I simply assume that the subject dareka “someone” picks up a singular 
individual in the situation, without specifying the actual mechanism that underlies the 
process. As a result, the description implies that there is only one individual in the 
situation that satisfies the predicate. This implicature of uniqueness forces the subject 
indefinite to be interpreted as specific, in the sense that it presupposes that there exists 
a uniquely identifiable individual that bears the property of being Japanese.  
 In order to further illustrate the point, let us compare a ga-sentence with the 
corresponding wa-sentence. Imagine that in a detective story, a detective who had 
been investigating a case of murder finally gathered up those involved. The people 
were anxious about what the detective would tell them. The detective then broke the 
ice by saying the following: 
(168) Kononaka-no dareka-ga hannin desu 
  this group-GEN someone-NOM criminal COP 
  “Someone in this group is the criminal” 
(169) Kononaka-no dareka-wa hannin desu 
  this group-GEN someone-NOM criminal COP 
  “Someone in this group is a criminal” 
 
 
The ga sentence in (168) sounds quite natural in the situation. Due to the uniqueness 
implicature, the sentence implies that the detective has evidence that shows that there 
is a unique individual that has a property of being a criminal in the group, whose 





(169) merely states that there is at least one individual in the group who is a criminal 
(hence the indefinite in English translation). The sentence thus implies that the 
detective has not come close to identifying the criminal: all he has is probably some 
circumstantial evidence that suggests that the criminal cannot be someone outside of 
the group (e.g., the murder occurred in a ship out at sea).  
 Based on the analysis, I propose that the uniqueness implicature that is associated 
with dareka “someone” as a ga-marked subject invokes the scope rigidity effect in 
sentences like (170): 
(170) Dareka-ga     dono kyoujyu mo hihan-sita 
 someone-NOM every professor criticize-did 
 *∀ >> ∃ 
 
 
Under the current approach, the meaning components of the sentence in (170) are 
analyzed as in (171): 
(171) a. Assertion by LF1: There is some individual x, such that for every y, x   
  criticized y. 
   Assertion by LF2: For every y, there is some individual x such that x   
   criticized y. 
 
  b. Existential presupposition: Within the situation that has been picked up by 
   the  speaker, there is some individual z and z has a property of being an  
   agent in an event of criticizing.40 
 
  c. Uniqueness/maximality implicature: There is only one x and x is unique  
   among the individuals in the situation in bearing the property of being an  
   agent in an event of criticizing. Therefore, x=z. 
 
                                                 
 
40 The relevant property in this component does not involve the semantic contribution of the object quantifier. 
This is because I want the component to be compatible with both LF1 and LF2. If we take the relevant property to 
be “λx. x criticized every professor”, then the component amounts to a presupposition that there is some x and x 
criticized every professor, which is only compatible with LF1. Such an analysis would predict that any ga-
sentence that invokes an existential presupposition only allows the surface scope interpretation, but cases that 






Since the grammar of Japanese generates two possible LF representations for the 
sentence (one of which corresponds to the surface scope interpretation, and the other 
corresponds to the inverse scope interpretation), there are two possible assertions of 
the sentence. However, the second assertion is not compatible with the uniqueness 
implicature: under the distributive interpretation, there should be multiple individuals 
that have a property of being an agent in an event of criticizing (i.e., one criticizer for 
each professor). The second assertion is thus blocked. In other words, the possibility 
for the subject to distribute over the universal quantifier is blocked due to the 
uniqueness implicature.  
 Cases that involve a plural indefinite subject receive the same analysis. Consider 
the following example, in which the distributive (i.e., inverse scope) interpretation is 
not possible: 
(172) Sannin-no gakusei-ga dono kyoujyu mo hihan-sita 
  three-GEN student-NOM every professor criticize-did 
  “Three students criticized every professor” 
  *∀>THREE 
 
 
Due to the maximality constraint, it is expected that the descriptive content of the 
subject maximally specifies the set of individuals that satisfy the relevant property. 
Here, I assume the subject picks up a set of students with exactly three members. 
Accordingly, the sentence implies that there are exactly three students who are unique 
in the situation in bearing the property of being an agent in an event of criticizing. 
However, under the distributive interpretation of the sentence, there should be more 
than three students who participated in the event of criticizing (i.e., three students for 





uniqueness/maximality implicature, and hence the sentence only allows the surface 
scope interpretation. 
 Under the present account, it is assumed that the uniqueness/maximality 
implicature falls out from the nature of thetic/descriptive judgments. This entails that 
the implicature would not arise within clauses that do not express a judgment, even 
with a ga-marked subject. Since judgments are defined to be the speaker’s 
commitment to the truth of the sentence, it would be reasonable to assume that irrealis 
clauses do not express a judgment (i.e., Kuroda’s Non-Statement Making Clauses). A 
defining property of irrealis contexts is that the truth of the proposition is left 
unspecified at the time of speech: hence, the speaker does not (or cannot) commit to 
the truth of irrealis clauses. Given this assumption, it follows that irrealis clauses do 
not invoke the uniqueness/maximality implicature of ga-marked subjects, and 
therefore, distributive inverse scope interpretations are not blocked, as we have 
observed in section 3.2.2. The relevant examples are repeated here as (173): 
(173) a. Imperative/subjunctive 
   Dareka-ga dono heya mo souji-si nakereba naranai 
   someone-NOM every room clean-do      MOOD 
   “It is imperative that someone cleans every room” 
   OK∀ >> ∃ 
 
  b. Counterfactual/subjunctive 
   Dareka-ga dono heya mo souji-suru hazu datta 
   Someone-NOM every room clean-do MOOD COP-past 
   “Someone should have cleaned every room” 
   OK∀ >> ∃ 
 
  c. Assumptive 
   (Sonouchi)            dareka-ga dono heya mo souji-suru darou 
   (In the meantime)  someone-NOM every room clean-do MOOD 
   “I assume someone will clean every room in the meantime) 






  d. Speculative 
   (Sonouchi)   dareka-ga dono heya mo souji-suru kamo shirenai 
   (in the meantime)  someone-NOM every room clean-do     MOOD 
   “It is possible that someone will clean every room in the meantine” 
   OK∀ >> ∃ 
 
 
 Next, let us turn to cases that involve an inherently non-specific QP as a ga-
marked subject. The relevant examples are repeated here as (174): 
(174) a.  Hutari ijyou-no          gakusei-ga dono kyoujyu-mo hihan-sita 
     two greater-than-GEN student-NOM every professor  criticize-did 
    “More than two students criticized every professor”      
   ∀ >> more than two 
 
  b. Sannin ika-no              gakusei-ga dono kyoujyu-mo hihan-sita 
   three smaller-than-GEN student-NOM every professor criticize-did 
   “Less than three students criticized every professor”   
   ∀ >> less than three 
 
  c. Sukunakutomo hutari-no gakusei-ga dono kyoujyu-mo hihan-sita 
   at-least             two-GEN   student-NOM every professor  criticize-did 
   “At least two students criticized every professor”    
   ∀ >> at least two 
 
 
I assume that the modified numeral quantifiers lack the ability to pick up a specific 
referent in the discourse, possibly due to the lack of choice-function interpretation 
(e.g., Reinhart 2006). Given this, those quantifiers may not provide a set of specific 
individuals from which the maximality constraint derives the implicature of 
uniqueness/maximality. Consequently, the implicature is not computed, and therefore 
the sentences are compatible with distributive inverse scope interpretations. 
 One remaining problem is the cases in which surface scope results in an 
implausible interpretation. In sentences like (175) (=(84)), the surface scope 





it is implausible that a specific individual is in a state of crossing every different 
crosswalk at a single moment of time. By contrast, the distributive inverse scope 
interpretation describes a plausible situation. I argue that in such a case, the listener 
tries to accommodate, and as a result, he ignores the uniqueness implicature that is 
associated with the subject in order to access the plausible interpretation.41 
(175) (Choudo ima) dareka-ga  dono oudan hodou mo watat-teiru 
 right now       someone-NOM every crosswalk      cross-ing 




 One might now wonder if inverse scope becomes possible by replacing ga of the 
subject with wa, as in the following: 
(176) Dareka-wa     dono kyoujyu mo hihan-sita 
 someone-NOM every professor criticize-did 
  “Someone criticized every professor” 
 
 
In order to test the possibility of inverse scope in this sentence, several different 
interpretations of the sentence must be properly sorted out. First, the subject in (176) 
can be assigned the so-called “thematic” interpretation, and the sentence means 
something like “Speaking of dareka, the person criticized every professor”. Under 
this construal, dareka is a referential pronoun rather than a quantifier, referring to a 
specific person whose identity the speaker happens not to know. Another possible 
interpretation is the “contrastive” one, which would arise in a context where the 
                                                 
 
41 Admittedly, this account lacks an independent argument for the assumption that the plausibility of a 
particular interpretation can make the listener ignore pragmatic implicature (Colin Phillips, Personal 
Communication). The assumption would be supported by an observation that an interpretation that is normally 
blocked by pragmatic implicature is made available by manipulating the plausibility of the (grammatically) 





referent of the subject is contrasted with another specific individual in the context. 
For example, the sentence can continue the following preceding discourse: “In the 
meeting, someone didn’t speak up at all. Someone else kept bringing up not-so-
important issues…”. In both of those interpretations, dareka is specific, and does not 
allow the inverse scope interpretation. However, there is another possible 
interpretation of the subject. That interpretation resembles the interpretation of the 
subject in (169), which can be paraphrased as “at least one”. Under this construal of 
dareka, the inverse scope reading is indeed possible: the sentence can mean “for 
every professor x, there is at least one person who criticized x”. The contrast between 
ga and wa is even clearer in the following pair of examples: 
(177) a. Dareka-ga dono heya mo souji-sita no? 
   someone-NOM every room clean-did Q 
   “Did someone clean every room?” 
   *∀>>∃ 
 
  b. Dareka-wa dono heya mo souji-sita no? 
   someone-TOP every room clean-did Q 
   OK∀>>∃ 
 
 
To my knowledge, this ga/wa contrast for scope rigidity has not been discussed in the 
literature. This is possible because of the existence of confounding interpretations, 
which seem to be preferred interpretations if the relevant wa-sentences are presented 
without any context. However, once irrelevant interpretations are carefully sorted out, 
it is possible to observe that a wa-marked subject can take part in an inverse scope 
interpretation. According to my informal interviews with Japanese speakers, the 





 Let us now summarize the proposal. I argued that Japanese has the grammatical 
means to derive inverse scope interpretations, and that the mechanism is identical 
with that of English. I then proposed that the uniqueness/maximality implicature 
imposed on ga-marked subjects is responsible for the rigid scope effect in Japanese. 
The grammaticalized system for distinguishing kinds of judgments is not included in 
the grammar of English. Therefore, English sentences are not associated with the 
relevant pragmatic implicature, allowing inverse scope interpretations more freely 
than their Japanese counterparts. Thus, even though the mechanism that is responsible 
for the cross-linguistic contrast is pragmatic in nature, the reason why pragmatics 
works differently in Japanese and English is attributed to the difference in 
grammatical options that those languages provide. 
3.6 Scrambling and reconstruction 
 
In this section, I turn to the scope reconstruction asymmetry in scrambled sentences 
that I pointed out in Chapter 1. I will first examine the scope reconstruction 
asymmetry in detail, and show that scope interpretations in non-canonical word order 
sentences, and show that QNPs that involve the focus particle mo do not scope-
reconstruct. I then propose that those quantifiers that do not reconstruct are base-
generated in the surface position. 
3.6.1 Reconstruction asymmetry 
 
 To recap, let us review the relevant data again. Hoji (1985) provides the following 
pair of canonical and scrambled order sentences, pointing out that only the scrambled 





(178) a. Dareka-ga daremo-o sementa 
   someone-NOM everyone-ACC criticized 
   “someone criticized everyone” (unambiguous) 
 
  b. Daremo-oi dareka-ga ti semeta 
   everyone-ACC someone-NOM criticized 
   Lit. “Everyone, someone criticized” (ambiguous) 
 
 
However, since the “surface scope” ∀ >> ∃ interpretation of (178)b is entailed by the 
inverse scope the inverse scope ∃ >> ∀ interpretation, the contrast in (178) does not 
provide conclusive evidence for the availability of the inverse scope interpretation in 
the scrambled version. The sentence in (178)a should thus be compared with (179), 
which in fact shows scope ambiguity: 
(179) Dareka-oi daremo-ga ti semeta 
  someone-ACC everyone-NOM criticized 
  Lit. “Someone, everyone criticized” 
  ∃>>∀ / ∀>>∃ 
 
 
The sentence can be truthfully uttered in a situation where everyone criticized a 
different individual. Since the surface scope ∃>>∀ interpretation should make the 
sentence false in the situation, this fact shows that the inverse scope interpretation is 
indeed available with the scrambled sentence. 
 Let us tentatively assume that the inverse scope interpretation (i.e., ∀>>∃) is 
derived by reconstructing the scrambled object to its base position. Thus, both in 
canonical order and scrambled order sentences, reconstruction of an overtly moved 
element is involved in the derivation of the inverse-scope LF. The examples in (180) 






(180) a. [Hutari-no kyoujyu-o]i dono gakusei mo ti hihan-sita 
   two-GEN professor-ACC every student            criticize-did 
   “Every student criticized two professors” 
   TWO>>∀ / ∀>>TWO 
 
  b. [Sukunakutomo hutari-no kyoujyu-o]i dono gakusei mo ti hihan-sita 
       at least             two-GEN professor-ACC every student        criticize-did 
   at least two>>∀ / ∀>>at least two 
   “Every student criticized at least two professors” 
 
 
A question remains, however, as to whether Hoji’s original claim about (178)b still 
stands: that is, whether a scrambled universal quantifier can scope-reconstruct. In 
order to test this possibility, it is necessary to find a combination of quantifiers in 
which the surface scope interpretation entails the inverse scope interpretation, so that 
we can construct a test scenario in which only the inverse scope interpretation is true. 
Since the combination of a universal quantifier and a negative quantifier in this order 
creates such an environment, we want a negative quantifier as the subject. Negative 
quantifiers, however, are not straightforwardly available in Japanese: Japanese does 
not have direct counterparts for nobody, noone, nothing, etc.  
 A solution for the dilemma is provided by the focus particle dake “only”. Let us 
first observe that, just like its English counterpart, a sentence that contains dake 
entails a negative proposition, as illustrated in (181): 
(181) Taroo-dake-ga kare-o hihan-sita 
  Taroo-only-NOM he-ACC criticize-did 
  “Only Taroo criticized him” 
   Everyone other than Taroo didn’t criticize him 
 
 
The negation within the entailed proposition scope-interacts with other 
quantificational elements in the sentence. Moreover, the scope of the negation is 





position, the entailed negation takes wider scope than the object; when dake appears 
in the object position, the entailed negation takes narrower scope than the subject: 
(182) Taroo-dake-ga dono kyouju mo hihan-sita 
  Taroo-only-NOM every professor criticize-did 
  “Only Taroo criticized every professor” 
   Everyone other than Taroo didn’t criticize every professor (¬>>∀) 
(183) Dono kyouju mo Taroo-dake-o hihan-sita 
  every professor   Taroo-only-ACC criticize-did 
  “Every professor criticized only Taroo” 
   Every professor criticized nobody other than Taroo42 (∀>>¬) 
 
 
Now imagine the following situation. Taroo, Hanako and Jiro are student 
representatives. In a student meeting, they started criticizing the faculty members of 
the department. Taroo criticized all the professors in the department (Prof. A, B and 
C). Hanako only criticized Prof. A. Jiro criticized Prof B and C. The situation is 
schematically represented in (184). 
(184)   Prof. A Prof. B  Prof.C 
  Taroo  √   √   √ 
  Hanako √   *   * 
  Jiro  *   √   √ 
 
 
The sentence (182) is true under the situation: Taroo was the only one who criticized 
every professor, that is, everyone other than Taroo didn’t criticize every professor. 
Now the question is whether the same interpretation can be obtained with the 
scrambled version of (182). If scope-reconstruction of a scrambled universal is 
possible, (185) can mean the same thing as (182) means: 
                                                 
 





(185) [Dono kyoujyu mo]i Taroo-dake-ga ti hihan-sita 
  every professor         Taroo-only-NOM criticize-did 
  Lit. “Every professor, only Taroo criticized” 
 
 
Native speakers of Japanese judge the sentence in (185) is false under the situation in 
(184). This suggests that the reconstructed interpretation is impossible: otherwise, the 
sentence should be accepted under the situation, just like its canonical order 
counterpart in (182). Instead, the sentence in (185) can only mean that for every 
professor x, Taroo is the only person who criticized x: everyone other than Taroo 
didn’t criticize x. The situation in (184) does not make this interpretation true: 
Hakano and Jiro also criticized some professor.  
 The scrambled universal QP consists of several subparts: a wh-phrase dono 
"which", the head noun kyoujyu "professor", and a focus particle mo "also". The focus 
particle mo may form a conjunction phrase in the form of NP1 mo NP2 mo. The 
…mo…mo conjunction also resists scope reconstruction when scrambled, as shown in 
(186): 
(186) [Piza mo pasuta mo]i Taroo-dake-ga ti tabeta 
   both pizza and pasta  Taroo-only-NOM ate 
  Lit. "Both pizza and pasta, only John ate" 
  ∧>>¬ / *¬>>∧ 
 
 
(186) only allows the interpretation in which the conjunction operator takes scope 
over the entailed negation associated with dake. That is, the sentence is false when, 
for example, Hanako ate pizza (but not pasta). 
 Furthermore, the focus particle mo itself induces the same anti-reconstruction 
effect. First, observe that sentences that involve a mo-marked focus entail an 





(187) Taroo-wa  piza mo  tabeta 
  Taroo-TOP pizza also ate 
  "Taroo ate pizza as well"  
   ∃x: x≠apple (Taroo ate x) 
 
 
The existential quantifier in the entailed proposition scope-interacts with other QPs in 
the same sentence, just in the cases that involve dake "only". For example, in (188), 
the entailed existential quantifier takes narrower scope than the subject universal, 
yielding a distributive interpretation with respect to what everyone ate in addition to 
pizza. Therefore, the sentence is true under the situation in (189). 
(188) Zen'in-ga        piza mo  tabeta 
  everyone-NOM piza-also ate 
  "Everyone ate pizza as well" 
    ∀x: x=person (∃y: y≠pizza (x ate y)) 
(189)    cake pasta pizza 
  Taroo  √  √  √ 
  Hanako √  *  √ 
  Jiro  *  √  √ 
 
 
In contrast, when the mo-marked object is scrambled to the front of the sentence, a 
distinct set of truth condition surfaces. The entailed existential now takes scope over 
the universal, yielding a specific interpretation with respect to what everyone ate in 
addition to pizza. That is, the sentence in (190) means that there is something other 
than pizza that everyone ate: 
(190)  [Piza mo]i  zen'in-ga     ti    tabeta 
   pizza also   everyone-NOM    ate 
  ∃x: x≠pizza (∀y: y=person (y ate x)) 
 
 
Crucially, scope-reconstruction of piza mo is again impossible, and the sentence in 





 The same effect persists even in sentences with a long-distance scrambling, which 
is somewhat surprising given that it has often been claimed that long-distance 
scrambling is semantically vacuous (e.g., Saito 1985, 1989; Tada 1993). 43 In order to 
make the relevant judgments easier to access, the following examples are built along 
the situations we are familiar with. First, imagine the following situation: several 
MLB teams are trying to acquire Japanese baseball players (Matsuzaka, Okajima, and 
Igawa), and people in Japan are interested in which team will get who. One 
newspaper, Tokyo Sports, presents their prediction that the Yankees are going to get 
all of them. Others have different opinions: Spo-Nichi calls that the Yankees are only 
getting Igawa; Too-Chu anticipates that the Yankees are going to acquire Matsuzaka, 
and only Matsuzaka. Under this situation, the following sentence can be uttered 
truthfully: 
                                                 
 
43 Tada (1993) claims that long-distance scrambling cannot change scope relations. The relevant example in 
Tada (1993) is the followings. 
 
(i) a. Dareka-ga      [John-ga daremo-o aisiteru]-to omotteiru 
  someone-NOM    -NOM everyone-ACC loves –comp thinks 
 
 b. Daremoi-o       dareka-ga [John-ga ti aisiteru]-to omotteiru 
  everyone-ACC someone-NOM –nom loves –comp thinks     (Tada 1993: 35) 
 
Tada argues that both sentences are unambiguous, allowing only the ∃>>∀ interpretation. The judgment is not 
clear to me: I agree that the distributive interpretation in (b) is somewhat degraded, but the interpretation does not 
seem to me to be completely impossible. But even if I put that concern aside, there are cases in which long-
distance scrambling clearly affects scope interpretations: 
 
(ii) a. Toosupo-dake-ga    [Yankees-ga hutari-ijyou-no nihonjin senshu-o kakutoku-suru]-to yosousita 
  Tokyo Sports-only-NOM       -NOM  more than two  Japanese player-ACC acquire-going-COMP predicted 
  "Only Tokyo Sports reported that the Yankees were going to acquire more than two Japanese players" 
 
 b. [Hutari-ijyou-no nihonjin senshu-o]i Toosupo-dake-ga    [Yankees-ga ti kakutoku-suru]-to yosousita 
  more than two Japanese player-ACC Tokyo Sports-only-NOM    -NOM acquire-goin-COMP predictetd 
  Lit. “More than two Japanese players, only Tokyo sports predicted that the Yankees were going to   
  acquire” 
 
With (ii)b, but not with (ii)a, the interpretation in which "more than two" takes scope over "only" is possible. 
Therefore, only (ii)b is true in the situation where Tokyo Sports reported Yankees was going to acquire Sinjyo, 
Saito, and Kuwata, and other papers predicted that Yankees was going to acquire Ichiro, Matuzaka and Okajima. 
Thus, whatever property is responsible for the (lack of) contrast in (i), the conclusion that long-distance 





(191) Toosupo-dake-ga [Yankees-ga dono nihonjin sensyu mo kakutoku-suru]-to  
  Tokyo Sports only-NOM    -NOM  every Japanese player   acquire-going-COMP 
  yosou-sita 
  predict-did 
  "Only Tokyo Sports predicted that the Yankees were going to acquire every  
   Japanese player" 
 
 
 In contrast, the long-scrambled version in (192) is false in the same situation, 
suggesting that the reconstructed interpretation is impossible. The sentence can only 
mean that for each Japanese player x, Tokyo Sports is the only one who predicted that 
the Yankees were going to acquire x, which is false, because others also predicted 
that the Yankees were going to get some of the players. Similarly, (193) is also false, 
again showing that the scrambled conjunction cannot reconstruct. 
(192) [Dono nihonjin senshu mo]i  Toosupo-dake-ga   [Yankees-ga ti kakutoku- 
  every Japanese player           Tokyo Sports-only-NOM      -NOM   acquire-  
  suru]-to      yosou-sita  
  going- COMP predict-did 
  Lit. ”Every Japanese player, only Tokyo Sports predicted that the Yankees  
  were going to get” 
(193) [Matsuzaka mo Igawa mo]i Toosupo-dake-ga  [Yankees-ga ti kakutoku-suru]- 
  both Matsuzaka and Igawa  Tokyo Sports-only-NOM      -NOM  acquire-going- 
  to      yosou-sita 
  COMP predict-did 
  Lit. "Both Matsuzaka and Igawa, only Tokyo Sports predicted that Yankees  
  was going to acquire" 
 
 
Also, observe the contrast in (194). In (194)a, the existential quantifier associated 
with mo can distribute over the matrix subject: each of the newspapers expected a 
different player to be acquired by the Yankees in addition to Matsuzaka. In contrast, 
for (194)b to be true, there must be a specific player in addition to Matsuzaka that all 
the newspapers predicted that the player is going to Yankees. The reconstructed 





(194) a. Subete-no sinbun-ga [Yankees-ga Matsuzaka mo kakutoku-suru]-to  
   all-GEN newspaper-NOM           -NOM                   also acquire-going-COMP    
   yosou-sita  
   predict-did 
   "All newspapers predicted that the Yankees were going to acquire    
   Matsuzaka as well" 
 
  b. [Matsuzaka mo]i  subete-no sinbun-ga [Yankees-ga ti kakutoku-suru]-to - 
                      also   all-GEN  newspaper-NOM         -NOM  acquire-going-COMP  
   yosou-sita 
   predict-did 
   Lit. “Matsuzaka as well, all newspapers predictetd that the Yankees were  
   going to acquire” 
 
 
 Finally, a parallel observation can be made with VP-internal scrambling. In 
contrast to indefinites that can scope-reconstruct44, the mo-family only allows the 
interpretations that match surface word order: 
(195) Taroo-wa [nanika-o]i dono gakusei-ni mo ti ageta 
  Taroo-TOP something-ACC every student gave 
  “Taroo gave something to every student” 
  ∃>>∀ / ∀>>∃ 
(196) a. Taroo-wa [dono tabemono mo]i Hanako-dake-ni ti ageta 
   Taroo-TOP every food                 Hanako-only-DAT   gave 
   “Taroo gave every food to only Hanako” 
   ∀ >> ¬ / *¬ >> ∀ 
 
  b. Taroo-wa [piza mo pasuta mo]i Hanako-dake-ni ti ageta 
   Taroo-TOP both pizza and pasta    Hanako-only-DAT   gave 
   “Taroo gave both pizza and pasta to only Hanako” 
   ∨ >> ¬ / ¬ >> ∨ 
 
  c. Taroo-wa [piza mo]i  dono gakusei-ni mo ti  ageta 
   Taroo-TOP  pizza also every student              gave 
   “Taroo gave pizza as well to every student” 
   *∀x: x=student (∃y: y≠pizza (Taroo gave y to x)) 
 
 
                                                 
 






 The observation that the specific lexical choice of the NP that undergoes overt 
movement affects the possibility of scope-reconstruction is not a novel one. Lasnik 
(1997, 2000) argues that in English, only indefinites can scope-reconstruct after 
moving to an A-position (some relevant examples are discussed in 2.2.2). Lechner 
(1997) points out that a topicalized/scrambled phrase in German can scope-
reconstruct only when the phrase is a QP headed by a weak determiner. The current 
Japanese paradigm, however, may not be identified with those cases. Crucially, QPs 
like zen’in “everyone” and subete-no X “all the Xs” can scope-reconstruct in 
Japanese, even though they are definitely not indefinites, and are presumably not 
weak QPs. 
(197) [Zen’in-o]i Taroo-dake-ga ti hihan-sita 
  everyone-ACC Taroo-only nom criticize-did 
  Lit.“Everyone, only Taroo criticized” 
  ∀ >> ¬ / ¬ >> ∀ 
(198) [Subete-no hon-o]i  Taroo-dake-ga  ti  yonda 
  all-GEN       book-ACC  Taroo-only-NOM ti read 
  Lit. “All the books, only Taroo read” 
  ∀ >> ¬ / ¬ >> ∀ 
 
 
Thus, the generalization about possible scope interpretations with different scrambled 
QPs seems to be Japanese-specific. I propose the following generalization: 
(199) A mo-based QP (NP mo; dono NP mo; NP mo NP mo) must be interpreted in  
 its surface position. 
 
 
In the next section, I give an account for why (199) is the case. 







 One way to capture the generalization in (199) is to assume that a “scrambled” 
mo-QP is base-generated in its surface position, and that the thematic position of the 
QP is occupied by a null pronoun that is bound by the QP. Since such a base-
generated phrase is not related to its lower thematic position via movement (i.e., 
reconstruction), it does not show a scope-reconstruction effect. I will provide some 
arguments for the base-generation analysis.  
 First, it has been pointed out (e.g., Saito 1985) that scrambling shows sensitivity 
to constraints on movement. For example, scrambling from inside a relative clause 
leads to ungrammaticality, as shown in (200): 
(200) *[Furansugo-o]i Taroo-ga [ti hanasu] hito-o mituketa 
  French-ACC          Taroo-NOM  speaks   person-ACC found 
  Lit. “French, Taroo found a person who speaks” 
 
 
Curiously, if the fronted NP is replaced by one of the mo-family, the acceptability of 
the sentence improves significantly: 
(201) a. ?[Furansugo mo]i Taroo-ga [ti hanasu] hito-o mituketa 
   French also          Taroo-NOM  speaks   person-ACC found 
   Lit. “French as well, Taroo found a person who speaks” 
 
  b. ?[Furansugo mo Supeingo mo]i Taroo-ga [ti hanasu] hito-o mituketa 
   both French and Spanish          Taroo-NOM  speaks   person-ACC found 
   Lit. “Both French and Spanish, Taroo found a person who speaks 
 
  c. ?[Dono romansugo mo]i Taroo-ga [ti hanasu] hito-o mituketa 
   every Romance language Taroo-NOM  speaks   person-ACC found 
   Lit. “Every romance language, Taroo found a person who speaks”” 
 
 
The ungrammaticality of (200) suggests that the scrambling of accusative-marked NP 
involves some form of movement operation, and the movement has violated a 





boundary. Given this, the improved acceptability of sentences in (201) can be 
interpreted as suggesting that the scrambled phrases in (201) have not actually been 
moved. In other words, the “scrambled” phrases are allowed to be linked to their 
thematic positions (represented as t in (201)) by some way other than direct 
movement between the two positions. If movement is the only way to construct such 
a link, then the sentences in (201) should sound as bad as (200). 
 A second piece of evidence comes from data concerning resumption with local 
scrambling. With a case-marked scrambled element, pronominal resumption in the 
same clause is strictly prohibited: 
(202) *[Kono tukue-ni]i Taroo-wa sorei-ni hon-o noseta 
   This desk-DAT       Taroo-TOP it-DAT   book-ACC put 
  Lit. “On this desk, Taroo put a book on it” 
 
 
However, the acceptability of the sentence is again improved by replacing the 
scrambled object with one of mo-family, as in (203): 
(203) a. [Kono tukue-ni mo]i Taroo-wa sorei-ni hon-o noseta 
    This desk-DAT also     Taroo-TOP it-DAT   book-ACC put 
   Lit. “On this desk as well, Taroo put a book on it” 
 
  b. [Kono tukue-ni mo isu-ni mo]i Taroo-wa sorei-ni hon-o noseta 
    This desk-DAT  also chair-DAT also Taroo-TOP it-DAT   book-ACC put 
   Lit. “Both on this desk and the chair, Taroo put a book on it” 
 
  c. [Dono tukue-ni mo]i Taroo-wa sorei-ni hon-o noseta 
    Every desk-GEN       Taroo-TOP it-DAT   book-ACC put 
   Lit. “On every desk, Taroo put a book on it” 
 
 
If a “scrambled” phrase and its base position are related via a movement operation, it 
is expected that a resumptive pronoun is excluded from the base position (a local 





improved acceptability of the sentences in (203), then, gives further support to the 
claim that the sentence-initial NPs can be base-generated in the surface position: 
otherwise, we expect the same degree of acceptability degradation.  
 So far, I have reviewed two observations that suggest that a mo-based QP, in 
contrast to other case-marked QNPs, can be base-generated at the “scrambled” 
position and stay there. I now turn to a case that suggests that a scrambled mo-QP 
must stay at the base-generated position. The case concerns the availability of bound-
variable interpretations. As pointed out by Hoji (1985) and Ueyama (1998), among 
others, a scrambled object may allow variable-binding from the subject, suggesting 
that the object may be c-commanded by the subject at LF. In the following example 
from Ueyama (1998), the pronoun so-ko in the scrambled object may be variable-
bound by the subject: 
(204) [So-ko-no ko-gaisha]-o     Toyota-sae-ga  suisensita 
  that-place-GEN child-company-ACC Toyota-even-NOM recommended 
  “Even Toyota recommended [its subsidiary]” 
                 (Ueyama 1998: 149) 
 
 
I assume that this kind of binding-reconstruction requires the scrambled object to be 
placed in its thematic position at LF. Given this, if a scrambled mo-based QP fails to 
show the binding-reconstruction effect, such data would suggest that the QP cannot 
be located in its thematic position at LF. However, simply replacing the scrambled 
object in (204) with one of the mo-family might not provide an ideal test. We have 
observed that a scrambled mo-phrase does not scope-reconstruct. Then, if the position 
in which an element is interpreted with respect to its scope must coincide with the 





1988), binding-reconstruction with a mo-based QP should automatically be blocked 
when the subject is a scope-taking element (as in (204)). In order to get around this 
potential confounding factor, I use sentences with ATB scrambling, as exemplified in 
(205): 
(205) [Soko-no shain-o]i       Toyota-wa ti uttae Nissan-wa ti kubinisita 
  that place-GEN employee  Toyota-TOP   sued  Nissan-TOP  fired 
  Lit. “Its employee, Toyota sued and Nissan fired” 
 
 
The sentence allows a “sloppy” reading of the pronoun soko, that is, it can mean that 
Toyota sued Toyota’s employee and Nissan fired Nissan’s employee. Given the 
observation that sloppy readings of a pronoun require c-command from its antecedent 
(e.g., Reinhart 1983), I interpret the fact in (205) to mean that binding-reconstruction 
is allowed in the sentence. Now, let us compare (205) with cases that involve a mo-
based QP. The relevant examples are in (206). Sloppy interpretations are not available 
with these sentences, suggesting that the “scrambled” mo-phrases cannot be in their 
thematic positions at LF.45 
(206) a. [Soko-no shain mo]i       Toyota-wa ti uttae Nissan-wa ti kubinisita 
   that place-GEN employee also  Toyota-TOP   sued  Nissan-TOP  fired 
   Lit. “Also its employee as well, Toyota sued and Nissan fired” 
 
  b. [Soko-no shain mo bengoshi mo]i Toyota-wa ti uttae Nissan-wa ti  
   both its employee and lawyer               Toyota-TOP   sued  Nissan-TOP   
   kubinisita  
   fired 
   Lit. “Both its employee and lawyer, Toyota sued and Nissan fired” 
 
 
                                                 
 
45 Admittedly, the judgments regarding the contrast between (205) and (206) are not crystal clear. Many native 
speakers I have consulted with simply did not get the reconstructed interpretation, even with the base-line sentence 
(205). However, all the informants who did get the reconstructed interpretation with (205) also found the attested 





Thus, a scrambled mo-QP cannot undergo binding-reconstruction, even when scope 
interpretation is not relevant. This observation suggests that the lower thematic 
position is not accessible for a scrambled mo-QP.  
 The option of base-generating an argument in a non-theta position has been 
widely discussed in the Japanese syntactic literature. For example, Kuno (1973) and 
Saito (1985) argue that topicalized (i.e., wa-marked sentence initial) phrases in 
Japanese can be base-generated in the surface position. Ueyama (1998) claims that a 
certain kind of “scrambled” phrases are base-generated in the surface position. 
Bošković and Takahashi (2001) take perhaps the most radical approach, arguing that 
all scrambled phrases are base-generated at the surface position, and are lowered to 
their thematic positions at LF. Bošković and Takahashi claim that the LF-lowering of 
a scrambled phrase is a last-resort operation, triggered by the need to check formal 
features. This analysis accounts for the fact that adverbial adjuncts may not undergo 
long-distance scrambling, as shown in the following example by Saito (1985): 
(207) a. Mary-ga [John-ga [riyuu-mo naku] sono setsu-o sinjiteiru to]  
   Mary-NOM John-NOM reason-even without that theory-ACC believes that 
    omotteiru 
   thinks 
   “Mary thinks that John believes that theory without any reason” 
 
  b. *[Riyuu-mo naku]i Mary-ga [John-ga ti sono setsu-o sinjiteiru to]  
   reason-even without Mary-NOM John-NOM that theory-ACC believes that   
   omotteiru  
   thinks 
   “Without any reason Mary thinks John believes that theory” 
 
 
Both surface forms of (207) are fine, but (207)b may not have the interpretation that 
the sentence-initial adverbial “riyuu-mo naku” modifies the subordinate clause. 





generated at the surface position and is fully licensed at the position, with no formal 
features that could motivate LF-lowering. Therefore, economy conditions on 
syntactic movement block LF-lowering of the adjunct, excluding the possibility that 
the adjunct is interpreted in the lower clause.  In contrast, when the scrambled adjunct 
is a wh-phrase, it can be lowered at LF, as shown in the following example: 
(208) ?Naze Mary-ga [CP John-ga sono setu-o sinziteiru ka] sitteiru. 
  why Mary-NOM John-NOM that theory-ACC believes Q knows 
  “Mary knows why John believes in that theory.” 
 
 
In this sentence, the wh-phrase naze “why” is interpreted within the subordinate 
clause, suggesting that it is lowered at LF. This is expected, given the assumption that 
wh-phrases have a formal wh-feature that must be checked by an appropriate 
interrogative C-head, and the matrix CP in (208) is not interrogative: the wh-phrase 
must undergo LF-lowering to check its feature. 
 An observation that would be relevant to Bošković and Takahashi’s model of 
scrambling is that mo-based QPs may never be followed by a case particle, in contrast 
with other focus particles such as dake “only”.  
(209) a. *Taroo mo-ga / *Taroo mo-o / *Taroo mo-ni 
                           NOM                ACC                     DAT 
 
  b. *Taroo mo Hanako mo-ga / *Taroo mo Hanako mo-o /  
   *Taroo mo Hanako mo-ni 
 
  c. *dono gakusei mo-ga / *dono gakusei mo-o / *dono gakusei mo-ni 
 
  d. OKTaroo-dake-ga / OKTaroo-dake-o / OKTaroo-dake-ni 
 
 
If we interpret this fact as showing that the mo-based QPs lack a formal case feature, 





theory of Japanese scrambling.46 Under the theory, all “scrambled” phrases are base-
generated, and active formal features of a scrambled phrase trigger LF-lowering of 
the phrase. I argue that the mo-based QPs lack a formal case feature, and therefore 
they cannot undergo the last-resort lowering, just like non-wh adjuncts. I assume that 
the thematic position of a scrambled mo-based QP is filled by a null pronoun that is 
bound by the QP, as illustrated in (210). The null-pronoun is a covert counterpart of 
the overt resumptive pronouns that we observed in (203). 
(210)  [NP mo]i Subj-ga [vP ...proi... V] 
  
 
 It must be pointed out here that there is a mo-based QP that does not fall under the 
generalization we have made so far. Daremo “everyone”, which consists of dare 
“who” and mo, can be followed by a case-marker: 
(211) OKdaremo-ga / OKdaremo-o 
 
 
This fact suggests that daremo can have a case-feature. Given this, the present theory 
predicts that daremo can be reconstructed to a vP-internal position, hence allowing 
scope-reconstruction of scrambling. This prediction is indeed borne out: the 
reconstructed interpretation is possible in (212): 
(212) [Daremo-o]i    Taroo-dake-ga ti hihan-sita 
  everyone           Taroo-only-NOM criticize-did 
  Lit. “Everyone, only Taroo criticized” 
  OK¬ >> ∀ 
 
                                                 
 
46 The “dative” –ni may appear within a mo-based QP, e.g., OKTaroo-ni-mo. I assume that –ni in those cases is a 
postposition, rather than a structural case-marker, as the form is ambiguous between the two different grammatical 
morphemes (e.g., Sadakane and Koizumi 1995). However, it remains a problem to explain why –ni as a 






Thus, the contrast between daremo and other mo-based QPs adds further support to 
the base-generation theory developed here.  
3.6.3 Two types of reconstruction? 
 
 Before closing this section, let us comment on the difference between canonical 
word order and non-canonical word order sentences. Recall that I argued in 2.5.1 that 
inverse scope in canonical order sentences is derived by reconstructing the subject 
into the vP-internal position. Thus my theory posits the exact same mechanism of 
covert scope shifting for inverse scope in canonical order and scrambled sentences: it 
is reconstruction of overt movement. This position might raise a question as to why 
inverse scope is readily available in scrambled sentences, but requires some special 
manipulation in canonical order sentences. For example, inverse scope is impossible 
in (213), but it is easily obtained in its scrambled counterpart in (214): 
(213) Dareka-ga dono kyoujyu-mo hihan-sita 
 someone-NOM every professor criticize-did 
 “Someone criticized every professor” 
  *∀ >> ∃ 
(214) [Dareka-o]i  dono kyoujyu-mo ti hihan-sita 
  someone-ACC  every professor         criticize-did 
  Lit, “Someone, every professor criticized” 
  OK∀ >> ∃ 
 
 
In fact, my theory provides a straightforward answer to the apparent asymmetry. 
Recall that I argued in 2.5.4. that the uniqueness implicature that is imposed on a ga-
marked subject contributes to the difficulty of obtaining inverse scope in cases like 





uniqueness implicature is imposed on the indefinite Without the uniqueness 
implicature, dareka does not resist the distributive interpretation, and therefore 
inverse scope is readily accessible in (214). 
 In short, the apparent asymmetry does not necessitate a distinction between 
mechanisms that derive inverse scope in canonical order sentences and scrambled 
sentences. An independently motivated theory about the interpretation of ga-marked 
subjects appropriately handles the contrast between (213) and (214). 
 A problem remains, however. When a universal object QNP is scrambled into the 
sentence-initial position, a ga-marked dareka can receive a distributive interpretation, 
as the following Hoji’s (1985) example shows: 
(215) Daremo-oi     dareka-ga ti semeta 
  everyone-ACC someone-NOM criticized 
  Lit. “Everyone, someone criticized”  
  OK∀>>∃ 
 
 
The issue is related to a problem that I chose to put aside in section 3.5.4. If the 
uniqueness/maximality implicature is always computed in terms of the set that is 
specified by the descriptive content of the ga-subject, then the subject in (215) should 
invoke an implicature that there was only one individual who bears the property of 
being an agent in an event of criticizing. The distributive interpretation is therefore 
predicted to be blocked, contrary to the fact. With cases like (215), then, I need to 
show either that the uniqueness/maximality implicature does not arise at all, or that 
the set of individuals on which the maximality constraint is imposed is not 
determined by the descriptive content of the subject. Either way, it would be helpful if 





invoke a uniqueness implicature. Unfortunately I am currently not aware of any such 
evidence, partly because a uniqueness implicature can always be cancelled (e.g., 
Dareka-ga kita. Jitsuwa, daremo-ga kita. “Someone came. In fact, everyone came”). 
Thus it is hard to distinguish cases that do not invoke a uniqueness implicature at all 
from cases in which the implicature is somehow cancelled. I leave the issue open for 
future research. 
3.7 Revisiting the learnability problem 
 
 In this section, I discuss how the theoretical account of scope rigidity that I have 
developed so far in this chapter affects the learnability problem in the acquisition of 
scope rigidity. Let us first recap the learnability problem. Our experimental data 
revealed that Japanese children allow inverse scope interpretations that Japanese 
adults do not allow. This suggests that children’s grammar allows flexibility in the 
mappings between surface syntax and semantics, as schematically shown in (216): 
(216) Surface syntax    Semantics 
  [QP1...[QP2...]]   Q1 >> Q2 (surface scope) 
         Q2 >> Q1 (inverse scope) 
 
 
There are, however, several types of inverse scope interpretations that are impossible 
in the adult language. Children must accordingly learn the impossibilities of those 
interpretations, but input data do not provide any reliable evidence against those 
interpretations. Therefore, children cannot learn to block the relevant scope 
interpretations directly on the basis of input evidence about possible scope 
interpretations. A theory of language acquisition thus needs to explore a possibility of 





something on the basis of observable properties of the language leads children to 
block their non-adult scope interpretations. 
 The theoretical account that I have developed so far in this chapter provides such 
a possibility. First, under my approach to scope rigidity in canonical order sentences, 
the acquisition of the scope constraint is reduced to the acquisition of the correct 
semantic/pragmatic properties of ga-marked subjects: acquiring the 
uniqueness/maximality implicature imposed on ga-subjects has the effect of blocking 
children’s non-adult inverse scope interpretations. In fact, it is possible that Japanese 
children at age 5 have already acquired the knowledge about ga-subjects, but they 
simply did not compute pragmatic implicature in the experimental trials. It has been 
widely observed that young children do not reliably compute pragmatic implicature 
(i.e., reject test sentences on the basis of pragmatic implicature) in a TVJT (e.g., 
Noveck 2001; Papafragou and Musolino 2003; Guasti et al. 2005). But in any case, 
the theoretical account provides a way to block children’s non-adult inverse scope 
interpretations by learning something else. 
 A crucial question, then, is how that “something else” is actually learnable from 
input data. For learners of the ga/wa distinction, the relevant data are certainly 
abundant in the input: most sentential subjects are marked either by ga or wa, except 
for cases that involve colloquial case-marker drops, some focus particles (e.g., mo), 
and dative subjects. The distributional differences between ga and wa would thus be 
evident in, for example, the contrast between descriptive statements and generic 
statements, as illustrated in the following examples: 






  a. Inu-ga      hoeta 
   dog-NOM barked 
 
  b. #Inu-wa   hoeta47 
   dog-TOP barked 
(218) Context: the speaker is talking about dogs in general 
  a. #Inu-ga  hoeru 
   dog-NOM barks 
 
  b. Inu-wa   hoeru 
   dog-TOP  barks 
 
 
If children are sensitive to the distinction between describing a situation and merely 
presenting a proposition that the speaker believes to be true (in Kuroda’s terms, 
affirming and asserting), then they would be able to relate the distributional 
difference between ga and wa to the distinction. Once children learn that ga-
sentences express thetic/descriptive judgments, then they would be able to derive the 
uniqueness/maximiality implicature using general principles of pragmatics (i.e., 
something along the lines of Grice’s conversational maxims).  
 Admittedly, the story is still not fully articulated, and there are still unexplained 
details about how children derive the appropriate semantic/pragmatic consequences 
from learning the speech functions of ga/wa (i.e., expressing different kinds of 
judgments). In some sense, the acquisition of the ga-wa distinction resembles the 
acquisition of the definite-indefinite distinction in languages like English: the relevant 
data are quite abundant, yet discovering the exact semantic properties of definiteness 
from observing input data does not seem to be easy at all, and it has been observed 
that children show some non-adultlike behaviors in this domain (e.g., Maratsos 1976; 
                                                 
 
47 The form is not truth-conditionally false, nor does it invoke some implicature that makes the sentence 





Karmiloff-Smith 1979; Wexler 2003; Munn et al. 2006). The problem is, however, 
different from not having evidence for choosing between narrowly restricted 
hypotheses. For learners of possible scope interpretations, the logical possibilities that 
they need to consider is fairly restricted in the first place: given a surface structure, it 
is mapped onto (i) surface scope interpretation, (ii) inverse scope interpretation, or 
(iii) both surface and inverse scope interpretation. Innate linguistic knowledge can 
further restrict possible grammatical hypotheses for each of those possibilities. But 
even with such a narrowly restricted hypothesis space, learners are not provided with 
evidence about possible scope interpretations that allows them to choose between the 
choices. In contrast, for now I do not foresee that learners of the ga/wa distinction 
would face the same kind of challenge. It might be necessary to posit some innate 
linguistic knowledge to restrict possible hypotheses, but once the hypothesis space is 
appropriately restricted, the abundance of input data should lead learners to the 
correct grammar. Given these considerations, I tentatively conclude that Japanese 
children learn scope rigidity in canonical order sentences from learning the ga-wa 
distinction, leaving issues on the details about the acquisition of the distinction for 
future research. 
 With respect to the reconstruction asymmetry between case-marked QNPs and the 
mo-based QNPs in scrambled sentences, I argued that it is due to the fact that the 
latter lacks a formal case feature that is required to trigger the covert lowering 
operation. If we assume that children have adultlike knowledge about the derivation 
of scrambled sentences (under the current approach), then, children’s overgeneration 





overgeneration of case-features with the mo-QNPs. That is, children assigned a case 
feature to the mo-based QNPs, enabling the application of the LF-lowering operation 
to them. The assignment of a case feature to the mo-based QNPs is probably triggered 
by the observation that those QNPs mostly share their distribution with other normal 
NPs. Under this story, the acquisition of the reconstruction asymmetry is reduced to 
the acquisition of correct feature assignments for each type of QNPs. More 
specifically, once the learner realizes that the mo-based QNPs are devoid of formal 
case features, the grammar of covert lowering immediately blocks scope-
reconstruction of those QNPs, provided that the learner is equipped with the grammar 
of the case system and its correlation with movement. How, then, does the learner 
figure out the correct feature assignments? Since Japanese allows case-marker drop 
(especially in colloquial speech), the absence of a case-marker in a single instance 
cannot be taken as evidence for the absence of case features. Rather, conclusions 
must be drawn on the basis of probabilistic observation of the distribution of case 
markers on a certain kind of NP. This is something that a probabilistic learning 
mechanism really excels at. Suppose that the learning mechanism considers the 
following two hypotheses for each type of NP: 
(219) a. X can have a formal case feature. 
 
  b. X may not have a formal case feature. 
 
 
Let us assume that (219)a predicts that input data involves instances of X followed by 
a case marker in addition to instances of X without a case marker. Thus, if input data 
does not involve cases in which X is followed by a case marker, the probabilistic 





hypothesis (219)a. Now, for example, take X to be NP mo: since this form cannot be 
followed by a case marker, the crucial evidence supporting (219)a is absent in the 
input data, and the probabilistic learning mechanism will eventually dismiss the 
hypothesis. What is crucial here is that any instance of NP mo is relevant for 
discriminating the two hypotheses in (219)b, and objective observations of linguistic 
signals provide concrete evidence. This is in clear contrast with learning possible 
scope interpretations from evidence about possible scope interpretations: recall that if 
the probabilistic learning mechanism were to learn the reconstruction asymmetry 
from evidence for inverse scope, it must pick up the crucial data from highly 
restricted cases that involve very specific combinations of quantifiers (e.g., NP mo 
scrambled over a universal QNP). In the current case, the data sparseness problem is 
significantly reduced, making the probabilistic learning scenario quite plausible.  
  The acquisition scenario crucially relies on the assumption that the learner knows 
the causal relations between what is actually learned (i.e., the case-resistant nature of 
the mo-based QNPs) and what is acquired (i.e., the restriction on inverse scope). The 
causal relations stem from abstract grammatical system with a rich internal structure. 
How, then, has the abstract grammatical system been formed in the mind of the 
learner? I am not going to seriously pursue the question here, and tentatively adopt 
the assumption that innate knowledge plays an important role: the relevant structures 
of the grammatical system are innately given to children, rather than being formed 
through experience. 
 Summarizing, the present theoretical account of scope rigidity in Japanese has an 





grammatical properties of the language. Under this account, scope rigidity is thus not 
an arbitrary constraint, in the sense that the lack of certain scope interpretations is 
predictable from other properties of the grammar. I argue that this theory resolves the 
learnability problem in the acquisition of scope rigidity: acquiring the 
semantic/pragmatic properties of ga-sentences and the lack of case-feature with the 
mo-QNPs has the consequence of constraining possible scope interpretations in some 
specific contexts. Crucially, learners of those properties do not suffer from the same 
data-sparseness problem that learners of possible scope interpretations face. It 
remains to be seen whether this account for the acquisition of scope rigidity receives 
any empirical support. This is an important issue for future research. 
3.8 Summary 
 
 In this chapter, I examined the properties of CSS in Japanese. I first showed that 
inverse scope interpretations can be made available in Japanese by manipulating 
contexts or replacing the subject with a certain type of quantifier. Given this, I argued 
that “scope rigidity” is not a property of the language, contrary to what has often been 
claimed in the literature. Second, I pointed out that CSS in Japanese obeys the same 
constraints as CSS in English. This led me to conclude that Japanese and English use 
the same mechanism to shift scope of a quantificational element covertly. I then 
proposed a theory of CSS in Japanese and English, which assumes that covert 
syntactic movement is involved in deriving inverse scope interpretations. With 
respect to the original scope rigidity effect in Japanese, I argued that the 
semantic/pragmatic property of ga-marked subjects in Japanese is crucially 





reconstruction asymmetry between scrambled mo-based QNPs and other case-marked 
QNPs. I proposed a base-generation account for the lack of the reconstructed reading 
with a scrambled mo-QNP. In the last part of the chapter, I discussed how the 










 So far, I have restricted my attention to the scope interaction between two 
quantified arguments. In this chapter, I turn to the scope interaction between a 
quantificational argument and sentential negation. The main focus of this chapter is 
on the scope behavior of Japanese logical connectives: disjunction ka and 
conjunction ...mo...mo. In simple negative sentences, the Japanese connectives 
receive interpretations that are different from those of their English counterparts. I 
will argue that the cross-linguistic contrast is due to another language-specific 
constraint on scope interpretations in Japanese, and present the results of 
experimental studies that investigated the acquisition of the constraint. 
 This chapter is organized as follows. In section 4.2, I begin the discussion by 
illustrating the interpretive contrast between English and Japanese logical connectives 
in simple negative sentences. Empirical observations reveal that Japanese connectives 
have Boolean semantics but are subject to a scope constraint that prevents them from 
yielding the Boolean interpretations within simple negative sentences. Section 4.3 
reviews previous experimental studies on the acquisition of the semantics of 
disjunction and its interaction with negation. Section 4.4 discusses pragmatic felicity 
conditions that are associated with the use of disjunction and negation. Based on the 
discussion, a TVJT that aims to satisfy the felicity conditions for disjunction and 
negation is designed in section 4.5, and the results of the experiment show that 





ka in simple negative sentences. Section 4.6 reviews the experiments that investigated 
children’s interpretation of logical connectives within sentences containing dake 
“only”. Overall, the results from our experimental studies show that Japanese children 
do not consider non-adult hypotheses that are compatible with the majority of the 
input data. At the same time, children’s non-adult behavior with ka shows that the 
acquisition of the scope constraint on the connective involves some nontrivial 
learning. Section 4.7 considers how the learning is possible, and the examination of 
possible input data leads to the conclusion that the acquisition of the scope of ka 
presents the same kind of learnability problem that I discussed in the previous 
chapters. 
4.2 The scope of Japanese connectives 
 
4.2.1 The interpretive contrast 
 
 In English, when the disjunction operator or is interpreted within the scope of 
negation, it allows an inference that closely resembles one of De Morgan’s laws of 
classical logic. In (220), to illustrate, the truth conditions of the sentence that contains 
a negated disjunction can be recast with the conjunction and presiding over both of 
the disjuncts. 
(220) John doesn’t speak Spanish or French 
   John doesn’t speak Spanish AND doesn’t speak French 
 
 
We call this interpretation the “conjunctive” interpretation of disjunction because it is 





(221) A B A∨B ¬(A∨B) ¬A   ¬B    ¬A∧¬B 
  0 0  0     1    1   1    1 
  0 1  1     0    1   0     0 
  1 0  1     0    0   1     0 
  1 1  1     0    0   0     0 
 
 
Therefore in normal contexts, the sentence in (220) is judged to be false if John 
speaks either Spanish or French. In contrast, the Japanese counterpart of (220) 
appears to lack the conjunctive interpretation. As illustrated in (222), a Japanese 
simple negative sentence that involves the disjunction ka is most naturally 
paraphrased by the disjunction of two negated expressions: 
(222) John-wa supeingo ka furansugo-o hanasa-nai 
 John-TOP Spanish or French-ACC speak-NEG 
 Lit. “John doesn’t speak Spanish or French” 
   John doesn’t speak Spanish OR he doesn’t speak French 
 
 
Thus, the sentence in (222) can be truthfully uttered in a situation where, for example, 
John speaks Spanish but not French48. In order to convey the intended “neither” 
meaning of (220), Japanese speakers use the form …mo…mo: 
(223) John-wa supeingo mo furansugo mo hanasa-nai 
 John-TOP Spanish also French also speak-NEG 
  John doesn’t speak Spanish AND doesn’t speak French 
 
                                                 
 
48 Some speakers that I consulted reported that they found sentences like (222) to sound awkward, if the 
sentence is presented without any context. I assume this is due to rather intricate pragmatic requirements that the 
sentences like (222) have.  As I will discuss in detail in 4.4, negation and disjunction have somewhat contradictory 
felicity conditions for their uses, and it is rather hard to imagine a context that satisfies both of the conditions 
simultaneously. I found that the same speakers judge the same sentence to be quite natural when it is given in 
appropriate contexts. I choose to postpone our discussion on the contexts until we start talking about experimental 





The particle mo, as the gloss shows, corresponds to the English focus particle also. 
When it is used with a single NP, it invokes an existential presupposition. Thus (224) 
presupposes that there is someone other than John who came: 
(224) John mo kita 
 John also came 
  ∃x [x≠John & x came] 
 
When two mo-marked NPs are conjoined, however, it expresses a conjunction, which 
would be translated to both…and…in English49. The conjunction …mo…mo no longer 
invokes an existential presupposition. Thus while the sentence in (225) sounds odd in 
a situation where there are no contextually relevant individuals other than those 
mentioned in the sentence, the one in (226) is free from such awkwardness: 
(225) #Taroo-wa ko-nakatta ga, John mo kita 
`  Taroo-TOP come-NEG but John also came 
  “Although Taroo didn’t come, John also came” 
(226) Taroo-wa ko-nakatta ga, John mo Mary mo kita 
  Taroo-TOP cone-NEG but John also Mary also came 
  “Although Taroo didn’t come, both John and Mary came” 
 
 
The interpretation of …mo…mo in simple negative sentences shows another contrast 
with its English counterpart. When the conjunction both…and… appears in the object 
position of a simple negative sentence, it is interpreted in the scope of negation and 
                                                 
 
49  In addition to …mo…mo, Japanese has several conjunction-like expressions. To, toka, and ya yield more or less 
similar interpretations to ...mo...mo  in the following sentence: 
 
(i) John-wa supeingo to / toka / ya furansugo-o hanasu 
 “John speaks Spanish and French” 
 





allows an inference that closely resembles another De Morgan’s law: the truth 
conditions can be recast with the disjunction or presiding over both of the conjuncts: 
(227) John doesn’t speak both Spanish and French 
  John doesn’t speak Spanish OR doesn’t speak French 
 
 
This interpretation is not available in the Japanese counterpart in (223). Therefore, for 
example, while the English sentence (227) can truthfully be uttered if John speaks 
Spanish but not French, the Japanese sentence (223) is judged to be false in the same 
situation. 
 In sum, the Japanese disjunction ka and conjunction …mo…mo lack the "De 
Morgan" interpretations in simple negative sentences. Accordingly, the distributions 
of those connectives in simple negative sentences are the opposite of the distributions 
of their English counterparts: the truth conditions of English sentences that involve 
the disjunction or correspond to those of Japanese sentences with the conjunction 
…mo…mo, and the truth conditions of English sentences that involve the conjunction 
both…and… correspond to those of Japanese sentences that involve the disjunction ka. 
The interpretive contrasts between Japanese and English raise an immediate question: 
why is it that the Japanese connectives ka and …mo…mo do not yield the logical "De 
Morgan" interpretations in simple negative sentences? I will pursue this question in 
the following sections. Closer examinations on those items will reveal that the cross-
linguistic contrast does not extend to other contexts.  






 One possible account for the contrasts between Japanese and English assumes that 
the semantics of the relevant connectives in Japanese is fundamentally different from 
that of their English counterparts, and therefore Japanese connectives do not interact 
with negation in the same way as their English counterparts. The semantic interaction 
between English negation and or / both…and… suggests that those connectives 
correspond to Boolean disjunction and conjunction respectively. Given the lack of the 
same semantic interaction with negation in simple clauses, it is possible to assume 
that the Japanese connectives are not logical Boolean operators, but that they happen 
to yield identical truth conditions with the corresponding Boolean connectives in 
positive contexts. Under this hypothesis, the interpretive contrast in the negative 
contexts is interpreted as disclosing a fundamental semantic difference between the 
connectives in Japanese and English. Let us call the account the semantic account.  
 The semantic account attributes the source of the interpretive contrasts that arise 
in simple negative sentences to the lexical semantics of the relevant connectives in 
Japanese and English. Therefore under the semantic account, it is predicted that the 
interpretive contrasts between Japanese and English persist in other linguistic 
environments in general. This prediction, however, turns out to be false. First, when 
ka appears in a subordinate clause that is embedded under matrix negation, it yields 
the same conjunctive interpretation as English or. That is, the interpretive contrast 
between Japanese ka and English or evaporates in such embedded contexts. The 
following examples illustrate the identical conjunctive interpretations of ka and or 
when they appear in a sentential complement (228), and in a relative clause (229). 
(228) a.  English complement clause 





   John didn’t say that Mary speak Spanish AND didn’t say that Mary  
  spoke French 
 
 b.  Japanese complement clause 
  John-wa [Mary-ga supeingo ka furansugo-o hanasu-to] iwa-nakat-ta 
  John-TOP Mary-NOM Spanish or French-ACC speak-Comp say-NEG-PAST 
   John didn’t say that Mary speaks Spanish AND didn’t say that Mary  
  spoke French 
(229) a.  English relative clause 
  John didn’t see a student who speaks Spanish or French 
   John didn’t see a student who speaks Spanish AND didn’t see a student 
  who speaks French 
 
 b.  Japanese relative clause 
  John-wa [supeingo ka huransugo-o hanasu] gakusei-o mi-nakat-ta 
  John-TOP Spanish or French-ACC speak student-ACC see-neg-PAST 
   John didn’t see a student who speaks Spanish AND didn’t see a student 
  who speaks French 
 
 
Exactly the same observation can be made with …mo…mo and both…and…. Within 
embedded contexts, the conjunction …mo…mo is interpreted under the scope of 
extraclausal negation, yielding the “not both” interpretation50: 
(230) a.  English complement clause 
  John didn’t say that Mary speaks both Spanish and French 
   ¬ >> both 
 
 b.  Japanese complement clause 
  John-wa [Mary-ga supeingo mo furansugo mo hanasu-to] iwa-nakat-ta 
  John-TOP Mary-NOM Spanish also French also speak-Comp say-NEG-PAST 
   ¬ >> …mo…mo 
(231) a.  English relative clause 
  John didn’t see a student who speaks both Spanish and French 
   ¬ >> both 
 
 b.  Japanese relative clause 
                                                 
 
50 As observed in Zwarts 1996, an extraclausal negation is merely an antiadditive operator, and does not allow 
the “De Morgan” paraphrase of conjunctions. Thus for example, the sentence in (228)b cannot be paraphrased as 
“John didn’t say that Mary could speak Spanish OR didn’t say that Mary could speak French”, but this is 





  John-wa [supeingo mo huransugo mo hanasu] gakusei-o mi-nakat-ta 
  John-TOP Spanish also French also speak student-ACC see-neg-PAST 
   ¬ >> …mo…mo 
 
 
Both the English and Japanese sentences in (230) effectively mean that John didn’t 
say that Mary is a French-Spanish bilingual; the sentences in (231) means that John 
didn’t see any French-Spanish bilingual student. Therefore, we now have exactly the 
same paradigm as in the case of ka: …mo…mo is not interpreted under the scope of 
local negation, but it is interpreted under the scope of extraclausal negation.  
 These data are problematic for the semantic account. Contrary to the prediction of 
the semantic account, the interpretive contrasts do not survive under embedding. In 
fact, the identical conjunctive interpretation of English or and Japanese ka, and the 
identical "not both" interpretation of English both…and… and Japanese mo…mo… in 
embedded contexts strongly suggests that these lexical items have  identical 
semantics. We therefore reject the semantic account.  
4.2.3 Scope of Japanese negation 
 
 Another possible account for the interpretive contrasts supposes that negation in 
Japanese takes narrower scope than its counterpart in English. In Japanese, negation 
appears on a clause-final predicate as a bound morpheme, and it must appear between 
the verb root and the tense morpheme as in (232). Japanese does not have negative 
quantifiers like English no, or negative adverbs like never. Also, there are no ways to 
express constituent negation directly, as in not every girl left in English.  
(232) Taroo-ga Hanako-o tataka-nakat-ta  
 Taroo-NOM Hanako-ACC hit-NEG-PAST  






 The head-final structure of Japanese makes it difficult to determine the surface c-
command relations between negation and other elements in the sentence. Assuming 
that the negation morpheme -na- is the head of the functional projection NegP (cf. 
Pollock 1989), its relative position within the verbal inflections suggests that NegP is 
located between VP51 and TP, as in (233): 
(233)   TP 
   
  Subj   T’ 
     
   NegP   T 
   
  VP   Neg 
  
 Obj   V 
 
However, this analysis does not preclude the possibility that c-command relations at 
surface structure have been altered by some movement operations. Given the word 
order in Japanese, it should in principle be possible to move arguments around so that 
they escape from the c-command domain of the Neg-head. Therefore, it is possible to 
assume that the object is not c-commanded by negation in surface structure, and is not 
interpreted under the scope of negation (e.g., Kuno 1980). The lack of the "De 
Morgan" interpretations of ka and …mo…mo in simple negative sentences follow 
from this analysis: those connectives are not in the scope domain of negation in 
Japanese.  
 An immediate problem for the hypothesis that Japanese negation does not take 
scope over the transitive object is the scope ambiguity of sentences like (234). In 
                                                 
 





(234), the narrow scope interpretation of zen’in "everyone" under negation is 
available along with the wide scope interpretation.  
(234) Taroo-wa zen’in-o tataka-nakatta 
 Taroo-TOP everyone-ACC hit-NEG 
 Lit. “Taroo didn’t hit everyone” 
 ∀ >> ¬ / ¬ >> ∀52 
 
 
However, it is still in principle possible to argue that in Japanese negation does not c-
command the object position, and that the narrow scope interpretation of zen’in in 
(234) is derived via some special mechanism that is available to a restricted set of 
lexical items. Under this assumption, the wide scope interpretation of ka and 
…mo…mo in simple negative sentence is the “default” option in Japanese since they 
are not c-commanded by negation, and no assumption that is specific to the lexical 
items is required to explain the scope interpretation. 
 However, a closer examination of the data in (229) and (231) reveals that this 
hypothesis cannot be sustained. The relevant Japanese sentences are repeated here as 
(235): 
(235) a.  John-wa [supeingo ka huransugo-o hanasu] gakusei-o mi-nakat-ta 
  John-TOP Spanish or French-ACC speak student-ACC see-neg-PAST 
    ¬ >> ka 
 
 b.  John-wa [supeingo mo huransugo mo hanasu] gakusei-o mi-nakat-ta 
                                                 
 
52 Although the availability of the narrow scope interpretation of the quantified object seems to be clear to me in 
this particular example, there are considerable disagreements in the literature as to whether quantified objects in 
general can be inside the scope of local negation (e.g., Kuno 1980; Kato 1985). In experimental studies using a 
TVJT, Japanese adults show inconsistent behavior with the narrow scope interpretation of the object (Han et al. 
2004, also Chapter 6 of this thesis). In general, Japanese speakers strongly prefer the wide scope interpretation of 
the object in simple negative sentences, and the availability of the narrow scope interpretation seems to be greatly 
affected by factors like the choice of quantifier, word order (whether the quantifier is in a prenominal position or is 
“floated”, following its host noun), intonation and context. See the discussion in 6.5.1. In any case, there is 
evidence that show the narrow scope interpretation of the object under negation is not entirely impossible (i.e., 
Japanese speakers sometimes, if not always, do accept the narrow scope interpretation), and in this sense 





  John-TOP Spanish also French also speak student-ACC see-neg-PAST 
   ¬ >> …mo…mo 
 
 
In those sentences, ka and …mo…mo are embedded within the relative clause that is 
attached to the object, and are interpreted within the scope of negation. Note that this 
should not be possible under the assumption that the lack of narrow-scope 
interpretations of those connectives in simple negative sentences is due to the lack of 
c-command by negation. If negation in Japanese does not c-command the object 
position as in (236), then it does not c-command anything within the object relative 
clause, as in (237). Therefore, if the lack of the narrow scope interpretation of 
ka/...mo...mo in simple negative sentences is due to the lack of c-command from 
negation, then the narrow scope interpretation of ka/...mo...mo should equally be 
impossible with a relative clause structure, contrary to the fact: 
(236)   XP 
   
   Obj   NegP 
     
    VP   Neg 
(237)     XP 
     
[rel.clause…]  Obj   NegP 
       
      VP   Neg 
 
This observation demonstrates that Japanese negation can take scope over the object 
position of transitive sentences, and therefore suffices to reject the hypothesis that the 
interpretive contrasts between Japanese and English are due to the general restricted 





4.2.4 Strength of negation  
 
Another possibility is to assume that some property of ka and …mo…mo forces them 
to take scope over local negation. Under this view, the cross-linguistic contrasts 
between Japanese and English are reduced a matter of scope interpretations, and the 
differences in scope interpretations are derived by some lexical property of ka and 
…mo…mo. This property must distinguish between negation in the same clause and 
negation in the higher clause: while ka and …mo…mo resist taking scope under local 
negation, they can happily be interpreted under the scope of negation in a higher 
clause. The relevant data are repeated here as (238) and (239): 
(238) a.  Simple clause 
  John-wa supeingo ka furansugo-o hanasa-nai 
  John-TOP Spanish or French-ACC speak-NEG 
  *¬ >> ka 
 
 b.  Complement clause 
  John-wa [Mary-ga supeingo ka furansugo-o hanasu-to] iwa-nakatta 
  John-TOP Mary-NOM Spanish or French-ACC speak-COMP say-NEG 
  OK¬ >> ka 
 
 c.  Relative clause 
  John-wa [supeingo ka huransugo-o hanasu] gakusei-o mi-nakatta 
  John-TOP Spanish or French-ACC speak student-ACC see-NEG 
  OK¬ >> ka 
(239) a.  Simple clause 
  John-wa supeingo mo furansugo mo hanasa-nai 
  John-TOP Spanish also French also speak-NEG 
  *¬ >>…mo…mo 
 
 b.  Complement clause 
  John-wa [Mary-ga supeingo mo furansugo mo hanasu-to] iwa-nakatta 
  John-TOP Mary-NOM Spanish also French also speak-COMP say-NEG 
  OK¬ >>…mo…mo 
 
 c.  Relative clause 





  John-TOP Spanish or French-ACC speak student-ACC see-NEG 
  OK¬ >> …mo…mo 
  
One semantic difference between clause-internal sentential negation and sentential 
negation in a superordinate clause is their ability to license particular logical 
inferences. Zwarts (1996) proposes a hierarchy of negative expressions in natural 
language in which negative expressions are classified into three classes according to 
their “strength”. The hierarchy is summarized in (240): 
(240) a. A functor f is decreasing iff f(X ∨ Y)  f(X) ∧ f(Y) 
 
  b. A functor f is anti-additive iff f(X ∨ Y) = f(X) ∧ f(Y) 
 
  c. A functor f is antimorphic iff f is anti-additive and f(X ∧ Y) = f(X) ∨ f(Y) 
 
 
Under the definitions in (240), clause-internal sentential negation and sentential 
negation in a superordinate clause belong to different classes. The former is 
antimorphic, but the latter is merely anti-additive, as shown by the non-equivalence of 
sentences in (241): 
(241) John didn’t claim that Mary ate (both) pizza and pasta 
 ≠ John didn’t claim that Mary ate pizza or didn’t claim that Mary ate pasta 
 
Thus, the following constraint on the scope interpretation of ka and …mo…mo 
captures the scope behavior of those connectives in sentences like (238) and (239): 




Zwarts (1998) and van der Wouden (1997) point out that the semantic distinction in 





also classified into three types according to what kind of licenser they need. For 
example, while “superstrong” (in van der Wouden’s terminology) NPIs require an 
antimorphic licenser, “strong” NPIs can be licensed by a merely anti-additive functor, 
and so on (thus, while superstrong NPIs require a clausemate negation, strong NPIs 
may be licensed by a negation in the superordinate clause). If the distinction in (240) 
plays a crucial role in some domain of natural language grammar, the existence of a 
constraint like (242) would not be totally implausible.  
 However, the constraint (242) faces some empirical problems. Let us start our 
discussion with the focus operator only, and its Japanese counterpart dake. As is 
illustrated in (243), a sentence containing only entails a negative proposition (cf. Horn 
1969), and (244) shows that in this respect Japanese dake works exactly the same. 
(243) Only John speaks Spanish 
 53 Everyone other than John doesn’t speak Spanish 
(244) John-dake-ga supeingo-o hanasu 
 John-only-NOM Spanish-ACC speak 
  Everyone other than John doesn’t speak Spanish 
 
When the conjunction both…and… appears in the scope of the covert negation that 
appears within the proposition entailed by sentences containing only54, it yields a 
“disjunctive” interpretation that can be paraphrased using or. Observe that the first 
sentence in (245) entails the second one, which in turn is logically equivalent to the 
third one. 
                                                 
 
53 The arrow means that “the above sentence entails that” and is used to introduce entailed propositions. 
54 Notice that the direct scope relation between only and and is not at issue here. Sentences containing only are 
also associated with positive propositions, and for that reason only does not create a typical DE domain (cf. von 
Fintel 1999, Herburger 2000). For the current discussion, however, we will ignore this issue and concentrate on 





(245) Only John speaks both French and Spanish 
  Everyone other than John doesn’t speak both French and Spanish 
 = Everyone other than John doesn’t speak French OR55 doesn’t speak Spanish 
 
Given that an entailment relation holds between the first sentence and the third in 
(245), we conclude that the covert negation associated with only is an antimorphic 
operator. Notice also that this shows that the covert entailment component of 
sentences with only has a universal quantifier that takes scope over the entailed 
negation. Observe that a negation that takes scope over an existential quantifier is not 
antimorphic, as illustrated in the examples in (246): 
(246) a. Nobody speaks Spanish and French 
  ≠ Nobody speaks Spanish OR nobody speaks French 
 
 b. It is not the case that someone speaks Spanish and French 
  ≠ It is not the case that someone speaks Spanish OR it is not the case that  
   someone speaks French 
 
 An interesting fact here is that the Japanese conjunction …mo…mo interacts with 
the covert negation associated with dake in exactly the same way as English 
both…and...: 
(247) John-dake-ga supeingo mo furansugo mo hanasu 
 John-only-NOM Spanish also French also speak 
 “Only John speaks both Spanish and French” 
  Everyone other than John doesn’t speak French and Spanish 
 = Everyone other than John doesn’t speak French OR doesn’t speak Spanish 
 
The constraint (242) predicts that ...mo...mo in the sentence (247) must take scope 
over the antimorphic negation, yielding the interpretation that Everyone other than 
John doesn’t speak French AND doesn’t speak Spanish. However, this prediction is 
                                                 
 
55 The disjunction is, as is specified in the relevant De Morgan’s law, the inclusive disjunction. The use of 





not borne out: the conjunction …mo…mo can be interpreted within the scope of 
antimorphic negation, which is not expressed overtly. Not surprisingly, once we try to 
express the entailment of (247) in a Japanese single clause sentence, the relevant 
narrow-scope interpretation of …mo…mo is completely excluded: 
(248) John igai-no zen’in-ga supeingo mo furansugo mo hanasa-nai 
 John except-GEN everyone-NOM Spanish also French also speak-NEG 
 = Everyone other than John doesn’t speak French AND doesn’t speak Spanish 
 
Thus, the relevant distinction is not whether negation is antimorphic or not. In both 
(247) and (248), the negation is antimorphic, but the narrow scope of ...mo...mo is 
allowed only with the covert version in (247). 
 The disjunction ka can also be interpreted under the scope of the covert negation 
associated with dake. Within the covert negative entailment, ka yields the conjunctive 
interpretation, as shown in (249). 
(249) John-dake-ga supeingo ka furansugo-o hanasu56 
 John-only-NOM Spanish or French-ACC speak 
 “Only John speaks Spanish or French” 




 The facts so far show that ka and …mo…mo can be interpreted within the scope of 
a covert antimorphic operator. I now add another observation, that ka and …mo…mo 
can take scope under overt antimorphic negation. First, let us observe the following 
                                                 
 
56 Here and in what follows, we are abstracting away from the issue of the pragmatic requirements associated 
with the use of disjunction. Normally disjunction is used to express a speaker’s uncertainty, and the sentence 
sounds much more natural when it is used as, for example, a prediction about the future. While this issue is not 
crucially important in this theoretical discussion, it will become quite relevant when we design psycholinguistic 





conditional sentence, in which …mo…mo and negation appear inside the antecedent 
clause: 
(250) Mosi John-ga supeingo mo furansugo mo hanasa-nai-to, kare-wa komaru 
 If John-NOM Spanish also French also speak-NEG-COMP he-TOP in-trouble 
  Lit. "If John doesn’t speak both Spanish and French, he will be in trouble" 
 
 
Imagine a situation in which a person is going to have a job interview with a 
professor named John. The person wants to present his previous work to John, but in 
order to fully appreciate the value of his research, one must be proficient both in 
Spanish and French. Thus, the person hopes that John speaks both Spanish and 
French: if John doesn’t speak Spanish or doesn’t speak French, then he may miss the 
importance of the person’s work. The sentence can be truthfully uttered in the 
situation. That is, the sentence has an interpretation that can be paraphrased as 
follows: if John doesn’t speak Spanish OR doesn’t speak French, he will be in trouble. 
This fact shows two things: first, the negation within the antecedent clause is an 
antimorphic negation with respect to …mo…mo; second, …mo...mo is interpreted in 
the scope of the antimorphic negation.  
 Exactly the same observation can be made with ka. Imagine a situation in which a 
person, who can only speak Spanish and French, is going to have a guest from a 
foreign country, whose name is John. The person is anxious about the language that 
John speaks: if John doesn’t speak Spanish and doesn’t speak French, there will be no 
productive way for the person to communicate with his guest. The sentence in (251) 
can truthfully be uttered as a description of the situation: 
(251) Mosi John-ga supeingo ka furansugo-o hanasa-nai-to, kare-wa komaru 





  Lit. "If John doesn’t speak Spanish or French, he will be in trouble" 
 
 
This indicates that the sentence can have an interpretation that can be paraphrased as 
follows: if John doesn’t speak Spanish AND doesn’t speak French, he will be in 
trouble. That is, ka can be interpreted under the scope of antimorphic negation. A 
question arises, however, as to why antecedents of conditionals behave differently 
from simple clause sentences with respect to the scope of ka/...mo...mo. I will return 
to this question in section 5.2.  
 The facts conclusively show that Japanese connectives are not entirely excluded 
from taking scope under an antimorphic operator, thereby rejecting the constraint in 
(242). More generally, these facts reveal the problem of stating the scope constraint 
on ka and …mo…mo in semantic terms: those connectives may or may not take scope 
under negation that seems to have exactly the same semantic property.   
4.2.5 Summary and issues for language acquisition 
 
 So far, I have examined interpretations of Japanese connectives and their semantic 
interaction with negation. Based on empirical data, I have rejected the following 
hypotheses: 
(252) a. The semantic hypothesis 
   Japanese ka and …mo…mo are not logical Boolean connectives, and   
   therefore they do not interact with negation in the same way as their   
   English counterparts. 
 
  b. The negation scope hypothesis 
   Japanese sentential negation does not c-command the object position of  
   transitive predicates, and therefore ka and …mo…mo in object position are 
   interpreted outside the scope of negation. 
 





   Some lexical property of ka and …mo…mo forces them to take scope over  
   antimorphic negation. 
 
 
Thus, ka/...mo...mo are Boolean connectives, which are subject to some independent 
scope constraint that forces them to take scope over local negation. I will provide an 
alternative analysis for the scope constraint on ka/...mo...mo in the next chapter. For 
now, let us turn to the acquisition of those connectives. The main question that I 
would like to address here is whether or not Japanese children consider any of the 
non-adult hypotheses in (252). Since all those hypotheses yield the “correct” 
interpretations (i.e., truth-conditionally equivalent) of ka/...mo...mo in simple negative 
sentences, the majority of input data would presumably be compatible with them. 
Thus it would appear that children could be misled by input data to assume a non-
adult hypothesis, such as those in (252). Thus, an empirical issue for acquisition 
resarch is how “adultlike” children’s knowledge of Japanese connectives is: more 
specifically, (i) whether or not Japanese children have the correct lexical semantics of 
ka/...mo...mo, and (ii) whether or not they have adultlike knowledge of the scope 
constraint on the connectives.  To address the issue, an experimental study should 
determine (i) whether or not Japanese children can compute the Boolean, “De 
Morgan” interpretations of those connectives, and (ii) whether or not Japanese 
children can assign the correct scope interpretations to those connectives in 
accordance with the contexts. In what follows, I will explore ways to assess 
children’s knowledge of logical connectives and their interactions with negation. 






The semantic interaction between disjunction and negation has attracted a growing 
interest in acquisition research. There are experimental studies with English-speaking 
children that examined children’s interpretation of the disjunction operator within and 
outside of the scope of negation. I will review some of the results that are informative 
with respect to what young children know about the semantic interaction between 
disjunction and negation.   
4.3.1 Structure dependence of children’s semantic interpretations 
 
 Crain et al. (2002) investigated children’s interpretation of sentences that involve 
disjunction and negation in different structural relations. The question pursued in the 
study was whether or not children rely on linear precedence in determining the 
semantic relation between disjunction and negation. A sample pair of test sentences 
used in Crain et al.’s study is given in (253): 
(253) a. The girl who stayed up late will not get a dime or a jewel 
 
 b. The girl who didn’t go to sleep will get a dime or a jewel 
 
 
Both of the sentences involve the disjunction operator or and negation. In addition, in 
both of the sentences negation precedes disjunction. However, the structural relations 
between negation and disjunction are different in the two sentences. In (253)a, the 
negation not appears in the matrix clause, and is structurally higher than the 
disjunction or, i.e., the former c-commands the latter. In contrast, the negation n’t in 
(253)b is embedded within a relative clause, and hence it does not c-command the 
disjunction or. This difference in the structural relations affects the interpretations of 





conjunctive truth conditions: the girl will not get a dime AND will not get a jewel. In 
(253)b, or is interpreted outside the scope of negation, and therefore the sentence is 
not associated with conjunctive truth conditions.  
 Crain et al. describe the experimental story that was used for the test sentences in 
(253) as follows: 
(254) On this trial, children were told a story about two girls who had both lost a  
 tooth. The girls knew that the Tooth Fairy would come during the night and  
 would give them a reward in exchange for their lost tooth. One girl decided to  
 go to bed right away, while the other girl decided to stay up late to see what  
 the Tooth Fairy looked like. Then, the Tooth Fairy arrived, with two jewels  
 and two dimes. 
                 (Crain et al. 2002: 18) 
 
 
At this point, the puppet interrupted the story, and presented his prediction about what 
would happen in the reminder of the story. One group of children were presented with 
(253)a, while the other group heard (253)b. The story then resumed, as in (255): 
(255) As events ensued, the Tooth Fairy gave a dime and a jewel to the girl who was 
 sleeping. The Tooth Fairy was disappointed to see that the other girl was still  
 awake, however. The little girl explained that she had decided to stay up to see 
 what the Tooth Fairy looked like. At the end, the Tooth Fairy decided to give  
 a jewel, but no dime, to the girl who had stayed up late. 
                (Crain et al. 2002: 19) 
 
 
Following the completion of the story, the puppet repeated the test sentence, 
reminding the child participant what his prediction was. The child participant was 
then asked to judge whether the puppet was right or wrong. 
 Under the adult interpretations of the test sentences, (253)a is false in the situation, 
because of the conjunctive truth conditions associated with the sentence (i.e., the girl 





situation, due to the lack of c-command between negation and disjunction. Crain et al. 
found that English-speaking children at age 4-5 rejected sentences like (253)a 92% of 
the time, while they accepted sentences like (253)b 87% of the time. The results 
exclude the possibility that children compute the semantic interaction between 
negation and disjunction on the basis of linear precedence: the linear orderings of the 
negation and the disjunction do not distinguish the test sentences. 
 Gualmini and Crain (2005) extended Crain et al.’s (2002) study by investigating 
the role of linear distance in children’s interpretation of the semantic interaction 
between disjunction and negation. The study controlled the linear distance between 
negation and disjunction operators as in the following examples: 
(256) Winnie the Pooh will not let Eeyore eat the cookie or the cake 




In (256), the negation c-commands the disjunction, but the two operators are further 
from each other than in the corresponding condition in Crain et al.’s study (i.e., 
(253)a). In (257), the negation does not c-command the disjunction, but they are 
closer to each other than in (253)b. If linear proximity plays crucial role in children’s 
interpretation of the semantic interaction between the two operators, then their 
interpretation of sentences like (256) should resemble their interpretation of sentences 
like (253)b; at the same time, their interpretation of (257) should resemble their 
interpretation of (253)a. In other words, if children rely crucially on linear proximity 
and ignore structure, it is predicted that they assign a conjunctive interpretation only 





between the two operators on the basis of structural notion of c-command, then linear 
proximity should not matter, and children should assign conjunctive truth conditions 
only to sentences like (257). 
 Gualmini and Crain’s experimental finding supported the latter possibility. 
English-speaking children at age 3-6 rejected test sentences like (256) 85% of the 
time when, for example, Winnie the Pooh let Eeyore eat the cookie, but not the cake. 
In contrast, children accepted test sentences like (257) 80% of the time when, for 
example, the Karate Man gave the Pooh Bear he couldn’t lift the honey, but not the 
doughnut. Taken together, Crain et al’s and Gualmini and Crain’s results strongly 
suggest that children base their interpretation of sentences on abstract syntactic notion 
of c-command, rather than on structure-independent notions such as linear precedence 
or linear proximity.57 
 Another point that is worth pointing out about their findings is that children not 
only assigned a conjunctive interpretation to or when it is c-commanded by negation 
in surface structure, but they also rejected the wide scope interpretation of or. 
Suppose, for example, that in sentence (253)a, repeated here as (258), the disjunction 
phrase can undergo an operation of covert scope shift. Then the sentence should be 
ambiguous between the narrow scope (i.e., conjunctive) and the wide scope 
interpretation of disjunction. Under the wide scope interpretation, the sentence is true 
in the experimental condition associated with it: the wide scope interpretation can be 
                                                 
 
57 The c-command requirement for conjunctive interpretations of or may not be a grammatical primitive, but 
may rather be a consequence of compositional computation of semantic interpretations. The notion of structure-





paraphrased as: the girl who stayed up late will not get a dime OR will not get a jewel, 
and it is indeed the case that the girl did not get both a dime and a jewel.  
(258) The girl who stayed up late will not get a dime or a jewel 
 
 
Nevertheless, the observation was that children consistently rejected the sentence in 
the experimental condition. This behavior of children is somewhat reminiscent of the 
“Isomorphism” effect that we discussed in section 3.4: children did not access the 
inverse scope interpretation. However, there is one important difference between the 
standard isomorphism cases and the cases that involve disjunction. In standard 
isomorphism cases that involve negation and quantifiers such as every, some, or two 
(e.g., Musolino et al. 2000; Lidz and Musolino 2002), adult control groups showed no 
problem in accepting inverse scope interpretations. In the cases that involve negation 
and disjunction, by contrast, even adults stuck to surface scope interpretations, 
showing identical behaviors with children. I take these observations as showing that 
the relative scope interpretation between sentential negation and the disjunction or in 
English strictly corresponds to their surface hierarchical relation (at least with a 
standard intonation). In other words, or cannot undergo a process of CSS to take 
scope over negation that c-commands the disjunction. I will come back to the point in 
section 5.7. 
4.3.2 “Two-faced” disjunction  
 
 Within the discussion so far, we have restricted our attention to the semantic 
interaction between disjunction and negation. However, the actual contexts in which 





fact, as defined in Zwarts’ hierarchy of negative expressions (see section 4.2.4), the 
licensing of the conjunctive interpretation of disjunction is the defining characteristic 
of various “negative expressions”. That is, the disjunction or yields conjunctive truth 
conditions in the scope of decreasing operators, which also license inferences from a 
set to its subset (downward-entailing, or DE). Here are several examples of the 
licensing contexts, taken from Crain et al. (2002): 
(259) a. First argument of “every” 
   Every student who speaks French or Spanish likes to travel 
     Every student who speaks French likes to travel AND every student  
   who speaks Spanish likes to travel 
 
  b. Nuclear scope of “none of the NPs” 
   None of the students in this class speaks French or Spanish 
     None of the students in this class speaks French AND none of the   
   students in this class speaks Spanish 
 
  c. Complement of “before” 
   John went to Europe before learning French or Spanish 
    John went to Europe before learning French AND before learning   
   Spanish 
 
  d. Complement of “without” 
   John went to Europe without learning French or Spanish 
     John went to Europe without learning French AND without learning  
   Spanish 
 
                (Crain et al. 2002: pp6-7) 
 
 
There are contexts that are apparently related to the ones in (259), but that 
nonetheless do not allow the disjunction or to have the conjunctive interpretation. The 
tests in (261) reveal the correlation between the conjunctive interpretation of or and 
downward-monotonicity: the contexts in (259), but not those in (260), license 





(260) a. Second argument of “every” 
   Every student who likes to travel speaks French or Spanish 
   *  Every student who likes to travel speaks French AND speaks Spanish 
 
  b. Nuclear scope of “some of the NPs” 
   Some of the students in this class speak French or Spanish 
   *  Some of the students in this class speak French AND some of the   
   students in this class speak Spanish 
 
  c. Complement of “after” 
   John went to Europe after leaning French or Spanish 
   *  John went to Europe after learning French AND after learning    
   Spanish 
 
  d. Complement of “with” 
   John went to Europe with French or Spanish interpreter 
   *  John went to Europe with French interpreter AND Spanish interpreter 
(261) a. First vs. second argument of “every” 
   Every student who speaks a Romance language likes to travel 
    Every student who speaks French likes to travel 
   Every student who likes to travel speaks a Romance language  
   *  Every student who likes to travel speaks French 
 
  b. “None of the NPs” vs. “some of the NPs” 
   None of the students in this class speaks a Romance language 
    None of the students in this class speaks French 
   Some of the students in the class speak a Romance language 
   *  Some of the students in the class speak French 
 
  c. “Before” vs. “after” 
   John went to Europe before learning a Romance language 
    John went to Europe before learning French 
   John went to Europe after learning a Romance language 
   *  John went to Europe after learning French 
 
  d. “Without” vs. “with” 
   John went to Europe without a Romance language interpreter 
    John went to Europe without a French interpreter 
  John went to Europe with a Romance language interpreter 







These observations lead to the following generalized schema of the semantic 
interpretation of disjunction, where OPDE stands for a downward-entailing 
(=decreasing) operator: 
(262) OPDE (A ∨ B)  OPDE (A) ∧ OPDE (B)   
 
         (cf. Gualmini and Crain 2002, Crain et al. 2002) 
 
 
The focus operator only provides an interesting problem for the descriptive 
generalization in (262). As pointed out in previous research (cf. von Fintel 1999), 
only does not exhibit the typical DE pattern. For example, the first sentence in (263) 
does not entail the second, since it might be the case that John speaks French but not 
Spanish. In that situation, English native speakers judge the first sentence to be true, 
but the second sentence to be false: 
(263) Only John speaks a Romance language 
  *  Only John speaks Spanish 
 
 
Von Fintel argues that the reason that the sentence in (263) does not pass the standard 
DE test is that the meaning of the sentence contains a proposition that does not 
involve a DE operator. As we have discussed several times so far, sentences 
containing only entail a negative proposition. However, a full semantic description of 
sentences with only involves another meaning component in addition to the entailed 
negative proposition. Specifically, as proposed by Horn (1969), the meaning of 
sentences with only is decomposed into two conjoined propositions, with (264) 
representing the fully decomposed meaning of (264): 





  ii. Everyone other than John doesn’t speak a Romance language 
 
 
There is considerable debate regarding the nature of these propositions. While 
everyone seems to agree that the second part is directly asserted/entailed by the 
original sentence, people disagree about the status of (i): Horn (1969; 1996) and von 
Fintel (1999) argue that it is a presupposition; Atlas (1993; 1996) and Herburger 
(2000) claim that it is also the assertion of the sentence. In this thesis, I choose to put 
this issue aside. For the sake of exposition only, I will adopt Horn’s terminology and I 
will call (i), which is the proposition about the focused individual, the 
“presupposition”; and I will call (ii), which is the proposition about background 
individuals, the “assertion”. I intend no theoretical commitments by using this 
terminology.  
 Turning back to the entailment properties of the two propositions in (264), the 
second “assertion” part introduces a standard DE operator: negation (or a semantic 
equivalent of negation). As we have discussed several times, the introduction of the 
negative operator in the covert meaning component is a characteristic semantic 
property of only. Thus the scope domain of the covert negation is downward-entailing 
and, therefore, (263) entails the following proposition: 
(265) Everyone other than John doesn’t speak Spanish 
 
 
By contrast, the first meaning component, the “presupposition” of (264), does not 
introduce a DE operator and therefore does not create a DE context. Consequently, no 
entailment relation holds between (263) and the following proposition: 







Given this analysis, we are now able to see why the standard DE test in (263) fails. 
Consider (263) again. The “presupposition” part of the first sentence in (263) does not 
entail the “presupposition” part of the second sentence, as illustrated in (267). 
(267) John speaks a Romance language (“presupposition” of the first sentence) 
  *  John speaks Spanish (“presupposition” of the second sentence) 
 
 
 In sum, we have observed that sentences containing only are associated with two 
conjoined propositions, which contrast with each other in their entailment properties. 
In other words, the focus domain of only is not simply DE or non-DE: the context has 
both of the properties. The interpretation of disjunction in this context is affected by 
this duality in an interesting way. By applying the decomposition analysis, we can 
observe that disjunction or within the scope of only is effectively interpreted twice, 
receiving two distinct interpretations. Let us illustrate the point, using the following 
sentence as an example: 
(268) Only John speaks French or Spanish 
  i. John speaks French or Spanish, AND 
  ii. Everyone other than John doesn’t speak French or Spanish 
 
 
Within the first “presupposition” part of the decomposed propositions, or appears 
within a non-DE context, and thus is interpreted disjunctively with respect to what 
John speaks. Thus, for the sentence to be true, it must be the case that John speaks 
French or speaks Spanish (but not necessarily both French and Spanish). In contrast, 
within the second “assertion” part, or appears within a DE environment, and it 





than John doesn’t speak. Hence, for the sentence to be true, it must be the case that 
everyone other than John doesn’t speak French and everyone other than John doesn’t 
speak Spanish. These two interpretations of or suggest that the generalization in (262) 
is indeed correct: or is interpreted conjunctively only within a DE environment.  
 Goro, Minai and Crain (2005a) investigated children’s interpretation of 
disjunction or within the scope of only. As described above, or in this context is 
“two-faced”: it is simultaneously associated with two distinct truth conditions (i.e., a 
conjunctive and a disjunctive one). In order to correctly interpret the “two-faced” 
disjunction operator or within the scope of only, it is necessary to go through the 
process of semantic decomposition, and then compositionally compute the truth 
conditions for each meaning component. For example, in order to judge the truth 
value of the sentence (268), one must first determine whether or not John has a 
property of being able to speak French or Spanish: given the disjunctive interpretation 
of or, this condition is satisfied if John speaks French, or if John speaks Spanish. Next, 
one must determine whether or not everyone other than John has a property of not 
being able to speak Spanish or French. Within this condition or is conjunctive, and 
therefore, the condition is satisfied only if everyone other than John speaks neither of 
the languages.58 Thus, the semantic property of or within the scope of only provides 
an excellent ground for testing the nature of children’s semantic computation. The 
                                                 
 
58 One may alternatively describe the process of the truth value judgment as follows: speakers determine if John 
has the property of being able to speak French or Spanish, and that nobody else has the same property (Colin 
Phillips, Personal Communication). However, determining that nobody else has the property crucially includes 
knowing what it is about not having a property of being able to French or Spanish, which requires a computation 






correct interpretation of or in the context cannot be obtained by resorting to, for 
example, a “template” of form-meaning correspondence like (269): 
(269) Form    Meaning 
  not … X or Y   ¬X ∧ ¬Y 
 
 
Such templates may work in interpreting negative sentences that involve or, but not in 
the case of only. Crucially, in sentences containing or within the scope of only, or is 
not simply disjunctive or conjunctive, but has both interpretations at the same time. 
 One of the crucial test sentences used in Goro, Minai and Crain’s experiment is 
given in (270), and the test conditions had the setups illustrated in (271) and (272). 
(270) Only Bunny Rabbit will eat a carrot or a pepper 
(271) Condition I 
       Carrot   Pepper 
 Winnie the Pooh   *    * 
 Bunny Rabbit    √    * 
 Cookie  Monster   *    * 
(272) Condition II 
       Carrot   Pepper 
 Winnie the Pooh   *    * 
 Bunny Rabbit    √    * 
 Cookie  Monster   *    √ 
 
 
The experiment employed a Truth Value Judgment Task in ‘Prediction Mode’ (cf. 
Crain et al. 2000): after part of each story was acted out, it was interrupted so that the 
puppet could make a prediction about what would happen next in the story: for 
example, "I think only Bunny Rabbit will eat a carrot or a pepper". In Condition I, 
Bunny Rabbit proceeded to eat a carrot, but neither of the other characters ate 





pepper. The test sentence was repeated at the end of each story, and the child was 
asked if the puppet’s prediction was right or wrong. In Condition I, 21 English-
speaking children (age 3;6 – 5;8) accepted the test sentence in (270) in 93% of trials 
(Adult control group: 100% acceptance). In contrast, the same children rejected the 
test sentence in Condition II in 90% of trials (Adult control group: 100% rejection). 
 The interpretation of the results is as follows. First, the meaning of the test 
sentence in (270) is decomposed as in (273). 
(273) i. Bunny Rabbit will eat a carrot or a pepper, AND 
 ii. Everyone other than Bunny Rabbit will not eat a carrot or a pepper 
 
 
Within the non-DE presupposition part, or yields the disjunctive truth condition under 
adult interpretation (BR will eat a carrot OR will eat a pepper). The high acceptance 
rate of children in Condition I suggests that they actually interpreted or disjunctively 
with respect to what Bunny Rabbit ate: Bunny Rabbit only ate a carrot. By contrast, 
within the DE assertion part, or yields the conjunctive truth conditions under the adult 
interpretation (everyone else will not eat a carrot AND will not eat a pepper). Again, 
the high rejection rate of children in Condition II suggests that children interpreted or 
conjunctively with respect to what everyone else failed to eat. In short, children 
showed adultlike performance in interpreting a “two-faced” disjunction or within 
sentences containing only.  
 The results suggest that adultlike semantic composition of the meaning of 
sentences containing or and only is fully operative at around age 4. This implies that 
the relevant semantic computation is not subject to a performance problem that is 





computation appears to be quite complex. In interpreting the crucial test sentences, 
children must have created representations for two separate propositions 
(“presupposition” and “assertion”), and computed the truth conditions for each of the 
propositions individually, in order to derive the distinct truth conditions with the 
“two-faced” or. Children’s adultlike behavior with the “two-faced” or suggests that 
the processing capacity of children at around age 4 is capable of carrying out the 
computation.  
4.3.3 Interim summary 
 
 The results of previous experimental studies show that English-speaking children 
at around age 4-5 have adultlike knowledge of the semantic interaction between 
negation and disjunction. Children are able to compositionally compute the meanings 
of sentences that involve negation and disjunction following the interpretive schema 
in (262), taking into account the abstract structural relation of c-command between 
the two operators. The successful acquisition of the semantics of disjunction is a 
remarkable achievement by English-speaking children, given the nature of input data 
available to children. Crain et al. (forthcoming), among others, pointed out that in the 
vast majority of the input utterances available to children, the English disjunction or 
is used to indicate exclusive disjunction – that is, it is used in non-DE contexts with 
the disjunctive interpretation, carrying along an implicature of exclusivity. Moreover, 
as Gualmini and Crain (2005) argue, abstract structural notions such as c-command 
are not overtly marked in input data, and multiple incorrect hypotheses (e.g., linear 
precedence) seem to be compatible with the primary linguistic data. Given these 





taken to be providing a nativist’s argument for the poverty of the stimulus (e.g., Crain 
et al. 2002; Crain et al. forthcoming; Gualmini and Crain 2005). 
 Compared to children acquiring English, children acquiring Japanese face an 
additional challenge. Even if the basic semantics of disjunction (i.e., the interpretive 
schema in (262)) is innately specified, Japanese children still need to figure out that 
the disjunction operator ka in the language is subject to an independent scope 
constraint. The acquisition of ...mo...mo also involves the same challenge: the polarity 
sensitivity of ...mo...mo is not a universal property of conjunction in natural language, 
and therefore some form of learning is required to determine the scope behavior 
of ...mo...mo. The problem with this learning is that it apparently requires the learner 
to be sensitive to the absence of particular scope interpretations: that is, the narrow-
scope, De Morgan interpretations of those connectives in simple negative sentences. 
Given the indirectness of evidence concerning scope interpretations that we discussed 
in Chapter 1 and 2, we would expect it to be particularly hard for children to learn the 
unavailability of the narrow scope interpretations in the relevant constructions. These 
considerations invite a research question as to how Japanese children solve the 
learning problem. To address this question, I begin with an empirical investigation of 
Japanese children’s interpretation of ka/...mo...mo in simple negative sentences.  
4.4 Experimental design: pragmatic felicity 
 
 One general design requirement for a TVJT experiment is that test sentences must 
be used in a pragmatically felicitous way. This design requirement bears particular 
importance in experiments that involve test sentences with negation and another 





that children’s performance is greatly affected by the pragmatic felicity of test 
sentences: specifically, children’s non-adult bias towards “isomorphic” interpretations 
has been shown to be greatly reduced by pragmatic conditioning. We discussed the 
issue of the Observation of Isomorphism in 2.6: let us recap the issue here. 
 The relevant empirical observation is that young children experience problems in 
accessing interpretations in which the scope relation between negation and a 
quantifier does not match their surface order (i.e., inverse scope relations). For 
example, in an experiment by Musolino (1998), a group of children (mean 4;7) 
accepted the wide-scope interpretation of some only 35% of the time in sentences like 
(274).  
(274) The detective didn’t find someone/some guys. 
 
 
The sentence was uttered in a situation where the detective was playing hide-and-seek 
with two friends, and he was able to find one of his friends but not the other. Under 
the wide scope interpretation of some (i.e., there is someone that the detective didn’t 
find), sentence (274) is true. Adults in a control group accepted the test sentence 
100% of the time, whereas children had rejected it almost two-thirds of the time. 
Children’s adherence to surface scope interpretations is replicated with quantifiers 
like every (in the subject position), and two (Lidz and Musolino 2002). Furthermore, 
Lidz and Musolino (2002) extended the study to Kannada, a language with SOV word 
order. They found that Kannada-speaking children also have the same problem as 
English-speaking children in accessing wide-scope interpretations of object 
quantifiers, despite the difference in word order – negation follows the object in 





 In some recent experimental work, however, it has been discovered that children's 
performance with negation-quantifier scope interpretations is greatly improved by 
implementing certain changes in experimental design. For example, Musolino and 
Lidz (2002) found that children showed adult-like performance when the test 
sentences like (275) are preceded by a positive lead-in sentence, as illustrated in (276).  
(275) Every horse didn’t jump over the fence. 




In the original study by Musolino (1998), children who heard sentences like (275) 
showed difficulty in accessing the interpretation in which negation takes wider scope 
than the subject universal quantifier (i.e., not every horse jumped over the fence). 
However Musolino and Lidz showed that adding a positive lead-in, as in (276), 
greatly improved children's performance. With a positive lead-in, children accepted 
the inverse-scope interpretation of the target sentence much more often than in 
previous research. 
 Gualmini (2003) also showed that pragmatically felicitous uses of target negative 
sentences lead children to access the inverse-scope interpretation of sentences with 
multiple quantifiers. Gualmini based his experiment on De Villiers and Tager-
Flusberg’s (1975) observation that negative statements are typically used to point out 
that contextually determined expectations have not panned out. For example, the 
sentence in (274) sounds most natural and, hence, is easier to process when it is 
uttered in a context in which the detective was expected to find all of his friends, but 





sentence in (277) sounds odd in the same context, even though it is true, because the 
context did not establish the expectation that the detective would miss all of his 
friends.  
(277) The detective didn’t miss someone. 
 
 
Gualmini argues that the use of pragmatically unmotivated negative sentences in 
Musolino's (1998) experiment was the cause of children's degraded performance, and 
his experiments revealed that the pragmatic felicity of the use of negation in test 
sentences greatly affects children’s performance in accessing inverse scope 
interpretations. In an experiment that provided appropriate contextual expectations 
that the detective would find all of his friends – as the pragmatic basis for using 
negation – Gualmini found that children experienced no problems in accessing the 
inverse scope interpretation of sentences like (274), but within the very same context 
their performance was at chance with sentences like (277). 59 
 A general lesson that we can draw from Gualmini’s study is that test sentences in 
experiments must satisfy the felicity conditions associated with the use of negation. 
Otherwise, children’s performance may be degraded for some reason that is not 
related to children’s grammatical knowledge. To that end, for our purposes we must 
make sure that inverse scope interpretations in negative sentences are accessible to 
children. First, the experimental design must satisfy the pragmatic felicity conditions 
on the use of sentences with negation: the test sentences should point out 
                                                 
 
59 These finding has led to the proposal of the Question-Answer Requirement by Hulsey et al. (2004). 
According to the QAR view, children adhere to the scope interpretation that addresses the question under 





discrepancies between contextual expectations and the actual outcomes. Adding a 
positive lead-in should also help. In addition, a control condition can be included to 
ensure that the child participants can in principle access inverse scope interpretations. 
This can be established by replacing the disjunctive phrase in the target sentences 
with another quantificational expression. 
  One additional concern is about the pragmatics of the use of disjunction. Due to 
its polarity sensitivity, in simple negative sentences ka yields disjunctive truth 
conditions in adult interpretations. Generally, disjunctive interpretations indicate the 
speaker's uncertainty about what actually happened. If the speaker knows exactly 
what happened, she would avoid using a weak statement involving disjunction, in 
favor of a more descriptively accurate statement. As we have seen, however, negation 
is generally used to express mismatches between what was expected and what 
actually happened. Thus, a pragmatically felicitous use of negation generally implies 
that the speaker knows what actually happened. As a consequence, negation and 
disjunction with the disjunctive interpretation have somewhat contradictory pragmatic 
conditions on their use: while a disjunctive disjunction expresses that the speaker is 
not certain about what actually happened, negation is most naturally used when the 
speaker knows what happened. In fact, some adult speakers of Japanese that I have 
interviewed report a slight awkwardness with descriptive sentences with ka and 
negation such as (278) when they are presented without any context. 
(278) Taroo-wa piza ka pasuta-o tabe-nakatta 
 Taroo-TOP pizza or pasta-ACC eat-NEG 






We do not want to introduce the potential awkwardness into our test sentences, 
because it could interfere with children’s scope interpretations, and may trigger non-
adult performance for some reason independent of their grammar. Therefore, our task 
here is to find a context that satisfies the felicity conditions on the use of negation and 
disjunction simultaneously. 
 One way to achieve this goal is to control the amount of information that the 
speaker has access to. To illustrate, imagine the following situation. There is a course 
on linguistics that requires three research papers to get credit: a paper on syntax, 
semantics, and phonology. Suppose that one knows that John, a student taking the 
course, is a phonology major and has turned in his phonology paper. Then the 
semester ends, and the person hears that John has gotten an “incomplete” for the 
course. At this point, on the basis of the grade that John got, the person can conclude 
that John failed to turn in all the required papers to get a grade for the course. Put 
differently, it is clear to the person that there was a discrepancy between what had 
been expected (to turn in three research papers) and what actually happened (John 
didn’t turn in all of the required papers). But at the same time, the person is not sure 
about which paper John actually failed to turn in: it may be the syntax paper, maybe 
the semantics paper, or even both. In this situation, the person can felicitously utter 
the following sentence with negation and disjunction: 
(279) John-wa sintakusu-no ronbun ka semantikusu-no ronbun-wo dasa-nakatta 
 John-TOP syntax-GEN paper or semantics-GEN paper-ACC turn-in-NEG 
 Lit. “John didn’t turn in a syntax paper or a semantics paper” 
 
Since the disjunction ka must take scope over negation in the sentence, it means 





use of negation is pragmatically motivated by the fact that the person knows that John 
failed to satisfy the expectation to turn in all the required papers. At the same time, 
the use of disjunction is motivated by the fact that the person’s uncertainty about 
which paper John failed to turn in. The crucial feature of the context is that it 
dissociates information about the achievement of the objective (to get a grade for the 
course) from information about the individual requirements to achieve the objective. 
While the speaker of the sentence (279) has information about whether or not the 
objective was achieved (i.e., John did not get a grade), s/he does not have complete 
information about the satisfaction of each of the requirements (i.e., which of the 
required papers John turned in).  This structure of the speaker’s knowledge about 
what happened therefore creates a context that satisfies the felicity conditions for 
using negation and disjunction simultaneously. 
 Summarizing, the use of disjunction and negation in a descriptive sentence can be 
appropriately motivated by controlling the information that the speaker has access to. 
To that end, experimental contexts should follow the following general guidelines: 
(280) a. Explicit information should be provided with regard to the objective that is 
  expected to be achieved, and the requirements for achieving the objective. 
 
  b. It must be made clear that the objective is not achieved at the end. 
 
  c. Information about which requirement was not satisfied should not be   
   transparent at the time when a test sentence is presented. 
 
(280)b is necessary to motivate a use of negation, and (280)c provides appropriate 
pragmatics for using disjunction with a disjunctive interpretation. In the next section, 





4.5 Experiments: simple negative sentences 
 
4.5.1 Design and participants 
 
 The first set of experiments was carried out in collaboration with Sachie Akiba, 
and the study has been published as Goro and Akiba (2004a; 2004b). The 
experiments aimed to investigate Japanese-speaking children’s interpretations of ka 
and …mo…mo in simple negative sentences. The sample test sentences are given in 
(281): 
(281) a. Butasan-wa ninjin ka piiman-wo tabe-nakat-ta 
  Pig-TOP carrot or pepper-ACC eat-NEG-PAST 
  Lit. “The pig didn’t eat the carrot or the pepper” 
 
 b. Butasan-wa ninjin mo piiman mo tabe-nakat-ta 
  Pig-TOP carrot also pepper also eat-NEG-PAST 
  Lit. “The pig didn’t eat both the carrot and the pepper” 
 
 
Under adult interpretations, both ka and …mo…mo take wider scope than negation in 
these sentences. Thus (281)a means “The pig didn’t eat the carrot OR didn’t eat the 
pepper” and (281)b means “The pig didn’t eat the carrot AND didn’t eat the pepper”. 
Therefore, sentence (281)a is true in a situation where the pig ate the carrot but not 
the pepper. By contrast, sentence (281)b is false in the same situation. 
 The experiment used the Truth Value Judgment Task (Crain and McKee 1985; 
Crain and Thornton 1998). In order to satisfy the pragmatic felicity conditions for 
using the test sentences, we created an experimental design that consists of two 
phases. The first phase was a partial “story”. One experimenter acted out this part of 





part. Here, a puppet, Kermit the Frog, was manipulated by a second experimenter. 
The puppet uttered the target sentences. These sentences were interspersed with filler 
trials. The task of the child was to judge the truth of the test sentences by giving 
Kermit different fruit toys (a strawberry for “right”; a lemon for “wrong”).  
 The central theme of the stories was an eating-contest. There were twelve 
different animals, who were each invited to eat the following foods: a piece of cake, a 
carrot, and a green pepper. The participant was told, first, that all of the animals like 
cake, but not all of them like carrots or green peppers (just like many children). Then 
we introduced the rules of the contest. First, if an animal eats not only cake, but also 
the vegetables, then it receives a shining gold medal. Second, if an animal eats cake 
but only one of the vegetables, then it receives a blue medal. Finally, if an animal 
only eats cake and does not eat any vegetables, then it gets a black cross. These 
rewards serve as “reminders” in the second phase of the experiment (see Crain and 
Thornton 1998). This procedure for the contest dissociates the objective and the 
requirements in the game: the objective is to obtain the best reward (a gold medal), 
and the requirements for achieving the objective are to eat both of the vegetables. 
Explicit information regarding the objective and the requirements is provided as the 
rules of the game. 
 After explaining the rules, the story commences. One of the experimenters acts 
out the eating trials for each animal. Among the twelve animals, four eat both 
vegetables and get a gold medal; four eat only one of the vegetables and get a blue 
medal, and four eat none of the vegetables and get a black cross. All of the animals 





child when s/he makes mistakes. Most of the children did not have any problems 
understanding the rules of the game, and those who made more than three mistakes in 
choosing a correct reward were excluded from the data analysis. The story phase 
continued until all twelve animals finished their trials and were presented with their 
rewards. 
 After the story phase was finished, we returned to the first animal, and the puppet 
started to guess how well each animal did in the game. First, the puppet said that he 
didn’t remember exactly what each animal ate, then he started to make guesses about 
this, based the color of the prizes the animals had been presented as awards. For 
example, the puppet uttered the test sentence (283), preceded by the lead-in in (282) 
for the pig, who had eaten the carrot but not the green pepper: 
(282) Butasan-wa aoi medaru-wo motteru-yo. To-iu koto-wa… 
 “The pig has a blue medal, which means…” 
(283) Butwasan-wa keki-wo tabeta kedo,  ninjin ka piman-wo tabe-nakat-ta 
 pig-TOP   cake-ACC eat-PAST but  carrot or pepper-ACC eat-NEG-PAST 
 Lit. “the pig ate the cake, but didn’t eat the carrot or the pepper” 
 
 
In this way, the design motivated the use of negation and disjunction simultaneously. 
First, the “contest” set up a context in which negative sentences could be used 
felicitously. The objective of the contest was to eat all of the foods and obtain the best 
prize: a gold medal. Given the rules for awarding prizes, the color of the prizes 
provides the puppet with enough information to judge whether the objective has been 
achieved. Receiving a lesser prize indicated that the requirements for getting the best 
prize had not been fulfilled and, therefore, this was associated with a clear sense of 





indicated that what had actually happened did not match the expectation of what 
should have happened. Also, a positive lead-in to the target sentence was included, as 
in (283), to reduce any difficulty for children in accessing inverse-scope readings 
(Musolino and Lidz 2002). 
 Second, the two-phased structure of the design was incorporated to motivate the 
use of disjunction. Recall that the puppet started to make its guesses after the 
“contest” phase had been completed. Therefore, the puppet could not remember 
exactly what each animal had eaten, so its guess was based on the color of the prizes 
that each animal had been awarded. It is crucial here that a blue medal was awarded 
only to those animals who had eaten just one of the vegetables - it did not indicate 
which vegetable the animals had actually eaten. Therefore, the color of prizes 
provides only incomplete information with respect to which requirement was actually 
satisfied, and which was not. Given this incompleteness of information, all that the 
puppet could reasonably guess was something like “he didn’t eat the pepper or he 
didn’t eat the carrot”, which corresponds to the adult-Japanese interpretation of the 
target sentence. In this way, this design minimizes the possibility that children might 
reject the adult interpretation because of pragmatic infelicity associated with that 
interpretation. If children had an adult-like interpretation of negated disjunctions in 
Japanese, they should have accepted sentence like (283). However, if children 
assigned the conjunctive interpretation to ka, then they should have rejected the 
puppet’s statements, since the color of the medal revealed that the animal had eaten 





 The same logic applies to target sentences with …mo…mo. For example, the 
target sentence in (284) is presented in exactly the same situation, as the puppet’s 
guess for an animal with a blue medal: 
(284) Butwasan-wa keki-wo tabeta kedo,  ninjin mo piman mo tabe-nakat-ta 
 pig-TOP   cake-ACC eat-PAST but  carrot also pepper also eat-NEG-PAST 
 Lit. “the pig ate the cake, but didn’t eat both the carrot and the pepper” 
 
 
Here we are concerned whether Japanese children can successfully exclude the 
narrow-scope, “not both” interpretation of …mo…mo. Notice that the “not both” 
interpretation, if that is possible at all, can work as a perfectly reasonable guess for 
the animals with a blue medal: the medal shows that the animals ate at least one of the 
vegetables, but not both, without specifying exactly which vegetable was not eaten. 
Thus again, the design minimizes the possibility that children might reject the non-
adult interpretation because of pragmatic infelicity associated with the relevant 
interpretation.  
 The puppet made guesses for all twelve animals. The test sentences consisted of 
four fillers (for animals with a gold medal), four target sentences with ka (two for 
animals with a blue medal; two for those with a black cross), and four target 
sentences with …mo…mo as in (284) (two for animals with a blue medal; two for 
those with a black cross). 
 In addition to the main experiment (which will be referred to as Experiment 1A), 
we carried out a control experiment (Experiment 1B) using test sentences containing 
another quantificational element. The control experiment aimed to see whether or not 
Japanese children can access inverse-scope readings of an object QP in this particular 





target sentences were replaced with nanika “something”; similarly A mo B mo 
phrases were replaced with nanimo (anything). Nanika is an indefinite existential 
corresponding to English something, and nanimo is a NPI-version of nanika: 
(285) Butasan-wa  nanika   tabe-nakat-ta 
 Pig-TOP    something eat-NEG-PAST 
 "The pig didn’t eat something" 
(286) Butasan-wa nanimo tabe-nakat-ta 
 Pig-TOP anything eat-NEG-PAST 
 “The pig didn’t eat anything” 
 
Like its English conterpart something, nanika must take scope over local negation. 
Therefore the adult interpretation of (285) means "there is something that the pig 
didn’t eat" rather than "The pig didn’t eat anything". In short, the inverse-scope 
relation is required for adults. For present purposes, it suffices to show that the 
inverse-scope reading is available to children with nanika.  
 In the control experiment, we used three different vegetables, rather than a piece 
of cake and two vegetables, in order to create a situation in which sentences like (286) 
were true. All other details were the same as those of the main experiment. If children 
accepted the inverse-scope reading of nanika in the control experiment, that would 
suggest that the experiments were properly designed and did not create any extra-
linguistic difficulties that caused problems for children in accessing inverse-scope 
interpretations. 
 Thirty monolingual Japanese-speaking children (Age: 3;7 - 6;3, Mean: 5;3) 
participated in the main experiment, and another thirty monolingual Japanese-
speaking children (Age: 3;7 - 6;3, Mean: 5;4) participated in the control experiment. 





at Totsuka Sumire Kindergarten, Yokohama, and were tested individually. The 
experiments were carried out by two Japanese native speakers. In addition, an adult 
control group (N=10, age 29 - 32, Japanese monolingual non-linguists) participated in 
the main experiment, and another adult control group (N=20, age 23 – 32, Japanese 
monolingual) participated in the control experiment.  
4.5.2 Results and discussion 
 
 The results from the crucial test conditions are summarized in the tables in (287) 
and (288). (287) shows the results from the main experiment, and (288) shows the 
results from the control experiment: 
(287) Experiment 1A: Ka vs. …mo…mo 




ka…NEG 25% (15/60) 100% (20/20) Didn’t eat carrot OR  
Didn’t eat pepper / Blue …mo…mo…NEG 5% (3/60) 0% (0/20) 
ka…NEG 78.3% (47/60) 20% (4/20) Didn’t eat carrot AND 
Didn’t eat pepper / Black ...mo…mo…NEG 95% (57/60) 95% (19/20) 
(288) Experiment 1B: Nanika vs. nanimo 
Outcome / Medal Target sentence % accept 
 (children) 
% accept  
(adults) 
nanika…NEG 88.3% (53/60) 100% (40/40) Didn’t eat carrot OR  
Didn’t eat pepper / Blue nanimo…NEG 15% (9/60) 0% (0/40) 
nanika…NEG 58.3% (35/60) 27.5% (11/40)Didn’t eat carrot AND 
Didn’t eat pepper / Black nanimo…NEG 100% (60/60) 100% (40/40) 
 
 
 Let us review the crucial results in turn. First, in Experiment 1A, adults and 
children showed contrasting behaviors in the crucial test cases on ka. The crucial test 
cases are the puppet’s guess about those animals with a blue medal, that is, those who 
ate only one of the vegetables. In this situation the adult control group accepted the 





shows that the experiment was properly designed so that the crucial test sentences 
were in fact judged to be true by those who have the disjunctive interpretation of 
negated ka. In contrast to the pattern of results for adults, children only accepted the 
crucial test sentences under the same situation 25% of the time. The difference in the 
acceptance rates was statistically significant (Wilcoxon Signed Ranks, z = 4.417, p < 
0.01) Among the thirty children, only four (ages: 4;11, 5;5, 5;10, and 6;2) were 
adultlike in consistently accepting the test sentences. The remainder of the children 
consistently rejected the test sentences 87% of the time. When these children were 
asked to explain the reason for their negative judgments, most children said e.g., 
either “because the pig did eat one of the vegetables” or “because it is only one of the 
vegetables that the pig didn’t eat”.  
 The negative judgments of the vast majority of children, combined with these 
children’s explanation for their negative judgments, suggest that Japanese children 
are assigning the conjunctive interpretation to ka in simple negative sentences. 
Furthermore, when sentences like (283) were uttered as a guess about the animals 
who had received a black cross, i.e., those who had eaten none of the vegetables, 
children accepted the sentences 78% of the time. Assuming that the 75% rejection in 
the blue-medal condition corresponds to the rate that children assigned the 
conjunctive interpretations to negated ka, the 78% acceptance rate in the black-cross 
condition makes sense: in this situation, the sentences with ka were true under the 
conjunctive interpretation of negated ka.  
 Within the black-cross condition, the test sentences with ka under the adult 





but invokes the familiar scalar implicature and implies “it is not the case that the pig 
ate neither the carrot nor the pepper”. While 8 out of 10 adult participants consistently 
rejected the test sentences in the situation on the basis of the scalar implicature, the 
other 2 participants consistently accepted the test sentences. When asked to motivate 
their judgment, those participants stated that the sentences sounded strange but were 
nonetheless logically true. We assume that the variation in adult responses in this 
condition is due to the variation among strategies adult participants employed in the 
experiment: some followed truth-conditional meanings, the others computed scalar 
implicatures. The same thing applies to the black-cross condition in the control 
experiment: the sentences with nanika are truth-conditionally true, but are 
inappropriate given scalar implicatures. Both children and adults responded rather 
inconsistently in this condition, and we assume that this reflects the variation among 
strategies that the participants employed. In addition, some children might have failed 
to compute scalar implicatures at all, as suggested by previous research (cf. Noveck 
2001; Papafragou and Musolino 2003; Guasti et al. 2005). 
 Another finding was that children performed almost without error in the 
…mo…mo conditions. For those animals who had received a blue medal, children 
correctly rejected the sentences containing …mo…mo 95% of the time, showing that 
they excluded the narrow-scope “not both” interpretation of …mo…mo; for those 
animals who had received a black cross, they correctly accepted the sentences 100% 
of the time. Adults in the control group rejected these sentences 100% of the time in 
the blue-medal condition, and they accepted the sentences 95% of the time in the 





to …mo…mo in simple negative sentences. Finally, the high level of accuracy in these 
conditions suggests that the children in our experiment understood the task well, 
including the rules for awarding rewards. 
 A third set of findings comes from the control sentences with nanika in 
Experiment 1B. Here, children did not show the same non-adult performance as the 
children in the ka conditions in the main experiment. For those animals who had 
gotten a blue medal, children in the control group correctly accepted test sentences 
like (285) 88% of the time. This result shows that Japanese children in our 
experiments did not experience general problems in accessing inverse-scope 
interpretations of object QPs60. Given this, Japanese children’s non-adult performance 
in interpreting sentences with ka cannot be attributed to a general inability to access 
inverse-scope interpretations. The non-adult performance by children must have to do 
specifically with the lexical item ka.  
 Let us now discuss the implications of the experimental results. First, Japanese 
children’s conjunctive interpretation of ka can be interpreted as showing that they 
interpreted the disjunction within the scope of local overt negation. Under this 
interpretation of the results, the non-adult behavior by children suggests that Japanese 
children at around age 5 do not endorse any of the hypotheses in (252) with respect to 
ka. Children know that ka is a Boolean disjunction that yields a conjunctive truth 
condition under the scope of negation; children know that Japanese sentential 
negation may take scope over a QP in the object position; and finally, children do not 
                                                 
 
60 This might be either because Japanese children at this age do not have any problems in assigning inverse-
scope interpretations, or because our experimental design correctly eliminated the causes of children’s adherence 





assume that ka resists taking scope under antimorphic negation. Furthermore, the fact 
that a majority of Japanese children rejected the wide-scope interpretation of 
disjunction ka suggests that the narrow-scope interpretation of disjunction is the only 
interpretation that is available to children. In this respect, Japanese children are 
similar to English children/adults, in that they all adhere to the conjunctive 
interpretation of disjunction when disjunction is in the c-command domain of 
negation in surface structure. The results from the various controls undermining the 
possibility that non-adult performance with ka is simply an experimental artifact. It is 
especially important to point out that children accepted the wide scope reading of 
nanika in the control experiment. The contrast between nanika and ka further 
strengthens the conclusion that children do not have the option to shift the scope of ka 
covertly.  
 However, there is another possible way to interpret the data. If children assume 
that ka is a logical conjunction rather than disjunction, then assigning the wide scope 
interpretation to ka should yield the identical truth condition with the conjunctive 
interpretation of disjunction. In order to eliminate this possibility, it is necessary to 
show that Japanese children accept a disjunctive interpretation of ka when it appears 
within a non-DE context. This issue will be addressed in our second experiment. 
 Let us now turn to ...mo...mo. In the experiment, Japanese children showed 
adultlike performance in interpreting ...mo...mo in simple negative sentences. 
However, the result alone does not let us conclude that children’s knowledge about 
…mo…mo is completely adultlike. For example, children might be assigning non-





negation, and the Boolean “not both” interpretation is excluded independently of 
scope assignment. Another possibility is that children assume that ...mo...mo may not 
take scope under antimorphic negation, or even worse, negation in general. In that 
case, children’s interpretation of ...mo...mo happens to match the adult interpretation, 
but that is not because they know the correct constraint on the scope interpretation 
of ...mo...mo. In other words, the data so far are still compatible with some of the non-
adult hypotheses in (252). A follow-up experiment is called for to test those 
possibilities.  
 Summarizing, the results of the experiments reveal an interesting asymmetry 
between the acquisition of ka and ...mo...mo: Japanese children are like Japanese 
adults in interpreting ...mo...mo, but they are more like English children/adults in 
interpreting ka in simple negative sentences. The remaining issue is the existence of 
the potential non-adult hypotheses that can explain the data so far. To address the 
issue, a second set of experiments investigates Japanese children’s interpretation of 
ka/...mo...mo in sentences containing dake “only”. 
4.6 Experiments: sentences containing dake “only” 
 
4.6.1 Design and participants 
 
 The second set of experiments was carried out in collaboration with Utako Minai 
and Stephen Crain, and the results have been reported in Goro, Minai and Crain 
(2004) and Minai, Goro and Crain (2006). The experiments aimed to examine 
Japanese children’s interpretation of ka and ...mo...mo within the DE and non-DE 





results of the experiments in section 2.5.3. Here I will present a full description of the 
experiments within the current context. 
 In analyzing the meanings of sentences containing dake, we used the 
decomposition analysis discussed in section 4.3.2. Under this analysis, the meaning of 
sentences containing dake is decomposed into two conjoined propositions, as 
illustrated in (289): 
(289) Taroo-dake-ga furansugo-o hanasu 
  Taroo-only-NOM French-ACC speak 
  “Only Taroo speaks French” 
  i. Taroo speaks French, AND 
  ii. Everyone other than Taroo doesn’t speak French. 
 
 
The first, the “presupposition” meaning component, does not involve a DE operator. 
In contrast, the second, the “assertion” component, creates a DE context due to the 
presence of an operator whose semantic property is equivalent to antimorphic 
negation (see section 4.2.4). As I pointed out in 4.2.4, both ka and ...mo...mo can be 
interpreted within the scope of the covert negative operator: the scope constraint does 
not apply to this case. Therefore, those connectives assume the “two-faced” character 
within the scope of dake, yielding distinct truth conditions in each of the two meaning 
components. In this context, the interpretations of the Japanese connectives are 
identical to those of their English counterparts. 
 We first carried out two experiments with English-speaking children, one with or 
and only, the other with and and only. The findings were that English-speaking 
children were fully adultlike in interpreting the disjunction or and the conjunction and 
within the scope of only (for details, see Goro, Minai and Crain 2005a; 2005b). The 





semantic interaction between only and a logical connective. Given the successful 
results, we decided to directly translate the experiments into Japanese. This choice 
should reduce the possibility that Japanese children might show non-adult behavior 
due to poor design of the experiments.  
 The experiment with ka (Experiment 2A) employed the Truth Value Judgment 
Task in Prediction Mode, in order to accommodate the felicity conditions for using 
disjunction. The experiment involved 8 stories, 4 for the test conditions and 4 for 
fillers. Each story involved 3 characters and 2 objects. One experimenter acted out the 
stories, and another experimenter manipulated the puppet (Kermit the Frog) and 
presented the test sentences. In one story Winnie the Pooh, Bunny Rabbit, and 
Doraemon (a famous Japanese cartoon character) went hiking. On their way, they 
found a farm with carrots and green peppers. At this point the story was interrupted 
by Kermit the Frog to make a prediction about what would happen next. His 
prediction served as the test sentence: 
(290) Usagisan-dake-ga ninjin ka piiman-wo taberu to omou 
 Rabbit-only NOM carrot or pepper-ACC eat COMP think 
 “I think only Bunny Rabbit will eat a carrot or a pepper” 
 
After Kermit’s prediction, the story resumed. Winnie the Pooh considered eating a 
carrot or a pepper, but he decided not to eat anything. Bunny Rabbit, in contrast, 
picked up a carrot and ate it. Doraemon said that he didn’t like vegetables, so he 








(291) Condition I 
       Carrot   Pepper 
 Winnie the Pooh   *    * 
 Bunny Rabbit    √    * 
 Doraemon     *    * 
 
 
The other condition differs from Condition I in that another character ate one of the 
vegetables, as in (292)61: 
(292) Condition II 
       Carrot   Pepper 
 Winnie the Pooh   *    * 
 Bunny Rabbit    √    * 
 Doraemon     *    √ 
 
 
At the end of each story, Kermit the Frog repeated the prediction that he had made in 
the middle of the story, and the participant was asked whether Kermit was right or 
wrong. 
 Under the analysis we are endorsing here, the meaning of the test sentence in 
(290) is decomposed into two propositions: 
(293) i. Bunny Rabbit will eat a carrot or a pepper, AND 
 ii. Everyone other than Bunny Rabbit will not eat a carrot or a pepper 
 
 
The disjunction in the “presupposition” part is interpreted disjunctively, thus Bunny 
Rabbit does not need to eat both a carrot and a pepper to make the proposition true. In 
contrast, the disjunction in the “assertion” part is interpreted conjunctively without 
invoking the positive polarity effect of ka, giving rise to the interpretation that 
everyone else will not eat a carrot AND will not eat a pepper. Thus, the test sentence 
                                                 
 
61  To present the logic of the experiment clearly, in these examples we simplified the actual variations among 
conditions. In the actual experiment, each condition involves different characters and different objects, with 





in (290) is true in Condition I but is false in Condition II. For our current concerns it 
is important to determine whether or not Japanese children accept the test sentence in 
Condition I. In the last section, I pointed out that the results of the first experiments 
could be explained by assuming that Japanese children assumed ka is a conjunction 
rather than disjunction. If that is the case, then they should reject the test sentence in 
Condition I, because it is not the case that Bunny Rabbit ate a carrot and a cake.  
 The experiment with …mo…mo (Experiment 2B) used a Truth Value Judgment 
Task in Description Mode. The theme of the experimental story-line was a PSI-power 
training session, in which three Pokemon characters (Pikachu, Zenigame, and 
Hitokage) attempted to perform several feats using their PSI power, e.g., open boxes, 
flip over cars, etc. The feats were presented as computer generated animation on a 
screen, which was coordinated with actions of toy figures of the three characters. For 
example, a box on the screen was animated to open as one of the toy figures gestured 
towards the screen. Each of the characters was rewarded with prizes each time he 
succeeded in performing one of the feats. These prizes served as reminders for 
children, whose task was to judge the truth or falsity of the test sentences. The 
experiment involved 5 test conditions, interspersed with 4 fillers. At the end of each 
trial, Kermit the Frog uttered a sentence, describing what he thought happened in the 
trial. The crucial test sentences involved dake “only” and …mo…mo, as in (294), and 
there were 3 test conditions62: 
(294) Pikachu-dake-ga aoi hako mo kuroi hako mo aketa 
                                                 
 
62  Again, the conditions are simplified for ease of exposition. In the actual experiment, different conditions 
involved different objects for applying PSI power to, and each condition differed from others with respect to who 





 Pikachu-only-NOM blue box also black box also opened 
 “Only Pikachu opened the blue box and the black box” 
(295) Condition I 
       Blue box  Black box 
 Pikachu     √    √ 
 Zenigame     *    * 
 Hitokage     √    * 
(296) Condition II 
       Blue box  Black box 
 Pikachu     *    √ 
 Zenigame     *    * 
 Hitokage     √    * 
(297) Condition III 
       Blue box  Black box 
 Pikachu     √    √ 
 Zenigame     *    * 
 Hitokage     √    √ 
 
 
(298) represents the fully decomposed meaning of the test sentence in (294): 
(298) i. Pikachu opened both the blue box and the black box, AND 
 ii. Everyone other than Pikachu did not open both the blue box and the black  
  box 
 
 
Here, the crucial part is the interpretation of the second, “assertion” meaning 
component. Under the adult interpretation, the conjunction …mo…mo is interpreted 
under the scope of the DE meaning component, yielding the “not both” interpretation. 
Thus the sentence in (294) entails (299): 
(299) Everyone other than Pikachu didn’t open the blue box OR didn’t open the   
 black box 
 
 
Hence, the sentence is true in Condition I because nobody other than Pikachu 





because in this case Hitokage also opened both of the boxes. Condition II also makes 
the sentence false, because the “presupposition” that Pikachu opened the blue box and 
the black box is not satisfied63 . In order to correctly accept the test sentence in 
Condition I, children must know that i) ...mo...mo corresponds to Boolean conjunction, 
and ii) the scope constraint does not apply to the interpretation of the sentence. If 
children assign a non-Boolean semantics to ...mo...mo, then it would not yield the 
“not both” interpretation, and they should reject the test sentence in Condition I on 
the basis of the fact that Hitokage also opened a box. Similarly, if Japanese children 
adhere to a wide-scope interpretation of ...mo...mo over the covert negation within the 
“assertion” component, the test sentence should mean (300): 
(300) Everyone other than Pikachu didn’t open the blue box AND didn’t open the  
 black box 
 
 
Under this interpretation, the sentence is false in Condition I, because Hitokage did 
open one of the boxes. In sum, children’s non-adult hypotheses about the semantics 
and scope property of ...mo...mo should lead them to reject the test sentence in 
Condition I, as well as in Conditions II and III.  
 Twenty monolingual Japanese-speaking children (Age: 4;5 - 6;2, Mean: 5;3) 
participated in the experiment with ...mo...mo, and another twenty monolingual 
Japanese-speaking children (Age: 4;1 - 6;2, Mean: 5;4) participated in the experiment 
with ka. There was no individual overlap between the two groups. The children were 
recruited at Totsuka Sumire Kindergarten, Yokohama, and were tested individually. 
                                                 
 
63 I amaware of the possibility that this might just be a case of presupposition failure, and the sentence is not 
“false” in the proper sense (i.e., the sentence may not have a truth value). This is related to the issue about the 
nature of propositions associated with sentences containing only, which I briefly mentioned in 4.3.2. As I did in 





The experiments were carried out by two Japanese native speakers. In addition to 
those groups of children, adult Japanese speakers (N=15 for the ...mo...mo experiment, 
N=18 for the ka experiment)  participated in video-taped versions of the experiments. 
Those adults were undergraduate students of Ritsumeikan University who were 
recruited at American University, Washington DC. 
4.6.2 Results and discussion 
 
 The results from the crucial test conditions are summarized in (301) and (302). 
The conditions correspond to those we used as examples in the previous section. 
“True” and “false” represent whether the test sentence is true under adult 
interpretation.  
(301) Experiment 2A: Dake…ka 
 %  acceptance by children
(n=20) 
% acceptance by adults 
(n=18) 
Condition I (True) 97.5% (39/40) 100% (36/36) 
Condition II (False) 2.5% (1/40) 0% (0/36) 
(302) Experiment 2B: Dake…mo…mo 
 %  acceptance by children 
(n=20) 
% acceptance by adults 
(n=15) 
Condition I (True) 95% (38/40) 100% (30/30) 
Condition II (False) 5% (1/20) 0% (0/15) 
Condition III (False) 10% (4/40) 3% (1/30) 
 
 
 Let us review the results in turn. First, in Experiment 2A, children performed at 
ceiling. They correctly accepted the test sentences 97.5% of the time in Condition I, 
suggesting that they assigned the disjunctive interpretation to ka within the 
“presupposition” part of the test sentence. This eliminates the possibility that 
Japanese children at this age misanalyze ka as a logical conjunction. Remember that 





objects, and the other two characters do nothing. If children assign the conjunctive 
interpretation to ka within the presupposition part, they should have rejected the test 
sentence. In addition, they correctly rejected the test sentences 97.5% of the time in 
Condition II, suggesting that they assigned the conjunctive interpretation to ka within 
the negative “assertion” part of the test sentence. When they were asked to motivate 
their negative judgment, children always pointed to the third character who did 
something to one of the objects (e.g., Doraemon in (292)). We interpret this result as 
showing that Japanese children have adultlike semantics of ka as a Boolean 
disjunction.  
 In Experiment 2B, children again performed at ceiling. First, the most important 
finding is that children accepted the test sentences 95% of the time in Condition I. 
This suggests that Japanese children assigned the narrow-scope, Boolean “not both” 
interpretation to the conjunction within the negative “assertion” part of the 
decomposed semantics of the test sentences. This result demonstrates that neither 
children’s lexical semantics nor the scope property of ...mo...mo deviate from adult 
knowledge. For children, ...mo...mo is a Boolean conjunction that can be interpreted 
under the scope of antimorphic negation. Furthermore, the high rejection rates in the 
false conditions (Condition II and Condition III) suggests that children were actually 
computing the truth conditions for each decomposed proposition of the test sentences. 
Remember that the test sentences are false in Condition II due to the fact that the 
“presupposition” part was not satisfied, and are false in Condition III because the 
“assertion” part contradicts the situation. The fact that children consistently rejected 





I is taken to show that children are able to associate distinct truth conditions for each 
decomposed meaning component of the test sentences. 
 Overall, the results from the second set of experiments conclusively show that 
Japanese children’s lexical semantics of the logical connectives are adultlike. Given 
this conclusion, I reject the hypothesis that children’s non-adult behavior with ka in 
simple negative sentences (i.e., in the first set of experiments) was due to their non-
adult semantics of ka. Consequently, children’s conjunctive interpretation of ka in 
simple negative sentences must be attributed to their non-adult scope assignment: for 
children, ka takes scope under overt local negation. Similarly, children’s adultlike 
knowledge of the lexical semantics of ...mo...mo entails that they assigned an 
adultlike scope interpretation to ...mo...mo in simple negative sentences. 
4.7 Children’s knowledge of Japanese connectives 
 
 The experimental results we have obtained reveal that Japanese children exhibit 
both adultlike and non-adult behaviors in interpreting ka and ...mo...mo and their 
scope interaction with negation. Let us now discuss what we can infer about 
children’s knowledge about the connectives from the empirical data. First, the 
experimental results show that children know that both ka and ...mo...mo yield the 
“De Morgan” interpretations when they are interpreted under the scope of negation. 
Japanese children assigned the conjunctive interpretation to ka in simple negative 
sentences and in the covert negative propositions that are associated with sentences 
containing dake. Similarly, they assigned the “not both” interpretation to ...mo...mo 
within the covert negative meaning component of sentences with dake. These 





both ka and ...mo...mo, without being misled by input. Second, children’s 
interpretation of ka in simple negative sentences suggests that they do not know that 
ka must take scope over overt local negation. Rather, they interpreted the disjunction 
in situ, and resisted assigning the wide-scope interpretation to the item. In this respect 
Japanese children are similar to English-speaking children/adults. By contrast, 
children’s scope assignments to ...mo...mo were fully adultlike. Not only did they 
assign the correct wide-scope interpretation to ...mo...mo in simple negative sentences, 
they also correctly avoided overgeneralizing that scope pattern to cases that involve 
covert negation.  
 The fact that Japanese children allowed the narrow scope interpretation of ka in 
simple negative sentences has two consequences. First, it shows that children do not 
learn possible scope interpretations conservatively, but can productively generate 
scope interpretations that are not examplified by input data. In this sense Japanese 
children’s non-adult behavior with ka in simple negative sentences is similar to the 
Freedom of Scope observed in the experiments in Chapter 2. Second, it indicates that 
the scope constraint must in fact be learned by learners of Japanese. In other words, 
the scope constraint cannot be a mere reflection of some default hypothesis or a 
product of conservative learning, and learners need to modify their grammar on the 
basis of some kind of linguistic experience. The crucial question is how children can 
purge their non-adult hypothesis on the basis of the input data available to them. Let 
us first consider if some form of domain-general learning algorithm can solve the 





 Imagine a learner who considers the following three hypotheses about possible 
scope interpretations of simple negative sentences with ka in the object position: 
(303) i. Hypothesis 1: ¬ >> ∨ 
 ii. Hypothesis 2: ∨ >> ¬ 
 iii. Hypothesis 3: ¬ >> ∨ or ¬ >> ∨ 
 
The first hypothesis predicts that only the surface scope interpretation is possible. 
This seems to be the hypothesis that a majority of Japanese children endorse at 
around age 5. The second hypothesis corresponds to adult Japanese grammar. The 
third hypothesis predicts that the sentence is scopally ambiguous. This is also a 
perfectly reasonable hypothesis to consider, given that in Japanese many 
quantificational expressions in the object position show scope ambiguity with 
sentential negation. For example, in the following sentence the object “two books” 
can either take scope over or under negation64: 
(304) Taroo-wa nisatu-no hon-o yoma-nakatta 
  Taroo-TOP two-GEN book-ACC read-NEG 
  “Taroo didn’t read two books” 
  ¬ >> TWO / TWO >> ¬ 
 
 
Under Hypothesis 1, ka is interpreted under the scope of negation, yielding 
conjunctive truth conditions (¬A AND ¬B). The situations in which such conjunctive 
truth conditions are satisfied are a subset of the situations in which the relevant forms 
would actually be used with the wide scope interpretation of disjunction (¬A OR ¬B). 
                                                 
 
64 In this particular sentence, the wide scope interpretation of negation is less preferred, probably because 





The semantic subset relation holding between the two scope interpretations is 
illustrated in (305): 
(305)      
   ¬A OR ¬B  
 
   ¬A AND ¬B 
 
 
Thus, the learner can obtain explicit “error signals” for Hypothesis 1 by encountering 
cases in which the relevant form is used in a situation where the conjunctive 
interpretation is false. One such case would involve a context in which it is clear that 
¬A AND ¬B is false: for example, the context we used in our experiment 1A. 
Another possible case is when the speaker expresses his uncertainty by continuing the 
crucial sentence by something like “but I don’t know which”. In this case, even if the 
context does not provide an explicit clue that suggests ¬A AND ¬B is false, 
assigning the conjunctive interpretation with disjunction creates a contradiction with 
the continuation. Such an experience would tell the learner that the wide scope 
interpretation of ka is possible, and consequently lead the learner to reject Hypothesis 
1. 
 Deciding between Hypothesis 2 and 3 is a more complex matter. In this case, no 
explicit error signal against the wrong hypothesis (i.e., Hypothesis 3) is available 
because Hypothesis 3 simply generates all logically possible scope interpretations. 
Given that the wrong hypothesis can never be directly falsified by input data 
(assuming that direct negative evidence is not available), a remaining possibility is to 
resort to indirect negative evidence. The possible scope interpretations that 





interpretations that Hypothesis 2 generates (wide scope of ka). In this case, a 
probabilistic leaner (with, for example, a Bayesian learning algorithm: e.g., Regier 
and Gahl 2004; Tenenbaum and Griffiths 2001) might be able to learn to dismiss the 
superset hypothesis. The idea is as follows: if the learner observes that the superset 
hypothesis generates not only the interpretation that can be seen in the input (i.e., the 
wide scope of ka) but also an interpretation that is never encountered (i.e., the narrow 
scope of ka), then the absence of the predicted interpretation can serve as evidence 
against the hypothesis.  
 We note that in order to detect the absence of a particular scope interpretation, the 
learner must be able to reliably identify the intended scope interpretation of an 
utterance. However, as we discussed in Chapter 2, this is not a straightforward 
assumption to make. Linguistic signals do not explicitly mark intended scope 
interpretations, and thus it is in principle possible that the scope interpretation that the 
learner assigns for an utterance does not match the scope interpretation that the 
speaker intends. For example, even if Japanese adults only use ka with an intended 
wide scope interpretation over local negation, it is possible that the learner may 
sometimes interpret the form with a different scope interpretation (in fact, this seems 
to be what happened in our experiment – Japanese children assigned narrow scope 
interpretations to ka in simple negative sentences). If the learner counts such an 
experience as evidence for an “occurrence” of the narrow scope of ka, a learning 
mechanism that exploits indirect negative evidence would face a serious problem in 





necessary to pick up appropriate “intake” evidence from general input experience (on 
a related issue, see Pearl and Lidz 2006). 
 But even if we put the technical issues aside, a probabilistic learning account 
faces a serious challenge when actual uses of negated disjunction are considered. In 
the CHILDES database, I could not find any adult utterance in which sentential 
negation cooccurs with ka in the local object position. Furthermore, among 100,000 
sentences that were randomly collected from internet forums, there are only two such 
forms, but both of them are antecedents of conditionals.65 The relevant data are given 
in (306): 
(306) a. Uwattura-dake-demo, interior ka graphic-o kajittei-nai-to muzukasii- 
  superficially-only-even interior or graphic-ACC learn-NEG-COMP difficult- 
   deshou  
   DEC 
   “If you haven’t learned interior or graphic design even only superficially,  
   it would be difficult” 
 
  b. Nihongo ka Eigo-o kichinto-si-nai-to            kodomo-ga  
   Japanese or English-ACC right-do-NEG-COMP   child-NOM 
   otona-ni natta          toki-ga          taihen nan desuyone 
   adult-DAT become time-NOM    trouble COP DEC+MOOD 
   “If he does not study Japanese or English in the right way, the child will  
   face problems when he becomes an adult” 
 
 
As was pointed out in section 4.2.4, in the antecedent of conditional clauses ka may 
take scope under negation in the same clause, and in fact, the narrow scope 
interpretation of ka seems to be the intended scope interpretation of those sentences. 
Thus, not only are the forms that are crucially relevant for the constraint vanishingly 
                                                 
 
65 This corpus search, by and large, is preliminary. In Japanese texts, no spaces are put between words, and the 
disjunction ka is always written in Hiragana, which are phonogramic letters. Those properties of Japanese texts 
make it particularly hard to isolate disjunction ka from other syllables that have the same pronunciation. I first 
searched for frequent words with a syllable ka and deleted them, then extracted sentences that involve the letter ka 
and negation. It is thus possible that a few cases of disjunction ka were deleted in the first step. A more rigorous 





rare, 66  but also the actual data can be misleading. Even if the learner ignores 
subordinate clauses like antecedents of conditionals, the data sparseness problem 
remains: within the crucial context, the wide scope interpretation of ka is almost as 
rare as the narrow scope interpretation of ka. The sparseness of positive evidence for 
the wide scope interpretation of ka can seriously impair a probabilistic learner that 
depends on input evidence for rejecting the non-adult scope interpretation. As I 
pointed out in section 2.7, probabilistic comparisons of different data sets would not 
yield a reliable conclusion when the overall data size is so small. Given this problem, 
I consider it extremely unlikely that the input data provide a basis for a probabilistic 
learning model to distinguish Hypothesis 3 and Hypothesis 2. In other words, the 
non-adult narrow scope interpretation of ka cannot be expunged on the basis of input 
data. 
 Thus, the acquisition of the scope constraint on ka represents the same kind of 
learnability problem that I discussed in the previous chapters on the acquisition of 
scope rigidity. First, children productively generate scope interpretations that are not 
possible in the adult grammar. Second, the input data do not provide negative 
evidence (direct or indirect) against children’s non-adult scope interpretation. Given 
this, a theoretical analysis of the scope constraint on ka (and on ...mo...mo) becomes 
quite relevant. Because children cannot learn which of the relevant scope 
interpretations is impossible from the input, there must be some mechanism in 
children’s grammar that makes them abandon their non-adult interpretation when 
                                                 
 
66 The low frequency might be due to the felicity conditions associated with the use of disjunction and negation. 
As we discussed in 5.3, sentences that involve ka and negation are subject to partially contradicting felicity 
conditions, and consequently there are only limited contexts that satisfy those felicity conditions simultaneously. 
One such context is the one I used in the experimental story, but one could easily imagine that such a situation 





something else is learned. A relevant question is whether or not an empirically well-
motivated theoretical analysis of the scope constraint could offer such a mechanism 
that resolves the learnability problem. The next chapter presents a theory of the scope 











 In this chapter, I present a theoretical analysis of the scope constraint imposed on 
Japanese logical connectives, and discuss implications of the analysis to the 
learnability problem that arises with the acquisition of the scope of ka. The analysis 
of scope interpretations in Japanese that I proposed in the previous chapters was 
based on the assumption that relative scope relations between quantificational 
elements correspond to their hierarchical relations in LF representations (see section 
3.5.1). I will keep this basic assumption in analyzing relative scope relations between 
negation and a quantificational element. Under this assumption, the two possible 
scope interpretations with negation and a quantifier are each assigned the following 
LF configurations: 
(307)  a. ¬ >> Q        b. Q >> ¬ 
   
              
      NEG      QP 
   
     QP     ...          ...     NEG 
 
 
 Now recall that ka and ...mo...mo in the object position of simple negative 
sentences must take scope over local negation, as illustrated in (222) and (223): 
(308) John-wa supeingo ka furansugo-o hanasa-nai 
 John-TOP Spanish or French-ACC speak-NEG 
 Lit. “John doesn’t speak Spanish or French” 





(309) John-wa supeingo mo furansugo mo hanasa-nai 
  John-TOP Spanish also French also speak-NEG 
  Lit. “John doesn’t speak both Spanish and French” 
  ∧ >> ¬ / *¬ >> ∧ 
 
 
Given the obligatory wide scope of ka/...mo...mo, we are forced to assume that those 
connectives occupy a position that is higher than negation in LF. However, in section 
4.2.3, I argued that the base structure for Japanese negative transitive sentences is the 
following, in which the object is c-commanded by negation: 
(310)   TP 
   
  Subj   T’ 
     
   NegP   T 
   
  VP   Neg 
  
 Obj   V 
 
 
Therefore, it is necessary to assume that some movement operation alters the 
structural configuration in (310) when the object involves ka or ...mo...mo. I will 
argue that ka and ...mo...mo are subject to obligatory syntactic movement that raises 
them to a position higher than local negation. The movement approach yields various 
consequences that receive empirical support. Furthermore, I argue that Japanese 
connectives are Positive Polarity Items (PPI), and discuss a cross-linguistic variation 
among PPIs, which is called “rescuing” by Szabolcsi (2004). The movement analysis 
yields two major consequences that receive empirical support: (i) locality, and (ii) 
insensitivity to non-overt negation. In the last part of the chapter, I discuss the 
learnability problem concerning the acquisition of Japanese connectives in terms of 





5.2 A syntactic account  
 
 Let us first recall the three hypotheses that I have rejected. Those hypotheses 
about the interpretive contrasts between Japanese and English are summarized in 
(311): 
(311) a. The semantic account 
   Japanese ka and …mo…mo are not logical Boolean connectives, and   
   therefore they do not interact with negation in the same way as their   
   English counterparts. 
 
  b. The negation scope account 
   Japanese sentential negation does not c-command the object position of  
   transitive predicates, and therefore ka and …mo…mo in object position are 
   interpreted outside the scope of negation. 
 
  c. The semantic scope constraint account 
   Some lexical property of ka and …mo…mo forces them to take scope over  
   antimorphic negation. 
 
 
The semantic account was rejected on the basis of the observation that ka and 
…mo…mo yield identical interpretations to their English counterparts in embedded 
contexts. We then pursued the possibility of reducing the interpretive contrast to a 
matter of scope interpretation: ka and …mo…mo must take wider scope than local 
negation. However, it turned out that the scope behavior of ka and …mo…mo cannot 
be reduced to a general inability of Japanese negation to take scope over other QNP 
arguments in the sentence. Similarly, our attempt to define the scope constraint on 
Japanese connectives in semantic terms also failed. Given this background, I now 
explore the possibility of defining the scope behavior of ka and …mo…mo in 





 Given the assumption that configurations in LF determine relative scope between 
quantificational elements, it is in any case necessary to assume that ka and...mo...mo 
are always in a higher position than local negation at LF. The question is how we 
derive the configuration, especially when ka and ...mo...mo are the object of the 
sentence. Let us assume that ka and …mo…mo must undergo obligatory movement 
that targets a functional projection that is located right above NegP. The movement is 
illustrated in (312): 
(312)        xP 
 
 ka/…mo…mo  xP 
     NegP   x 
 
    VP   Neg 
 
   t   V 
 
 
In this configuration, ka/…mo…mo is outside of the c-command domain of Neg, thus 
it takes scope over negation. Let us assume that the obligatory movement occurs in 
the covert component (i.e., LF) and cannot be reconstructed. Given these assumptions, 
it follows that ka/…mo…mo must take scope over local negation: the obligatory 
movement places those connectives in a higher position than negation in LF 
representations.  
 Crucially, I assume that the movement is driven by a purely syntactic reason. 
Specifically, I assume that ka and …mo…mo have a weak uninterpretable feature in 
the sense of Chomsky (1995) that must be checked in the specifier position of a 
specific functional projection. Let us call the functional projection fP (due to the lack 





assumption, the LF representation of simple negative sentences that involve 
ka/…mo…mo should look like (313)67: 
(313)        TP 
 
    Subj  TP    
         
         fP    T 
 
  ka/…mo…mo   fP 
 
     NegP   f 
 
    VP   Neg 
 
   t   V 
 
 
The raised object has its uninterpretable feature checked at the specifier position of fP, 
and therefore it is not forced to move anymore (although some optional LF movement 
may still apply to the object). In other words, the feature-driven movement only 
affects the c-command relation between the object and local negation, and it does not 
force ka/…mo…mo to move above negation in the superodinate clause because the 
feature-checking completes within the local clause domain. The locality effect that we 
have observed in the previous chapter is thus explained: the movement forces 
ka/…mo…mo to take scope over local negation, but does not necessarily affect their 
relative scope with extraclausal negation, as illustrated in the examples in (314) and 
(315). 
                                                 
 
67 There remains a question about the size of the constituent that must be “pied-piped” by ka/...mo...mo. One 
possibility is that the entire NP/DP that involves ka/...mo...mo is raised to the specifier position of fP, possibly 
exploiting the mechanism of percolation and subsequent large-scale pied-piping as proposed by Nishigauchi 
(1990). Another possibility is that only ka/...mo...mo moves, leaving the conjoined NPs in the base position. I 





(314) a.  Simple clause 
  John-wa supeingo ka furansugo-o hanasa-nai 
  John-TOP Spanish or French-ACC speak-NEG 
  *¬ >> ka 
 
 b.  Complement clause 
  John-wa [Mary-ga supeingo ka furansugo-o hanasu-to] iwa-nakatta 
  John-TOP Mary-NOM Spanish or French-ACC speak-COMP say-NEG 
  OK¬ >> ka 
 
 c.  Relative clause 
  John-wa [supeingo ka huransugo-o hanasu] gakusei-o mi-nakatta 
  John-TOP Spanish or French-ACC speak student-ACC see-NEG 
  OK¬ >> ka 
(315) a.  Simple clause 
  John-wa supeingo mo furansugo mo hanasa-nai 
  John-TOP Spanish also French also speak-NEG 
  *¬ >>…mo…mo 
 
 b.  Complement clause 
  John-wa [Mary-ga supeingo mo furansugo mo hanasu-to] iwa-nakatta 
  John-TOP Mary-NOM Spanish also French also speak-COMP say-NEG 
  OK¬ >>…mo…mo 
 
 c.  Relative clause 
  John-wa [supeingo ka huransugo-o hanasu] gakusei-o mi-nakatta 
  John-TOP Spanish or French-ACC speak student-ACC see-NEG 
  OK¬ >> …mo…mo 
  
 A further consequence of this movement approach is that ka and …mo…mo are 
not forced to take scope over the subject. This explains why ka/…mo…mo can be 
interpreted under the scope of dake in the subject position, and consequently, under 
the scope of covert negation associated with dake. The relevant data are repeated here 
as (316) and (317):68 
                                                 
 
68 A problem arises, however, with the derivation of sentences with ...mo...mo in the sentence-initial, 
“scrambled” position. In chapter 2, I made the assumption that scrambled phrases are base-generated in their 
surface position. Under this assumption, it is not clear how a scrambled ...mo...mo can check its uninterpretable 
feature. If it is lowered to the specifier of fP, then it is predicted to take scope under the subject, contrary to the 





(316) John-dake-ga supeingo ka furansugo-o hanasu 
 John-only-NOM Spanish or French-ACC speak 
 “Only John speaks Spanish or French” 
  Everyone other than John doesn’t speak Spanish AND doesn’t speak 
 French 
(317) John-dake-ga supeingo mo furansugo mo hanasu 
 John-only-NOM Spanish also French also speak 
 “Only John speaks both Spanish and French” 
  Everyone other than John doesn’t speak French OR doesn’t speak Spanish 
 
 The cases of conditional clauses at first glance appear to be problematic for this 
approach. As we observed above, in the antecedent of conditional sentences ka and 
…mo…mo can be interpreted under the scope of local negation. The relevant data are 
repeated here as (318) and (319): 
(318) Mosi John-ga supeingo ka furansugo-o hanasa-nai-to, kare-wa komaru 
 If John-NOM Spanish or French-ACC speak-NEG-COMP he-TOP in-trouble 
  Lit. "If John doesn’t speak Spanish or French, he will be in trouble" 
  OK ¬ >> ka 
(319) Mosi John-ga supeingo mo furansugo mo hanasa-nai-to, kare-wa komaru 
 If John-NOM Spanish also French also speak-NEG-COMP he-TOP in-trouble 
  Lit. "If John doesn’t speak both Spanish and French, he will be in trouble" 
  OK ¬ >> …mo…mo 
 
 
However, a closer examination of the relevant facts reveals that negation in the 
antecedent of conditionals may take wider scope than in declarative main clauses. 
First, let us examine the scope interaction between zen'in "everyone" and negation in 
declarative main clauses. As shown in (320), negation may take scope over zen'in in 
the object position. However, the wide scope interpretation of negation is excluded if 
zen'in appears in the subject position: 
(320) a. Taroo-ga zen'in-o hihansi-nakatta 
  Taroo-NOM everyone-ACC criticize-NEG 





   OK ¬ >> ∀ 
 
  b. Zen'in-ga Taroo-o hihansi-nakatta 
   everyone-NOM Taroo-ACC criticize-NEG 
   "Everyone didn’t criticize Taroo" 
    * ¬ >> ∀ 
 
 
The lack of the wide scope reading of negation in (320)b suggests that negation does 
not c-command the subject position. As in (313), we assume that the subject is in the 
spec-TP position, which is higher than NegP, and that therefore it is interpreted 
outside the scope of negation.  
 Interestingly, when sentence (320)b is embedded within the antecedent of a 
conditional sentence, the relative scope relation between zen'in and negation becomes 
ambiguous: that is, in contrast with (320)b, the wide scope interpretation of negation 
is possible in (321): 
(321) Mosi zen'in-ga Taroo-o hihansi-nai-to kare-ha komaru 
  if  everyone-NOM Taroo-ACC criticize-NEG-COMP he-TOP be-in-trouble 
  "If everyone does not criticize Taroo, he will be in trouble" 
  OK ¬ >> ∀ / ∀ >> ¬ 
 
 
Based on this observation, Kato (1997) argues that negation in the antecedent of 
conditional clauses can undergo optional raising to a position from which it can c-
command the subject. If we adopt the optional neg-raising, then the facts in (318) and 
(319) follow: the raised negation is now higher than ka/…mo…mo, even after the 





(322)        XP    
 
         TP   Neg 
 
    Subj  TP    
         
         fP    T 
 
  ka/…mo…mo   fP 
 
     NegP   f 
 
    VP     t 
 
   t   V 
 
 
In this configuration, ka/…mo…mo is interpreted under the scope of negation. If the 
optional raising of negation does not occur, then ka/…mo…mo takes scope over 
negation, as in declarative main clauses. The sentences in (318) and (319) in fact 
allow the narrow scope interpretation of negation: (318) can mean that "if John 
doesn’t speak Spanish OR doesn’t speak French, he will be in trouble", and (319) can 
mean that "if John doesn’t speak Spanish AND doesn’t speak French, he will be in 
trouble".  
 Under the neg-raising analysis in (322), the narrow scope interpretation of 
ka/...mo...mo becomes possible only when negation is raised to the position from 
which negation takes sentential scope. Consequently, it is predicted that negation that 
takes scope over ka/...mo...mo in the object position must take scope over the subject. 
That is, within a configuration mosi [QPsubj ...ka/...mo...mo... NEG], possible scope 
interpretations are either ¬ >> QPsubj >> ka/...mo...mo, or  QPsubj >> ka/...mo...mo >> 





out. In the following examples, the intermediate scope interpretation of negation is 
excluded: 
(323) Mosi zen’in-ga supeingo ka furansugo-o hanasa-nai-to, kare-wa komaru 
 If   everyone-NOM Spanish or French-ACC speak-NEG-COMP he-TOP in-trouble 
  Lit. "If everyone doesn’t speak Spanish or French, he will be in trouble" 
 
  OK ¬ >> ∀ >> ka : ¬∀x [x speaks S OR x speaks F] 
  OK ∀ >> ka >> ¬:  ∀x [x doesn’t speak S OR x doesn’t speak F] 
  *∀ >> ¬ >> ka: ∀x [x doesn’t speak S AND x doesn’t speak F] 
(324) Mosi zen’in-ga supeingo mo furansugo mo hanasa-nai-to, kare-wa komaru 
 If everyone-NOM Spanish also French also speak-NEG-COMP he-TOP in-trouble 
  Lit. "If everyone doesn’t speak both Spanish and French, he will be in    
  trouble" 
 
  OK ¬ >> ∀ >> …mo…mo: ¬∀x [x speaks S AND x speaks F] 
  OK ∀ >> ...mo...mo >> ¬:  ∀x [x doesn’t speak S AND x doesn’t speak F] 
  *∀ >> ¬ >> ...mo...mo: ∀x [x doesn’t speak S OR x doesn’t speak F] 
 
 
Thus, (323) cannot mean “If nobody speaks Spanish or French...”; (324) cannot mean 
“If nobody speaks both Spanish or French...”. In contrast, if the quantified object is 
one which can take scope under negation in simple clauses (e.g., zen’in in (320)a), 
then the intermediate scope interpretation of negation is possible, as shown in (325). 
In fact, the intermediate scope interpretation of negation is possible in corresponding 
single clauses as in (326), which is not surprising given that the object QP can be in 
the scope of negation without neg-raising.69 
(325) Mosi zen’in-ga zen’in-o hihansi-nakatta-ra, kare-wa komaru 
                                                 
 
69 The relevant examples may sound a bit odd, due to the repetition of the same quantifier zen’in. Adding some 
modifier to the quantifier reduces the oddness. Such a modification does not affect possible scope interpretations: 
 
(i) Koko-ni iru zenin-ga achira-ni iru zen’in-o hihansi-nakatta 
 this place being everyone-NOM that place being everyone-ACC criticize-NEG 
 “Everyone in this place did not criticize everyone in that place” 






 If everyone-NOM everyone-ACC also speak-NEG-COMP he-TOP in-trouble 
  Lit. "If everyone doesn’t criticize everyone, he will be in trouble" 
  OK∀ >> ¬ >> ∀ 
(326) Zen’in-ga zen’in-o hihansi-nakatta 
  everyone-NOM everyone-ACC criticize-NEG 
   Lit. “Everyone did not criticize everyone” 
  OK∀ >> ¬ >> ∀ 
 
 
These observations add further support to the claim that the narrow scope 
interpretation of ka/...mo...mo in conditionals is derived by neg-raising. 
 In sum, the movement analysis successfully captures all the empirical data we 
have seen so far. I thereby endorse the movement analysis, whose crucial assumptions 
are given in (327): 
(327) a. Ka denotes the Boolean disjunction operator, and …mo…mo denotes the 
   Boolean conjunction operator. 
 
  b Ka and …mo…mo have a weak uninterpretable feature that must be   
   checked in the spec of fP. 
 
  c. fP is located in between NegP and TP. 
 
 
Under this analysis, the scope constraint on Japanese connectives is actually a 
constraint on LF-syntax: all that the constraint does is to place the relevant items in 
the appropriate syntactic position, which sometimes yields a semantic consequence. 
The cross-linguistic contrast between Japanese and English is reduced to the presence 
of the relevant syntactic feature in Japanese connectives. English or and both…and… 
do not have the feature that triggers LF raising to fP, and therefore they are not forced 
to take scope over local negation. The connectives in Japanese and English are 





that has a semantic consequence in certain limited contexts, e.g., simple negative 
sentences.  
5.3 Japanese connectives and positive polarity 
 
 The scope behavior of ka and …mo…mo is reminiscent of the defining property of 
so-called Positive Polarity Items (PPI). Observe that English some, which is assumed 
to be a PPI existential (cf. Progovac 1994; Szabolsci 2004), shows exactly the same 
locality effect in scope interpretation: 
(328) a. John didn’t call someone       *¬ >> ∃70 
 
  b. Taroo didn’t think John called someone    OK¬ >> ∃ 
 
  c. John didn’t meet a boy who called someone  OK¬ >> ∃ 
 
 
Furthermore, Szabolcsi (2002 argues that Hungarian disjunction vagy is a PPI. 
Szabolcsi points out that vagy does not take scope under clausemate negation, but it is 
interpreted under the scope of extraclausal negation: 
(329) a. Nem csukt-uk be az ajtó-t vagy az ablak-ot. 
  not closed-1PL in the door-ACC or the window-ACC 
  Lit. “We didn’t close the door or the window” 
   *¬ >> vagy 
 
 b. Nem hisz-em, hogy becsukt-uk volna az ajtó-t vagy az ablak-ot. 
  not think-1SG that in-closed-1PL AUX the door-ACC or the window-ACC 
  “I don’t think we closed the door or the window” 
  OK¬ >> vagy 
                 (Szabolcsi 2002: 2) 
 
                                                 
 
70 Although the literature often claims that the narrow scope interpretation of some is impossible, there seem to 
be nontrivial numbers of native speakers who find the reading just fine. This may possibly be due to a lexical 
variation among speakers: for those speakers that allow the narrow scope interpretation of some in simple negative 






Given the parallelism in the scope interpretations, I maintained (Goro 2004; 2006; 
Goro and Akiba 2004a; 2004b) that Japanese ka and …mo…mo are also PPIs. 
Furthermore, I argued (Goro 2004; 2006) that the obligatory covert movement 
outlined above was the defining property of PPIs in general. Under this view, positive 
polarity items are analyzed as having a weak uninterpretable feature (which is called 
f-PPI in Goro 2004) that triggers covert raising of those items to the spec of fP. I will 
adopt this position in this thesis. 
 There is, however, one open issue regarding the thesis that PPIs in natural 
language uniformly receive the movement analysis. The issue concerns a 
phenomenon that was called “rescuing” by Szabolcsi (2004). Szabolcsi, expanding 
upon an observation by Baker (1970), points out that the English PPI some can be 
interpreted within the immediate scope of overt negation, when the [¬ >> some] part 
is embedded within contexts that license weak NPIs (e.g. any). In other words, 
otherwise impossible scope interpretation of the PPI some is “rescued” by another 
NPI-licenser. The following examples are from Szabolcsi (2004), illustrating the 
rescuing phenomena: 
(330) I don’t think that John didn’t call someone.   √not > not > some 
(331) No one thinks that John didn’t call someone.  √no one > not > some 
(332) I am surprised that John didn’t call someone.  √surprise > not > some 
(333) I regret that John didn’t call someone.   √regret > not > some 
(334) If we don’t call someone, we are doomed.  √if (not > some) 
(335) Every boy who didn’t call someone . . .    √every (not > some) 





(337) Few boys didn’t call someone.      √few > not > some 
(338) Few boys thought that you didn’t call someone.  √few > not > some 
 
 
 Szabolcsi notes, in footnote 12 of Szabolcsi (2004), that Hungarian indefinite and 
disjunctive PPIs also exhibit the same behavior. Szabolcsi takes the ability to be 
rescued by a weak NPI licenser to be a core property of PPIs. However, the rescuing 
effect does not directly follow from the movement analysis. Specifically, it is not 
clear under the movement analysis why the existence of a weak NPI licenser should 
affect the relative scope relation between a PPI and negation.  
 In fact, the narrow scope interpretation of Japanese ka and …mo…mo fails to be 
rescued in many of the contexts that Szabolcsi lists.  We begin with sentences with 
double negation. When a simple negative sentence that involves some is embedded 
under matrix negation, the narrowest scope interpretation of some is “rescued”, as 
shown in (330).  Japanese ka and …mo…mo, in contrast, still resist taking scope 
under the local negation in the same context.  
(339) John-wa [Taroo-ga piza ka pasuta-o tabe-nakat-ta to] omowa-nakatta 
 John-TOP Taroo-NOM pizza or pasta-ACC eat-NEG-PAST COMP think- NEG 
 Lit. “John didn’t think that Taroo didn’t eat pizza or pasta” 
 *¬ >> ¬ >> ka / OK¬ >> ka >> ¬ 
(340) John-wa [Taroo-ga piza mo pasuta mo tabe-nakat-ta to] omowa-nakatta 
 John-TOP Taroo-NOM pizza also pasta also eat- NEG-PAST COMP think- NEG 
 Lit. “John didn’t think that Taroo didn’t eat both pizza and pasta” 
 *¬ >> ¬>> …mo…mo / OK¬ >> …mo…mo >> ¬ 
 
 
Second, within the first argument of the universal quantifier (English counterpart: 
(335)), ka and …mo…mo continue to resist scoping under local negation: 





 Spanish or French-ACC speak-NEG every student 
 Lit. “Every student who doesn’t speak Spanish or French…” 
 *every (¬>> ka) / OKevery (ka >> ¬) 
(342) Supeingo mo furansugo mo hanasa-nai dono gakusei-mo… 
 Spanish also French also speak-NEG every student 
 Lit. “Every student who doesn’t speak both Spanish and French…” 
  *every (¬>> …mo…mo) / OKevery (…mo…mo >> ¬) 
 
 
Next, within sentences containing dake “only” (English counterpart: (336)), ka and 
…mo…mo resist taking scope under local overt negation:  
(343) Taroo-dake-ga supeingo ka furansugo-o hanasa-nai 
 Taroo-only-NOM Spanish or French-ACC speak-NEG 
 Lit. "Only Taroo doesn’t speak Spanish or French" 
 
 can mean: For all x, x≠Taroo, it is not the case that x doesn’t speak Spanish 
 OR doesn’t speak French (¬>> ka >> ¬) 
  cannot mean: For all x, x≠Taroo, it is not the case that x doesn’t speak    
  Spanish AND doesn’t speak French  (¬>>¬>> ka) 
(344) Taroo-dake-ga supeingo mo furansugo mo hanasa-nai 
 Taroo-only-NOM Spanish also French also speak-NEG 
 Lit. "Only Taroo doesn’t speak both Spanish and French" 
 
 can mean: For all x, x≠Taroo, it is not the case that x doesn’t speak Spanish 
 AND doesn’t speak French  (¬>> …mo…mo >> ¬) 
 cannot mean: For all x, x≠Taroo, it is not the case that x doesn’t speak 
 Spanish OR doesn’t speak French (¬>>¬>> …mo…mo) 
 
 
If the narrowest scope of the PPI connectives is rescued in this context, the sentence 
in (343) should be able to mean “Taroo doesn’t speak Spanish or French, and 
everyone other than Taroo speaks French or Spanish”. This interpretation is, however, 
not available with the sentence. Similarly, the sentence in (344) cannot mean “Taroo 
doesn’t speak both Spanish and French, and everyone else speaks both Spanish and 
French”, suggesting that the narrow scope interpretation of …mo…mo under the overt 





 As we have seen above, in the antecedent of conditional clauses ka and …mo…mo 
can take scope under local negation. However, I provided independent evidence that 
in the context negation takes wider scope than it does in matrix declarative clauses. 
Thus, Japanese has a mechanism (i.e., optional neg-raising) that can derive the narrow 
scope interpretation of ka/...mo...mo in conditionals independently of the rescuing in 
Szabolcsi's sense. Furthermore, there is indeed evidence that suggests that the neg-
raising is the only mechanism that derives the exceptional scope interpretation of 
Japanese connectives in conditionals. Kato (1997) points out that the optional neg-
raising in the antecedent of conditionals is conditioned by the semantics of the matrix 
predicate. Specifically, only "adversative" predicates that describe some negative 
event can trigger the neg-raising.71  Thus in (345), replacing the matrix predicate 
komaru "be in trouble" with uresii "be happy" makes the wide scope interpretation of 
negation over the subject impossible, just as in matrix declarative clauses: 
(345) a. Mosi zen’in-ga shukudai-o dasa-nai-to     kare-wa komaru 
  If everyone-NOM homework-ACC submit-NEG-COMP he-TOP be-in-trouble 
  “If everyone doesn’t submit the homework, he’ll be in trouble” 
  OK¬ > ∀ 
 
  b. Mosi zen’in-ga shukudai-o dasa-nai-to   kare-wa uresii 
  If everyone-NOM homework-ACC submit-NEG-COMP he-TOP be-happy 
  “If everyone doesn’t submit the homework, he’ll be happy” 
  *¬> ∀ 
 
   
                                                 
 
71 Another way to look at the neg-raising is to assume that neg-raising is always possible, but the sentential 
scope interpretation of negation is blocked in some contexts by some independent factor. Under this view, the 
sentential scope interpretation of negation is similar to the inverse scope interpretation that I discussed in Chapter 
2: the grammar of Japanese provides a way to derive that interpretation, but it fails to surface in some specific 
contexts (especially, in matrix declarative clauses). In any case, a theory of Japanese neg-raising must explain why 





If the narrow scope interpretation of ka/...mo...mo in the antecedent of conditionals 
depends strictly on the availability of neg-raising, then it is predicted that within the 
antecedent clause of (345)b, ka/…mo…mo may not take scope under local negation. 
This prediction is borne out: ka/…mo…mo indeed resists taking scope under local 
negation in (346) and (347): 
(346) Mosi John-ga supeingo ka furansugo-o hanasa-nai-to, kare-wa uresii 
 If John-NOM Spanish or French-ACC speak-NEG-COMP he-TOP be-happy 
  Lit. "If John doesn’t speak Spanish or French, he will be happy" 
  *¬ >> ka 
(347) Mosi John-ga supeingo mo furansugo mo hanasa-nai-to, kare-wa uresii 
 If John-NOM Spanish also French also speak-NEG-COMP he-TOP be-happy 
  Lit. "If John doesn’t speak both Spanish and French, he will be happy" 
  *¬ >> …mo…mo 
 
 
This is unexpected if the narrow scope of ka/…mo…mo is rescued by the presence of 
a weak NPI licenser: the semantics of the matrix predicate should not affect the NPI-
licensing ability of the antecedent clause (e.g., OKIf anyone can help me, I will be 
happy).  
 Exactly the same observation can be made with complements of adversative 
predicates. First, the narrow-scope interpretation of ka/…mo…mo is possible within 
the complements of adversative predicates: 
(348) Boku-wa Taroo-ga supeingo ka furansugo-o hanasa-nakatta koto-ni odoroita 
 I-TOP Taroo-NOM Spanish or French-ACC speak-NEG thing-DAT surprised 
 “I was surprised at the fact that Taroo did not speak Spanish or French” 
 OK¬ >> ka 
(349) Boku-wa Taroo-ga supeingo mo furansugo mo hanasa-akatta koto-ni odoroita 
 I-TOP Taroo-NOM Spanish also French also speak-NEG thing-DAT surprised 
 “I was surprised at the fact that Taroo did not speak both Spanish and French” 
 OK¬ >> …mo…mo 





 I-TOP Taroo-NOM Spanish or French-ACC speak-NEG thing-ACC regreted 
 “I regretted the fact that Taroo did not speak Spanish or French” 
 OK¬ >> …mo…mo 
(351) Boku-wa Taroo-ga supeingo mo furansugo mo hanasa-nakatta koto-o  
 I-TOP Taroo-NOM Spanish or French-ACC speak-NEG thing-ACC  
 koukaisita  
 regretted 
 “I regretted the fact that Taroo did not speak Spanish or French” 
  OK¬ >> …mo…mo 
 
 
Second, the narrow scope interpretation of zen’in in the subject position is allowed 
within these contexts: 
(352) Boku-wa zen’in-ga shukudai-o dasa-nakatta koto-ni odoroi-ta 
 I-TOP everyone-NOM homework-ACC submit-NEG thing-DAT surprise-PAST 
 “I was surprised at the fact that everyone didn’t submit the homework” 
 OK¬ >> ∀ 
(353) Boku-wa zen’in-ga shukudai-o dasa-nakatta koto-o koukaisi-ta 
 I-TOP everyone-NOM homework-ACC submit-NEG thing-ACC regret-PAST 
 “I regretted the fact that everyone didn’t submit the homework” 
  OK¬ >> ∀ 
 
 
The narrow-scope interpretation of zen’in disappears if the main predicate is replaced 
by a “positive” predicate, such as kandousuru “be impressed”: 
(354) Boku-wa zen’in-ga shukudai-o dasa-nakatta koto-ni kandousita 
 I-TOP everyone-NOM homework-ACC submit-NEG thing-DAT be-impressed 
 “I was impressed at the fact that everyone didn’t submit the homework” 
 *¬ >> ∀ 
 
 
Based on those observations, I conclude that the narrow scope of ka and …mo…mo 
under local negation is not rescued in the same semantic contexts as English some. In 
other words, the Japanese connectives are not “rescuable” PPIs. The cross-linguistic 





directly accounted for by our present movement analysis. To explain the scope 
behavior of items like some in the rescuing contexts, some mechanism should be 
added on top of covert movement. This issue, however, is beyond the scope of this 
thesis. Our main concern is with the interpretive contrasts between Japanese and 
English logical connectives, and the feature-based movement analysis alone suffices 
to explain the scope behavior of those connectives. I therefore choose to put the 
matter aside here, and leave the issue on the theory of positive polarity in natural 
language for future research.  
5.4 Further consequences 
 
In what follows, I explore further consequences of the movement account for the 
scope behavior of Japanese logical connectives.  
5.4.1 The size of complement clauses 
  
 In simple clause sentences, the uninterpretable feature of ka/...mo...mo is checked 
at the specifier position of fP in the same clause. In complement clauses with full CP 
structure, the feature checking is carried out within the complement clause, and 
therefore ka/...mo...mo can be interpreted under the scope of negation in the matrix 
clause. However, we have not considered the cases that involve smaller complement 
clauses that do not have the fP layer. If a complement clause lacks fP, then a PPI 
connective that is embedded inside the complement must be moved to the matrix fP to 
check its uninterpretable feature. Consequently, it is predicted that in such a case the 






(355)        TP 
 
    Subj  TP    
         
         fP    T 
 
  ka/…mo…mo   fP 
 
     NegP   f 
 
    VP   Neg 
 
   XP   V 
 
       ...t... 
 
 
In order to examine the prediction empirically, we need to find a diagnosis for the 
size of complement clauses.  First, let us compare finite vs. nonfinite complement 
clauses. In Japanese, finite complement clauses show three typical properties: (i) a 
tense marker appears on the complement verb, (ii) the clause is headed by an overt 
complementizer (comparable to English that), and (iii) the complement subject is 
assigned nominative case.  
(356) John-wa [Taroo-ga piza-o tabe-ta-to] itta 
 John-TOP Taroo-NOM pizza-ACC eat-PAST-COMP said 
 “John said that Taroo ate pizza” 
 
The properties of the finite complements suggest that those clauses have the fully 
projected functional layers up to CP. As we have seen above, a PPI connective that is 
embedded within those finite clauses can be interpreted under the scope of matrix 
negation.  
 By contrast, most nonfinite complements show none of these properties. For 





clausal structure (cf. Kuroda 1965), (i) tense markers are excluded from the 
complement verb, (ii) overt complementizers are disallowed, and (iii) nominative 
case of the complement subject is not licensed: 
(357) John-wa [Taroo-ni/*ga piza-o tabe-(*ta)-(*to)] sase-ta 
 John-TOP Taroo-DAT/NOM pizza-ACC eat-(PAST)-(COMP) cause-PAST 
 “John made Taroo eat pizza” 
 
Furthermore, non-finite complement clauses differ in their ability to take sentential 
negation. For example, while the complement of saseru does not allow sentential 
negation to appear on the complement predicate, the complement of tehosii “want” 
does. 
(358) a. *tabe-nai-saseru 
  eat-NEG-cause 
 
 b. tabe-nai-dehosii72 
  eat-NEG-want 
 
 
This contrast can be interpreted as reflecting different selectional properties of those 
predicates. Under the assumption that NegP is generated above VP, sentential 
negation should be excluded from a VP complement clause. Thus, if we assume that 
saseru selects VP as its complement, the ungrammaticality of (358)a follows. As for 
tehosii, let us assume that it selects non-finite TP as its complement. The exact 
syntactic category of those complements is not crucial here. What is important is that 
the former complement clause is smaller than NegP. We assume that fP is located in 
between NegP and TP (i.e., (327)): thus if a complement clause is smaller than NegP, 
then the clause may not involve the fP projection. Given these considerations, our 
                                                 
 





theory predicts that a ka/...mo...mo that is embedded within the complement of saseru 
is forced to take scope over matrix negation. The examples in (359) show that the 
prediction is indeed borne out. The scope interpretations in those sentences are 
restricted just as in simple clauses. 
(359) a. John-wa [Taroo-ni piza ka pasuta-o tabe] sase-nakatta 
  John-TOP Taroo-DAT pizza or pasta-ACC eat cause-NEG 
  Lit. “John didn’t make Taroo eat pizza or pasta” 
  *¬ >> ka 
 
 b. John-wa [Taroo-ni piza mo pasuta mo tabe] sase-nakatta 
  John-TOP Taroo-DAT pizza also pasta also eat cause-NEG 
  Lit. “John didn’t make Taroo eat both pizza and pasta” 
  *¬ >> …mo…mo   
 
In contrast, a PPI connective within the complement clause of tehosii can be 
interpreted under the scope of matrix negation, as shown in (360). This indicates that 
the scope restriction in (359) is not a general property of non-finite clauses, but 
reflects the lack of fP. 
(360) a. John-wa [Taroo-ni piza ka pasuta-o tabe-] tehosiku-nai 
  John-TOP Taroo-DAT pizza or pasta-ACC eat-want-NEG 
  “John doesn’t want Taroo to eat pizza or pasta”  
  OK ¬ >> ka 
 
 b. John-wa [Taroo-ni piza mo pasuta mo tabe-] tehosiku-nai 
  John-TOP Taroo-DAT pizza also pasta also eat-want-NEG 
  “John doesn’t want Taroo to eat both pizza and pasta”  
  OK¬ >> …mo…mo 
 
 
Let us further expand the data. First, (361) is a list of non-finite complement clauses 
that cannot take sentential negation. We assume those complement clauses do not 





(361) a. Complement of tuzukeru “continue” 
  tabe-*(nai-) tuzukeru 
  eat-NEG-continue 
 
 b. Complement of hajimeru “begin” 
  tabe-*(nai-) hajimeru 
  eat-NEG-begin 
 
 c. Complement of yameru “cease” 
  tabe-*(nai-) yameru 
  eat-NEG-cease 
 
 d. Complement of tai “want (to do something)”73 
  tabe-*(nai-) tai 
  eat-NEG-want 
 
 e. Complement of tesimau “finish”74 
  tabe-*(nai-) desimau 
  eat-NEG-finish 
 
 
Ka/...mo...mo embedded inside those complement clauses may not take scope under 
negation in the matrix clause, again conforming to the prediction of our theory: 
(362) Complement of tuzukeru “continue”  
 a. John-wa [piza ka pasuta-o tabe] tuzuke-nakatta 
  John-TOP pizza or pasta-ACC eat continue-NEG 
  Lit. “John didn’t continue to eat pizza or pasta” 
  *¬ >> ka 
 
 b. John-wa [piza mo pasuta mo tabe] tuzuke-nakatta 
                                                 
 
73 In English, want may take a complement clause with its subject being controlled by the matrix subject (e.g., I 
want to go), or a complement clause with a lexical subject (I want John to go). In Japanese, the two kinds of 
complements require a different matrix predicate: the control complement is selected by tai, and the lexical subject 
complement is selected by tehosii: 
 
(i) a. Bokui-wa [PROi ringo-o tabe]-tai 
  I-TOP      apple-ACC eat-want 
 b. *Bokui-wa [PROi ringo-o tabe]-tehosii 
  “I want to eat an apple” 
(ii) a. *Boku-wa [John-ni ringo-o tabe]-tai 
  I-TOP     -DAT   -ACC eat-want 
 b. Boku-wa [John-ni ringo-o tabe]-tehosii 
  “I want John to eat an apple” 
 
74 The form is ambiguous between the “finish” interpretation and “end up doing” interpretation. The 





  John-TOP pizza also pasta also eat continue-NEG 
  Lit. “John didn’t continue to eat both pizza and pasta” 
  *¬ >> …mo…mo 
(363) Complement of hajimeru “begin”  
 a. John-wa [piza ka pasuta-o tabe] hajime-nakatta 
  John-TOP pizza or pasta-ACC eat begin-NEG 
  Lit. “John didn’t begin to eat pizza or pasta” 
  *¬ >> ka 
 
 b. John-wa [piza mo pasuta mo tabe] hajime-nakatta 
  John-TOP pizza also pasta also eat begin-NEG 
  Lit. “John didn’t begin to eat both pizza and pasta” 
  *¬ >> …mo…mo 
(364) Complement of yameru “cease” 
 a. John-wa [piza ka pasuta-o tabe] yame-nakatta 
  John-TOP pizza or pasta-ACC eat cease-NEG 
  Lit. “John didn’t cease to eat pizza or pasta” 
  *¬ >> ka 
 
 b. John-wa [piza mo pasuta mo tabe] yame-nakatta 
  John-TOP pizza also pasta also eat cease-NEG 
  Lit. “John didn’t cease to eat both pizza and pasta” 
  *¬ >> …mo…mo 
(365) Complement of tai “want (to do something)”  
 a. John-wa [piza ka pasuta-o tabe] taku-nakatta 
  John-TOP pizza or pasta-ACC eat want-NEG 
  Lit. “John didn’t want to eat pizza or pasta” 
  *¬ >> ka 
 
 b. John-wa [piza mo pasuta mo tabe] taku-nakatta 
  John-TOP pizza also pasta also eat want-NEG 
  Lit. “John didn’t want to eat both pizza and pasta” 
  *¬ >> …mo…mo 
(366) Complement of tesimau “finish” 
 a. John-wa [piza ka pasuta-o tabe] tesimawa-nakatta 
  John-TOP pizza or pasta-ACC eat finish-NEG 
  Lit. “John didn’t finish eating pizza or pasta” 
  *¬ >> ka 
 
 b. John-wa [piza mo pasuta mo tabe] tesimawa-nakatta 
  John-TOP pizza also pasta also eat cease-NEG 
  Lit. “John didn’t finish eating both pizza and pasta” 






 In contrast, the complement clause of temiru “try” can support negation, as in 
(367). A PPI connective embedded within the complement clause can be interpreted 
within the scope of matrix negation: 
(367) OKtabe-nai-demiru 
      eat-NEG-try 
(368) Complement of temiru “try” 
  a. John-wa [piza ka pasuta-o tabe] temi-nakatta 
  John-TOP pizza or pasta-ACC eat try-NEG 
  Lit. “John didn’t try to eat pizza or pasta” 
  OK ¬ >> ka 
 
 b. John-wa [piza mo pasuta mo tabe] temi-nakat-ta 
  John-TOP pizza also pasta also eat cease-NEG 
  Lit. “John didn’t try to eat both pizza and pasta” 
  OK¬ >> …mo…mo 
 
 
 An aspectual predicate teiru provides a further striking case. This morpheme is 
three ways ambiguous: (i) progressive, (ii) habitual, and (iii) perfective: 
(369) tabe-teiru 
  (i)  is eating 
  (ii)  has a habit of eating  
  (iii) has eaten 
 
 
The morpheme allows its complement to take negation, as in (370)a. However, when 
negation is placed within the complement, the progressive interpretation is no longer 
available. The oddness of (370)b, a sentence with a temporal adverb that is 
compatible only with a progressive interpretation, illustrates this point: 
(370) a. tabe-nai-deiru 
   eat-NEG-teiru 
 





   John-TOP 5 o’clock at(TOP) pizza-ACC eat-NEG-INF teiru-PAST 
   Intended: “John was not eating pizza at 5 o’clock” 
 
 
The form (370)a is compatible with adverbs that force perfective or habitual readings: 
(371) a. John-wa goji made(wa) piza-o tabe-na-i deita 
   John-TOP 5 until-(TOP) pizza-ACC eat-NEG-INF teiru-PAST 
   “John had not eaten pizza until 5 o’clock” 
 
  b. John-wa natu-no aida(wa) piza-o tabe-na-i deita 
   John-TOP summer-GEN during (TOP) pizza-ACC eat-NEG-INF teiru-PAST 
   “John has a habit of not eating pizza during the summer” 
 
 
These observations suggest that the progressive teiru selects a “smaller” complement 
clause than the complement of habitual or perfective teiru. Let us assume, consistent 
with our discussion so far, that the progressive teiru selects a VP complement. The 
crucial observation is that, when teiru is interpreted as progressive, a PPI connective 
within the complement is forced to take scope over matrix negation as shown in 
(372); otherwise, the narrow-scope reading of the PPI is possible as in (373) and 
(374): 
(372) a. John-wa goji choudo-ni(wa) [piza ka pasuta-o tabe] tei-nakatta 
   John-TOP 5 o’clock at(TOP) pizza or pasta-ACC eat tei-NEG 
   Lit. “John was not eating pizza or pasta at 5 o’clock” 
   *¬ >> ka 
 
 b. John-wa goji choudo-ni(wa) [piza mo pasuta mo tabe] tei-nakatta 
   John-TOP 5 o’clock at(TOP) pizza also pasta also eat teiru-NEG 
   Lit. “John was not eating both pizza and pasta at 5 o’clock” 
   *¬ >>…mo…mo 
(373) a. John-wa goji made(wa) [piza ka pasuta-o tabe] tei-nakatta 
   John-TOP 5 o’clock until(TOP) pizza or pasta-ACC eat teiru-NEG 
   “John had not eaten pizza or pasta until 5 o’clock” 
   OK ¬ >> ka 
 





   John-TOP 5 o’clock until(TOP) pizza also pasta also eat teiru-NEG 
   “John had not eaten both pizza and pasta at 5 o’clock” 
   ?¬ >> …mo…mo 
(374) a. John-wa natu-no aida(wa) [piza ka pasuta-o tabe] tei-nakatta 
   John-TOP summer-GEN during (TOP) pizza or pasta-ACC eat teiru-NEG 
   “John didn’t have a habit of eating pizza or pasta during the summer” 
   OK ¬ >> ka 
 
 b. John-wa natu-no aida(wa) [piza mo pasuta mo tabe] tei-nakatta 
   John-TOP summer-GEN during (TOP) pizza also pasta also eat teiru-NEG 
   “John didn’t have a habit of eating both pizza and pasta during the    
   summer” 
   ?¬ >> …mo…mo 
 
 
The fact that the scope behavior of Japanese PPI connectives in embedded contexts 
correlates with the size of the complement clause provides a strong argument for the 
syntactic movement analysis that I am endorsing here. Under our theory, the crucial 
distinction is whether or not a complement clause is large enough to support an fP 
projection within the clause. The empirical data we have observed suggest that the 
distinction is indeed real. 
5.4.2 Non-overt negations 
 
 Under the present approach, the scope restriction on ka/...mo...mo is a 
consequence of purely syntactic movement that happens to have a semantic effect in 
some specific configurations (i.e., simple negative sentences). In other words, there is 
no semantic reason for the connectives to not be able to take scope under negation, 
and the effect of the scope restriction is sensitive only to negations that have 
corresponding expressions within syntactic representations. In this section, I present 





 As we saw in section 4.2.4, ka and ...mo...mo can be interpreted under the scope 
of covert negation that is associated with the focus operator dake (‘only’). The same 
observation can be made with another focus-related construction. First, observe that 
the cleft construction in (375) entails a negative proposition: 
(375) John-ga supeingo-o hanasu-no-wa gonenburi da 
 John-NOM Spanish-ACC speak-COMP-TOP 5-years-since COP 
 “It has been five years since John spoke Spanish” 
  John had not spoken Spanish for five years 
 
 
Within the entailed proposition, both ka and …mo…mo are interpreted under the 
scope of the covert negation. Therefore, the sentence in (376) is false when John had 
only used Spanish for the past five years, due to the conjunctive truth condition of ka. 
In contrast, the sentence in (377) can still be true in the same situation, showing that 
the conjunction yields the “not both” interpretation. 
(376) John-ga supeingo ka furansugo-o hanasu-no-wa gonenburi da 
 John-NOM Spanish or French-ACC speak-COMP-TOP 5-years-since COP 
 “It has been five years since John spoke Spanish or French” 
  John had not spoken Spanish for five years AND had not spoken French 
 for five years 
(377) John-ga supeingo mo furansugo mo hanasu-no-wa gonenburi da 
 John-NOM Spanish also French also speak- COMP-TOP 5-years-since COP 
  John had not spoken Spanish for five years OR had not spoken French for 
 five years 
 
 
 Implicative verbs that entail the falsity of their complement proposition (cf. 
Karttunen 1971) provide another set of relevant data. Let us take the verb, kanichigai-
suru “mistakenly believe” for example. With this verb as the matrix predicate, the 
truth of whole sentence entails the falsity of the complement proposition in the actual 





Taroo speaks Spanish” to be true, it must be the case that the proposition “Taroo 
speak Spanish” is false. Thus, the negation of the complement proposition is entailed, 
as illustrated in (378). 
(378) John-wa [Taroo-ga supeingo-o hanasu to] kanchigai-si-teiru 
 John-TOP Taroo-NOM Spanish-ACC speak COMP mis-believe-ing 
 “John mistakenly believes that Taroo speaks Spanish” 
  Taroo doesn’t speak Spanish 
 
 
Predicates like uso-o tsuku “tell a lie”,  furi-o suru “pretend” also entail the negation 
of the complement proposition: 
(379) John-wa [pro supeingo-o hanasu to] uso-o tsuita 
 John-TOP pro Spanish-ACC speak COMP told-a-lie 
 “John lied that he speaks Spanish” 
  John doesn’t speak Spanish 
(380) John-wa [pro speingo-ga hanas-eru] furi-o sita 
 John-TOP pro Spanish-NOM speak-able pretend-did 
 “John pretended that he can speak Spanish” 
  John cannot speak Spanish 
 
 
When ka or …mo…mo appear within the complement clause of those predicates, they 
happily take scope under the entailed negation, yielding the “De Morgan” 
interpretations. Thus again, the effect of the scope restriction fails to manifest itself 
with those non-overt negations: 
(381) a. John-wa [Taroo-ga supeingo ka furansugo-o hanasu to] kanchigaisi-teiru 
  John-TOP Taroo-NOM Spanish or French-ACC speak COMP mis-believe-ing 
   Taroo doesn’t speak Spanish AND doesn’t speak French 
 
 b. John-wa [Taroo-ga supeingo mo furansugo mo hanasu to] kanchigaisi- 
  John-TOP Taroo-NOM Spanish also French also speak COMP mis-believe- 
  teiru  
  ing 





(382) a. John-wa [pro supeingo ka furansugo-o hanasu to] uso-o tuita 
  John-TOP pro Spanish or French-ACC speak COMP told-a-lie 
   John doesn’t speak Spanish AND doesn’t speak French 
 
 b. John-wa [pro supeingo mo furansugo mo hanasu to] uso-o tuita 
  John-TOP pro Spanish also French also speak COMP told-a-lie 
   John doesn’t speak Spanish OR doesn’t speak French 
(383) a. John-wa [pro speingo ka furansugo-ga hanas-eru] furi-o sita 
  John-TOP pro Spanish or French-NOM speak-able pretend-did 
   John cannot speak Spanish AND cannot speak French 
 
 b. John-wa [pro speingo mo furansugo mo hanas-eru] furi-o sita 
  John-TOP pro Spanish also French also speak-able pretend-did 
   John cannot speak Spanish OR cannot speak French 
 
 The relevant observation further extends to cases that involve adverbs like ayauku 
“nearly/almost”, and izure “eventually”. Unlike the constructions we have seen so far, 
those adverbs require an eventive predicate, but the crucial point remains the same: 
negative propositions are entailed, and the PPI connectives are interpreted under the 
scope of entailed negation. 
(384) a. John-wa ayauku piza ka pasuta-o taberu tokoro datta 
  John-TOP nearly pizza or pasta-ACC eat the-moment COP 
  “John nearly ate pizza or pasta” 
   John didn’t eat pizza AND didn’t eat pasta   
 
 b. John-wa ayauku piza mo pasuta mo taberu tokoro datta 
  John-TOP nearly pizza also pasta also eat the-moment COP 
  “John nearly ate both pizza and pasta” 
   John didn’t eat pizza OR didn’t eat pasta 
(385) a. John-wa izure supeingo ka furansugo-o hanasu youni-naru 
  John-TOP eventually Spanish or French-ACC speak become 
  “John will eventually become capable of speaking Spanish or French” 
   John doesn’t speak Spanish AND doesn’t speak French 
 
 b. John-wa izure supeingo mo furansugo mo hanasu youni-naru 





  “John will eventually become capable of speaking both Spanish and   
  French” 
   John doesn’t speak Spanish OR doesn’t speak French 
 
 
 The counterfactual constructions in (386) and (387) also add another set of 
relevant data:  
(386) a. John-ga supeingo ka furansugo-ga hanas-e-tara iinoni 
  John-NOM Spanish or French-NOM speak-able-COMP be-nice 
  “It would be nice if John could speak Spanish or French” 
   John cannot speak Spanish AND cannot speak French 
 
 b. John-ga supeingo mo furansugo mo hanas-e-tara iinoni 
  John-NOM Spanish also French also speak-able-COMP be-nice 
  “It would be nice if John could speak both Spanish and French” 
   John cannot speak Spanish OR cannot speak French 
(387) a. John-wa supeingo ka furansugo-o tukau beki datta 
  John-TOP Spanish or French-ACC use should COP 
  “John should have used Spanish or French” 
   John didn’t use Spanish AND didn’t use French 
 
 b. John-wa supeingo mo furansugo mo tukau beki datta 
  John-TOP Spanish also French also use should COP 
  “John should have used both Spanish and French” 
   John didn’t use Spanish OR didn’t use French 
 
 
 The last set of data concerns negative answers to a Yes-No question. Let us 
consider the dialog in (388). The question asks whether or not the proposition “John 
speaks French” is true. The answer asserts that the proposition is not true, that is, the 
negation of the proposition is true: 
(388) Q:  John-wa supeingo-o hanasu-no? 
  John-TOP Spanish-ACC speak-Q 
  “Does John speak French? 
 
 A:  Iie 
   no 





   John doesn’t speak Spanish 
 
In (389) and (390), the negative answer yields the “De Morgan” interpretation of the 
connective in the question. Thus, the negative answer in (389) can be interpreted as 
meaning that John speaks neither Spanish nor French and the negative answer in 
(390) can be interpreted as meaning that John doesn’t speak both Spanish and French. 
(389) Q:  John-wa supeingo ka furansugo-o hanasu-no? 
  John-TOP Spanish or French-ACC speak-Q 
  “Does John speak French or Spanish? 
 
 A:  Iie 
   no 
  “No” 
   John doesn’t speak Spanish AND doesn’t speak French 
(390) Q:  John-wa supeingo mo furansugo mo hanas-u-no? 
  John-TOP Spanish also French also speak-PRES-Q 
  “Does John speak French and Spanish? 
 
 A:  Iie 
   no 
  “No” 
   John doesn’t speak Spanish OR doesn’t speak French 
 
 
In contrast, if we spell out the whole negative proposition using overt negation, then 
those De Morgan interpretations are no longer available. (391) only allows the wide-
scope interpretation of ka, and sounds awkward as an answer to the question in (389), 
because that interpretation does not address the question asked. Similarly, (392) only 
allows the wide-scope interpretation of ...mo...mo, and therefore cannot be truthfully 
uttered when John speaks either Spanish or French: 
(391) Iie, John-wa supeingo ka furansugo-o hanasa-nai desu 
 No John-TOP Spanish or French-ACC speak- -NEG COP 
 Lit. “No, John doesn’t speak Spanish or French” 





(392) Iie, John-wa supeingo mo furansugo mo hanasa-nai desu 
 No John-TOP Spanish also French also speak- NEG COP 
 Lit. “No, John doesn’t speak both Spanish and French” 
  John doesn’t speak Spanish AND doesn’t speak French 
 
 
 Those observations lead me to conclude that the scope restriction on Japanese 
connectives is uniformly insensitive to negation that is not expressed overtly. 
Assuming that the cases we examined above do not involve syntactically represented 
negation (i.e., negation in NegP), the data straightforwardly follow from the syntactic 
movement analysis. In contrast, any attempt to state the scope restriction on 
ka/...mo...mo in semantic terms would be hard-pressed to explain these data. There is 
no clear semantic primitive that distinguishes overt negation from various types of 
non-overt negation, and therefore, a semantic approach would face a serious 
challenge in explaining why the restriction is insensitive to non-overt negation in 
general.  
5.5 Revisiting the learnability problem 
 
 Given the theoretical analysis of the scope constraint on ka/...mo...mo that I have 
developed so far, I am now in a position to discuss its implications for the acquisition 
of those connectives. The results of the experimental studies reviewed in the previous 
chapter present a learnability puzzle: children assign a non-adult scope interpretation 
to ka in simple negative sentences, and the scope interpretation cannot be purged on 
the basis of input data about possible scope interpretations. Therefore, there must be 
some way for children to block their non-adult scope interpretation by learning 
something else. In what follows I discuss how the movement account contributes to a 





 Under the present analysis, the acquisition of the scope property of ka is reduced 
to the acquisition of the correct lexical feature assignment to the lexical item. The fact 
that Japanese children allowed the narrow scope interpretation of ka in simple 
negative sentences suggests that ka lacks the uninterpretable feature that triggers 
obligatory movement to fP within children’s grammar. Once children learn that ka is 
a PPI – it has an uninterpretable feature that triggers obligatory movement to fP – the 
ban on narrow scope interpretations under overt local negation follows. This, 
however, is not enough to resolve the puzzle: it does not explain how children learn 
that ka is a PPI. As I pointed out in section 4.7, cases that involve ka in the object 
position with overt local negation are quite rare, and therefore the possible hypothesis 
that ka may take scope under overt local negation (i.e., it is not a PPI) cannot be 
rejected on the basis of input data about possible scope interpretations. I therefore 
propose that innate linguistic knowledge restricts possible hypotheses about the scope 
of natural language disjunctions, so that learners may not consider the interfering 
hypotheses in the first place. Specifically, I propose that (393) is a part of innate 
linguistic knowledge: 
(393) Boolean disjunctions in natural language are associated with a lexical    
 parameter with the following values: {+PPI, −PPI}. 
 
 
A +PPI disjunction has an uninterpretable feature that triggers covert raising to fP. I 
assume that the syntactic position of fP is also specified in innate linguistic 
knowledge. As for the −PPI value, let us stipulate (394): 







Something like (394) is in any case necessary to explain the scope behavior of the 
English disjunction or. As we have seen above, the wide scope interpretation of or is 
not possible when it is c-commanded by negation. Given that this is not a property of 
quantificational elements in general (e.g., quantifiers like many, two, etc. can take 
scope over c-commanding negation), the wide scope interpretation of or over c-
commanding negation must somehow be blocked by some independent mechanism. I 
leave the issue about the theoretical implementation of (394) open here. 75 
 Given (393), the learner’s task is to determine which value of the parameter a 
particular disjunction in her target language has. For Japanese children, their behavior 
suggests that they initially have the −PPI setting for ka, and therefore they need to 
reset the value to +PPI. The crucial evidence is whether or not the disjunction can 
take wider scope than c-commanding negation; due to the constraint in (394), such 
inverse scope interpretations can only be obtained by feature-driven movement to fP. 
Hence, an input utterance in which a disjunction takes wider scope than c-
commanding negation provides unambiguous evidence for the +PPI setting. With the 
+PPI setting, the disjunction may not be interpreted within the scope of negation in 
local NegP. In this model, the learning is essentially a “triggering”: a single piece of 
crucial evidence can in principle trigger the learning of the +PPI setting, and 
probabilistic generalizations over large amount of data are not required. Nonetheless, 
the acquisition of the +PPI value is expected to take a considerable amount of time, 
given the sparseness of the crucially relevant data. In addition, a certain kind of 
                                                 
 
75 Thus, having the −PPI value is not equivalent to being a non-PPI (i.e., lacking the relevant syntactic feature), 
and −PPI items are subject to an independent scope constraint, i.e., they must be interpreted under the scope of c-





psychological development might be required to find out the crucial evidence in the 
input data. An intended wide scope interpretation of ka over negation would most 
effectively be detected by recognizing that the form is intended to express the 
speaker’s uncertainty. Unless the uncertainty is explicitly expressed (e.g., by saying 
“but I don’t know which”), children must infer the speaker’s intention, which young 
children have been found to be not very good at. Thus until children develop “Theory 
of Mind”, they might not be able to reliably detect the crucial evidence in input data. 
 Under this scenario, the hypotheses that the learner considers are very narrowly 
restricted so that she can concentrate on a very specific piece of input evidence: an 
intended wide scope of ka over overt local negation. Although the learner crucially 
uses information about scope in fixing the parameter, she is not learning possible 
scope interpretations directly from scope interpretations: the constraint on scope is 
derived as a consequence of fixing the parameter. Note also that choosing the +PPI 
value does not entirely eliminate the possibility of scope ambiguity. All that the 
setting does is force the disjunction to be raised to fP. If negation can subsequently be 
raised to a position that is higher than fP, the scope relation is reversed again. This is 
what happens in the antecedents of conditionals (and some other constructions) in 
Japanese, and it would not be surprising to find a language that allows the option of 
neg-raising in larger contexts. In such a language, negation and disjunction would 
show extensive scope ambiguity, and input data that involve such scope ambiguity 
would be interpreted by learners as showing the extensive availability of neg-raising. 
 I extend the same account to the acquisition of conjunction. Specifically, I 





(395) Boolean conjunctions in natural language are associated with a lexical    
 parameter with the following values: {+PPI, −PPI}. 
 
 
With respect to ...mo...mo, the data sparseness problem is not as severe as with ka. 
Among the same 100,000 sentences from internet forums that were used to search for 
ka, there were 81 cases in which ...mo...mo appears in the object position with local 
negation. 76  Given the higher frequency of crucially relevant data, the parameter 
setting for ...mo...mo would possibly take less time than the setting for ka.77 By setting 
the correct +PPI value for ...mo...mo, the learner’s grammar correctly constrains 
possible scope interpretations of the connective. This approach explains why 
Japanese children did not endorse non-adult scope hypotheses that seem to be 
compatible with the vast majority of input evidence: those hypotheses are simply not 
possible hypotheses for children, and hence they do not consider them. 
 In Goro (2004) and Goro and Akiba (2004a; 2004b) I argued the lexical 
parameter for disjunction/conjunction has a different default value. The argument is 
based on a learnability consideration. Assuming that direct negative evidence does 
not play a crucial role in language acquisition, the learnability argument goes as 
follows. Suppose that a language L has Boolean disjunction OR and conjunction 
AND. In order to determine whether these items are +PPI or −PPI, the crucial data is 
a single clause negative sentence, in which the form A OR B or A AND B appears in 
the potential scope domain of sentential negation (e.g., the object position in 
                                                 
 
76   Pullum and Scholz (2002) estimate the number of utterances that a child hear by the age of 3 to be 2.5 million. 
Under a very rough estimate using the number, Japanese children would hear the crucial sentences about 1.85 
times per day. 
77   The .081% frequency of the relevant sentences, on the face of it, is not very common within all the sentences 
that would constitute the input data. However, it is necessary to relativize the frequencies of the occurrences of 





transitive sentences). With such a form as input, there are two different output truth 
conditions for each of the two connectives, corresponding to whether the item is +PPI 
or −PPI: 
(396) Disjunction OR: 
 a. OR [−PPI ]  ¬A ∧ ¬B 
 
 b. OR [+PPI]  ¬A ∨ ¬B 
(397) Conjunction AND: 
 a. AND [−PPI]  ¬A ∨ ¬B 
 
 b. AND [+PPI]  ¬A ∧ ¬B 
 
The truth conditions in (a) correspond to the narrow-scope interpretation of the 
logical connectives, and the truth conditions in (b) correspond to the wide-scope 
interpretation of the connectives. As shown in the diagram in 0, the situations in 
which “¬A ∧ ¬B” is true are a subset of the situations in which “¬A ∨ ¬B” is true. 
(398)      
   ¬A ∨ ¬B  
 




Thus, in every logical situation where ¬A ∧ ¬B is true, ¬A ∨ ¬B is also true. Given 
this, the learnability argument claims that an incorrect hypothesis that yields the 
superset truth conditions can never be falsified by positive input data. Therefore, the 
relevant parameters must have a default value so that the children always start with a 
hypothesis that yields the subset truth condition. Such a default value for disjunction 





 The experimental data from Japanese children are compatible with the predicted 
default values for the parameters of ka and ...mo...mo: Japanese children consider ka 
to be [−PPI], and they consider ...mo...mo to be [+PPI]. However, I am not so sure if 
the learnability argument still stands: it is built upon the classic learnability 
assumption that subset-superset grammars cannot be distinguished by positive 
evidence, which is not a logical necessity once we take indirect negative evidence 
into account (e.g., Regier and Gahl 2004). Gualmini and Schwarz (2007) also argue 
that the semantic entailment problem can be gotten around either by taking pragmatic 
implicature into account, or by considering cases in which the relevant forms are 
embedded under a downward-entailing operator (see Gualmini and Schwarz (2007) 
for details). In short, the conceptual underpinnings for the learnability argument have 
been challenged (in reasonable ways, in my opinion) in recent research in the domain. 
But even if the conceptual argument has to be lifted, the question of whether or not 
the relevant parameter has a default value remains as a valid empirical issue. I will 
leave this issue for future research. 
5.6 On the “wide-scope” interpretation of English or 
 
A crucial component of my theory of the acquisition of disjunction is the assumption 
in (394): a −PPI disjunction may not take scope over local negation. This assumption 
is necessary to restrict the set of possible hypotheses about the scope of disjunction in 
order to assure the acquisition with sparse input data. However, one possible problem 
arises, once we take Schwarz’s (1999) reduction theory into account. Schwarz (1999) 
argues that the derivation of (399) involves an IP-disjunction and ellipsis, as 





(399) Either John ate rice or beans 
(400) Either [IP John ate rice] or [IP John ate beans] 
 
 
Under the reduction theory, it should also be possible to derive (401) from (402). In 
(402), or is not inside the scope domain of negation. Therefore, it is predicted that 
(401) can have a “wide scope” interpretation of or, which is paraphrased as “John 
didn’t eat rice OR didn’t eat beans”: 
(401) John didn’t eat rice or beans 
(402) [IP John didn’t eat rice] or [IP John didn’t eat beans] 
 
 
Although this wide scope interpretation of or is highly dispreferred (as shown in the 
experiments I reviewed in 5.2), Jing (2006) showed that English speakers did 
nonetheless access the reading under a particular kind of experimental context. A 
sample story and test sentence used in Jing’s TVJT is given in (403) and (404): 
(403) Bear brother and bear sister came to play a pushing-the-cart game. The judge  
 said:  
  You need to play a pre-game to see whether you can play the real game. See  
  this passage here? I’ll make it an obstacle course. In the pre-game, I’ll put this 
  bench in the middle. You are supposed to push the cart through this obstacle  
  course. If you don’t hit the bench, you can play the real game. Bear sister was  
  very nervous and hit the bench. Bear brother made it to the end without hitting 
  the bench, so he was able to play the real game.  
  The judge said: the real game is much harder. Look, now I put two obstacles  
  on the way, this barrel and this rock. It seems that bear brother is very good at  
  pushing the cart. Bear brother, if you push the cart through the obstacle course 
  and don’t hit the barrel, I’ll give you a shell as reward; and if you don’t hit the 
  rock, I’ll also give you a shell as reward. So, you can get two shells if you   
  don’t hit anything. You did really good in the pre-game, try hard this time!  
  (Curtain put down)  
  (Kermit said: I wonder how well bear brother is doing in the real game.)  
  (After some time, curtain removed)  
  Bear brother had one shell. He says: The real game was much harder. I only  





(404) Bear brother didn’t hit the barrel or the rock 
 
 
This experimental story has two crucial features. First, what Bear brother actually did 
(or didn’t) was not shown to the participant throughout the story: the curtain was put 
down while Bear brother was on his trial. This feature makes the wide scope 
interpretation of or pragmatically felicitous, since it is quite clear that the speaker (i.e., 
the puppet) is not certain about what Bear brother didn’t actually hit. Second, the 
story explicitly presents the two propositions that correspond to the disjoined 
propositions under the wide scope interpretation of or, i.e., “If you...don’t hit the 
barrel....if you don’t hit the rock...”. The independent presentations of those two 
propositions could have primed the structure that involves IP-disjunction and 
subsequent ellipsis, as illustrated in (405). The second point was not discussed by 
Jing, but under the reduction theory of wide-scope or, it could be quite relevant. 
(405) [IP Bear brother didn’t hit the barrel] or [IP Bear brother didn’t hit the rock] 
 
 
In Jing’s experiment, both English-speaking children and adults accepted the test 
sentences like (404) about 50% of the time. This suggests that the “wide scope” 
interpretation of or with sentences like (404) is not totally excluded in English, even 
though the interpretation is still not consistently available to speakers. 
 This observation raises the possibility that English children may encounter cases 
that involve or with an intended wide scope interpretation in a simple negative 
sentence. Here, a problem arises: English children must avoid taking such cases as 
evidence for the [+PPI] setting for or. Given the dispreference for the wide scope 





Japanese: wide-scope ka in simple negative sentences is rare, as we have seen above. 
Nonetheless, Japanese children learn that ka is a PPI on the basis of the rare evidence. 
Therefore, it appears that learners of the two languages must interpret the same kind 
of input data differently. 
 These considerations suggest that learners of the [±PPI] parameter must take the 
amount of confirming evidence into account. I argued that that the default value of 
the parameter for disjunction is −PPI. English children would encounter a nontrivial 
amount of confirming evidence for this setting, i.e., or with the narrow-scope, 
conjunctive interpretation in simple negative sentences. Let us assume that each 
encounter with such confirming evidence reinforces the learner’s confidence in his 
current hypothesis (i.e., the  −PPI setting), and once the confidence level reaches a 
certain threshold, the learner may not take a case with wide-scope or to be 
disconfirming evidence for the −PPI setting. This assumption seems intuitively 
plausible, and can easily be implemented in a probabilistic learning model. By 
contrast, Japanese children would encounter significantly less cases with ka being 
interpreted under the scope of local negation. Therefore, the default −PPI setting is 
not strongly supported by input evidence, and the learner’s confidence level may not 
reach the critical threshold. I assume that small number of encounters with wide-
scope ka can trigger the re-setting of the parameter under this situation. The contrast 
between English and Japanese is thus the relative plausibility of the −PPI setting with 
respect to the input data. When the −PPI setting is highly plausible within given input 
data, the learner chooses to analyze “exceptional” cases as involving a distinct 





learners of Japanese do not rely solely on positive evidence for the +PPI setting: the 
lack of positive evidence for the −PPI setting also plays a crucial role. 
5.7 Summary 
 
 In this chapter, I presented a theoretical analysis of the scope constraint on 
Japanese logical connectives. I proposed that ka/...mo...mo are PPIs, which have a 
syntactic feature that triggers obligatory movement to fP. Under the analysis, the 
scope constraint is actually a constraint on LF-syntax, and it yields the following 
empirical consequences: (i) locality, and (ii) insensitivity to covert negation. In the 
last parts of the chapter, I revisited the learnability problem in the acquisition of the 
scope of ka. I argued that innate linguistic knowledge must restrict possible 
hypotheses so that children can successfully learn that ka is a PPI from available input 
evidence. Specifically, the assumptions in (393) and (394) were required to resolve 
the learnability puzzle. With the restrictions on possible hypotheses about the scope 
of Boolean disjunctions, learners are able to restrict their attention to a certain specific 
piece of positive evidence, which would allow them to get around the data sparseness 
problem.  
 The assumptions in (393) and (394) yield empirical predictions about possible 
cross-linguistic variation on the scope of Boolean disjunctions in natural language. 
For example, it is predicted that the narrow scope interpretation of a +PPI disjunction 
under local negation can only be possible when negation takes sentential scope (via 
neg-raising or some other means). Likewise, the wide scope interpretation of a −PPI 
disjunction over local c-commanding negation is predicted to be possible only when 





subsequent ellipsis). Testing these predictions with Boolean disjunctions in languages 










 The experimental studies I have reviewed in the previous chapters revealed that 
there are variations between Japanese children and adults with respect to possible 
scope interpretations: Japanese children often allow scope interpretations that adults 
do not allow. This chapter presents a case that involves the same kind of variation 
among Japanese adults: some adults allow a certain scope interpretation that other 
adults do not allow. The experimental observation leads to the conclusion that two 
populations with a different grammar coexist among adult speakers of Japanese. I 
take the observation as supporting evidence for the claim that input evidence about 
possible scope interpretations is too unreliable as a basis of learning what is not 
possible. 
 The scope constraint that I examine in this chapter concerns the scope relation 
between a certain type of verbs and a quantificational argument. Once again, I keep 
the assumption that scope interpretations are determined by the configuration of LF 
representations. As a consequence, I assume that certain scope interpretations are 
derived by syntactic movement. The issue of whether such movement occurs in the 
overt or covert component of syntax is largely irrelevant to the discussion in this 
chapter. 
                                                 
 
78  Most of the contents of this chapter are based on collaboration research with Tomo Fujii and Utako Minai 





 The chapter is organized as follows. Section 6.2 provides a description of the 
properties of implicative verbs, which were first discussed by Karttunen (1971). 
Section 6.3 points out that negative implicative verbs in Japanese must take lower 
scope than a quantificational argument of the complement predicate. Following 
Bobaljik and Wurmbrand (2005; 2007), I refer to this constraint as the anti-
reconstruction constraint. In section 6.3 and 6.4, I report the results of experimental 
studies that investigated Japanese adults and children’s sensitivity to the constraint. 
The experimental results revealed that a certain proportion of Japanese adult speakers 
do not obey the constraint, allowing the scope interpretation that the literature claims 
to be impossible. Based on the results, section 6.6 proposes that two different 
grammars of anti-reconstruction coexist within adult speakers of Japanese. This 
conclusion adds support to the claim that constraints on scope interpretations are not 
reliably learnable from evidence about possible scope interpretations. 
6.2 Implicative verbs 
 
 It was first observed by Karttunen (1971) that a certain class of verbs entails the 
truth of their complement proposition. Consider the following examples: 
(406) a. John managed to solve the problem 
   ⇒ John solved the problem 
 
  b. John remembered to lock his door 
   ⇒ John locked his door 
 
  c. John saw fit to remain silent 
   ⇒ John remained silent 
 







As shown in (406), sentences that involve verbs like manage, remember, or see fit 
entail the proposition expressed by their infinitival complement. Thus, for example, 
(406)a entails that John solved the problem, and therefore a continuation with 
negation of the proposition results in a contradiction, as illustrated in  (407): 
(407) *John managed to solve the problem, but he didn’t solve it. 
                    (ibid.: 342) 
 
 
This class of verbs is called implicative verbs. Implicative verbs contrast with verbs 
that take an irrealis infinitival complement, and hence do not entail the truth of the 
complement proposition. The example in (408) illustrates the point, where the verb 
hope takes an irrealis complement whose truth is left unspecified at the time of 
speech: 
(408) John hoped to solve the problem, but he didn’t / will not solve it 
                     (ibid.) 
 
 
 Karttunen pointed out that implicative verbs must be distinguished from factive 
verbs. The difference between the two classes appears in sentences that contain 
negation. With factive verbs, the presupposition expressed in the complement is not 
affected by the presence of negation in the matrix clause. Thus, (409)a and (409)b 
share the same presupposition that is given in (409)c: 
(409) a. John realized that he had no money 
 
  b. John didn’t realize that he had no money 
 
  c. John had no money 
 







In contrast, with implicative verbs, the presence of negation affects what is entailed. 
Specifically, negation of implicative verbs entails negation of their complement 
clauses, as shown in (410): 
(410) a. John didn’t manage to solve the problem 
   ⇒ John didn’t solve the problem 
 
  b. John didn’t remember to lock his door 
   ⇒ John didn’t lock his door 
 
  c. John didn’t see fit to remain silent 
   ⇒ John didn’t remain silent 
 
                     (ibid.) 
 
 
 In this chapter, I am primary concerned with a subclass of implicative verbs that 
are called negative implicatives. Those verbs entail the negation of the complement 
proposition, as illustrated in (411): 
(411) a. John failed to solve the problem 
   ⇒ John didn’t solve the problem 
 
  b. John forgot to lock his door 
   ⇒ John didn’t lock his door 
 
 
The entailed negation associated with negative implicatives scope-interacts with 
quantificational elements in the complement clause. For example, the sentences in 
(412) exhibit the familiar scope ambiguity between negation and a universal 
quantifier: 
(412) a. John failed to solve all the problems 
   ¬ >> ∀ interpretation: John solved some, but not all of the problems 






  b. John forgot to lock all the doors 
   ¬ >> ∀ interpretation: John locked some, but not all of the doors 
   ∀ >> ¬ interpretation: John locked none of the doors 
 
 
The narrow scope interpretation of the universal quantifier corresponds to the surface 
hierarchical relations. The wide scope interpretation of the universal is not 
problematic either, given that in English CSS can generally cross an infinitival clause 
boundary (see discussion in Chapter 3).  
 Against this background, we now turn to Japanese. Let us take the verb wasureru 
“forget” for example. Like its English counterpart, the verb is a negative implicative, 
and entails the negation of its complement proposition: 
(413) Taroo-wa sono hon-o yomi-wasureta 
  Taroo-TOP that book-ACC read-forgot 
  “Taroo forgot to read that book” 
  ⇒ Taroo didn’t read that book 
 
 
In (413), the complement predicate yomu “read” forms a morphological unit with the 
main predicate wasureru, without having an independent tense marker within the 
complement clause. A lexical subject is excluded from the complement clause, as is 
the case in other infinitival complement clauses. Wasureru may also take an NP, or a 
nominalized clause with an accusative case maker as its complement: 
(414) Taroo-wa sono hon-o wasureta 
  Taroo-TOP sono book-ACC forgot 
  “Taroo forgot that book” 
(415) Taroo-wa sono hon-o yomu no/koto-o wasureta 
  Taroo-TOP that book-ACC read thing-ACC forgot 







The nominalized complement may have a lexical subject, but in that case a somewhat 
different interpretation arises. Specifically, when the nominalized complement has a 
lexical subject, wasureru is interpreted as taking a factive complement, just like the 
English forget taking a finite clause complement: 
(416) Taroo-wa Hanako-ga sono hon-o yomu no/koto-o wasure-teiru79 
  Taroo-TOP Hanako-NOM that book-ACC read thing-ACC forget-teiru 
  “Taroo has forgotten that Hanako is going to read that book” 
 
 
The factivity presupposition of the complement clause in (416) is not affected by the 
presence of negation in the matrix clause, as shown in (417): 
(417) Taroo-wa Hanako-ga sono hon-o yomu no/koto-o wasure-tei-nai 
  Taroo-TOP Hanako-NOM that book-ACC read thing-ACC forget-teiru-NEG 
  “Taroo has not forgotten that Hanako is going to read that book” 
  ⇒ Hanako is going to read that book 
 
 
In contrast, adding negation to (415) reverses the truth conditions of the entailed 
proposition: 
(418) Taroo-wa sono hon-o yomu no/koto-o wasure-nakata 
  Taroo-TOP that book-ACC read thing-ACC forget-NEG 
  “Taroo didn’t forget to read that book” 
  ⇒ Taroo read that book 
 
 
Given these observations, I conclude that while nominalized complements with a 
controlled subject such as (415) are infinitival, complements with a lexical subject 
such as (416) are finite. I will put the finite/factive cases aside for the remainder of 
this discussion. 
                                                 
 
79  For some reason that I am not going to examine closely, a simple past tense (i.e., wasureta) sounds somewhat 







 Bobaljik and Wurmbrand (2005; 2007) discuss a curious property of infinitival 
complements like the one in (413). They report that a quantificational element within 
this type of complement is forced to take scope over the matrix predicate. Observe 
that Japanese (419) is scopally unambiguous, only allowing the wide scope 
interpretation of the universal quantifier. This contrasts with the scope ambiguity of 
its English counterpart, given in (420): 
(419) Taroo-wa subete-no hon-o yomi-wasureta 
 Taroo-TOP all-GEN book-ACC read-forgot 
  Lit. “Taroo forgot to read all the books” 
  *forget >> ∀ / ∀ >> forget 
(420) Taroo forgot to read all the books 
  forget >> ∀ / ∀ >> forget 
 
 
Thus, (419) is judged to be false if Taroo did read some of the books, if not all; (420), 
in contrast, is true in the same situation. In other words, the Japanese sentence 
prohibits the “surface scope” interpretation: the QNP is thematically related to the 
complement predicate yomu “read”, but it is forced to take scope over the matrix 
predicate. The lack of the surface scope interpretation cannot be reduced to the lexical 
property of the universal quantifier subete-no X. In simple negative sentences, the 
same form shows scope ambiguity: 
(421) Taroo-wa subete-no hon-o yoma-nakatta 
  Taroo-TOP all-GEN book-ACC read-NEG 
  “Taroo didn’t read all the books” 







Furthermore, within the nominalized clausal complement of wasureru “forget”, the 
universal quantifier can be interpreted under the scope of the matrix predicate: 
(422) Taroo-wa subete-no hon-o yomu no/koto-o wasureta 
  Taroo-TOP all-GEN book-ACC read thing-ACC forgot 
  “Taroo forgot to read all the books” 
  forget >> ∀ / ∀ >> forget 
 
 
The constraint on scope interpretation observed in (419) is referred to as the anti-
reconstruction effect by Bobaljik and Wurmbrand (2005; 2007: henceforth B & W). 
 According to B & W, the anti-reconstruction effect is a characteristic property of 
a certain class of “restructuring” predicates, and the same scope constraint is observed 
with the corresponding German and Itelmen sentences, and related infinitival 
constructions in Japanese (e.g., Koizumi, 1995; Takano, 2003). B & W argue that the 
complement clause of (419) has undergone a “clause union” process with the matrix 
clause and accordingly has lost its status as an independent clause. Specifically, B & 
W assume that the complement clause is a VP complement, crucially lacking the vP 
projection which is responsible for checking the case-feature of the complement 
object. The base structure of (419) under B & W’s analysis is represented in (423): 
(423)    TP 
 
    Subj T’ 
 
     vP  T 
 
    VP  v 
 
   VP  V 
     wasureta     
  Obj V 
    yomi 






Since the complement clause lacks any functional projections, the complement object 
must have its case checked by a functional projection in the matrix clause. B & W 
argue that the case-checking cannot be carried out via the long-distance agreement 
process (i.e., the operation Agree: e.g., Chomsky 2000) due to the following locality 
constraint on the agreement process: 
(424) The (verbal) complement to a lexical verb delineates an agreement domain. 
            (Bobaljik and Wurmbrand 2005: 828) 
 
 
The complement clause in (423) forms an agreement domain that makes a DP within 
that domain inaccessible for Agree. This forces the complement object to move to the 
vP in the matrix clause in order to check its case-feature: 
(425)    TP 
 
    Subj T’ 
 
     vP  T 
 
    Obj vP 
 
     VP  v 
 
    VP  V 
      wasureta     
   t  V 
     yomi 
 
 
B & W further propose that case/agreement-checking relations must be LF-visible (cf. 
Koizumi 1995) and therefore (426), which is called the agreement-scope correlation, 






(426) A DP may not be interpreted (for scope and binding) in a position lower than  
 in the domain in which it undergoes Case/agreement-checking. 
                   (ibid.: 812) 
 
 
Given the constraint in (426), the raised object in (425) cannot be reconstructed into 
its base position (hence the name anti-reconstruction effect), and therefore, it must 
take scope over the matrix predicate. Thus, B & W’s account for the scope constraint 
in sentences like (419) has three components: i) the lack of a vP in the complement 
clause due to the restructuring process, ii) the obligatory raising of the complement 
object, and iii) the ban on reconstruction. Under this account, the cross-linguistic 
contrast between Japanese (419) and English (420), and also the contrast between 
Japanese (419) and (422) are reduced to the obligatoriness of restructuring: while 
sentential infinitival complements of Japanese wasureru obligatory undergo 
restructuring, infinitival complements of English forget and nominalized infinitival 
complements of wasureru do not (at least not obligatorily). 
 Concerning the scope of negative implicative predicates, there is one thing that is 
not addressed in B & W’s approach. As I mentioned above, Japanese wasureru may 
directly take a NP as its complement. The English counterpart forget also shows the 
same property: 
(427) a. Taroo-wa sono hon-o wasureta 
   Taroo-TOP that book-ACC forgot 
   “Taroo forgot that book” 
 
  b. Taroo forgot that book 
 
 
If the object is a quantificational phrase, it must take scope over wasureru/forget. The 





restructuring complements. For example, (428) can truthfully describe a situation 
where Taroo didn’t bring any of the books, but is false when Taroo did bring some of 
the books: 
(428) a. Taroo-wa subete-no hon-o wasureta 
   Taroo-TOP all-GEN book-ACC forgot 
   “Taroo forgot all the books” 
   *forget >> ∀ / ∀ >> forget 
 
  b. Taroo forgot all the books 
   *forget >> ∀ / ∀ >> forget 
 
 
However, it is not clear under B & W’s approach why the narrow scope of the 
universal quantifier is not possible in (428). Presumably, the case-feature of the object 
is checked in situ via Agree, and therefore there seems to be no case-theoretic reason 
to motivate a configuration in which the object asymmetrically c-commands the 
predicate.  
 One way to resolve the puzzle is to assume that a quantifier in the object position 
must be covertly raised (i.e., via Quantifier Raising) to the closest node of type <t> in 
order to resolve a semantic type mismatch (e.g., Heim and Kratzer 1998). Since the 
movement is motivated purely by semantic reasons, it seems reasonable to assume 
that the object must be interpreted at the raised position (see the discussion in section 
3.5.1). In sentences in (428), the type <t> node that is closest to the object position is 
vP. The resultant syntactic configuration after the covert raising of the object is 





(429)  vP 
 
 Obj vP 
   v  VP 
   
    V  t 
     forgot 
 
In this structure, the raised object is higher than the predicate.80 Under the assumption 
that the object cannot undergo scope-reconstruction, the obligatory wide scope of the 
object in the sentences in (428) follows. We refer to this account as the QR account. 
 The QR account can be straightforwardly extended to anti-reconstruction 
examples like (419). Once we adopt the assumption that the complement clause in 
(419) lacks a vP node, it follows that the type-mismatch between the complement 
predicate and the object cannot be resolved within the complement clause. In this case, 
the closest node of type <t> is the matrix vP, and the quantified object is forced to 
raise to that position. Thus, the QR account motivates exactly the same movement of 
the complement object as in (425), independently of case-theoretic considerations. 
One advantage of the QR account for the anti-reconstruction effects in restructuring 
complements is that it allows a uniform account with the cases that involve nominal 
complements. Given this, I will tentatively adopt the QR account for the anti-
reconstruction effects in restructuring complements, but the choice is not crucial to 
the discussion that follows. The QR account and B & W’s case-theoretic approach 
share the core assumption that the scope constraint in sentences like (419) is crucially 
related to the lack of a vP projection in the complement clause and subsequent 
                                                 
 





movement of the complement object to the matrix vP. They only differ in what 
triggers the movement, and the difference does not crucially affect the acquisition 
issues that I am going to discuss in the subsequent sections. 
 Under the restructuring account of the anti-reconstruction constraint, the 
acquisition of the constraint is reduced to the acquisition of obligatory restructuring in 
certain infinitival complements. However, it remains unclear how children can 
determine whether or not a certain complement clause undergoes restructuring. In fact, 
it is not enough to learn that a certain complement clause can undergo restructuring; 
the anti-reconstruction effect follows only when restructuring is obligatory. There 
seems to be no overt indication for restructuring of infinitival complement clauses in 
Japanese. For example, a bare indefinite that is embedded within the infinitival 
complement of a intensional predicate can easily have a narrow scope/de dicto 
reading, suggesting that such complement clauses are not subject to obligatory 
restructuring. For example, the following sentence can naturally mean that I have a 
general desire to read some English book, without having a particular book in the real 
world in mind:81 
(430) Boku-wa eigo-no hon-o yomi-tai 
  I-TOP   English-GEN book-ACC read-want 
  “I want to read a English book/English books” 
                                                 
 
81   In both English and Japanese, a QNP complement of intensional verbs like want may receive a de dicto 
interpretation. Thus, the following sentences can mean that John has a general desire of having an English book, 
without having any particular book in mind: 
 
(i) John wants an English book 
(ii) John-wa eigo-no hon-ga hosii 
 John-TOP English-GEN book-NOM want 
 “John wants an English book” 
 
Larson et al. (1997) argue that the complements of such “intensional transitive verbs” involve a concealed clausal 
structure. Given that the narrow scope interpretation of the object QNP is possible, the abstract complement clause 







Note that the morphological form of the complement verb yomu “read” is exactly the 
same as in (419), which involves obligatory restructuring. This indicates that 
restructuring complements and non-restructuring complements cannot be 
discriminated by their forms.  
 If there is no independently observable indication of obligatory restructuring, then 
learners of Japanese would be forced to learn the scope constraint of anti-
reconstruction from evidence of the possible scope interpretations. Presumably, 
learners of the scope constraint would face the same kind of data sparseness problem 
that we have discussed in previous chapters: the scope constraint is only relevant to a 
limited set of scope-taking predicates (e.g., negative implicatives) that take an 
infinitival complement82, and hence the relevant data would not be abundant in the 
input data. Against this background, we carried out several experimental studies with 
Japanese adults and children, aiming to collect empirical data to shed light on the 
question of how learners of Japanese solve the learning problem. Interestingly, the 
                                                 
 
82   Among the following negative implicative verbs, only wasureru “forget” and sokoneru “fail” may take an 
infinitival complement: 
 
a. wasureru “forget”         b. sokoneru “fail” 
 tabe-wasureru “forget to eat”        tabe-sokoneru “fail to eat” 
c. sippaisuru “fail”         d. okotaru “neglect” 
 *tabe-shippaisuru “fail to eat”       *tabe-okotaru “neglect to eat” 
e. kotowaru “decline”         f. kyohisuru “decline” 
 *tabe-kotowaru “decline to eat”       *tabe-kyohisuru “decline to eat” 
g. sakeru “avoid”         h. nogareru “avoid” 
 *tabe-sakeru “avoid to eat”        *tabe-nogareru “avoid to eat” 
i. koraeru “refrain”         j. enryosuru “refrain” 
 *tabe-koraeru “refrain to eat”        *tabe-enryosuru “refrain to eat” 
 
In contrast, all of these verbs can take a nominalized complement clause. This is not a complete list of Japanese 
negative implicative verbs, but it suggests that a majority of negative implicatives do not take an infinitival 
complement. In fact, I am not aware of any infinitival-complement taking negative implicative other than 





results of our experiments suggest that the learners do not really “solve” the learning 
problem. The following subsections review the experiments and the results. 
6.4 Experiment #1 
 
6.4.1 Design and participants 
 
 The main purpose of the first experiment was to examine the robustness of the 
anti-reconstruction effect in Japanese. Both adult Japanese speakers and children 
participated in the experiment. The participants were divided into four groups, 
depending on their age and the type of test sentence they hear in the experiment. The 
2 × 2 design is illustrated in (431).  
(431)    neg   forget 
  Adults  Group I  Group II 
  Children Group III  Group IV 
 
 
Groups I and III are control groups, and they were presented test sentences with 
sentential negation. Group II and IV were presented test sentence with wasureru 
“forget”. Sample test sentences of each type are given in (432) and (433): 
(432) Pikachu-wa omocha-o zenbu katazuke-nakatta 
  Pikachu-TOP toy-ACC all clean up-NEG 
  “Pikachu didn’t clean up all the toys” 
(433) Pikachu-wa omocha-o zenbu katazuke-wasureta 
  Pikachu-TOP toy-ACC all clean up-forgot 
  “Pikachu forgot to clean up all the toys” 
 
 
In (432), the universal quantifier zenbu can be interpreted under the scope of negation, 





toys, but not all. By contrast, given the effect of the anti-reconstruction constraint, 
(433) should only allow the wide scope interpretation of zenbu, and thus the sentence 
should be judged false in the same situation.  
 Note that in those test sentences, we used “floated” quantifiers instead of genitive-
marked prenominal quantifiers. One motivation for this choice is because a 
prenominal version of the universal quantifier zenbu-no omocha “all the toys” sounds 
less natural. A more general concern is that genitive-marked prenominal quantifiers in 
Japanese induce certain semantic interpretations. First, indefinites with genitive-
marked prenominal quantifiers strongly favor specific interpretations. The specificity 
effect can be illustrated by the following dialogue between a waiter and a customer at 
a restaurant83: 
(434) Waiter: Gochuumon-wa okimari desu ka? 
    order-TOP           decide    COP Q 
    “Are you ready to order?” 
 
  Customer: Hai. 
     Yes 
    a. Biiru-o nihon kudasai. 
     Beer-ACC two take 
    b. #Nihon-no biiru-o kudasai 
     Two-GEN beer-ACC take 
     “I’ll take two bottles of beer” 
 
 
In this context, the use of genitive-marked prenominal quantifier creates 
awkwardness, due to the specific interpretation of nihon-no biiru “two bottles of 
beer”: it sounds as if the customer wants two specific bottles of beer. In fact, the form 
can felicitously be used when it is clear that the customer refers to a specific two 
                                                 
 





bottles of beer (e.g., there are bottles of various kinds of beer lined up on the counter: 
ten bottles of Bud Light, ten bottles of Sam Adams, etc. The customer noticed that 
there are only two bottles of Heineken left, and decided to try the brand, because he 
thought that that was a popular one).  
 Second, and more directly relevant to our current concern, genitive-marked 
prenominal quantifiers embedded within intensional contexts strongly prefer a wide-
scope, de re reading. For example, while (435)a is perfectly natural under a de dicto 
reading in which Taroo is trying to buy every book on linguistics in general, (435)b 
only allows a de re reading in which for each book on linguistics, Taroo has the intent 
of buying it: 
(435) a. Taroo-wa gengogaku-no hon-o subete ka-ou-to siteiru 
   Taroo-TOP linguistics-GEN book-ACC all buy-MOOD-COMP doing 
   “Taroo is trying to buy every book on linguistics” 
 
  b. Taroo-wa subete-no gengogaku-no hon-o ka-ou-to siteiru 
   Taroo-TOP all-GEN linguistics-GEN book-ACC buy-MOOD-COMP doing 
   “Taroo is trying to buy every book on linguistics” 
 
 
In general, prenominal quantifiers favor taking wider scope than other 
quantificational elements. In order to avoid possible interference from these semantic 
properties of prenominal quantifiers, we decided to avoid using those forms. Our 
intuition84 is that the use of floated quantifiers in sentences like (433) does not affect 
possible scope interpretations: the anti-reconstruction effect persists, and the narrow 
scope of the universal quantifier is not possible.85 
                                                 
 
84  This is based on the judgments by TG, Tomo Fujii, and Utako Minai. 
85   A floated quantifier can be “stranded” by its host NP that undergoes overt movement like scrambling. In such 






 A sample story goes as follows. Pikachu was playing with his toys (a robot, a 
soccer ball, and blocks) in his room. In the room, the toys and some forks were 
scattered on the floor, and the room was quite messy. Then Satoshi showed up with a 
hamburger. Satoshi told Pikachu that he would give the hamburger to Pikachu, but 
then he noticed that Pikachu’s room was littered with toys and forks. Satoshi told 
Pikachu to clean up his room, and he promised to give Pikachu the hamburger if 
Pikachu successfully cleaned up all the toys. Pikachu got back to his room, and 
started cleaning up. He first put the forks into the cabinet. At this point Pikachu 
thought he was done, and left the room, leaving all the toys on the floor. This makes 
the wide scope interpretation of the universal quantifier in the test sentences almost 
true: Pikachu didn’t clean up any of the toys at this point. But then something 
occurred to him: he remembered that he had not cleaned up the toys, and he went 
back to his room again. He put the robot and the soccer-ball into the toy box, and 
thought he was done. Satoshi then checked Pikachu’s room, and found out that the 
blocks were still left on the floor. Satoshi told Pikachu that he could not give the 
                                                                                                                                           
 
a. Kyoujyu-o dareka-ga t zenin hihansita 
 professor-ACC someone-NOM all criticized 
 Lit. “Professors, someone criticized all” 
 *∀ >> ∃ 
 
b. Kyoujyu-o zenin dareka-ga t hihansita 
 professor-ACC all someone-NOM criticized 
 Lit. All the professors, someone criticized” 
 OK∀ >> ∃ 
 
In the (a) example, the stranded universal quantifier zenin cannot take wider scope than the subject dareka 
“someone”. Given this, it is necessary to explain why a floated quantifier in anti-reconstruction contexts cannot be 
stranded within the lower clause, taking narrower scope than the matrix predicate. The QR approach to the anti-
reconstruction effect provides an answer: if a quantified object QP must be moved to the closest vP edge in order 
to resolve the type mismatch, then it would be possible to argue that a floated quantifier associated with an object 
must also be raised to the closest vP. In cases like (a), the floated quantifier is stranded at the edge of vP that is still 
lower than the subject position. However in the anti-reconstruction context, a floated quantifier that is raised to the 





humburger to Pikachu, because Pikachu didn’t clean up the blocks. However, Satoshi 
felt pity for Pikachu, and decided to give him a lesser reward – a carrot. 
 At the end of each story, Kermit the Frog said what he thought happened in the 
story. With the story described above, the participants in Group I and III heard the 
test sentence with sentential negation in (432); the participants in Group II and IV 
heard the test sentence with wasureru “forget” in (433). If the participants know that 
the complement clause of wasureru in (433) must undergo obligatory restructuring, 
then due to the anti-reconstruction effect, the test sentence cannot have the narrow 
scope interpretation of the universal quantifier. Consequently, the participants should 
reject the test sentence. In contrast, if the participants (especially children) do not 
know about the obligatory restructuring of the complement of (433), then for such 
participants the sentence should have the narrow scope interpretation of zenbu just as 
in the control sentence (432), and therefore (433) should be accepted in the test 
condition as often as (432). There were two crucial test conditions and six filler trials. 
Those participants who made more than two errors with filler trials were excluded 
from the final data analysis. 
 Adult participants were undergraduate students of Ritsumeikan University, 
recruited at American University, Washington D.C.. There were 15 participants in 
Group I, and 18 in Group II. The adult participants watched a video-taped version of 
the TVJT experiment in the respective groups. Child participants were recruited in 
Totsuka Sumire Kindergarten. Group III consisted of 20 children (Age 4;4 - 6;0, 
Mean: 5;2), and Group IV also consisted of 20 children (Age 4;8 - 6;2, Mean: 5;6). 







 The results from the experiment are analyzed in terms of the acceptance rate of 
the narrow scope interpretation of the universal quantifier zenbu in the crucial test 
sentences. The percentages are presented in the table and the figures below: 
(436)  
  neg (e.g. (432)) forget (e.g. (433)) 
Adults G-I (n=15) 76.7% (23/30) 
G-II (n=18) 
30.6% (11/36) 
Children G-III (n=20) 42.5% (17/40) 
G-IV (n=20) 
47.5% (19/40) 





















































A 2 x 2 ANOVA (Age x Condition) revealed a significant interaction between age 
(±Adult) and condition (neg vs. forget) (F (1, 69) = 5.8, p = 0.018). There was no 
main effect of age (F (1, 69) = 0.6, p = 0.418), but a marginal main effect of condition 
(F (1, 69) = 3.8, p = 0.056) was observed. Simple main effect tests showed that a 





< 0.01), but was not significant for the child groups (F (1, 69) < 1). A simple main 
effect of age was significant for the negation condition (F (1, 69) = 5.2, p = 0. 025), 
but was not significant for the forget condition (F (1, 69) = 1.3, p = 0.261). 
6.4.3 Discussion 
 
 A significant finding of the experiment is the inconsistency in the adult response 
patterns. Although adult participants in Group I (those who were presented with test 
sentences with negation) accepted test sentences significantly more often than 
participants in Group II (those who were presented test sentences with wasureru 
“forget”), there were a considerable amount of unexpected responses from both of the 
groups. As for the lack of consistent acceptance of the narrow scope interpretation of 
the universal quantifier under negation (i.e., Group I), it can be interpreted as 
reflecting adults’ bias towards the other possible scope interpretation – the wide scope 
interpretation of the universal quantifier. Such a general preference for wide scope 
interpretations of a quantifier over negation may be related to the function of the 
“topic” marker wa in negative sentences. Generally, when wa appears in negative 
sentences, it forces the wa-marked quantificational element to be interpreted within 
the scope of negation, as illustrated in (438): 
(438) Pikachu-wa omocha-o zenbu-wa katazuke-nakatta 
  Pikachau-TOP toy-ACC all-TOP clean up-NEG 
  “Pikachu didn’t clean up all the toys” 
  ¬ >> ∀ / *∀ >> ¬ 
 
 
Since wa-marking unambiguously signals the narrow-scope interpretation of the host 





that the wide-scope interpretation is intended. The implicature can be canceled easily, 
but still it biases the listener towards the inverse scope interpretation of sentences like 
(432). I suspect that this is one major reason behind the lack of consistent acceptance 
of test sentences like (432). 
 The lack of consistent rejection of the narrow scope interpretation of zenbu in 
sentences like (433) is more problematic. Within Group II, 5 out of 18 adult 
participants consistently accepted the scope interpretation that the literature claims to 
be impossible in Japanese. One participant accepted the interpretation in one out of 
the two crucial trials, and the remaining 12 participants consistently rejected the test 
sentences in the crucial trials. Thus, it looks as if for about the 30% of adult 
participants sentences like (433) do not show the anti-reconstruction effect, and the 
narrow scope interpretation of the complement object QP is a possible scope 
interpretation of the relevant sentences. In order to determine if this is actually the 
case, it would be useful to test if the variation among individuals persists with a 
different set of test sentences. This issue is addressed in the next experiment. 
 Let us now turn to the results from children. Both in Group III and Group IV, 
children performed around chance. The poor performance by children might be due to 
some problem in the experimental design. Alternatively, it could be interpreted as an 
exaggerated version of the adults’ inconsistency. In any case, given the lack of 
consistency in the adult groups and the fact that there were only two crucial test trials, 
we cannot draw any firm conclusions about children’s knowledge of anti-





determine whether the response pattern is due to the particular experimental design or 
due to children’s linguistic knowledge. 
6.5 Experiment #2 
 
6.5.1 Design and participants 
 
 The second experiment involved the following modifications to Experiment 1. 
First, the number of crucial test trials was increased to four from two. Second, the 
complement object quantifier was replaced by ni86 “two”. Third, the control sentences 
were replaced by sentences involving a nominalized complement clause of wasureru 
“forget”. A sample test sentence and the corresponding control sentence are given in 
(439) and (440), respectively: 
(439) Usagisan-wa gyuunyuu-o nihon todoke-wasureta 
  Rabbit-TOP milk-ACC    two   deliver-forgot 
  “The rabbit forgot to deliver two bottles of milk” 
(440) Usagisan-wa gyuunyuu-o nihon todokeru-no-o wasureta 
  Rabbit-TOP milk-ACC    two    deliver-thing-ACC forgot 
  “The rabbit forgot to deliver two bottles of milk” 
 
 
As we have discussed above, sentences like (440) allow the narrow scope 
interpretation of the complement object quantifier. This construction excludes a wa-
marked QP from inside the complement clause as shown in (441). We expect that this 
property of the construction reduces the listener’s preference for the wide scope 
                                                 
 
86   In actual usage, a classifier that matches the semantic type of the host noun is added to the quantifier, e.g., ni-
hon (two bar-shaped objects), ni-ko (two solid objects), ni-hiki (two small animals), etc. For ease of exposition I 





interpretation of the complement object QP, since the unambiguous marking of the 
narrow scope by wa is not possible as in negative sentences (e.g., (438)). 
(441) *Usagisan-wa gyuunyuu-o nihon-wa todokeru-no-o wasureta 
    Rabbit-TOP milk-ACC    two    deliver-thing-ACC forgot 
    “The rabbit forgot to deliver two bottles of milk” 
 
 
 In a sample trial the participant was first introduced to a rabbit and a pig. The 
rabbit runs a milk delivery service, and he delivers a bottle of milk to the pig every 
morning. One day, the pig told the rabbit that instead of the usual one bottle of milk, 
he wanted two bottles of milk and a pancake for the next morning, because his 
brother was going to stay at his place. That night the rabbit prepared two bottles of 
milk and a pancake for the pig. The next morning the rabbit overslept, and in a mad 
rush he grabbed only the pancake and headed to the pig’s house. At the last moment 
the rabbit recalled that he forgot about the milk, but since he was in such a hurry he 
didn’t remember the special order, and delivered only one bottle of milk like ordinary 
mornings. The pig pointed out that the rabbit didn’t bring two bottles of milk as he 
ordered. The rabbit apologized, and the pig said that he would share the bottle of milk 
with his brother. 
 At this point Kermit the frog presented either (439) or (440) to the participant. 
Under the narrow scope interpretation of nihon “two”, the test sentences are true in 
the situation, because it was not the case that the rabbit delivered two bottles of milk 
– he only delivered one. By contrast, the wide scope interpretation of nihon means 
that there were two bottles of milk that the rabbit did not deliver, and under that 
interpretation the sentences are false, because there was only one bottle of milk that 





suggests that the narrow scope interpretation of nihon is possible for the participant. 
Note also that in the story an event that corresponds to the wide scope interpretation 
almost happened: the rabbit first left his house only with the pancake, forgetting about 
milk. This feature of the story serves a function of satisfying the Condition of 
Plausible Denial (e.g. Crain and Thornton 1998) 
 The experiment employed the same 2 x 2 design as the first experiment. 
Participants were divided into four groups, depending on their age (±adult) and the 
type of test sentences that they heard in the crucial trials (nominalized complement 
like (440) or infinitival complement like (439)). The 2 x 2 design is represented in 
(442). 
(442)    nominal. complement  infin. complement 
  Adults   Group I     Group II 
  Children  Group III     Group IV 
 
 
As noted above, there were four crucial test trials interspersed with four filler trials. 
Those participants who made more than one error in the filler trials were excluded 
from the final data analysis. 
 The adult participants in group I (n=20) were undergraduate students of Miyagi 
Gakuin University, and the adult participants in Group II (n=16) were undergraduate 
and graduate students of Tohoku University. Those adult participants watched a 
video-taped version of the TVJT experiment in their respective groups. Child 
participants were recruited in Miyagi Gakuin Kindergarten. Group III consisted of 16 
children (Age 4;6 - 5;7, Mean: 5;2), and Group IV also consisted of 16 children (Age 
4;8 - 5;7, Mean: 5;2). The child participants were tested individually by two native 







 The results from the experiment are analyzed in terms of the acceptance rate of 
the narrow scope interpretation of the complement object quantifier in the crucial test 
sentences. The percentages are presented in the table and the figures below: 
(443)  
  nominal. (e.g. (440)) infin. (e.g. (439)) 
Adults G-I (n=20) 91.3% (73/80) 
G-II (n=16) 
32.8% (21/64) 
Children G-III (n=16) 84.4% (54/64) 
G-IV (n=16) 
56.3% (36/64) 






















































The result of a 2 x 2 ANOVA (Age x Condition) showed a significant main effect of 
condition (nominalized complements vs. infinitival complements) (F (1, 64) = 22.3, p 
< 0.01). There was no main effect of age (±adult) (F < 1). The interaction between 








 In this experiment, no significant difference between child groups and adult 
groups was observed. Both children and adults accepted the sentences with a 
nominalized complement reliably more often than the sentences with an infinitival 
complement. In other words, with respect to the grammar of anti-reconstruction, 
Japanese children and adults are similar – but in an interesting way. Note that the 
overall acceptance rate from Group II adults was 32.8%, which is quite similar to the 
number from Group II in the previous experiment (30.6%). Moreover, the distribution 
of individual acceptance patterns is strictly bimodal: 5 participants consistently 
accepted the test sentences in all of the four crucial test trials, and 10 participants 
consistently accepted the test sentences in all of the trials. The remaining one 
participant accepted a test sentence only once out of four trials, which can possibly be 
regarded as noise. In short, the results from Group II adults replicated the individual 
variation observed in the previous experiment: for about 30% of adult Japanese 
speakers, sentences like (439) do not show the anti-reconstruction effect and the 
narrow scope interpretation of the complement object QP is possible; but for the 
remaining 70% of adult speakers, the same scope interpretation is strictly impossible.  
 In the experiment in 2.4, adult English speakers accepted the inverse scope 
interpretation of the test sentence “someone ate every food” about 30% of the time. I 
interpreted the result as reflecting a general preference for the surface scope 
interpretation, rather than showing that the inverse scope interpretation is 
grammatically excluded by 70% of adult English speakers. This conclusion is based 





interpretations between QNP arguments of simple transitive sentences, and also on 
the psycholinguistic observations that inverse scope interpretations are generally 
dispreferred by the human processing mechanism. In other words, we have good 
reasons to believe that the lack of consistent acceptance of the inverse scope 
interpretation in the particular experimental context is due to some performance 
problem. The anti-reconstruction effect, in contrast, can hardly be regarded as a 
performance problem. For speakers that are sensitive to the effect, the lack of the 
narrow scope of the complement object QP is quite robust, conditioned systematically 
by the type of complement clause, rather than by the choice of a particular 
quantificational element. Below I provide several examples that illustrate the 
robustness of the anti-reconstruction effect. The judgments are by TG and Tomo Fujii, 
who are both sensitive to the anti-reconstruction effect. 
  First, the choice of the complement object QP does not affect the anti-
reconstruction effect. We have discussed cases that involve a universal quantifier or a 
bare numeral. In addition to that, the narrow scope interpretation of the complement 
object QP is systematically unavailable in the following examples:87 
                                                 
 
87   I avoided using quantifiers that are positive polarity items (e.g., A ka B “A or B”, A mo B mo “both A and B”, 
nanika “something”, etc.), because if the analysis of PPIs given in Chapter 5 is correct, it is predicted that those 
quantifiers in an anti-reconstruction context must move to the matrix fP (due to the lack of fP projection in the 
complement clause), and consequently take wider scope than the matrix predicate. As a matter of fact, a PPI in the 
anti-reconstruction context must take wider scope than the matrix predicate as shown in the following example,, 
but this could be due to the lexical property of PPIs, rather than due to the property of the construction. 
 
a. Taroo-wa piza ka pasuta-o tabe-wasureta 
 Taroo-TOP pizza or pasta-ACC eat-forgot 
 “Taroo forgot to eat pizza or pasta” 
 ∨ >> forget / *forget >> ∨ 
 
b. Taroo-wa piza mo pasuta mo tabe-wasureta 
 Taroo-TOP pizza also pasta also eat-forgot 
 “Taroo forgot to eat both pizza and pasta” 






(445) dake “only” 
  Taroo-wa sono hon-dake-o yomi-wasureta 
  Taroo-TOP that book-only-ACC read-forgot 
  Lit. “Taroo forgot to read only that book” 
 
  can mean: “That book was the only thing that Taroo forgot to read”  
  (only >> forget) 
  cannot mean: “It was not the case that Taroo read only that book” 
  (forget >> only) 
(446) takusan “many” 
 Taroo-wa hon-o takusan yomi-wasureta 
  Taroo-TOP book-ACC many read-forgot 
  “Taroo forgot to read many books” 
 
  can mean: “There were many books that Taroo forgot to read” 
  (many >> forget) 
  cannot mean: “It was not the case that Taroo read many books” 
  (forget >> many) 
(447) sukunakutomo nisatu “at least two” 
  Taroo-wa hon-o sukunakutomo nisatu yomi-wasureta 
  Taroo-TOP book-ACC at least two read-forgot 
  “Taroo forgot to read at least two books” 
 
  can mean: “There were at least two books that Taroo forgot to read” 
  (at least two >> forget) 
  cannot mean: “It was not the case that Taroo read at least two books” 
 
 
 Second, adding a positive lead-in (cf. Musolino and Lidz 2002) does not save the 
narrow scope interpretation of the universal quantifier in the following example: 
(448) Taroo-wa syntax-no ronbun-o subete yonda ga,  
  Taroo-TOP syntax-GEN paper-ACC all read but 
  semantics-no ronbun-wa subete yomi-wasureta  
  semantix-GEN paper-TOP all read-forgot 
  “Taroo read all the syntax papers, but he forgot to read all the semantics   
  papers” 
  ∀ >> forget / *forget >> ∀ 
                                                                                                                                           
 
c. Taroo-wa nanika-o tabe-wasureta 
 Taroo-TOP something-ACC eat-forgot 
 “Taroo forgot to eat something” 







 Thirdly, the anti-reconstruction effect cannot be “canceled” by adding a 
continuation that is compatible only with the narrow scope interpretation of the 
complement object QP. Thus, the following sentence results in a contradiction: 
(449) #Taroo-wa hon-o subete yomi-wasureta ga, nansatuka-wa yonda 
   Taroo-TOP book-ACC all read-forgot but  some books-TOP read 
  “Taroo forgot to read all the books, but he did read some” 
 
 
 Given these observations, I conclude that the anti-reconstruction effect is a 
grammatical phenomenon. This conclusion precludes the possibility of interpreting 
the experimental data as reflecting a performance problem in accessing the relevant 
scope interpretation. Rather, I contend that about 70% of our participants simply 
obeyed the grammatical anti-reconstruction constraint, excluding the narrow scope 
interpretation of the complement object QP. The problem, then, is how we interpret 
the data from the remaining 30% of adult speakers. It is highly unlikely that adult 
participants of a TVJT experiment consistently accept a scope interpretation that is 
prohibited by their grammar. For example, in the experiments reviewed in previous 
chapters, Japanese adults showed almost no variation in rejecting scope 
interpretations that violate some constraint. Thus, the only remaining possibility is 
that the grammar of the 30% of the adult speakers is different, and in fact allows the 
“reconstructed” scope interpretation in anti-reconstruction contexts. This conclusion 
amounts to claiming that there are two populations among adult Japanese speakers: 





 Given the split in the adult population, it is not surprising that children also 
showed the same split. The following table summarizes the distribution of individual 
acceptance rates from Group IV:  
(450)  
% acceptance of narrow 
scope complement obj. 
0% 25% 50% 75% 100% Total 
N 
Children in G-IV (n) 4 2 2 2 6 16 
Adults in G-II (n) 10 1 0 0 5 16 
 
 
A Chi-square analysis comparing the children's distribution with adults' distribution 
found a marginal difference (χ2 = 6.99, p = 0.136) between the two groups. For those 
children who behaved inconsistently, it is possible that the competition between the 
two grammars of anti-reconstruction (one that yields scope ambiguity and one that 
blocks scope ambiguity) has not been settled yet for them. Such a situation would be 
most likely to occur if a child is exposed to conflicting input data, which is possible 
given that the adult generation is not uniform with respect to the grammar of anti-
reconstruction. I discuss the issue of the acquisition of the scope constraint in the next 
section. 
6.6 General discussion 
 
 In this section, I discuss some consequences of the overall experimental findings. 
The following table summarizes the results from the crucial test trials in the two 
experiments. A significant part of the findings is that about 30% of the adult 








%/n of acceptances of the 
narrow scope of the complement 
object QP 
Experiment #1 
(all + forget) 
Experiment #2  
(two + forget) 
Adults 30.6% (11/36) 32.8% (21/64) 
Children 47.5% (19/40) 56.3% (36/64) 
 
 
Given the results, I argued that two populations with distinct grammars of anti-
reconstruction coexist among adult speakers of Japanese, and that the split in the adult 
population leads to the inconsistency in the acquisition of the relevant grammatical 
knowledge by the younger generation. 
 A similar proposal has been put forward by Han et al. (2006) about the grammar 
of Korean verb raising. Based on results from their experimental investigation on the 
relative scope interpretation between sentential negation and a quantified object QP, 
Han et al. argue that there are two populations of Korean speakers: one with V-raising 
and one without. For the speakers who allow V-raising to a higher functional 
projection, sentential negation that is cliticized onto the verb head can take wider 
scope than a quantified object QP. By contrast, the wide scope reading of negation is 
impossible for the speakers who do not have V-raising.88  Korean is a head-final 
language, and hence overt raising of V to higher functional projections may not yield 
directly observable consequences such as changes in word order. Han et al. argue that 
this property of the language leads to a “poverty of the stimulus” with respect to the 
acquisition of the grammar of V-raising, and learners thus choose the relevant 
                                                 
 
88   Han et al’s analysis crucially depends on the assumption that in Korean objects raise from a VP-internal 
position to a functional projection that is higher than negation. To my knowledge, there is no strong argument for 
the same movement of objects in Japanese. As we have seen, quantified object QPs in Japanese generally show 
scope ambiguity with sentential negation, although there seems to be a certain degree of preference for the wide 





parameter value (i.e., ±V-raising) essentially randomly, due to the lack of crucial 
evidence in the input data.  
 Japanese is similar to Korean in that crucial evidence for V-raising is generally 
lacking. In fact, there is an ongoing debate in the theoretical literature about whether 
or not Japanese has V-raising to a functional projection (e.g., Koizumi 2000; Fukui 
and Sakai 2003). Given this similarity in the sparseness of evidence concerning the 
V-raising parameter, Han et al’s approach would predict that the same kind of 
grammar variation also exists in Japanese. The possibility of V-raising might possibly 
underlie the variation with the anti-reconstruction effect among Japanese speakers. If 
V-raising is possible, then verbs like wasureru can be moved into a position that is 
higher than the position of the raised complement object, as shown in (452): 
(452)    TP 
 
    Subj T’ 
 
     vP  T 
       wasureta 
    Obj vP 
 
     VP  v 
 
    VP  V 
       t     
   t  V 
     yomi 
 
Alternatively, the variation in the anti-reconstruction effect might be due to variation 
in the restructuring process applied to infinitival complements of predicates like 
wasureru. This approach assumes that restructuring of infinitival complement of 
wasureru is not obligatory for some speakers, and hence for such speakers the 





(453)    TP 
 
    Subj T’ 
 
     vP  T 
 
    Obj vP 
 
     VP  v 
 
    vP  V 
      wasureta     
     Obj  vP 
      
    VP  v 
 
    t  V 
     yomi 
 
 
One way to tease these two possibilities apart is to run an experiment with test 
sentences in which wasureru directly takes a quantificational NP as its complement. 
As I pointed out above, such an object QNP must take scope over wasureru: 
(454) Taroo-wa subete-no hon-o wasureta 
  Taroo-TOP all-GEN book-ACC forgot 
  “Taroo forgot all the books” 
  *forget >> ∀ / ∀ >> forget 
 
 
I argued that this is because the object QNP must undergo QR targeting the closest vP. 
But if V-raising is possible, then the verb can further be raised to a position that is 





(455)    TP 
        
    vP  V 
      wasureta     
     Obj  vP 
      
    VP  v 
 
    t   t 
 
      
Thus, if a Japanese speaker allows V-raising, then sentences like (454) should be 
ambiguous to her. Consequently, if V-raising is what underlies the variation in the 
anti-reconstruction effect, then we expect that the same proportion of adult Japanese 
speakers (i.e., around 30%) should accept the narrow scope reading of the object QNP 
in sentences like (454). Conversely, if Japanese adults consistently reject the relevant 
interpretation of sentences like (454), the variation in the anti-reconstruction effect 
cannot be due to V-raising. This is a topic for future research. 
 In any case, there is some variation in the grammar of adult speakers of Japanese. 
About 70% of speakers do not allow V-raising, and apply obligatory restructuring to 
infinitival complements of wasureru; the remaining 30% of speakers either allow V-
raising, or allow a derivation without restructuring (or possibly both).  I interpret this 
as suggesting that evidence concerning those grammatical options is not 
systematically available to learners of Japanese. Due to the surface word order and 
morphology of the language, V-raising and restructuring of infinitival complements 
do not have any directly observable consequences on linguistic signals. This would 
pose a particularly difficult problem for learners who try to distinguish the relevant 





(456) about restructuring. Hypothesis I is a subset hypothesis of Hypothesis II, in the 
sense that it generates a subset of the representations that Hypothesis II generates:  
(456) a. Hypothesis I: obligatory restructuring 
    Prediction: [VP ...V] wasureru 
 
  b. Hypothesis II: optional restructuring 
   Prediction: [VP...V] wasureru / [vP...V] wasureru 
 
 
If VP complements and vP complements could systematically be distinguished on the 
basis of, for example, overt morphological cues, then distinguishing between those 
two hypotheses would not be too serious a problem. If evidence for vP complements 
is absent in the input data, then a probabilistic learner could use the absence as 
indirect negative evidence against the superset hypothesis. However, given the lack of 
a morphological distinction between VP and vP complements in Japanese, the learner 
would be hard-pressed to identify the categorical status of infinitival complements in 
the input data. It is possible that the learner hears a sentence that involves a VP 
infinitival complement and mis-analyzes the complement as vP. If that happens, then 
the two hypotheses cannot be reliably distinguished on the basis of indirect negative 
evidence. The same problem would occur with the grammar of V-raising. 
 Because of the lack of independently observable evidence that correlates with 
obligatory restructuring, learners can obtain useful information only from scope 
interpretations, or more specifically, from the lack of a certain scope interpretation. In 
other words, learners are forced to learn the grammar of anti-reconstruction on the 
basis of input evidence about possible scope interpretations. However, as I have 
pointed out in the previous chapters, it is not clear whether input evidence about 





impossible. For both scope rigidity (Chapters 2 and 3) and positive polarity (Chapters 
4 and 5), I argued that the relevant scope constraints (i.e., knowledge that a particular 
scope interpretation is impossible) cannot be learned from input evidence about 
possible scope interpretations, and hence there must be some way to derive the effect 
of the relevant constraint by learning something else. These conclusions would lead 
us to expect that Japanese learners may not be able to learn the grammar anti-
reconstruction reliably, because in this case there is no “something else” from which 
learners can derive the effect of the constraint. The grammar variation observed 
among adult Japanese speakers suggests that this is indeed the case: some learners 
actually do not learn the constraint. Thus, the present experimental data can be 
interpreted as providing empirical support for the claim that input evidence about 
possible scope interpretations is unreliable for learning what is impossible.  
 Let us now turn to the difference between children and adults. The strict bi-modal 
distributions of individual response patterns from adult participants suggest that 
learners of Japanese eventually converge on one of two distinct grammars, rather than 
something messier. Compared to that, children’s behavior is generally more 
inconsistent, which can be interpreted as showing that some child participants still 
have not chosen between those grammars. The contrast between adults and children 
suggests that learners must somehow make a decision about the grammar of anti-
reconstruction at a certain point of development, even without enough decisive 
evidence for/against one of the options. It remains an interesting puzzle to determine 
how learners make such a choice. One possibility is that they choose one of the 





choose the grammar that is maximally consistent with whatever they have heard in 
the input. For example, some learners would conclude that the narrow scope of the 
object QP is excluded on the basis of the lack of supporting evidence for the 
interpretation; others would reach the opposite conclusion either because they in fact 
encountered cases that involve a narrow-scope object QP, or because they mis-
interpreted some of input data as involving the intended narrow scope interpretation 
of the object QP. I currently do not have a basis for choosing between those 





Chapter 7: Conclusions 
 
 The central question that I have pursued in this thesis is how first language 
learners learn possible scope interpretations. Scope interpretation in natural language 
poses an especially difficult challenge for learners, because (a) surface syntactic 
structures often fail to uniquely determine the corresponding scope interpretations, 
and (b) the range of possible scope interpretations varies across languages and across 
constructions. The former characteristic leads to the indirectness of relevant evidence 
in the input, yet the existence of variation suggests that experience must play a 
nontrivial role in the acquisition process. Given the empirical data that I have 
collected from my experimental investigations, I am now in a position to discuss 
general consequences of my findings for a theory of the acquisition of scope, and for 
a theory of language acquisition in general. 
7.1 Productivity, no negative evidence, and arbitrariness 
 
 Let us first recap the empirical questions that I set up in Chapter 1. The questions 
are repeated here as (457): 
(457) a. Productivity: How productive are Japanese children in the acquisition of  
  possible scope interpretations? Do they generate scope interpretations that  
  have not been  exemplified in the input? Do they allow scope     
  interpretations that Japanese adults do not allow? 
   
  b. No negative evidence: Do input data provide children with any form of  
   negative evidence against particular scope interpretations? If direct   
   negative evidence is not available, is there any other way for children to  
   discover useful information that shows that those scope interpretations are  
   impossible? 





  c. Arbitrariness: How arbitrary are the language-specific constraints on   
   scope interpretation? Can the impossibility of specific scope     
   interpretations be predicted based upon (some) other properties of the   
   language? If so, are the crucial properties learnable from experience? 
 
 
These questions are important, if we are to identify the nature of the learnability 
problem involved in the acquisition of language-specific constraints on scope in 
Japanese, and consequently, to construct a theory of how first language learners 
acquire the constraints. 
 With respect to the question about children’s productivity, a significant finding 
from my experimental studies is that Japanese children allow scope interpretations 
that Japanese adults do not allow. This observation clearly shows that children do not 
learn the language-specific constraints on scope interpretations through some form of 
conservative learning. Rather, children may allow a particular scope interpretation 
without waiting for direct supporting evidence for that interpretation in the input. 
Extending the terminology employed in Chapter 2, I refer to children’s non-
conservative scope assignments in general as the Freedom of Scope:  
(458) Freedom of Scope 
 Given a particular construction/sentence, children may assign a scope 
 interpretation to the construction/sentence that has never been supported by 
 input evidence. 
 
 
Given the productivity of children’s scope assignments, the acquisition of language-
specific constraints on scope in Japanese resists a conceptually simple explanation in 
terms of conservatism. Children do make mistakes, and therefore they need to correct 
their mistakes by the time they become adults. Accordingly, the remaining two 





acquisition of the scope constraints must specify how the “unlearning” is carried out 
by children. 
 In Chapters 2 and 4, I considered whether input data about possible scope 
interpretations can provide a basis for children to purge their non-adult scope 
interpretations (i.e., inverse scope interpretations with sentences that contain two 
quantificational arguments, and the narrow scope interpretation of ka in simple 
negative evidence). My general conclusion was that input data do not provide learners 
with reliable negative evidence (direct or indirect) against those scope interpretations, 
and consequently, Japanese children cannot learn to purge their non-adult scope 
interpretations on the basis of evidence about possible scope interpretations. The 
unreliability of indirect negative evidence against those scope interpretations is due to 
inherent properties of the input data concerning possible scope interpretations, 
namely data sparseness and the indirectness of the evidence. Given these properties, it 
is difficult for learners to build up the observation that those scope interpretations are 
consistently absent across a reasonable amount of examples. The case of anti-
reconstruction adds independent support for the conclusion about the unreliability of 
indirect negative evidence: when the learning of a given piece of linguistic knowledge 
depends on evidence about the impossibility of certain scope interpretations, learners 
do not reliably acquire that knowledge.  
 Taken together, children’s productivity and the lack of negative evidence create 
nontrivial learnability problems. If the relevant constraints on scope interpretation in 
Japanese are arbitrary, then the learnability problems become paradoxes: there can be 





interpretations. Given this, I explored the possibility of denying the arbitrariness of 
the constraints. In Chapter 3, I argued that scope rigidity in Japanese is a consequence 
of semantic/pragmatic/syntactic properties of certain particles (i.e., the 
uniqueness/maximality implicature on ga-subjects, and the lack of formal case 
features on mo-QNPs), and that learning those properties derives the effects of the 
scope constraint. Similarly, I proposed in Chapter 4 that Boolean disjunctions in 
natural languages are either [+PPI] or [−PPI], and learning that ka is a [+PPI] 
disjunction (i.e., ka can take scope over local negation) automatically blocks its 
narrow scope interpretation under local negation. The anti-reconstruction effect is 
also a consequence of something else (i.e., obligatory restructuring of certain 
infinitival complements), but it contrasts with the other constraints in that the 
“something else” may not be independently learned on the basis of observable 
properties of the language. Restructuring of infinitival complements is not overtly 
marked by linguistic signals, and possible positive evidence for the availability of 
restructuring (e.g., long passive of the complement object) is not sufficient to show 
that the process is obligatory. Therefore, learners cannot learn the impossibility of 
particular scope interpretations in anti-reconstruction contexts from something else, 
and hence the results of the acquisition process show variation among individual 
speakers. 
 It remains an interesting empirical question to determine to what extent Freedom 
of Scope is a general phenomenon. In the earlier part of this decade it was claimed 
that children only access a subset of the possible scope interpretations in their 





However, as I discussed in Chapter 2, recent experimental studies revealed that 
children’s bias towards isomorphic scope interpretations can be lifted by 
manipulating experimental designs, which has led to the conclusion that the 
conclusion that the Observation of Isomorphism is due to a performance/pragmatic 
factor and is not due to children’s grammar. In addition, several experimental studies 
have also reported that children accessed non-adultlike scope interpretations (e.g., 
Hulsey et al. 2004; Krämer 2000). In short, there is (to my knowledge) no established 
observation that the set of children’s scope representations constitutes a proper subset 
of adults’ scope representations (i.e., children’s grammar generates only one scope 
interpretation for a sentence that is ambiguous for adults). In other words, there is no 
known evidence that shows that children are conservative learners of possible scope 
interpretations. Thus, the Freedom of Scope, as defined in (458), is compatible with 
the empirical facts observed in previous research. It is, however, still important to 
determine how productive children are: do children also violate universal constraints 
on scope interpretation (e.g., the ban on QR across an island)? Do children at 
different ages show different degrees of scope productivity? To what extent is 
children’s scope productivity affected by properties of lexical items (i.e., semantics, 
frequency in the input, etc.), and by properties of constructions? Answering these 
questions in future research should provide important insights about the nature of 
children’s learning mechanism and innate constraints imposed on the mechanism.  
 Another remaining question is about the robustness of the lack of (indirect) 
negative evidence against a particular scope interpretation. In this thesis, I only 





“passive” computations of scope interpretations: the learner is presented with a form, 
and assigns a scope interpretation to the form, which is counted as evidence for the 
scope interpretation. Another possibility is that the learner actively makes predictions 
about what kind of forms can express a particular scope interpretation, and takes the 
lack of supporting evidence for a prediction to be evidence against the hypothesis that 
yields the prediction. Suppose, for example, that the learner considers the hypothesis 
that ka can take scope under local negation. Then the learner predicts that a form in 
which ka is c-commanded by local negation would be used in situations where the ¬ 
>> ∨ interpretation is true (i.e., a “neither A nor B” type situation). Since adult 
Japanese speakers presumably use ...mo...mo instead of ka in such situations, the 
learner’s prediction would not be supported by the input data, and the learner uses the 
absence of supporting evidence for the prediction as evidence against the hypothesis 
that ka can take scope under local negation. This scenario does not strike me as totally 
far-fetched, but the details of such a prediction mechanism remain unclear. The 
prediction mechanism that is required in this case is far more complex and 
sophisticated than, for example, a mechanism that predicts the subsequent word given 
a word in the input (e.g., the Simple Recurrent Network in Elman 1993). Given how 
little we know about to what extent first language learners make predictions about 
forms that express a given meaning, I am currently not be able to judge the 
psychological plausibility of such a prediction mechanism. In this connection, it must 
be pointed out that a theory that resorts to such a prediction mechanism must explain 
why Japanese children at age 5 still have not learned the constraint on ka, even 





in simple negative sentences. This fact might require the introduction of further 
complexities to the theory, such as maturation of the prediction mechanism. 
 A possibly relevant point can be raised from observations on the acquisition of the 
semantics of scalar terms. Previous experimental studies commonly found that young 
children do not reliably compute scalar implicatures, and fail to reject test sentences 
in TVJT on the basis of scalar implicatures. For example, in one of Papafragou and 
Musolino’s (2003) experiments, 5-year-olds almost consistently accepted the test 
sentence Some of the horses jumped over the fence under a situation where all of the 
horses jumped over the fence, while adults overwhelmingly rejected the same 
sentence in that situation. From another point of view, however, this kind of results 
can be interpreted as showing that children have the correct knowledge of the logical 
meanings of scalar terms: some, for example, does not mean not all, and children 
know the logical meaning of the word. This fact yields an implication about the 
nature of the learning mechanism that children use in the acquisition of the lexical 
semantics of weak scalar terms. Because of scalar implicatures, it is presumably the 
case that adult speakers avoid using weak scalar terms when corresponding stronger 
terms are appropriate. For example, to describe a situation where every horse jumped 
over the fence, adult speakers use every/all instead of some. As a result, some is 
excluded from the contexts in which every/all is true, and the distribution of some in 
the input data would therefore be compatible with the hypothesis that the logical 
meaning of some is, for example, at least one and not all. However, children’s 
behavior in the experimental studies suggests that they do not take the absence of 





some is at least one. Thus, the absence of a logical word in a certain kind of semantic 
context does not lead children to conclude that the meaning of the word contradicts 
the relevant semantic context. This conclusion can potentially be problematic for the 
learning scenario that I outlined above: in the scenario, children must use the absence 
of ka in a certain kind of semantic context as evidence against the hypothesis that the 
use of ka is compatible with the semantic context. Although it is logically possible to 
assume that children use different learning mechanisms for the acquisition of lexical 
semantics and for the acquisition of scope interpretation, I do not find such a move to 
be well-motivated. 
7.2 Covert scope-shifting in natural languages 
 
 CSS, or scope ambiguity due to CSS, is a curious property of natural language. 
For one thing, it introduces a lot of complications to language use. For example, CSS 
complicates sentence processing, because it requires reanalysis of a parsed surface 
structure. CSS also complicates communication, because it prevents the hearer from 
uniquely determining the intended scope interpretation from the linguistic signals. 
Moreover, natural languages often provide alternative ways to express a particular 
scope interpretation in a way that it matches surface syntactic configuration (e.g., 
overt movement, constituent negation, etc.). These complexities and the existence of 
alternative forms can be a part of reasons for why inverse scope is generally more 
“marked”, less preferred interpretive option. 
 Within the input data to children, the dispreference for inverse scope should result 
in a lowered frequency of input sentences with the intended inverse scope 





with surface scope interpretations, with a small number of exceptional inverse scope 
interpretations. If children must find out the availability of CSS from experience, then 
it is expected that such low-frequency “irregular” cases will gradually be regularized 
into more frequent patterns across generations, eventually to the point that scope 
ambiguities cease to exist. Such a loss of irregular patterns has been observed in the 
historical change of verb inflection. For example, Bybee (1985) found that low-
frequency irregular verbs in Old English have now been regularized through 
historical changes. CSS, by contrast, still survives even in a language like Japanese, 
in which the input evidence for the availability of CSS is presumably exceedingly 
rare. The difference between irregular verb inflection and CSS, then, should reside in 
how the knowledge is passed down to the next generation. Irregular verb inflections 
must be learned from experience, therefore their survival depends on input frequency. 
By contrast, I argue that the availability of CSS is not learned from experience: it is a 
part of innate linguistic knowledge. The knowledge is inherited by genes and 
therefore input frequency is simply irrelevant.  
 The Freedom of Scope exhibited by Japanese children corroborates the argument 
that the availability of CSS is a part of innate linguistic knowledge. Given that the 
possibility of inverse scope in Japanese is highly restricted, it is highly unlikely that 
Japanese children receive a lot of positive evidence for inverse scope interpretations. 
Nonetheless, Japanese children access inverse scope interpretations as often as 
English children/adults, which suggests that the contrast in adult languages does not 





the assumption that the option of shifting the scope of an element covertly is innately 
given to children: children do not learn the availability of CSS from experience. 
 Under the theoretical framework that I endorse in the thesis, the innateness 
argument for CSS amounts to claming that innate linguistic knowledge involves some 
specific knowledge about the syntax of LF, e.g., phrase structure and covert 
movement/reconstruction, etc. Such innate knowledge might also be required for the 
acquisition of the language-specific constraints on scope. My account for the 
acquisition of scope rigidity and positive polarity depends on the assumption that 
learners are equipped with a grammatical system with a rich covert component that 
yields appropriate consequences for learning the crucial properties (e.g., the case-
resistant nature of mo-QNPs). I assume that the grammatical system is largely innate, 
because I cannot imagine a way to learn such a system from experience, and know of 
no proposals that solve this problem. Under this line of reasoning, the covert 
component of language faculty should be largely universal, with possible cross-
linguistic variation restricted to cases that are learnable from observable properties of 
languages. This conclusion conforms to the assumption of LF invariance advocated 
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